Chullin 43b — the Talmud in English

And we explain: The practical difference is

with regard to an uncertain case of derusa

[as will be explained below], for in it they must examine the veshet, and it is impossible to examine whether it was perforated except from its inner, white side.

That uncertain case of derusa came before Rabba.

Rabba was examining the veshet for him from the outside,

from the outside, to ascertain whether it had been perforated or not.

Abaye said to him: But was it not you, Master, who said, “The veshet cannot be examined except from inside”?! Rabba turned it over

to the outer layer of the veshet,

and examined it

the inner white layer,

and two drops of blood were found upon it,

two drops of blood,

and he declared it terefa,

for the presence of the drops of blood on the inner layer of the veshet proves that the clawing indeed reached the inner side of the veshet, and it is therefore a perforated veshet, which is terefa.

And the Gemara explains:

And Rabba too,

who examined the veshet from the outside, did not do so because it is possible to examine it from the outside, but

he wanted to sharpen Abaye,

so that Abaye would ask him.

Ulla said: If a thorn lodged in the veshet,

that the animal ate a thorn, and the thorn became stuck from inside within the veshet, and it does not appear to be perforated toward the outside, and no drop of blood was found in it from inside, it is kasher, because

we do not suspect that it healed.

That is, we need not suspect that the veshet was perforated from inside through to the outside, and afterward the perforation healed when a membrane grew over it and it is no longer discernible—for we hold that a membrane at the site of a perforation is not considered a sealing. Rather, we attribute it to the fact that the perforation did not reach through to the outside.

(He pressed pieces with an impure knife—sign)

And we inquire about it:

And according to Ulla

there is a difficulty:

What is different

about a thorn that lodged, where we have to be uncertain whether the thorn also perforated the white layer [except that now the perforation is not discernible because a membrane grew over it], and nevertheless we do not remain uncertain and do not suspect this,

from an uncertain case of derusa,

where a lion entered the flock and we do not know whether it clawed this animal, in which case the law is that we must examine the veshet from inside in order to know whether it was not clawed?!

But here, where it is impossible to examine it—for the thorn lodged on the inner side, and the entire uncertainty is whether it also perforated the outer layer—we should prohibit it.

And we answer:

Ulla holds: We do not suspect

also

an uncertain case of derusa!

For it is a dispute between Rav and Shmuel later in our chapter, and Ulla holds like Rav, that we do not suspect an uncertain case of derusa.

And we inquire about it: Why does Ulla not suspect that the thorn perforated the outer layer

? And what is different from two pieces, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat,

where a person ate one of them and does not know which one he ate, so that he must bring an offering for uncertain guilt on account of the uncertainty? It is proven that we suspect on account of uncertainty that perhaps he ate the forbidden piece. If so, here, when a thorn lodged in the veshet on the inner side, why do we not suspect that it also perforated the outer layer, and it is therefore terefa?

And we answer:

There,

when two pieces were before him, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat, and he ate one of them,

the prohibition had been established,

for certainly among the two pieces there was one piece of forbidden fat, but

here, the prohibition had not been established

before slaughter, since the lodging of the thorn in the veshet without a perforation in the outer layer is of no consequence.

And further we inquire about it:

And what is different from one who slaughters with a knife and it is found defective

after slaughter, and we do not know whether the knife became defective on the skin before he slaughtered the identifying organs, so that the animal was slaughtered with a defective knife and became terefa, or whether the knife became defective on the vertebra itself after the slaughter of the identifying organs. Here, too, “the prohibition had not been established” before slaughter, and nevertheless Rav Huna said above in the first chapter that his slaughter is invalid, lest the knife became defective on the skin before the slaughter of the identifying organs!?

And we answer:

There, a defect arose in the knife.

Now the knife is defective, except that we do not know when it became defective. Therefore, even if the prohibition was not established at the outset, nevertheless an uncertainty has now arisen, after the slaughter. But when a thorn lodged, no defect arose at all, for we do not see the perforation of the outer layer. Since the prohibition was not established in it from the outset and no defect arose in it now, we do not prohibit it.

And further we inquire about it:

And what is different from uncertain tumah in a private domain, whose uncertainty is impure,

even though the prohibition was not established from the outset and no defect arose now!?

And we answer:

And according to your reasoning,

since you objected, “What is different from uncertain tumah in a private domain, whose uncertainty is impure?” why do you compare it to uncertainty in a private domain,

let us compare it to uncertain tumah in a public domain, whose uncertainty is pure?!

Rather, necessarily, we cannot derive from uncertain tumah. For

there, it is a halakha received from Sinai, derived from the case of a sotah,

the laws of uncertain tumah are derived, both with regard to rendering impure in a private domain and with regard to declaring pure in a public domain, from the impurity of a sotah: just as the seclusion and impurity of a sotah are in a private domain [for if it were in a public domain, this would not be “seclusion”], and the Torah renders her impure on account of uncertainty, so too every uncertain tumah in a private domain has an impure uncertainty.

And there is no reason for the matter; rather, it is a halakha. Therefore, one cannot derive from it for the laws of terefot.

A certain scholar sat before Rav Kahana, and sat and said:

What Ulla said, that we do not suspect when there was a thorn in the veshet, “

was found

a thorn” in the veshet

was stated,

that only if the thorn was found in the veshet in such a manner that it was not embedded in it, then we do not suspect.

But

if the thorn

lodged

in the veshet, having been embedded in it, then

we do suspect

that perhaps it also perforated the outer layer and healed, and the perforation is not discernible, and it is therefore terefa.

Rav Kahana said to them: Do not listen to him

that certain scholar! Rather,

“lodged”

specifically

was stated,

that with regard to this case Ulla said that there is no need to be concerned.

But

if

“was found”

the thorn in the veshet without being embedded,

it was not necessary

for

Ulla

to teach us that we do not suspect it,

for all animals of the wild,

all the animals that graze and eat their food outside,

eat thorns.

It was stated: The torbatz ha-veshet

which is the place where the veshet joins the jaw [illustration in the book Sichat Chullin], which was perforated—

Rav said:

if it was perforated

by any amount,

the animal is terefa.

And Shmuel said:

only if it was perforated

in most of it

is the animal terefa.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Rav said, by any amount,

because the torbatz ha-veshet is considered like the veshet itself, in which even a perforation of any amount renders the animal terefa. For Rav held that the torbatz ha-veshet is

a place of slaughter,

that is, it is included within the veshet.

And this place is above the place fit for slaughter of the windpipe, but there is no invalidity of cutting beyond the proper place in it, for the invalidity of cutting beyond the proper place was stated only with regard to the windpipe, and not with regard to the veshet.

And Shmuel said:

until it is perforated

in most of it.

For Shmuel holds:

it is not a place of slaughter,

for its law is not like the law of the veshet, and one who slaughters in this place invalidates his slaughter under the law of cutting beyond the proper place, since he did not slaughter in the appropriate place. Therefore, even if this place was perforated, the animal does not become terefa until the place is perforated in most of it, for its law is not like that of the veshet, in which any perforation renders the animal terefa.

And we explain:

Which is the torbatz ha-veshet?

Mari bar Mar Ukva said in the name of Shmuel: Any place which, when one cuts it, widens

where the opening of the cavity of the veshet widens as a result of its being cut,

that is the torbatz ha-veshet.

And any place

which, when one cuts it, remains in its place,

where the opening of the cavity of the veshet does not widen,

that is the veshet itself.

Rav Pappi said to them: My master,

my teacher,

did not say so. And who is he?

Rav Pappi’s teacher? —

Rav Bibi bar Abaye!

Rather,

this is what he said:

Any place which, when one cuts it, remains in its place—

that is the torbatz ha-veshet.

Rather, which is the veshet itself?!

Any place which, when one cuts it, contracts.

It contracts, and the circle of the opening of the cavity of the veshet closes at the place of the cut.

Rabbi Yonah said in the name of Rabbi Zeira:

What is the torbatz ha-veshet? —

The mavlaata.

The place of swallowing, very close to the veshet.

And how much

is the length of that place of swallowing close to the veshet?

Rav Avya said:

Its length is

less than a barley-grain,

than the length of a barley,

and more than a wheat-grain,

more than the length of a wheat.

There was a certain ox that was

owned

by the sons of Rav Ukva, in which slaughter was begun in the torbatz ha-veshet, and completed

the slaughter

in the veshet

itself.

Rava said: We impose upon it

we impose upon it

the stringencies of Rav and the stringencies of Shmuel,

as he proceeds to explain,

and declare it terefa.

And Rava explains:

The stringencies of Rav, for Rav said

that the measure for a perforated torbatz ha-veshet is

by any amount,

and here, at the beginning of the slaughter, the torbatz ha-veshet was perforated by any amount.

And should you say: If we follow Rav, how do we declare it terefa?

For Rav said

that the torbatz ha-veshet is

a place of slaughter,

and it follows that this is not a perforation but an act of slaughter according to law!?

The answer is: We declare it terefa

according to Shmuel, who said that it is not a place of slaughter,

and it follows that cutting it perforates it and renders it terefa.

And should you say:

If

it is according to

Shmuel,

why did it become terefa? But

did he not say

that a perforated torbatz ha-veshet is terefa only if it was perforated

in most of it,

and here, he began the slaughter in the torbatz ha-veshet, but continued and completed it in the veshet itself, so it follows that the torbatz ha-veshet was not perforated in most of it?

The answer is: With regard to the measure of the perforation, we proceed

like Rav, who said, by any amount.

That is, we are stringent to consider the place of the perforation the torbatz ha-veshet, a place unfit for slaughter, like Shmuel, and we are stringent that the perforation be by any amount, like Rav.

The matter rolled on, and reached

and the matter came

before Rabbi Abba.

He said to them,

Rabbi Abba:

The ox

whose slaughter began in the torbatz ha-veshet and ended in the veshet itself—

is permitted according to both Rav and Shmuel.

For according to Rav, it is a place of slaughter, and this is not a perforation. And even according to Shmuel, who said that it is not a place of slaughter, he holds that a perforation does not invalidate it until it is perforated in most of it, whereas here the perforation was only in its minority.

Therefore,

go, tell the son of Rav Yosef bar Hama,

that is, tell Rava, who was the son of Rav Yosef bar Hama, that he is mistaken concerning a Mishna, since one does not adopt the two stringencies of two disputants. Since Rava adopted the stringency of Rav on one side and the stringency of Shmuel on the other, although according to both Rav and Shmuel that animal is permitted, therefore go and tell him

to pay

that he should pay

the value of the ox to its owner,

because through his mistake concerning a Mishna he caused him monetary loss.

Mar, son of Ravina, said: I will raise a refutation against the enemy of

[against the enemies of]

Rava.

That is, he used “an improved expression,” because he wanted to challenge Rava from what is written in Ecclesiastes, “And the fool walks in darkness”; therefore he spoke in an expression directed toward Rava’s enemies, and not toward Rava himself.

For we learned:

Always—

the halakha is according to the words of Beit Hillel!

And one who wishes to act according to the words of Beit Shammai—

acts.

And one who wishes to act

according to the words of Beit Hillel—

acts!

But one who acts according to

the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the leniencies of Beit Hillel

is

wicked!