Chullin 39b (לט:) — the Talmud in English

In a place where מחשבה does not invalidate an ordinary non-sacred animal except through two sacrificial rites

which are slaughtering and the sprinkling of the blood, mentioned in the verses concerning the worship of idols,

is it not logical that everything should depend only on the slaughterer?

It was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan: One who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idolatrous worship and to offer its fat for idolatrous worship —

these are sacrifices of the dead.

The beraita explicitly supports the words of Rabbi Yohanan.

The beraita continues:

If he slaughtered it

and said nothing at the time of slaughtering,

and afterward formed an intention concerning it

and said that he intended to sprinkle its blood or offer its fat for idolatrous worship, and we do not know whether he had intended at the time of slaughtering to perform it for idolatrous worship,

this was an incident in Caesarea

and the Sages were asked,

and they did not say concerning it either that it was prohibited or that it was permitted.

Rav Hisda said:

The question posed in Caesarea depends on the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer as to whether an unspecified intention of an idolater is presumed to be for idolatrous worship, for it was discovered that the slaughterer of the animal was an idolater, and we did not know whether he had intended through this slaughter to perform idolatrous worship. Therefore,

they did not declare it prohibited, out of respect for the Rabbis, and they did not

say

that it was permitted, out of respect for Rabbi Eliezer.

And we reject Rav Hisda’s explanation:

From where

[what comparison is there]?

Perhaps the Rabbis said that only there

in the case of an idolater,

when we had not heard that he had formed an intention

to perform this animal for idolatrous worship, and presumably he did not slaughter it for idolatrous worship,

but here, when we heard that he had formed an intention

that the slaughterer of this animal wanted to sprinkle its blood for idolatrous worship, although we did not hear this at the time of slaughtering, it may be said that

the end proves what was in mind at the beginning,

and that he slaughtered it for idolatrous worship.

Alternatively,

it may be said conversely:

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer said only there

that the animal is prohibited,

in the case of an idolater, for an idolater’s unspecified intention is presumed to be for idolatrous worship; but in the case of a Jew

who has the presumptive status of being fit, and when he slaughtered the animal he still had that presumptive status, even though afterward he worshipped an idol,

we do not say that the end proves what was in mind at the beginning,

for it may be attributed to the evil inclination having entered him and his apostasy occurring only after the slaughtering.

Rather, Rav Shizevi said:

The question is whether the end proves what was in mind at the beginning, and

they did not declare it permitted out of respect for Rabban Shimon ben

Gamliel, who expresses the principle that the end proves what was in mind at the beginning elsewhere.

And we clarify:

Which

[where are the words of]

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

If you say it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who

said concerning

divorce documents

that the husband’s end proves what was in mind at the beginning?

As we learned: A healthy man who said

to two witnesses:

Write a bill of divorce for my wife

and sign it, but he did not tell them to give it to her, they do not become his agents to divorce her, since he instructed them only to write it. He did so because he

wanted to play a trick on her

so that she would not press him to give her a bill of divorce in order to free her from levirate marriage. But if a dangerously ill man said to witnesses, “Write a bill of divorce,” without saying, “Give it,” they become agents to give the bill of divorce and divorce her, because we say that he forgot to say “Give it” because he was distraught over his impending death, thereby freeing the woman from levirate marriage.

And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” and he went up to the roof, fell, and died,

and before his death the witnesses gave a bill of divorce to his wife, even though he had not said, “Give it.”

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell of his own accord

and by his own decision,

this is a valid bill of divorce; but if the wind pushed him —

it is not a valid bill of divorce. [Gittin 66a].

And we raise a difficulty: Does the Mishna cite

an

incident that contradicts

what it had said—that a healthy man who said, “Write,” did not instruct them to divorce her?

And we answer:

The Mishna is incomplete, and this is what it teaches: If the end proves

of the healthy man

what was in mind at the beginning,

that he was distraught over his impending death,

this is a valid bill of divorce. And there was also an incident involving a healthy man who said: “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” and he went up to the roof, fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell of his own accord, this is a valid bill of divorce; but if the wind pushed him —

it is not a valid bill of divorce. 390 .

And we see that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted the woman to remarry based on the proof provided by the husband’s end, and similarly, in our case, we should invalidate the slaughter for this reason.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different, because he said, “Write,”

and when he said this, there was already room for uncertainty as to whether he intended that they give it to her; and when he killed himself intentionally, it was proven that this had been his intention. But in our case, the slaughterer slaughtered while he had the presumptive status of being fit, and at the time of the act no doubt arose that he intended idolatrous worship; therefore, we do not say that the end proves what was in mind at the beginning.

Rather, Ravina said:

They did not permit it

out of respect for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in that case.

As it was taught: One who writes

a document and gives

his property to others

who are not his heirs,

and among the property were slaves, and the recipient said

[the recipient of the gift]:

I do not want them,

the gift is not nullified, and

if their second master was

the recipient of the gift,

a priest, they may eat teruma

as the slaves of a priest are entitled to do. Although by saying, “I do not want them,” he declares them ownerless and they go free, so that from then on he cannot return and enslave them, they are still considered his slaves with regard to permission to eat teruma.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once the recipient said: “I do not want them,”

the gift is retroactively nullified, and

the heirs have already acquired them

of the donor.

And we raise a difficulty: According to the first tanna,

does the recipient acquire the gift

even when he stands and cries out

that he does not want it? Surely a person does not acquire something against his will!

Rabba said, and some say Rabbi Yohanan: If he cried out from the outset,

when he received the document and said, “I do not want the slaves,”

everyone agrees that he did not acquire them

against his will.

If he was silent

when he received the document

and cried out at the end, everyone agrees that he acquired them,

because at first, when he was silent, he demonstrated that he wanted the slaves, and now he is retracting.

They disagree

in a case

where he acquired for him

the document

through another person

in his presence,

and

at the time of the acquisition

he was silent

and did not protest the acquisition of the slaves,

but ultimately cried out

when the document reached his hand.

The first tanna holds: Since he was silent

at the time of the acquisition,

he acquired them

as slaves, since presumably he wanted them,

and this fact that he cried out

when the document reached his hand is only because

he was retracting,

and we do not say that it is now proven that he did not want the slaves even at the time of the acquisition.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds:

Since at the outset there was no strong indication that he wanted to accept the slaves, and now he cries out that he does not want them,

the end proves what was in mind at the beginning

that he did not want the slaves then either.

And the fact that he did not cry out at the outset

must be explained, albeit with difficulty, by saying that the recipient of the gift

thought: “Since it has not yet come into my possession, why should I cry out?”

[Since the document had not yet come into his hand, why should he cry out?] And this is so even though he acquired the gift before the document reached his hand. And we see that although at the time he acquired the gift the slaves were in his possession and we had no reason then to question his ownership of them, now that he cries out, the end proves what was in mind at the beginning: according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he never wanted them. Similarly, in our case they did not declare the animal prohibited or permitted because of the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.

The Gemara returns to the dispute in our Mishna.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

that the owner’s intention does not prohibit the animal; even if we know that the owner intended idolatrous worship, the meat is not prohibited.

And we cite an incident:

Certain Arab merchants came to Tzikunia

[Ishmaelites came to Tzikunia],

and gave rams to Jewish slaughterers,

[to slaughter them; for it was customary for the Ishmaelites to slaughter their animals],

the Ishmaelites said to them

the slaughterers:

“The blood and the forbidden fat are ours

[the blood and fat will be ours] for the needs of idolatrous worship,

and the hide and the meat are yours”

[the hide and the meat will be yours].

Rav Tovi bar Rav Mattana sent this question before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the law?

Is the meat permitted?

He sent him this reply: This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

and it is permitted to eat the meat.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi

with regard to this question:

According to Rabbi Eliezer,

if

an idolater gives him

an idolater

a zuz to a Jewish slaughterer

in exchange for meat from one animal,

what is the law?

Does that idolater prohibit the animal because he has a share in it, just as Rabbi Eliezer prohibits an animal belonging to an idolater when the idolater will eat only its liver?

He said to him:

The gentile acquired a share of the animal with the money he gave, since money effects acquisition of movable property for a gentile; but ownership does not render the meat forbidden. Rather, this applies only when the slaughterer is compelled to give the owner his share. In that case, he slaughters on behalf of the owner and becomes his agent with regard to the slaughter, and the owner’s intention concerning the slaughter is effective. Therefore,

we see: If the man is violent, so that he cannot drive him away

[if the gentile is violent and it is impossible to drive him away and refuse to give him any of the meat], the meat

is forbidden; but if not

if he is not a violent man, and it is possible to drive him away and say to him, “Take your money, but I will not give you any of the meat,” the meat is not rendered forbidden, because he is not his agent—for had he wished, he

would have said to him: “Your head and the mountain.”

[May your head and the mountain strike one another.]

Mishna:

One who slaughters

an animal that he offered to idolatry that is attached, for example, if he slaughtered

for the sake of mountains

or

for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of deserts—

his slaughter is invalid,

and the meat is forbidden for consumption, although it does not have the status of an offering of idolatry and is not forbidden to derive benefit from, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.