Chullin 39b — the Talmud in English

A place where intention disqualifies in non-sacred slaughter only with regard to two services

which are slaughter and the sprinkling, which are mentioned in the verses concerning idolatry,

is it not a logical inference that everything follows only after the slaughterer?

It was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan: One who slaughters the animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idolatry and to offer its fat for idolatry —

these are sacrifices of the dead.

The beraita explicitly states in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yohanan.

The beraita continues:

He slaughtered it

and did not say anything at the time of slaughter,

and afterward he thought concerning it

and said that he intended to sprinkle its blood or offer its fat for idolatry, but we do not know whether he intended at the time of slaughter for idolatry,

this was an incident in Caesarea,

and they asked the Sages,

and they said neither that it was prohibited nor that it was permitted.

Rav Hisda said:

The question that was asked in Caesarea depends upon the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, whether an ordinary intention of an idolater is for idolatry, for it was revealed that the one slaughtering the animal was an idolater, but we did not know whether he intended through this slaughter for idolatry. Therefore

they did not say that it was prohibited, because of the honor of the Rabbis, and they did not

say

that it was permitted, because of the honor of Rabbi Eliezer.

And we reject Rav Hisda:

From where?

[What is there to compare?]

Perhaps the Rabbis said this only there

with regard to an idolater,

but only because we did not hear that he intended

for this animal to be for idolatry, and ordinarily he did not slaughter it for idolatry;

but here, since we heard that he intended

that the slaughterer of this animal wanted to sprinkle its blood for idolatry—even though we did not hear this at the time of slaughter—one may say:

the end proves concerning the beginning,

that he slaughtered for idolatry.

Alternatively,

[one may say] the opposite:

Rabbi Eliezer said this only there,

that the animal is prohibited,

but with regard to an idolater, for an ordinary intention of an idolater is for idolatry; but with regard to an Israelite,

who has the presumption of fitness, and when he slaughtered he still had the presumption of fitness, even though afterward he practiced idolatry,

we do not say that the end proves concerning the beginning,

for one can attribute it to the evil inclination having entered him and his having apostatized after the slaughter.

Rather, Rav Shizbi said:

The question is whether the end proves concerning the beginning, and

they did not say that it was permitted, because of the honor of Rabban Shimon ben

Gamliel, who expresses the principle that the end proves concerning the beginning elsewhere.

And we clarify:

Which

[where are the words of]

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

If you say it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who

said with regard to

divorce documents

that the end of the husband proves concerning his beginning?

As we learned: A healthy man who said

to two witnesses:

Write a divorce document for my wife,

and sign it, but he did not say to them, “Give it to her,” they do not become his agents to divorce her, since he commanded them only to write; and he did so because he

wanted to play with her,

so that she would not pressure him to give her a divorce document in order to exempt her from levirate marriage. But a dangerously ill man who said to witnesses, “Write a divorce document,” and did not say, “Give it,” they become agents to give the divorce document and divorce her, because we say that he forgot to say “Give it” because he was frantic over his death, and the woman is exempt from levirate marriage.

And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a divorce document for my wife, and he went up to the roof and fell and died,

and before his death the witnesses gave a divorce document to his wife, even though he had not said, “Give it.”

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell by his own accord

and of his own volition,

this is a valid divorce document, but if the wind pushed him —

it is not a valid divorce document. [Gittin 66a].

And we raised the difficulty: Does the Mishna bring an

incident that contradicts

what it said, that a healthy man who said, “Write,” did not command them to divorce her

?

And we answer:

Something is missing from the Mishna, and this is what it teaches: If the end proves

of the healthy man

concerning the beginning,

that he was frantic over his death,

this is a valid divorce document. And there was also an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a divorce document for my wife, and he went up to the roof and fell and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell by his own accord, this is a valid divorce document, but if the wind pushed him —

it is not a valid divorce document 390 .

And we see: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted the woman on the basis of the proof from the husband’s end; likewise, in our case we should disqualify the slaughter for this reason.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different, since he said, “Write,”

and when he said this, there was already room for uncertainty whether he intended that they give it to her; and when he deliberately killed himself, it was proven that this had been his intention. But in our matter, where the slaughterer slaughtered while he had the presumption of fitness, and at the time of the act no uncertainty arose that perhaps he intended for idolatry, we do not say that the end proves concerning the beginning.

Rather, Ravina said:

They did not permit it

because of the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel here.

As it was taught: One who writes

a document and gives his

property to others

who are not his heirs,

and among it were slaves, and the other said

[the recipient of the gift]:

I have no desire for them,

the gift is not nullified, and

if their second master was

—the recipient of the gift—

a priest, they eat teruma

according to the law of the slaves of a priest. Although by saying, “I have no desire for them,” he declares them ownerless and they go free, and from now on he cannot return and enslave them, they are still his slaves with regard to permission to eat teruma.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Since the other said, “I have no desire for them,”

the gift was nullified from the outset, and

the heirs had already acquired them

of the giver of the gift.

And we raised the difficulty: According to the first Tanna,

does the recipient of a gift acquire it

even while standing and shouting

that he does not want it? But surely a person does not acquire something against his will!

Rabba said, and some say Rabbi Yohanan: When he shouted from the outset,

when he received the document and said, “I do not want the slaves,”

everyone agrees that he did not acquire them

against his will.

When he was silent

when he received the document

and in the end shouted, everyone agrees that he acquired them,

because at first, when he was silent, he proved that he wanted the slaves, and now he is retracting.

They disagree

in a case

where he caused it to be acquired for him

the document

through another person

in his presence,

and

at the time of the acquisition

he was silent

and did not protest against the acquisition of the slaves,

and in the end he shouted

when the document reached his hand.

The first Tanna holds: Since he was silent

at the time of the acquisition,

he acquired them

the slaves, since ordinarily he wants them,

and this, that he is shouting

when he receives the document into his hand, is only because

he is retracting,

and we do not say that now it was proven that even at the time of the acquisition he did not want the slaves.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds:

Since at the beginning there was no strong proof that he wanted to receive the slaves, and now he is shouting that he does not want them,

the end proves concerning the beginning

that he did not want the slaves then either,

and this, that he did not shout at the outset,

we must explain with difficulty that the recipient of the gift

thought: Since it has not come into my hand, why should I shout?

[When the document has not yet come into his hand, why should he shout?] Even though he acquired the gift before the document reached his hand. And we see: Even though at the time he acquired the gift the slaves were under his control, and at that time we had no reason to doubt his ownership of them, now that he is shouting, the end proves concerning the beginning that he never wanted them, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And likewise in our matter they said neither that it was prohibited nor that it was permitted because of the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.

The Gemara returns to the dispute in our Mishna.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

that the owners’ intention does not prohibit, and even if it is known to us that the owners intended for idolatry, the meat is not prohibited.

And we bring an incident:

Those Ishmaelites who came to Ciconia

[Ishmaelites came to Ciconia],

gave rams to Israelite butchers,

[They gave rams to Israelite butchers] to slaughter them, since it was the practice of the Ishmaelites to slaughter the animals,

they said to them

the Ishmaelites said to the butchers:

The blood and the fat are ours

[the blood and the fat will be ours] for the needs of idolatry,

the hide and the meat are yours

[the hide and the meat will be yours].

Rav Tovi bar Rav Mattana sent before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the law?

Is the meat permitted?

He sent to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

and it is permitted to eat the meat.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi

this question:

According to Rabbi Eliezer,

if

he gave him

an idolater

a zuz to an Israelite butcher

in exchange for meat from one animal,

what is the law?

Does that idolater prohibit the animal, since he has a share in it, just as Rabbi Eliezer prohibits an animal belonging to a gentile when the gentile will eat only its liver?

He said to him:

The gentile acquired a share of the animal with the money he gave, since money acquires movable property for a gentile, but ownership does not prohibit it; rather, this is only when the slaughterer is compelled to give the owner his share. Then he slaughters for the owner and becomes his agent for the slaughter, and the owner's intention regarding the slaughter is effective. Therefore,

we see: if he is a violent person who cannot be pushed away [

if the gentile is violent and it is impossible to push him away and not give him any of the meat], the meat

is forbidden; but if not

he is not a violent person, and it is possible to push him away and say to him, “Take your money, and I will not give you any of the meat,” the meat is not forbidden, for he is not his agent, since if he had wanted,

he said to him: “Your head and the mountain.” [Your head and the mountain struck one another.]

[That is, “Let your head and the mountain strike each other.”]

Mishna:

The one who slaughters

who offered an animal to attached idolatry, such as one who slaughtered

for the sake of mountains

or

for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, for the sake of deserts—

his slaughter is invalid,

and the meat is forbidden for eating, although it does not have the prohibition of an idolatrous offering and is not forbidden for benefit, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.