Chullin 44a (מד.) — the Talmud in English

And one who acts

according to the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel

in two contradictory stringencies—

of him the verse says [

Ecclesiastes 2] “

The fool

walks in darkness.”

Rather,

if

he acts

according to Beit Shammai,

let him act

according to their leniencies and their stringencies;

and

if

he acts

according to Beit Hillel,

let him act

according to their leniencies and their stringencies!

But this is difficult for Rava, who adopted two stringencies that contradict one another.

For on the one hand he adopted Rav’s stringency, that a perforation of the esophageal vestibule renders the animal non-kosher even with the slightest perforation; while on the other hand he adopted Shmuel’s stringency, who said that it is not a place of slaughter! But these two stringencies contradict one another, for according to Rav it is a place of slaughter. And why, then, do we deem the animal non-kosher when one began slaughtering in the esophageal vestibule and continued into the esophagus itself?!

The Gemara now explains that which was taught in the beraita: In all cases, the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel; but anyone who wishes to act in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai may do so, and anyone who acts in accordance with the words of Beit Hillel is acting properly.

And we raised a difficulty with it:

This very matter is difficult! You said, “In all cases, the halakha is in accordance with the words of Beit Hillel,” and then you taught: “And one who wishes to act in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai may do so”?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult!

Here,

where we say that one may act in accordance with Beit Shammai, this is

before the bat kol

that emerged from Heaven and announced that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel.

Here,

where we say that the halakha is always in accordance with the words of Beit Hillel, this is

after the bat kol.

Alternatively, if you wish, I can say:

It always applies

even after

the emergence of the

bat kol

that announced that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel. And that which it taught, “One who wishes to act in accordance with Beit Shammai may do so,” is the opinion of

Rabbi Yehoshua, who said: We do not take notice of a bat kol!

For “it is not in Heaven”; once the Torah was given to human beings, the determination of the Sages is what decides matters of halakha, and a bat kol has no power to intervene and determine the halakha contrary to the opinion of the Sages.

We return to our difficulty:

In any event, it remains difficult:

How could Rava have adopted two contradictory stringencies?!

And we answer:

Rav Tavot said:

That was not what happened. Rava did not say that he was imposing upon the animal both Rav’s stringencies and Shmuel’s stringencies. Rather,

the entire matter was

in accordance with Rav,

whose ruling is the halakha in matters of ritual prohibitions;

he acted accordingly.

And the reason Rava deemed the animal non-kosher because he had begun slaughtering in the esophageal vestibule is that even according to Rav, the esophageal vestibule is not a place of slaughter.

For when Rami bar Yehezkel came, he said: Do not heed these general principles formulated by Yehuda, my brother, in the name of Rav!

That is, do not accept what Rav Yehuda, his brother, said in Rav’s name [that is, a report transmitted in Rav’s name in the generations after Rav, which Rav Yehuda transmitted]. And the statement above, as though Rava imposed upon the animal Rav’s stringency—that a perforation of the esophagus renders it non-kosher even with the slightest perforation—and that according to Rav this is not a place of slaughter, is not Rav’s position!

Rather,

this is what Rav said: The esophagus—

the Sages established a measure for it,

determining how far it is fit for slaughter. Beyond that place it is unfit for slaughter, just like the windpipe, which has a specific, defined place in which slaughter is performed; beyond that place, anyone who slaughters renders the slaughter invalid by the law of hagrama.

That is, the invalidation of hagrama that applies to the windpipe also applies to the esophagus: if one slaughters above the proper place of slaughter, his slaughter is invalid, by a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai known as hagrama.

And we infer:

From the fact that he said

“the esophagus”

the Sages established

for it

a measure

for the place of slaughter,

by inference

you learn

that the esophageal vestibule,

which is at the end of the esophagus,

is not a place of slaughter [for if it too were a place of slaughter, its perforation would render the animal non-kosher with the slightest perforation. This is similar to the windpipe, where there is no distinction between a place of slaughter and a place unfit for slaughter, as the measure of a disqualifying perforation is the same in both [and in the windpipe its measure is the majority].

because if it too were a place where slaughter is valid, a puncture in it would invalidate the animal even if it were of any size. This would be similar to the windpipe, where there is no difference between a place where slaughter is valid and an area where slaughter is not valid, since in both areas the measurement of a disqualifying puncture is the same; in the windpipe, the required measurement is the majority].

Thus, Rava acted solely in accordance with Rav, who invalidated even the slightest incision in the esophageal vestibule, despite the fact that it is not a place of slaughter.

And we raise the following question: When one slaughters and comes to cut the esophagus, if he wishes to slaughter

above,

toward the head,

how far

may he slaughter—how high up the animal’s neck may he slaughter?

Rav Naḥman said: As far as “a handhold.”

He must leave, on the side toward the head, a measure of four fingerbreadths.

And if he wishes to slaughter and cut the esophagus

below,

in its lower section, toward the body,

how far

may he slaughter?

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: As far as the point where there is hair.

That is, up to the place where there is hair [after slaughter, one pulls out the hair found inside, in the area where the esophagus joins the rumen. Up to the place of the hair is called esophagus, and from there onward it is called rumen].

We challenge this:

Is that so? But Ravina said in the name of Ganiva in the name of Rav: A handbreadth of the esophagus, adjacent to the rumen, is the “inner rumen”?!

That is, the Gemara is now assuming that the hair is found only inside the rumen itself, and not in the esophagus. If so, the difficulty is:

Why

did Rav Naḥman say in the name of Rabba bar Avuha that one may slaughter the esophagus up to the place of the hair—that is, the entire esophagus, up to the place where it joins the rumen [where the hair is found]? But Rav said that the final handbreadth of the esophagus, adjacent to the rumen, has the status of the rumen and is not a place of slaughter. If so,

when he slaughters

in the area of the final handbreadth,

is he not slaughtering in the rumen?!

And we answer:

Say

the following:

A handbreadth of the rumen

that is

adjacent to the esophagus is the inner rumen

mentioned in our Mishna, whose perforation renders the animal non-kosher even with the slightest perforation. It is called “inner” because it is concealed between the ribs of the chest. The rest of the rumen, from the handbreadth onward, is the outer rumen, whose status is determined by whether the majority of it has been torn.

Alternatively, if you wish, I can say: When Rav said

that a handbreadth of the esophagus is called “rumen,” this was

in the case of an ox—

which has more hair.

There are large oxen in which the hair of the rumen extends from the rumen into the esophagus for a measure of a handbreadth. In these oxen, the place of slaughter extends up to the point where the hair begins, but not into the area containing the hair.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: If the entire esophageal vestibule was removed from the jaw,

the animal is kosher.

The Gemara will later challenge this, since this detachment of the esophageal vestibule from its connection to the jaw is called “uprooting the simanim,” and why, then, is the animal kosher?

And a tanna also supports this [

the tanna of our Mishna supports him]:

If the lower jaw was removed—

the animal is kosher!

For once the lower jaw, which is the place where the simanim are attached to the jaw, has been removed, the simanim have been detached from their place of attachment. This is what Shmuel said: If the esophageal vestibule was removed and the simanim were detached, the animal is nevertheless kosher.

Rav Pappa raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman:

But there is

the invalidation of

uprooting the simanim,

for when the esophageal vestibule is removed, the simanim are uprooted from their attachment?!

We challenge Rav Pappa’s objection:

But according to Rav Pappa,

the Mishna is difficult!

For it teaches: “

If the lower jaw was removed—

the animal is kosher,”

implying that we are unconcerned about the detachment of the esophageal vestibule from the jaw, since when the lower jaw is removed, the connection of the esophageal vestibule to it is detached, and nevertheless the tanna of the Mishna rules the animal kosher.

Granted,

the Mishna

is not difficult for Rav Pappa,

because

this

which Rav Pappa declares invalid is when the esophageal vestibule was removed

by complete uprooting,

meaning that the uprooting of the esophageal vestibule is considered uprooting the simanim: the simanim were completely detached both from the jaw and from the flesh in which they were embedded.

Whereas

this

for which the tanna of the Mishna declares the animal kosher, when the lower jaw was removed, is when the simanim remained attached to the flesh,

the jaw having been scraped away

from

above the simanim,

meaning that the jaw was shaved away in such a manner that although it itself was detached from the simanim, the detachment occurred above the flesh in which the simanim were embedded. Thus, the simanim remained embedded in the flesh and were not detached from it when the lower jaw was removed; in such a case, this is not “uprooting the simanim.”

Rather, according to Shmuel,

who declares the animal kosher even when the entire esophageal vestibule was removed,

it is difficult,

for the esophageal vestibule is the place where the esophagus is attached both to the jaw and to the flesh. Once the esophageal vestibule is removed, the esophagus is detached at its place of attachment, both from the jaw and from the flesh in which it was embedded. If so, this is uprooting the simanim; how could Shmuel declare this kosher?!

And we answer:

Do not say

that Shmuel said that if the esophageal vestibule was removed

entirely

the animal is kosher.

Rather,

say that if

the majority

of the esophageal vestibule was removed, the animal is kosher. A connection between the esophagus and the jaw remains in the portion that was not removed, and this small amount of attachment suffices.

We challenge this:

But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Shmuel: If the simanim became loose over the majority of their area, the animal is non-kosher!

Here, too, once the esophageal vestibule was uprooted over the majority of its area, the simanim have been uprooted over the majority of their area?!

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: This

statement of Shmuel, that when the majority of the esophageal vestibule was removed and a portion remained, the minority of the simanim that remained attached suffices, applies

when they were peeled away.

That is, the majority of the simanim were peeled away from the flesh, while a minority remained. In such a case the animal heals and the simanim become attached again; therefore Shmuel did not deem the animal non-kosher, but declared it kosher.

Whereas

there,

in the case of the invalidation of uprooting the simanim, it applies

when they were pulled apart,

meaning that the minority of the simanim that remained attached was not attached as one unit, but was scattered. Such a minority does not heal. The expression “pulled apart” is an analogy to something that comes apart when forcibly uprooted from its place: the remaining attachments are not in one location, but consist of several small, scattered connections.

We learned in the Mishna:

And a split windpipe:

A tanna taught: What is the measure of

a split windpipe? The majority!

And how much

is

the majority?

The cavity of the windpipe [the trachea] is surrounded by a wall, whose thickness varies. On the outside it is a thick wall, while on the inside it is a thin wall. Accordingly, when we come to measure the cutting of the majority of the windpipe, if one cuts through the majority of the windpipe from the outer side, it is possible that the incision made through the majority of the windpipe will reach only a minority of the cavity. As stated, the outer side of the wall is thick, so even if one cuts through the majority of the windpipe, the incision may reach only the beginning of its cavity. [See the illustration in the book Siaḥat Ḥullin].

This is the Gemara’s question: What is considered cutting the majority of the windpipe? Does it mean cutting through the majority of the thickness of the windpipe, even though this cut does not include cutting through the majority of the windpipe’s inner cavity? Or does cutting the majority of the windpipe mean cutting through the majority of its inner cavity, so long as the windpipe has not been cut until the majority of its cavity has been severed, this is not “cutting through the majority.”