Chullin 38b (לח:) — the Talmud in English

ox

or a sheep" -

one must exclude from "or"

except a hybrid

born of a ewe and a he-goat, which is unfit as an offering.

"Or a goat" -

except a nidmeh,

whose father and mother are of the same species, but which resembles another species.

"When it is born" -

except one born by Caesarean section

whose mother's womb was cut open and it was removed through that opening, rather than being born in the usual manner.

"Seven days" -

From the plain meaning of the verse one learns

the exclusion of an animal that is less than the prescribed time

of eight days, which is unfit.

"Under its mother" -

except an orphan

whose mother has died.

Rava clarifies:

"This orphan—what are the circumstances?" [

When did this orphan's mother die?]

If you say that its mother gave birth to it and then died,

[that its mother died after the birth,] Is it necessary that she

remain alive forever,

and that every animal whose mother is no longer alive be unfit for sacrifice? Although one might have said that the mother must remain alive until the eighth day, we have a derasha in the Torat Kohanim that this too is unnecessary .

Rather,

say that an orphan is one whose mother

died

before the birth,

and then gave birth to it

by cutting open the womb and removing the fetus. But this too cannot be said, since it is one born by Caesarean section, and that disqualification

is derived for us from "when it is born"

!

Rather, obviously,

the disqualification of an orphan applies when

one departed toward death and the other departed toward life,

and the mother died during the birth.

It still must be clarified: Is the orphan whom the Torah disqualifies one whose mother died in the middle of the birth, whereas if she died at its end it is fit? Or did the Torah disqualify the fetus even if she died at the end of the birth?

Rava says:

If it is reasonable

that "under its mother" teaches that

we require vitality at the end of the birth

and for a short time afterward in order to render the fetus fit for sacrifice,

this is why a verse was necessary to exclude

a case in which she died at the end of the birth. For we have no other source to disqualify it in this case.

But if you say that vitality is not required at the end of the birth,

and the Torah disqualified it only when the mother died in the middle of the birth, the following question still arises:

why is it necessary

to exclude an orphan through a special verse? After all,

from "when it is born" -

the exclusion of one born by Caesarean section

is derived,

and even if it emerged through the place through which a fetus emerges in an ordinary birth, that has no significance once the mother has died.

Rava learns from here that just as the mother must be alive at the completion of the birth, so the animal must be alive at the completion of the slaughter. See the additional explanation in the note .

Rava adds another law concerning an animal in danger of dying.

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with this baraita: An animal

in danger of dying

that stretched out its foreleg and did not retract it -

is unfit,

because it is its usual action when expiring.

When does this statement apply? To a foreleg; but with regard to a hind leg, whether it stretched it out and did not bend it, or bent it and did not stretch it out -

it is fit,

because it is not its usual action to stretch out a leg when expiring; it does so with a foreleg, not a hind leg.

When does this statement apply? With regard to a small animal; but with regard to a large animal, whether with a foreleg or with a hind leg, whether it stretched it out and did not bend it or bent it and did not stretch it out -

it is fit.

And with regard to a bird,

which is weaker than an animal and finds it more difficult to make convulsive movements ,

even if it did not flutter [

make a slight movement]

but only moved its wing

and did not wag anything but its tail,

this is considered convulsive movement.

And we challenge this:

What does this teach us

by Rava establishing the halakha in accordance with this baraita? After all,

all

its laws

are already taught

in our Mishna; and certainly the halakha follows an unattributed Mishna, which states:

A small animal that stretched out its foreleg and did not retract it -

is unfit, since this is only an act of expiring.

And one can infer from it:

"Foreleg," yes; hind leg, no.

Small, yes; large, no.

And we answer: The law of

a bird was necessary for him, as it is not taught

in the Mishna.

Mishna:

One who

slaughters

an animal belonging to a gentile

for the

gentile's

needs 363 - his slaughter is valid. And Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it

and forbids deriving benefit from the meat , as the law of an offering to idolatry , because the owner's intention that the slaughter be performed for idolatry renders the meat forbidden.

Rabbi Eliezer said: Even

if an animal belonging to a gentile was

slaughtered

by a Jew so that a Jew would eat the meat, while

there remained

for the gentile

only

the lobe of its liver [

the accessory lobe of the liver]

of the animal -

it is unfit,

even if we did not hear the gentile say that the slaughter was for idolatry, because

the ordinary intention of a gentile is for idolatry.

Rabbi Yosei said:

Even if we heard the gentile owner of the animal directing his intention toward idolatry, it has no effect, and

the matter follows a kal va-chomer.

The owner's intention does not render it forbidden.

And if, in a case where intention disqualifies

namely, an intention of piggul

with regard to consecrated offerings,

nevertheless the owner does not make it piggul, for the Torah said concerning piggul, "The one who offers it shall not have it reckoned to him" [Leviticus 7:18], teaching that

everything follows only the one performing the service; where intention does not disqualify

namely,

with regard to non-sacred animals, is it not logical that everything should follow only the slaughterer?

Rabbi Yosei's statement that with regard to non-sacred animals intention does not disqualify is not understood, since we are discussing idolatrous intention, which does disqualify with regard to non-sacred animals!

The Gemara explains that in a particular case the slaughterer's idolatrous intention does not render the animal forbidden, while in that same case an intention of piggul does disqualify.

Gemara:

There are three opinions in our Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer forbids the animal as a sacrifice to the dead, while the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei declare it valid. The Gemara comes to explain the difference between the opinion of the first tanna and that of Rabbi Yosei.

These tannaim accept the position of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei. [

The first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer follow the view of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei,] who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei in our Mishna, maintaining that the owners do not cause piggul.

And we cite a baraita

as it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I heard

from my teachers

that the owners cause piggul

because the owners too are called "the one who offers."

And we explain the dispute as a dispute between tannaim: everyone agrees that the intention regarding idolatry can be derived from the intention of piggul,

but the first tanna holds: if we heard him

the idolater

considering

the act to be for idolatry—

the

meat is not rendered forbidden;

if not

we heard him

—no,

because

we do not say that an idolater’s unspecified intention is for idolatry—

we do not say so 371 .

And Rabbi Eliezer holds: even though we did not hear him considering the act to be for idolatry, the meat is forbidden, because

we do say that an idolater’s unspecified intention is for idolatry

.

And Rabbi Yosei came to say: even though we heard him considering it—

the meat is permitted, as in piggul, where the owners do not render the offering piggul, because

this one thinks

about the service

and this one performs

the service, and the service should thereby be invalidated—

we do not say so 372 .

Some say:

even

when we heard him considering it, they disagree

the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, although both hold in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, that the owners do render an offering piggul.

The first tanna holds: when we say

what we say] that it will be

this one thinks

about the service

and this one performs

the service, and it is invalid,

this applies to

the

inner

service, which is more stringent,

but not outside,

because

we do not derive outside from inside

we do not derive

as in every other instance, where we do not derive the laws of non-sacred offerings from those of sacred offerings.