Chullin 41a — the Talmud in English

But

in

another sacrifice,

it is different,

no.

Since he renders it forbidden before the end of the slaughter.

And if a person does not render forbidden something that is not his

at all,

why specifically a bird sin-offering; even an animal sin-offering

and other offerings

also

he cannot render them forbidden! And although one could say that the beraita mentioned a sin-offering to exclude a peace-offering, over which the owners have the power to render it forbidden, this is a forced way to answer. For if so, the beraita should have mentioned a burnt-offering, which is more common than a sin-offering, and we would have entertained this answer only when we had no alternative.

And we answer: Although according to Rav Naḥman a person does not render his fellow’s animal forbidden, he can render forbidden even most holy sacrificial offerings, in which he has no monetary ownership, for

since it acquires him for atonement—

it is considered like his own,

since the sin-offering and guilt-offering atone, and even a burnt-offering atones for failure to perform a positive commandment. And no offering can be found whose slaughter is completed before the prohibition of idolatry takes effect upon it, except for a bird sin-offering, in the manner that we established.

Come and hear

an objection to Rav Naḥman from what we learned in our Mishna:

Two people are holding a knife and slaughtering; one [slaughters] for the sake of one of all these, and one [slaughters] for the sake of a valid matter—

their slaughter is invalid

because of the rabbinic prohibition of idolatry. Apparently, one of the slaughterers did not own the animal, and it follows that even if the one slaughtering for the sake of mountains was not its owner, it is forbidden; and according to Rav Naḥman, it should have been that the slaughterer who does not own the animal does not render it forbidden! And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With one who has

a share,

a partnership in it

and renders his share forbidden, and the entire animal becomes forbidden because his share is mixed within it.

Come and hear

an objection to Rav Naḥman from another Mishna [Gittin 52b]:

One who renders impure

pure items belonging to his fellow and thereby causes him loss,

and one who contaminates

[who mixes teruma with his fellow’s non-sacred produce] his fellow’s produce, thereby lowering the value of the non-sacred produce, since now it is permitted only to kohanim because of the mixture of teruma,

and one who pours

his fellow’s wine as a libation for idolatry — is exempt from paying for the damage by Torah law, because this is unrecognizable damage; but the Sages imposed a penalty upon him and said that if he caused the damage

unintentionally—

he is exempt; intentionally—

he is liable.

And we object: According to Rav Naḥman, the one who pours does not cause any damage at all, because a person does not render forbidden something that is not his, even when he performs an act!

And we answer:

Here too, [we are dealing] with one who has a partnership in it

and renders his own [share] forbidden, thereby damaging his fellow, because his libation wine is mixed with his fellow’s wine.

The dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman is

[a dispute between] tannaim.

For it was taught:

A gentile who poured the wine of a Jew as a libation before an idol—

he rendered it forbidden

for benefit, since a person renders something that is not his forbidden through an act, and it is not significant that the libation was not performed before the idol.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava permit

it for two reasons:

One, that wine is poured as a libation only before an idol.

And one, that he can say to him: “You have no right to render my wine forbidden against my will” 436 .

These tannaim disagree as to whether it is possible to render his fellow’s object forbidden through an act, and Rav Huna holds like the first tanna.

And Rav Naḥman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak say:

In truth, the tannaim disagree as to whether a person renders forbidden something that is not his, but

even according to the one who says—

a person renders forbidden something that is not his,

and when we see a person slaughtering or pouring as a libation his fellow’s [property], the object becomes forbidden,

this applies

to

a Samaritan

who certainly intended to pour a libation,

but a Jew

who slaughtered his fellow’s animal for idolatry, we must judge him favorably, saying that he did not intend for idolatry, but

to cause him distress

the owner of the animal

is what he intends,

so that he will think that his animal has become forbidden.

Come and hear

an objection to them:

Two people are holding a knife and slaughtering; one [slaughters] for the sake of one of all these, and one [slaughters] for the sake of a valid matter—

their slaughter is invalid.

And even if the slaughterer for the sake of mountains was not the owner of the animal, he renders it forbidden. Why should we not say that he intended only to cause distress to the owner of the animal? And we answer: What the amoraim said, that we judge favorably the slaughterer for the sake of idolatry and say that he intended to cause distress, applies only to a Jew who is presumed to be valid; but

here, with what are we dealing? With a Jewish apostate

who had already worshipped idolatry once, and we do not judge him favorably.

Come and hear: One who renders impure, one who contaminates, and one who pours as a libation, unintentionally—

is exempt; intentionally—

he is liable.

And why do we not say that he intended not to pour as a libation but only to cause distress, and did not cause damage!

And we answer:

Here too, [we are dealing] with a Jewish apostate

who certainly intended to pour as a libation.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi

this question: A Jew who is presumed to be valid came to slaughter for idolatry his fellow’s animal, and

they warned him

not to worship idolatry,

and he accepted the warning

and slaughtered for idolatry—

what [is the law]?

Is even in this case to be judged favorably, that he intended only to cause distress to his fellow, and he is not liable to death and the animal does not become forbidden?

He said to him

Rav Ashi: A person is not liable to death in court until they warn him that he is liable to death for the transgression, and he says, “I know, and despite this I am doing it, so that I will die.” And if by

“he made himself liable to death” you mean

your question when he slaughters his fellow’s animal, certainly in this case it cannot be said that he intended to cause him distress, for

you have no greater apostate than this 440 .

Mishna:

This Mishna deals with places and circumstances in which one must not slaughter because of suspicion that the slaughter is for idolatry.

One may not slaughter into seas or into rivers,

lest people say that he is slaughtering for the minister of the sea or the river,

nor into vessels,

lest people say that he is collecting the blood in order to cast it before idolatry.

But he may slaughter into a round cavity

[a pit]

of water,

because then the blood is unfit for casting.

And

likewise it is permitted to slaughter

on a ship onto vessels

one end of which is in the ship and the other end outside the ship, and the blood flows into the sea, because it is understood that he is not slaughtering for the minister of the sea, but is doing so in order not to soil the ship. But even on a ship one may not slaughter into vessels, and one may not slaughter directly into the sea.

One may not slaughter into a pit at all, but he may make a pit in the midst of his house so that the blood will enter it.

The Gemara explains the meaning of the Mishna.

And in the marketplace he may not do so

even though the matter is permitted in the house.