Chullin 30a — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef: Nevertheless, Rava’s objection is an objection, since

was it not stated concerning it

[did they not say concerning this beraita]:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This

beraita is

the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

the anonymous one

[for many Mishnayot and beraitot left their statements anonymous in accordance with his view],

but the Sages say: Do two people slaughter one sacrifice?

And since this is so, one cannot explain the Mishna in tractate Parah as following the view of a single individual .

Abaye further said:

And even according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, let him distinguish

[it is also possible to distinguish] and say that the beginning of the slaughter does not impart impurity in a manner in which they did not transgress the halakha, and

in a case where one man slaughtered with two cloths

for in the middle of the slaughter his fellow came and took his cloth from his head and wrapped him in another cloth,

for the first cloth does not impart impurity, whereas the latter cloth imparts impurity!

And Abaye answers Rava’s objection:

Rather,

the reason that the tannai did not distinguish between the beginning of the slaughter and its end is because

he is speaking about the disqualification of the cow

and came to teach that the cow imparts impurity only as long as it is fit, but when it is made

fit he is not speaking

and he did not come to teach from what point the service that imparts impurity begins, which, according to Reish Lakish, is at the end of the slaughter.

Now the Gemara brings an objection against Reish Lakish from a Mishna in tractate Pesaḥim and the discussion stated concerning it. We shall explain several foundations of the discussion.

A. One who slaughters the Paschal sacrifice while he has leaven in his possession transgresses a prohibition, as it is stated: “You shall not slaughter the blood of My sacrifice with leaven” [Exodus 34:25

B. According to Rabbi Shimon, throughout all seven days of Pesaḥ this prohibition applies to other sacrifices that a person slaughters, but not to the Paschal sacrifice, because the Paschal sacrifice is disqualified when it is offered not at its proper time, on the fourteenth, and anyone who slaughters a disqualified sacrifice does not transgress a prohibition.

C. There is a halakha that a Paschal sacrifice that was not offered at its proper time for some reason—for example, it was lost on the fourteenth and was subsequently found—is to be offered as a peace-offering. There is a discussion in the Gemara whether it automatically becomes a peace-offering, or whether it becomes a peace-offering through designation, by offering it for the sake of a peace-offering.

Rav Idi bar Avin objected:

It is written in the Mishna:

And

one who slaughters a Pesaḥ

during the festival

over leaven, if he slaughtered it

for its sake—

he is exempt

from lashes, because the sacrifice is disqualified; but if he slaughtered it

not for its sake

but for the sake of a peace-offering—

he is liable

because its status is to be offered as a peace-offering.

And we discussed it: The reason

[specifically] the Mishna makes him liable in a case where

he

slaughtered it

not for its sake; but

if he slaughtered it

without specification

and did not intend it for the sake of a particular sacrifice—

he is exempt,

for if he were liable, the Mishna would have taught us that even when he slaughtered it without specification he is liable ;

and why is he exempt,

when, after all,

a Pesaḥ during the rest of the days of the year is a peace-offering?

And we say:

Learn from it: A Pesaḥ during the rest of the days of the year requires designation

and does not automatically become a peace-offering; and if he slaughtered it without specification, he did not remove from it the designation of Pesaḥ, and it is a Paschal sacrifice slaughtered not at its proper time and is disqualified.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said: A

rejection of this proof

was cast forth from the mouth of a group

of amoraim,

and they said:

In truth, a Paschal sacrifice whose owners have fulfilled their obligation to offer a Pesaḥ does not require designation and automatically becomes a peace-offering; and it is fit even when it was slaughtered without specification.

Here, with what are we dealing?

With a Pesaḥ that could be offered as a Paschal sacrifice,

for example, when its owners were impure with corpse impurity

on the fourteenth of Nisan,

who are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ, for

this sacrifice

stands without specification for its sake

since it can be offered as a Paschal sacrifice;

and this one is the one that requires designation, whereas another does not require designation.

And we challenge Reish Lakish:

Granted, if you say that slaughter exists from beginning to end

and the designation of disqualification can take effect at the beginning of the slaughter, then this sacrifice

was disqualified for him from the beginning of the slaughter

when it still stood to be a Paschal sacrifice, and without designation it is a Pesaḥ slaughtered not at its proper time.

But if you say that slaughter exists only at the end, once he slaughtered a little

[when he slaughtered a little] in such a manner that if he stopped the slaughter the animal would become a carcass, it has already

been deferred

the sacrifice

from the Second

Pesaḥ, and then it automatically becomes a peace-offering according to what the group said;

and the other

[the continuation of the slaughter]

when he slaughters—

he slaughters a peace-offering,

and at the end of the slaughter there is no disqualification!

Abaye said to him:

This is not an objection, because in truth the sacrifice remains a Paschal sacrifice even at the end of the slaughter, since the designation of Pesaḥ was not explicitly removed from it; and although it is no longer fit to be offered, nevertheless

although it has been deferred from

the offering of

the

Second Pesaḥ,

has it been deferred from the money of the Pesaḥ?!

After all, it can be redeemed and the money can be used for a Second Pesaḥ sacrifice; and since this is so, without specification it still stands for a Pesaḥ and not for a peace-offering, and it is a Paschal sacrifice that they offered not at its proper time.

Abaye adds:

And if you will say

[and if you will say] that it is impossible to redeem the sacrifice after they have begun to slaughter it, because consecrated animals cannot be redeemed without standing and valuation, as it is stated: “He shall have the animal stand before the priest, and the priest shall value it” [Leviticus 27:11–12], and this sacrifice

requires standing and valuation,

if they wished to redeem it, it could not stand on its legs after the slaughter.

Abaye says: This is not so,

and we learned

that it is possible to fulfill the law of standing and valuation after the slaughter, for it is written:

If he slaughtered it

the animal

two or the majority of two, and it is still convulsing, it is like a living creature in all its respects

and it is possible to make it stand .

The Gemara moves to another discussion concerning the laws of slaughter .

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: One who slaughters in two or three places,

who began to slaughter in one place but did not slaughter the majority of the signs there, and went and slaughtered in another place fit for slaughter along the length of the signs, and there slaughtered the majority of the signs , the law is that

his slaughter is fit

provided that he did not pause in the middle .

Rav Yehuda added:

When I said it before Shmuel

[when I said Rav’s words to Shmuel,] he disagreed with him and

said to me

that this slaughter is disqualified, because

we require exposed slaughter

[slaughter that is exposed] and recognizable. And when the slaughterer slaughters in several places, the cut is not clearly visible to the eye of the observer ,

and there is no

recognizable slaughter in this.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish also held: We require exposed slaughter. For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: From where is it derived that slaughter must be exposed? For it is stated: “An arrow shot is their tongue; deceit he speaks”

[Jeremiah 9:7]. Thus slaughter is compared to the act of an arrow, which strikes in only one place.

Rabbi Elazar objected

from the Mishna to Shmuel and Reish Lakish:

Two people hold a knife and slaughter

one animal,

even

if

one

slaughtered

from above and one

slaughtered

from below—

their slaughter is fit.

It follows from the Mishna that the two slaughter with two knives, and one slaughtered toward the head, above, while the other slaughtered toward the chest, below.

And Rabbi Elazar asks:

Why

is their slaughter fit according to Shmuel and Reish Lakish,

when there is no exposed slaughter?!

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him:

According to Shmuel,

our Mishna

speaks

of one knife,

and the slaughter is exposed,

and two people

hold it and slaughter, and the meaning of the wording in the Mishna, “one above and one below,” is that one holds the knife near the animal’s head and the other holds it near its chest, and the slaughter is diagonal .

Rabbi Abba said to him

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

If so,

that this is the meaning of the Mishna,

this is why it taught concerning it

[what is written in the beraita in explanation of the Mishna]:

We are not concerned lest they sever

the two slaughterers

one upon the other.

Granted, if you say

that the Mishna deals

with two knives and two people

slaughtering with them,

it is well

[the words of the beraita are understood] and its intention is:

Lest you say, let us be concerned that perhaps they rely on one another, and this one will not come to make a majority and this one will not come to make a majority

[one might say that there is reason to fear that each one will not slaughter the majority of the signs because he will rely on his fellow to slaughter properly], and one who does not slaughter the majority of the signs does not kill the animal but makes it a tereifa,

it teaches us that we are not concerned

about this .

But if you say

that the Mishna speaks

of one knife and two people

slaughtering with it, it is difficult:

this

wording,

“We are not concerned lest they sever one upon the other,”

for there is no reason to fear that they will not slaughter the majority of the two signs; the only matter that there would be reason to fear is that, because two people are pressing a knife upon the neck, they will sever the head all at once, and if so,

“lest they crush one upon the other” should have been required

for the tannai of the beraita to say.