Chullin 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to Rav Yosef:

In any event, Rava’s objection is an objection, since

was it not stated concerning it

was it not said concerning this beraita]:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is

the beraita of

the words of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

the anonymous one

because many Mishnayot and beraitot stated their rulings anonymously in accordance with his opinion].

But the Sages say: Do two people slaughter one offering?

And since that is so, one cannot explain the Mishna in tractate Parah as following the opinion of a single individual .

Abaye further said:

And even according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, one can distinguish

and say that the beginning of the slaughter does not impart impurity when no one has transgressed the halakha, as in the case

where one man slaughtered with two garments,

where, in the middle of the slaughter, his fellow came, removed the first man’s garment from his head, and wrapped him in another garment,

so that the first garment does not become impure, while the latter garment does become impure!

Abaye answers Rava’s objection:

Rather,

the reason the tanna did not distinguish between the beginning and the end of the slaughter is that

he is speaking of the cow’s disqualification,

and he came to teach that the cow imparts impurity only as long as it is fit, but once it becomes

fit, he is not speaking of it,

and he did not come to teach from what point the service that imparts impurity begins—which, according to Reish Lakish, is at the end of the slaughter.

The Gemara now raises an objection to Reish Lakish from a Mishna in tractate Pesaḥim and from the discussion stated concerning it. We will explain several foundations of the discussion.

a. One who slaughters a Paschal offering while he has leaven in his possession transgresses a prohibition, as it is stated: “You shall not slaughter the blood of My offering with leaven” [Exodus 34:25].

b. According to Rabbi Shimon, this prohibition applies throughout all seven days of Pesaḥ to other offerings that a person slaughters, but not to a Paschal offering. This is because a Paschal offering is disqualified when it is sacrificed outside its proper time, on the fourteenth, and anyone who slaughters a disqualified offering does not transgress the prohibition.

c. There is a halakha that a Paschal offering that was not sacrificed at its proper time for some reason—for example, it was lost on the fourteenth and then found—is sacrificed as a peace-offering. The Gemara discusses whether it automatically becomes a peace-offering, or whether it becomes a peace-offering through designation, by sacrificing it with the intention that it be a peace-offering.

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection:

It is written in the Mishna:

And

one who slaughters a Paschal offering

during the Festival

over leaven, if he slaughtered it

for its sake—

he is exempt

from lashes, because the offering is disqualified; but if he slaughtered it

not for its sake,

but for the sake of a peace-offering—

he is liable,

because its status is that of an offering to be sacrificed as a peace-offering.

And we raised the following discussion: The reason

the Mishna specifically obligates him in the case

where

he slaughtered it

not for its sake; but

if he slaughtered it

without specification,

without intending it for a particular offering—

he is exempt,

for if he were liable, the Mishna would have taught us that even when he slaughtered it without specification he is liable .

And why is he exempt?

But

a Paschal offering during the rest of the year is a peace-offering, is it not?

And we say:

Conclude from this: A Paschal offering during the rest of the year requires designation,

and it does not automatically become a peace-offering. If he slaughtered it without specification, he did not remove its designation as a Paschal offering; it is a Paschal offering sacrificed outside its proper time and is therefore disqualified.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said: A rejection was cast

of this proof

from the mouth of a group

of amoraim,

and they said:

Actually, a Paschal offering whose owners have fulfilled their obligation to bring a Paschal offering does not require designation; it automatically becomes a peace-offering and is fit even when slaughtered without specification.

Here, with what are we dealing?

With a Paschal offering that could still be sacrificed as a Paschal offering,

for example, when its owners were impure through contact with the dead

on the fourteenth of Nisan

and were deferred to the second Pesaḥ, so that

this offering

stands presumptively for its own sake,

since it can be sacrificed as a Paschal offering.

It is this one that requires designation; another does not require designation.

And we challenge Reish Lakish:

Granted, if you say that slaughter exists from beginning to end,

and the designation of disqualification can take effect at the beginning of the slaughter, then this offering

became disqualified from the beginning of the slaughter,

when it still stood to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and without designation it is a Paschal offering slaughtered outside its proper time and is disqualified.

But if you say that slaughter exists only at the end, once he has slaughtered a little,

when he has slaughtered a small amount, so that if he stops slaughtering the animal will become a carcass, it has already

been deferred

the offering

from

the second Pesaḥ, and then it automatically becomes a peace-offering, in accordance with what the group said.

And the other part

of the slaughter,

when he slaughters,

he is slaughtering a peace-offering,

and at the end of the slaughter there is no disqualification!

Abaye said to him:

This is not a difficulty, because in truth the offering remains a Paschal offering even at the end of the slaughter, since its designation as a Paschal offering was not explicitly removed. And although it is no longer fit to be sacrificed,

granted that it has been deferred from

the offering of

the

second Pesaḥ,

has it been deferred from the money of the Paschal offering?!

It can be redeemed and the money can be used for a second Paschal offering. Since that is so, it still presumptively stands for a Paschal offering and not for a peace-offering; it is a Paschal offering that was sacrificed outside its proper time.

Abaye adds:

And if you would say

that it is impossible to redeem the offering after they have begun to slaughter it, because consecrated animals cannot be redeemed without standing and valuation, as it is stated: “He shall have the animal stand before the priest, and the priest shall value it” [Leviticus 27:11–12], and this offering

requires standing and valuation,

then if they wished to redeem it, it could no longer stand on its legs after the slaughter.

Abaye says: That is not so.

But we learned

that the requirement of standing and valuation can be fulfilled after slaughter, as it is written:

If he slaughtered it,

the animal,

two or the majority of two organs, and it is still convulsing, it is considered alive in every respect,

and it can be made to stand .

The Gemara moves on to another discussion concerning the laws of slaughter .

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who slaughters in two or three places,

who began slaughtering in one place but did not slaughter the majority of the organs there, then went and slaughtered in another place that is valid for slaughter along the length of the organs, and there slaughtered the majority of the organs , the law is that

his slaughter is valid

provided that he did not pause in the middle .

Rav Yehuda added:

When I stated this before Shmuel

[when I told Shmuel Rav’s teaching], he disagreed with him and

said to me

that this slaughter is disqualified, because

we require exposed slaughter

[slaughter that is uncovered] and clearly discernible. When a slaughterer slaughters in several places, the cut is not clearly visible to an observer ,

and there is no

clearly discernible slaughter here.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, too, held that we require exposed slaughter. For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: From where do we know that slaughter must be exposed? As it is stated: “Their tongue is a slaughtered arrow; it speaks deceit”

[Jeremiah 9:7]. Thus, slaughter is compared to the action of an arrow, which strikes in only one place.

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection

from the Mishna against Shmuel and Reish Lakish:

Two people hold a knife and slaughter

one animal;

even if

one

slaughtered

from above and one

slaughtered

from below—

their slaughter is valid.

It follows from the Mishna that the two slaughterers use two knives: one slaughtered toward the head, above, and the other slaughtered toward the chest, below.

Rabbi Elazar asks:

Why

is their slaughter valid according to Shmuel and Reish Lakish,

as there is no exposed slaughter!

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him:

According to Shmuel,

our Mishna

speaks

of one knife,

and the slaughter is exposed, while

two people

hold it and slaughter. The phrase in the Mishna, “one from above and one from below,” means that one holds the knife near the animal’s head and the other holds it near the chest, so that the slaughter is diagonal .

Rabbi Abba said to him,

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

If so,

that this is the meaning of the Mishna,

this is what was taught concerning it

[what is written in the beraita in explanation of the Mishna]:

We are not concerned lest they sever

the two slaughterers

one another’s throats.

Granted, if you say

that the Mishna is discussing

two knives and two people

slaughtering with them,

it is well

[the words of the beraita are understandable], and its intent is:

Lest you say, let us be concerned that perhaps they rely on one another, and this one will not come to make a majority, and that one will not come to make a majority

[one might think that there is reason for concern that each will fail to slaughter the majority of the organs, relying on his fellow to slaughter properly], and one who does not slaughter the majority of the organs does not kill the animal but renders it a tereifa,

it teaches us that we are not concerned

about this .

But if you say

that the Mishna is speaking

of one knife and two people

slaughtering with it, there is a difficulty:

This

wording,

“We are not concerned lest they sever one another’s throats,”

—there is no reason to be concerned that they will fail to slaughter the majority of the two organs. The only possible concern would be that, because two people are pressing a knife against the neck, they might sever the head at once; and if so,

it should have said, ‘Lest they crush one another’s throats,’

for the tanna of the beraita to state.