Chullin 41b (מא:) — the Talmud in English

So that

he should not

imitate the Sadducees 446 ,

for this practice is one of their customs—to slaughter into pits—and one who does so lends them support.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

One may not slaughter into

the sea ... but one may slaughter into a water-filled basin.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is different about slaughtering into the sea, that one may not

slaughter there? It is because

they will say: He is slaughtering for the master of the sea,

and this gives rise to suspicion. If so,

into a water-filled basin as well

there should be suspicion, as

they may say: He is slaughtering for the reflection

[that is, his image] appearing in the water

!

Rava said:

In truth, one may not slaughter into a basin containing clear water, but

the mishna teaches the case of murky water

in which the image cannot be discerned.

We learned in our Mishna:

One may not slaughter into a pit

at all, but he may make a pit inside his house so that the blood will flow into it.

And we inquire: How can it be permitted to make a pit inside his house?

But you said

at the beginning that

one may not slaughter into a pit at all!

Abaye said: The first clause is referring to a pit in the marketplace

into which one may not slaughter because of the customs of the heretics; but in his house there is no prohibition against slaughtering directly into a pit.

Rava said to him: But since the latter clause teaches: “And in the marketplace he may not do so,” by inference, the first clause is not discussing the marketplace

but rather the house!

Rather, Rava said: This is what it means: One may not slaughter

in a manner in which the blood will flow directly

i

nto

a pit at all

even in his house, because this is the practice of the heretics.

And one who wishes to clean

[that is, to clear]

his courtyard

so that it will not be soiled with blood,

how should he act? He makes a place

to which the blood will flow

outside the pit, and slaughters, and the blood trickles and flows

from the channel

into the pit; but in the marketplace he may not do so, lest he imitate the Sadducees

even though he thereby departs somewhat from their practice, since he has no need to clean the marketplace.

It was taught in accordance with Rava’s opinion: If one was traveling on a boat and had no room on the boat in which to slaughter, he extends his hand outside the boat and slaughters, and the blood trickles and flows down the sides of the boat,

just as we learned in our Mishna that one may slaughter atop vessels, allowing the blood to flow from them into the sea.

And he may not slaughter into a pit at all. And one who wishes to clean his courtyard, how should he act? He makes a place outside the pit and slaughters, and the blood trickles and flows into the pit; but in the marketplace he may not do so, because it is stated: “And you shall not follow their customs” [Leviticus 18:3].

And if he did so, he requires investigation

to determine whether he is a heretic who worships idolatry; and if they find that he is a heretic, they must distance themselves from his wine.

Mishna:

This Mishna discusses one who slaughters a non-sacred animal outside the Temple courtyard and says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a sacrifice. This statement is merely nonsensical, and the animal should be permitted like any other non-sacred animal. Nevertheless, the Sages invalidated this slaughter because of mar’it ayin on the part of his neighbors who see him slaughtering it for the sake of a sacrifice and think that he has now also consecrated the animal for this sacrifice, and that he is slaughtering sacrificial meat and eating it outside the Temple courtyard. This decree was stated only with regard to one who slaughters it for the sake of a sacrifice that a person can consecrate. But when one slaughters it for the sake of an obligatory sacrifice that he cannot consecrate if he is not obligated to bring it, there is no concern because of mar’it ayin, since his neighbors know that his words are nonsensical and that the animal is permitted.

One who slaughters

a non-sacred animal

for the sake of an olah

or

for the sake of offerings

[that is, peace-offerings] or

for the sake of a conditional guilt-offering

or

for the sake of a Paschal offering

or

for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering —

his slaughter is invalid.

And Rabbi Shimon deems it valid

because he is not concerned about mar’it ayin.

If

two were holding a knife

and one

was slaughtering, one

slaughtered it

for the sake of one of all these, and one

performed an ordinary slaughter, which was

for the sake of a valid purpose—

his slaughter is invalid 457 .

One who slaughters for the sake of a sin-offering or for the sake of a definite guilt-offering [

all guilt-offerings brought for a definite transgression, unlike the conditional guilt-offering brought for a doubtful transgression, which do not involve mar’it ayin, because it is impossible to consecrate them without the transgression that makes one liable to bring them; or if he slaughtered

for the sake of a firstborn

or

for the sake of a tithe

which do not involve mar’it ayin, since his neighbors who see him know that these animals are neither firstborn nor tithe animals; or if he slaughtered

for the sake of a substitution

when he has no consecrated animal with which he could make a substitution—

his slaughter is valid.

This is the general rule: With regard to anything that may be vowed or donated, one who slaughters for its sake—

it is prohibited; but with regard to anything that may not be vowed or donated, one who slaughters for its sake—

it is valid.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

One who slaughters for the sake of an olah,

for the sake of offerings, for the sake of a conditional guilt-offering ... his slaughter is invalid.

And we raise a difficulty:

Is a conditional guilt-offering something that can be vowed or donated?

But it is an obligatory sacrifice brought for a transgression, like all guilt-offerings!

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: A person may volunteer a conditional guilt-offering every day 458 ,

since we find that the Torah validated a conditional guilt-offering to be offered and eaten in a case of doubtful transgression, and does not say that if he did not sin, he brought non-sacred meat into the Temple courtyard. From this it can be derived that even one whose heart troubles him, lest he have sinned, may bring a conditional guilt-offering, although the obligation applies only in a case of uncertainty arising when a person ate one piece from among two pieces, one of which was forbidden fat, and it is unknown whether he ate forbidden fat or permitted fat.

We learned in our Mishna: One who slaughters ... for the sake of a Paschal offering ... his slaughter is invalid.

And we raise a difficulty:

Is the Paschal offering something that can be vowed or donated?

But

a fixed time has been designated for it

[that is, a time has been fixed for it] when it must be offered, and it cannot be offered at another time!

Rabbi Hoshaya said: The Paschal offering is different

from all obligatory sacrifices, which cannot be consecrated before the obligation takes effect. But in the case of the Paschal offering,

since its designation

as a sacrifice can take place

throughout the entire year,

there is room to suspect that the slaughterer consecrated the animal as a Paschal offering.

Rabbi Yannai said: They taught

in our Mishna that we are concerned about mar’it ayin only with regard to

unblemished animals,

but with regard to

animals with a blemish

there is no concern, since

it is clearly known

to the observers that consecration cannot take effect upon them.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even

with regard to

animals with a blemish as well

there is concern because of mar’it ayin, since

at times something is placed over the blemish and it is not known

[at times the blemish is covered by wool or mud and the blemish is not known]. The Sages did not distinguish between cases, and invalidated the slaughter even when the blemish is visible.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who slaughters for the sake of a sin-offering ...

his slaughter is valid.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught this only

with regard to one

who is not obligated to bring a sin-offering, but

if it became known that he had committed a transgression for which he was

obligated

to bring a

sin-offering—

the animal is prohibited, since

perhaps he is doing this for the sake of his sin-offering.

But when it is not known that he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, there is no concern that people will say: Perhaps he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, but the matter is unknown to others, because one who is obligated to bring a sin-offering generally tells this to his neighbors, so that he will be embarrassed and thereby achieve atonement.

And we raise a difficulty:

But he did not say, “for the sake of my sin-offering,”

but rather, “for the sake of a sin-offering.” His words do not mean that this sin-offering is for an obligation to bring a sin-offering that he already incurred; rather, they mean that he is now donating a sin-offering, which is impossible!

Rabbi Abbahu said:

In truth, Rabbi Yoḥanan prohibited the animal only

when he says, “For the sake of my sin-offering.”

But if it is not known that he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, then even if he says, “For the sake of my sin-offering,” people do not believe him that he is obligated to bring one.

We learned in our Mishna: One who slaughters ...

for the sake of a substitution—

his slaughter is valid.

Rabbi Elazar said: They taught this only when he does not have a sacrifice in his house, but

if it becomes known that

he has a sacrifice in his house,

the animal is prohibited, since

perhaps he made a substitution for it

[perhaps he substituted this animal for it]. Although the sacrifice is not in his presence, he can make a substitution for it. But if we do not know that he has a sacrifice in his house, there is no concern that people will say: Perhaps he has one and we do not know it, because the practice is to publicize and warn people about consecrated animals so that they will not inadvertently misuse them.

And we raise a difficulty:

But he did not say, “for the sake of the substitution of my sacrifice,”

but rather, “for the sake of a substitution.” His words do not mean that this is to be the substitution of a particular sacrifice; rather, he is making a substitution under the general designation of a sin-offering or an olah, and that is impossible!

Rabbi Abbahu said:

Rabbi Elazar prohibited the animal only

when he says, “For the sake of the substitution of my sacrifice.”

But if it is not known that he has a sacrifice in his house, then even if he says, “For the sake of the substitution of my sacrifice,” people do not believe him.

We learned in our Mishna:

This is the general rule:

With regard to anything that may be vowed or donated, one who slaughters for its sake is prohibited; but with regard to anything that may not be vowed or donated, one who slaughters for its sake is valid.

And we inquire:

What does the general rule come to include

[what does the rule teach that we did not already know from the individual cases]?

And we answer: The terms “vowed or donated” written in the Mishna come

to include

one who slaughters for the sake of

a nazirite’s olah

which can be consecrated only if he took a nazirite vow,

as it might enter your mind to say

[that there would be room to say] that we should not prohibit the animal, since

he did not

know that he

took a nazirite vow,

and surely people will say that his words are nonsensical. The Mishna therefore teaches that people do suspect him and say:

Perhaps he took a vow

of ordinary naziriteship, which lasts thirty days,

in private

and the matter was not known to his neighbors. Therefore, even if in fact he did not take a nazirite vow, the animal is prohibited.

And anything that may not be vowed or donated

is written in the Mishna

to include

one who slaughters for the sake of

the olah of a woman who has given birth,

as his neighbors know that he is not obligated to bring this sacrifice.

Rabbi Elazar said

They taught this only when he has no wife, but if he has a wife,

one who slaughters for the sake of the olah of a woman who has given birth is prohibited, since

perhaps he is doing it for her sake

for the sake of his wife who gave birth,

he is doing so 466 .

And we raise a difficulty:

But he did not say, “for the sake of my wife’s olah”!

Rabbi Abbahu said:

Rabbi Elazar is speaking

of one who says, “For the sake of my wife’s olah.”

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious!

Did Rabbi Elazar not already teach us this novelty when he said that if one has a sacrifice in his house and says, “For the sake of the substitution of my sacrifice,” the animal is prohibited?