Chullin 40b (מ:) — the Talmud in English

And only then

he is merely cutting through earth,

and liability for slaughtering outside the Temple applies only when the slaughter necessary for performing the rite inside the Temple has been completed!

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with a bird sin-offering

whose law is that it is performed inside the Temple by pinching one siman; and although outside the Temple one is liable for slaughtering it, and not for pinching it, nevertheless, by slaughtering one siman he is already liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple, and it follows that

all the liabilities come simultaneously

[that all the liabilities arise at once]. On the contrary, according to Rav Huna it becomes clear why the beraita specified a sin-offering rather than any offering: Every offering becomes prohibited as an object of idolatrous worship before the completion of its own act, with the exception of a bird sin-offering.

And we challenge Rav Pappa: His answer is based on the premise that Rav Huna said “one siman” specifically, and he concedes that one who slaughters less than one siman for idolatry does not prohibit the animal. But

since

[after all]

according to whom did Rav Huna state his teaching?

[In accordance with whose words did Rav Huna state his words?]

In accordance with Ulla and Ulla,

who said: “Perform an act with it and he renders it prohibited,” even

he said [that this applies to] any insignificant act,

even less than one siman. Although Ulla’s own words could have been interpreted as requiring a significant and complete act, once Rav Huna said that a complete slaughtering is unnecessary and that one siman suffices, and his words were stated as an addition to Ulla’s words, we are compelled to say that Ulla intended any insignificant act; and accordingly, even a bird sin-offering becomes prohibited before its act is completed!

And we answer Rav Huna:

Rather,

we find that the prohibition of idolatrous worship does not take effect before the completion of the slaughtering

when

the slaughterer says that

at the completion of the slaughtering he is worshipping it

as an object of idolatrous worship. Throughout the slaughtering, he is not slaughtering it for idolatry, and then the prohibitions take effect simultaneously.

And we challenge this answer:

If so, why specifically

[did the beraita specify]

“a sin-offering”? Let it teach us [the same law with regard to] an offering

of peace-offerings, in which as well it is possible to find the two liabilities arising simultaneously, when he says that he is worshipping it at the completion of the slaughtering!

This difficulty does not apply to the disputants of Rav Huna who maintain that a person cannot render something that does not belong to him prohibited, even through an act. According to them, the beraita specified “a sin-offering” because it is a most holy offering, it is not eaten by its owners, and it does not belong to them; therefore, its owner cannot render it prohibited and remove its sanctity. The same applies to a burnt-offering. Peace-offerings, however, can be rendered prohibited by their owner, because they are the property of their owners, and the two liabilities will not arise in them simultaneously.

Rather, Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa:

Indeed, the case concerns specifically a bird sin-offering and not any other offering, and

here, with what are we dealing?

With a case in which he completed the slaughtering through an insignificant act, so that the prohibition of idolatrous worship did not take effect before the completion of the slaughtering,

for example, when half of the trachea

of the bird

was defective

before the slaughtering. A perforation renders the trachea a tereifa only when it affects most of the trachea, and he

added to it

through his slaughtering

any amount and completed it; all the liabilities therefore came simultaneously.

Rav Pappa said: Had Rav Huna not said

that even

one siman

renders the animal prohibited, and his sole novel point had been that a person can render something that does not belong to him prohibited through an act, then not only would it not have been difficult for him from the fact that the beraita imposes liability for slaughtering outside the Temple—for Rav Huna did not say that the prohibition of idolatrous worship takes effect at the beginning of the slaughtering—but even

“a sin-offering”

as stated in the beraita

would not have been a refutation of his opinion,

because this could be explained as follows: There is a major impediment to a prohibition taking effect on something that does not belong to him, and one must perform a significant act in order to prohibit another person’s animal. But with regard to his own animal, a prohibition can take effect through a minor act. The beraita specified “a sin-offering” to exclude peace-offerings, which are the property of their owners and upon which the prohibition takes effect at the beginning of the slaughtering; consequently, with regard to them the prohibition of idolatrous worship and the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple will not arise simultaneously. Although Rav Huna follows Ulla, and he did not mention “slaughtering” in his statement but rather “an act,” it can be explained:

What act is this? A significant act.

And Rav Pappa said: Had Rav Huna not said

that even

another person’s animal

becomes prohibited through any insignificant act, and his sole novel point had been that his own animal becomes prohibited through any insignificant act, even though an animal does not become prohibited when it is worshipped as an object of idolatry without an act,

“a sin-offering” would not have been a refutation of his opinion,

because the beraita specified a sin-offering, and the same law applies to all most holy offerings, in which their owners have no share. With regard to such offerings, an insignificant act is ineffective in rendering them prohibited, and they do not become prohibited before the completion of the slaughtering.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious!

And we answer:

Lest you say: Since he acquires it for atonement—

it is considered his own,

[Since the offering is his insofar as he achieves atonement through it, it might be considered his with regard to rendering it prohibited as well,] and this would pose a difficulty to the one who says that with regard to his own animal an insignificant act suffices

it teaches us

that Rav Pappa holds that this reasoning is not sufficiently strong to constitute a difficulty.

But now that Rav Huna says that a person can render another person’s property prohibited even through an insignificant act, the beraita poses a difficulty for him. Although the basic law of the beraita can still be explained as referring to one who says that he is worshipping it at the completion of the slaughtering, the fact that the beraita specified “a sin-offering” remains unexplained. It must therefore be answered that the case concerns a bird sin-offering whose trachea was defective in half. This possibility exists only with regard to a sin-offering, because a bird burnt-offering requires the pinching of two simanim, and one becomes liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple only upon slaughtering two simanim. It now emerges that specifically according to Rav Huna the beraita’s specification of “a sin-offering” is more readily understood, since only with regard to a bird sin-offering can the two prohibitions be envisioned as arising simultaneously.

Rav Naḥman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak say: A person cannot render something that does not belong to him prohibited

even through a significant act.

They raised an objection to it: One who slaughters a sin-offering on Shabbat outside the Temple for the sake of idolatry—

is liable for three sin-offerings.

The basic law of the beraita is understandable according to Rav Naḥman, because in his view it is altogether impossible to render something that does not belong to him prohibited. Therefore, he becomes liable both for slaughtering outside the Temple and for the prohibition of idolatry, since one who worships an idol is liable for it even without rendering the object worshipped prohibited.

However, the question arises: Why did the beraita specify “a sin-offering”?

And we established it: With a bird sin-offering whose trachea was defective in half

in order to answer the difficulty against Rav Huna.

And now we challenge Rav Naḥman:

The reason is that it is a bird sin-offering;

therefore, the slaughterer becomes liable both for idolatry and for slaughtering outside the Temple,

because all of them came simultaneously.