Chullin 39a (לט.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Eliezer came to say: We derive outside from inside,

for the Torah obligates one who performs the rites of an idolatrous service to perform rites that are fit for the Place, even when that is not the manner of the idolatrous service. Therefore, with regard to intention as well, one who performs an idolatrous service is to be derived from the service performed inside the Temple.

And Rabbi Yosei came to say: Even with regard to the service performed inside the Temple as well, we do not say that one person forms the intention and another performs the service.

It was stated: With regard to one who slaughters an animal

without intending that this slaughter be an act of service for idolatry, but slaughtered it for himself with the intention

of sprinkling its blood for idolatry, and offering [

or offering]

its fats for idolatry.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is unfit

and the animal is forbidden to derive benefit from, even if ultimately the blood was not sprinkled and the fats were not offered for idolatry.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: It is permitted 376 .

And we explain the dispute as follows:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One considers from one service

to another

service

that it should be performed for idolatry, and this is like having had an intention of idolatry during the slaughter.

And

the source of the matter is that

we derive

ordinary slaughter

outside

the context of idolatry

from

the slaughter of sacrificial animals

inside 378 ,

where the intention that disqualifies can be from one service to another: If one slaughters with the intention of sprinkling the blood tomorrow or offering the sacrificial portions tomorrow, this is pigul.

Reish Lakish said: It is permitted; one does not consider from one service to another, and we do not derive outside from inside 379 .

And we say:

And they follow their own reasoning [

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their respective positions] in the dispute in which they differed concerning the disqualification of an intention not for its sake in offerings, where an intention for the sake of a different offering disqualifies them.

As it was stated:

A sin-offering that

he slaughtered for its sake

with the intention

of sprinkling its blood not for its sake.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is disqualified.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: It is valid.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is disqualified; one considers from one service to another, and we derive

the intention not for its sake that disqualifies

from the intention of pigul.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: It is valid; one does not consider

an intention not for its sake

from one service to another, and we do not derive from the intention of pigul,

because every intention of pigul consists only of forming, while performing one service, an intention concerning another service that will be performed not at its proper time; one cannot derive from there to a case in which the intention disqualifies the service itself.

And we say:

And it is necessary

to state both disputes, because there is room to distinguish between them.

For if it had been stated only in this case

of one who slaughters with the intention of sprinkling for idolatry, I might have said that it is specifically

in this case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says so, because we do not derive outside from inside; but

with regard to one who slaughters with the intention of sprinkling not for its sake, where one can derive

inside from inside, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan

in this matter.

And if it had been stated only in that case

of one who slaughters with the intention of sprinkling not for its sake, I might have said that it is specifically

in that case that Rabbi Yoḥanan says so,

because one can derive the service inside from the service inside,

but in this case

of idolatry,

say that he concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

that one cannot derive an external service from an internal service.

It is necessary.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

from our Mishna against Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish:

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei said: The matter follows by means of a kal va-chomer: If in a place where an intention disqualifies consecrated offerings, everything follows only the one who performs the service, then in a place where an intention does not disqualify ordinary animals, is it not logical that everything should follow only the slaughterer?

Rav Sheshet examined this:

What does “an intention does not disqualify ordinary animals” mean? If you say that it does not disqualify at all

an intention of idolatry,

then how can you find a slaughter for idolatry that renders the animal forbidden? 382 .

But surely it is known that offerings of the dead are forbidden to derive benefit from by Torah law!

And Rav Sheshet said:

Rather, obviously

the difference between ordinary animals and consecrated offerings is with regard to an intention

from one service to another, and this is what

Rabbi Yosei

said: If in a place where an intention disqualifies consecrated offerings from one service to another,

and one who, at the time of slaughter, intends that the blood be sprinkled tomorrow or that it be sprinkled not for its sake disqualifies the offering, there is a leniency there, that

everything follows only the one who performs the service

and the owners do not disqualify it;

then in a place where an intention disqualifies ordinary animals from one service to another,

and an intention of idolatry disqualifies only

that same service, is it not logical that everything should follow only the slaughterer?

And Rav Sheshet raises a difficulty: The fact that Rabbi Yosei disqualified an intention from one service to another with regard to the service

inside the Temple is difficult for Reish Lakish.

And the fact that Rabbi Yosei validated an intention from one service to another

outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan!

And we say:

Granted, the service inside the Temple presents no difficulty for Reish Lakish,

for one can say that

this

which Reish Lakish validated was based on his own reasoning

before he heard it [

before he heard] our Mishna

from Rabbi Yoḥanan,

his teacher;

but after he heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan

the Mishna, he retracted his position;

but the service outside the Temple presents a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan!

He [

Rav Sheshet]

raised the objection and resolved it:

Rabbi Yosei was not speaking about an intention from one service to another at all, and there is no difficulty either for Rabbi Yoḥanan or for Reish Lakish. The stringency applying inside the Temple is that an intention disqualifies the offering

during

the performance of one of the

four services

—slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying it, and sprinkling it—whereas one who receives the blood and carries it for idolatry does not render the meat forbidden.

And this is what

Rabbi Yosei

said: If in a place where an intention disqualifies consecrated offerings during the four services, everything follows only the one who performs the service,