Chullin 44b (מד:) — the Talmud in English

Rav said:

the majority of its thickness.

That is, the thickness of the wall joins the lumen, even if only a minority of the lumen is severed, to constitute the majority of the windpipe being severed.

And some say

some say that this is what Rav said:

the majority of its lumen.

The severing of the wall is not taken into consideration; rather, only the severing of the majority of the lumen of the windpipe is considered.

There was that case of a severed windpipe that came before Rav.

Rav sat and examined it according to the majority of its thickness.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav:

Behold,

our master, you taught us

that it should be examined

according to the majority of its lumen?!

He sent it

he sent

Rav

that severed windpipe, which had been brought before him and which he had examined according to the majority of its thickness,

to Rabba bar bar Ḥana.

He examined it

Rabba bar bar Ḥana

according to the majority of its lumen,

and found that the majority of the lumen had not been severed,

and he declared it fit!

And he purchased from it

Rabba bar bar Ḥana

for thirteen plain istera

[thirteen state sela, which are plain and inexpensive sela]

meat.

That is, Rabba bar bar Ḥana purchased meat from this animal in order to eat it himself.

The Gemara asks:

And how did

Rabba bar bar Ḥana

do this?

But it was taught in a beraita: If a Sage declared an item impure —

his colleague may not declare it pure.

And if one Sage

forbade an item, his colleague may not permit it.

And we answer:

Here it is different, as Rav did not definitively forbid it;

rather, he wished to examine it according to the majority of its thickness, but the students did not allow him to conduct this examination; instead, they sent it to Rabba bar bar Ḥana. Therefore, he was permitted to declare it fit.

The Gemara still discusses the matter:

And once a Sage had issued a ruling concerning it,

meaning that this question had reached the point at which it required a Sage to issue a ruling,

how did he eat from it

Rabba bar bar Ḥana, despite having declared it fit?

But it is written

[Ezekiel 4]: “

And I said: Alas, Lord God! Behold, my soul has not been defiled, and from my youth until now I have not eaten an animal that died of itself or a torn animal, and no loathsome meat has entered my mouth.”

And earlier we interpreted it as follows:

“Behold, my soul has not been defiled” —

for I have not entertained a sinful thought during the day

a thought of transgression

that could lead to defilement at night.

“And an animal that died of itself or a torn animal I have not eaten” —

for I have never eaten “hurry, hurry” meat.

That is, I have not eaten the meat of an animal in mortal danger, concerning which they urged the slaughterer to hurry and slaughter it, saying to him, “Slaughter, slaughter!”

“And no loathsome meat has entered my mouth” —

for I have not eaten from an animal concerning which a Sage issued a ruling.

In the name of Rabbi Natan they said: “For I have never eaten from an animal whose required portions had not been removed,”

In the name of Rabbi Natan they said: “For I have not eaten from an animal whose required gifts had not been separated,”

the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw; I treated it as though it involved a prohibition, even though the meat is not forbidden before the priestly gifts have been separated from it.

If so, how did Rabba bar bar Ḥana eat from an animal concerning which a Sage had issued a ruling?!

And we answer:

These matters

—that there is a pious practice not to eat it when a Sage has issued a ruling—apply when the Sage ruled on

a matter dependent on reasoning,

such as a case in which one must compare one matter with another, since there is room to doubt that his reasoning was not sound. However,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana

did not issue this ruling on the basis of reasoning; rather,

he relied on his received teaching!

For he had received from his teacher that a severed windpipe must be examined according to the majority of its lumen, and not according to the majority of its thickness.

The Gemara nevertheless continues to ask why Rabba bar bar Ḥana purchased meat from this animal:

And let it follow

that he was forbidden to purchase meat from this animal

because of suspicion,

as it would appear that he was accepting payment for his ruling. Perhaps people would say that the seller reduced the price of the meat for him because he had declared it permitted?!

For it was taught:

A judge who

judged the case

between two litigants:

he acquitted one and found the other liable; he declared an item impure and declared another pure; he forbade an item and permitted another.

And likewise witnesses who testified concerning a field or a cloak that it belonged to a certain person.

All of them,

both the judges and the witnesses,

are permitted to purchase

from the successful litigant the very object that had been the subject of the dispute in court.

But the Sages said: Keep far from anything ugly and from anything resembling it!

People might say that the judge acquitted him, or that the witnesses testified in his favor, so that afterward they could purchase the object from him cheaply.

And we answer:

These matters

apply when there is something ugly about the matter, when it is

an item sold by appraisal,

whose value is assessed at the time of purchase and which has no fixed market price. There is concern there that people will say that he reduced the price for him. But

here,

where he purchased meat at the price at which meat is sold,

the weighing,

the weight of the meat,

demonstrates

that this is its price and that the price was not reduced for him. There is no further basis for slander.

As in the case of Rava, who permitted a tereifa,

that is, he issued a ruling concerning a tereifa and declared it fit,

and purchased meat from it.

His wife said to him,

who was

the daughter of Rav Ḥisda: “Father

would permit firstborn animals;

Rav Ḥisda, my father, would examine the firstborn animals that the priests brought before him, to determine whether they had a defect and would therefore be permitted to eat,

but he would not purchase meat from them,

and he would not purchase meat from firstborn animals that he had permitted for consumption.”

He said to her,

Rava:

These matters

—that your father, Rav Ḥisda, adopted the stringency of not purchasing from an animal concerning which he had issued a permitting ruling—apply to

a firstborn animal,

a firstborn animal, because

it is sold by appraisal.

The meat of a firstborn animal is not sold by weight, but only by estimation. The reason is that since the firstborn becomes permitted without redemption—once it develops a defect, it is permitted for consumption—the Sages were more stringent concerning its honor than concerning other consecrated animals disqualified from sacrifice, and said that it should be sold only by estimation, rather than having its meat weighed as ordinary nonconsecrated meat is weighed.

And since the meat of a firstborn animal is sold by estimation, it is inappropriate for the Sage who permitted it to purchase from it, lest people say that he reduced the price for him because he had permitted it.

But

here,

when I issued a ruling concerning a tereifa,

the weighing demonstrates the matter.

Everyone sees that I am taking it by weight, paying its full price according to the weight, and handing the money to the seller.

Rather,

what is there,

what could people suspect me of? Only

because of a choice cut of meat.

Even concerning this I need not be concerned, because

every day they sell me a choice cut of meat,

out of respect for me; they will not suspect me today that I permitted their animal and that, for this reason, they are giving me the choicest meat.

Rav Ḥisda said: Who is a Torah scholar? One who declares a tereifa

for himself!

When a doubt arises concerning whether his animal is a tereifa, and there are grounds both to forbid and to permit it, he does not spare it but declares it forbidden.

And Rav Ḥisda said: Who is

[Proverbs 15]

“the one who hates gifts shall live”?

One who declares a tereifa for himself.

If, concerning his own animal, he does not desire to decide the matter leniently, certainly he hates receiving gifts from others.

Mar Zutra expounded in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Concerning anyone who reads and studies, declares a tereifa for himself, and serves Torah scholars, the verse says

[Psalms 128],

“When you eat the labor of your hands, you are fortunate, and it is good for you.”

That is, one who declares a tereifa for himself and does not covet it in order to permit it—we can be certain that he will enjoy the labor of his hands and will not covet the property of others.

Rav Zevid said: He merits and inherits two worlds —

this world and the World to Come.

And this is how we expound the verse:

“You are fortunate” — in this world; “and it is good for you” —

in the World to Come.

When gifts were sent to Rabbi Elazar from the house of the Nasi,

when they sent him a gift from the Nasi’s household,

he would not accept them. When they invited him

to eat with them,

he would not go.

Rabbi Elazar said

and explained his reason to the Nasi: Why,

does my master not want me to live!?

Do you not want me to live?

For it is written: “The one who hates gifts shall live.”

When gifts were sent to Rabbi Zeira,

when they would send him a gift,

he would not accept it.

But

when they would invite him

to eat with them —

he would go.

He said