Chullin 38b — the Talmud in English

ox

or a sheep" —

one must exclude from “or”

except hybrids

the offspring of a ewe and a ram, which is unfit as an offering.

"or a goat" —

except a nidmeh,

whose father and mother are of the same species, but it resembles another species.

"When it is born" —

except one delivered by Caesarean section

whose mother’s womb was cut open and it was removed through there, and it was not born in its usual manner.

"Seven days" —

from the plain meaning of the verse one learns

except one lacking the required time,

of eight days, which is unfit.

"Under its mother" —

except an orphan

whose mother died.

And Rava clarifies:

“This ‘orphan’—what are the circumstances?” [

When did the mother of this orphan die?]

If you say it is that its mother gave birth to it and then died? [

That its mother died after the birth?] Must she

live forever and go on living,

and every animal whose mother is no longer alive is unfit for sacrifice? And although it could have been said that the mother must live until the eighth day, nevertheless we have a derasha in the Torat Kohanim that this too is unnecessary.

Rather,

let us say that an orphan is one whose mother

died

before the birth,

and then gave birth to it

by cutting open the womb and removing the offspring. One cannot say this either, for it is one delivered by Caesarean section, and this disqualification

is derived for us from “when it is born”

!

Rather, it is obvious

that the disqualification of an orphan applies when

this one departed toward death and that one departed toward life,

and at the birth the mother died.

It still must be clarified: Is the orphan whom the Torah disqualifies one whose mother died in the middle of the birth, but if she died at its end it is fit? Or did the Torah disqualify the offspring even if she died at the end of the birth?

And Rava says:

If you say

that “under its mother” teaches that

we require vitality at the end of the birth

and a little afterward in order to render the offspring fit for sacrifice,

this is why the verse was needed to exclude

when she died at the end of the birth. For we have no other source to disqualify it in this case.

But if you say that we do not require vitality at the end of the birth,

and the Torah disqualified it only when the mother died in the middle of the birth, it still follows that

why is it necessary

to exclude an orphan through a special verse? Is it not

from “when it is born”

—except one delivered by Caesarean section—

derived,

and even if it emerged through the place through which an offspring emerges in an ordinary birth, this has no significance after the mother’s death?

Rava learns from here that just as the mother must be alive at the completion of the birth, so the animal must be alive at the completion of the slaughter. See the additional explanation in the note.

Rava adds another law among the laws of an animal in danger of dying.

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with this beraita: An animal

in danger of dying

that stretched out its foreleg and did not draw it back —

it is unfit,

because it is its practice to do this when its life departs.

When are these words said? With regard to the foreleg; but with regard to the hind leg, whether it stretched it out and did not bend it, or bent it and did not stretch it out —

it is fit,

because it is not its practice to stretch out a hind leg when its life departs, but only a foreleg.

When are these words said? With regard to a small animal; but with regard to a large animal, whether with the foreleg or with the hind leg, whether it stretched it out and did not bend it, or bent it and did not stretch it out —

it is fit.

And with regard to a bird

which is weaker than an animal and finds it more difficult to twitch,

even if it did not flutter [

make a small movement]

but only its wing

and did not wag but only its tail,

this is twitching.

And we challenge:

What does he teach us

by Rava establishing the halakha in accordance with this beraita? Is it not that

all

its laws

we already taught them

in our Mishna? And certainly the halakha follows an unattributed Mishna, and the Mishna says:

A small animal that stretched out its foreleg and did not draw it back —

it is unfit, for this is only the departure of life.

And one may infer from it:

“Foreleg”—yes; hind leg—no.

“Small”—yes; large—no.

And we answer: The law of

a bird was necessary for him, for it was not taught.

Mishna:

One who slaughters

an animal belonging to a gentile

for the

purpose of

a gentile —

his slaughter is valid

363 . And Rabbi Eliezer declares it unfit,

and forbids the meat for benefit, as the law of an offering to idolatry, because the thought that the owner entertains, that the slaughter should be for the sake of idolatry, forbids the meat.

Rabbi Yose said: Even

an animal of a gentile that

a Jew slaughtered

so that a Jew would eat the meat, and there would remain

to eat

for the gentile

only

from the lobe of the liver

[

its

lobe] —

it is unfit,

and even if we did not hear the gentile say that the slaughter was for the sake of idolatry, because the ordinary thought of a gentile is for idolatry.

Rabbi Yose said:

even if we heard the gentile owner of the animal intending it for the sake of idolatry, this has no effect, and

the kal va-chomer is

that the owner’s thought does not forbid it.

And if in a place where thought disqualifies,

namely, the thought of pigul

with consecrated offerings,

nevertheless the owners do not cause pigul, for the Torah said concerning pigul, “The one who offers it shall not have it reckoned” [Leviticus 7:18], teaching that

everything follows only the one performing the service; in a place where thought does not disqualify,

namely,

with unconsecrated animals, is it not logical that everything should follow only the slaughterer?

Rabbi Yose’s words—that with unconsecrated animals thought does not disqualify—are not understood, for we are discussing the thought of idolatry, which disqualifies with unconsecrated animals!

The Gemara explains that in one particular place the slaughterer’s thought of idolatry does not forbid, whereas in that same place the thought of pigul does disqualify.

Gemara:

In our Mishna there are three opinions: Rabbi Eliezer forbids the animal because of the sacrifices of the dead, while the first tanna and Rabbi Yose deem it fit. The Gemara comes to explain what the difference is between the opinion of the first tanna and the opinion of Rabbi Yose.

These tannaim hold the position of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose. [

The first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer hold like Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose, who disagrees with Rabbi Yose in our Mishna, for Rabbi Yose holds that the owners do not cause pigul.]

And we bring a beraita

as it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose said: I heard

from my teachers

that the owners cause pigul

because the owners too are called “the one who offers.”

And we explain the dispute as a dispute of tannaim: everyone agrees that the intention of idolatry is to be derived from the intention of piggul,

however, the first Tanna holds: if we heard him

the idolater

intending

idolatry—

yes,

the meat is rendered forbidden;

if not

we heard him,

no,

for

we do not say that an ordinary intention of an idolater is for idolatry

. 371 .

And Rabbi Eliezer holds: even though we did not hear him intending idolatry—the meat is forbidden, for

we say that an ordinary intention of an idolater is for idolatry

.

And Rabbi Yosei came to say: even though we heard him intending

the meat is permitted, as with piggul, where the owners do not render it piggul, for

this one intends

with regard to the service

and this one performs

the service, and the service should be invalid—

we do not say so 372 .

There are those who say:

even

when we heard him intending, they disagree

the first Tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, and although both of them hold like Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei, that the owners render [the offering] piggul.

The first Tanna holds: when we say

[that which we say] that

this one intends

with regard to the service

and this one performs

the service, and it is invalid,

this applies to

the service of

inside

which is stringent,

but not outside,

for

from outside to inside ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

we do not derive

as in every place, we do not derive [the laws of] non-sacred [things] from [the laws of] sacred [things].