Chullin 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this: If completing the slaughter is indispensable to the service,

if so, it is a service

of Yom Kippur performed

by another

who is not the High Priest,

and it was taught in a beraita: All the services of Yom Kippur are valid only when performed by him!

And we answer:

This is what Reish Lakish is saying:

Reish Lakish said:

One might have thought

that if he did not complete the slaughter, it

would be disqualified by rabbinic decree, for one might have thought that there is a rabbinic disqualification

in sacrificial animals if all the סימanim were not slaughtered; however, the Sages did not make the matter so stringent that this service would be considered an invalid service when performed by an ordinary koen.

Therefore we learned: “One majority in a bird and one majority of two in an animal,”

which teaches that there is no rabbinic disqualification when he did not complete the slaughter.

And we inquire:

But since there is not even a rabbinic disqualification, why does he have to complete the slaughter?

Would it not have been preferable not to perform the service through another?

And we answer: Nevertheless,

it is a mitzva to complete the slaughter

in order to extract all the blood, and it is preferable to fulfill this mitzva even through another.

The Gemara now cites a dispute among the amoraim concerning the nature of slaughter.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Levi the Elder:

The slaughter

does not

receive

the

designation

of slaughter until its end

of the slaughter; but the beginning of the act of slaughter is not called slaughter with regard to halakhot that depend on the designation “slaughter.”

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Slaughter applies from the beginning through the end

The entire act is called slaughter.

The Gemara now explains the practical halakhic difference between the positions of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan .

Rava said: Everyone agrees

that if the beginning of the slaughter was not performed in accordance with its halakha, for example,

where a gentile slaughtered one siman, and

afterward

an Israelite slaughtered one siman, such that

the slaughter

is invalid 81 ,

because even according to Reish Lakish, we do not say that we follow the end of the slaughter,

since an act rendering it an animal with a fatal defect was performed on it by a gentile,

and any animal whose one siman has been severed is an animal with a fatal defect unless the severing was performed in accordance with the conditions of the laws of slaughter.

Rava presents another case that might have been thought to depend on the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, and Rava rejects this and says that in this case too there is in truth no dispute.

Just as Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to slaughter, so do they disagree with regard to melika. According to Reish Lakish, the designation “melika” applies only to the end of the melika; according to Rabbi Yohanan, the entire act is called melika.

There are two differences between the bird sin-offering and the bird burnt-offering with regard to melika.

a. For a sin-offering, one must perform melika on one siman, whereas for a burnt-offering one must perform melika on two simanim.

b. The place for performing melika on a bird burnt-offering is above the red line . The koen would ascend the ramp and turn toward the surrounding walkway of the altar, and there he would perform melika. If he performed it below, it was invalid; in the case of a sin-offering, he would perform it below. [Zevahim 64b].

And Rava says:

In the case of a bird burnt-offering as well,

although it might have been possible to say:

where he performed melika on one siman below

not in accordance with the halakha governing its melika,

and one siman above

in accordance with its halakha, this matter should depend on the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish: If the designation “melika” applies to its end, the melika was performed in its proper place; and if the designation “melika” applies from its beginning, the melika was not performed in its proper place.

In truth, the burnt-offering is

invalid

even according to Reish Lakish, and although with regard to a burnt-offering the completion of the melika is on the second siman,

since

when he performed melika on one siman,

he performed on it

something that constitutes the completion of

the act of a bird sin-offering

and he performed it invalidly

below,

so there is here an invalid completion of melika.

Rava explains that there is a practical difference between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard.

One who slaughters outside the courtyard is liable for karet. One who slaughters a consecrated bird outside the courtyard is liable as well, although its prescribed act is melika in the courtyard: he is liable for slaughtering it outside, not for performing melika outside .

Rava says:

They disagree only

in

a case where he slaughtered one siman

of a bird burnt-offering

outside and one siman inside. According to the one who says

slaughter applies from the beginning through the end

he is liable

for the beginning of the slaughter performed outside.

According to the one who says

slaughter applies only at the end

he is not liable

since the slaughter was completed inside, and before that the act was not called slaughter.

According to Rava, in this case the slaughterer is not liable for one siman on the grounds that it is sufficient to perform melika on one siman for a bird sin-offering, since he did not perform melika on the bird; rather, he slaughtered it. It is impossible to say that he completed outside the act that must be performed for a bird sin-offering. Since the Torah makes one liable for slaughter, the completion of the act of slaughter must be determined according to what must be done for a bird burnt-offering, because he slaughtered a bird burnt-offering outside .

Rabba bar Shimi said

to Rava:

Master did not say this, and who was it

—and who, then, was this master?

Rav Yosef.

According to Rav Yosef, even

where he slaughtered one siman outside and one siman inside, it is also invalid

and he is liable for karet according to all opinions. Although he slaughtered a burnt-offering, for which two simanim must be subjected to melika, nevertheless, one siman is considered the completion of the slaughter,

since he performed upon it the act of a bird sin-offering outside,

even though he slaughtered it rather than performing melika.

And Rav Yosef says:

They disagree only

in

a case where he slaughtered a minority of the simanim outside and completed them inside

88 . According to the one who says: Slaughter applies from the beginning through the end—

he is liable; according to the one who says: Slaughter applies only at the end—

he is not liable,

because a minority of the simanim does not constitute the completion of the act for any offering .

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

from a Mishna in tractate Para against Rabbi Yohanan:

All those engaged with the red

cow

from beginning through end

of its procedures, from the one who slaughters it until the one who gathers its ashes, are impure and

render the garments impure

that they are wearing at the time of the service.

And

those engaged with it

disqualify it

if they engage

in another labor

while carrying it out, for the verses were expounded to teach that a red cow is disqualified through performing another labor.

If a disqualification occurred in its slaughter

for example, it became a neveila, it imparts impurity as a neveila, but it does not impart impurity to those engaged with it by virtue of the laws of the red cow at all , and

whether before its disqualification or after its disqualification—

it does not render garments impure

since it was never valid, and all those engaged with it are not engaged with a red cow.

And if a particular disqualification occurred

during its sprinkling,

when its blood is sprinkled seven times toward the Sanctuary, those engaged with it

before its disqualification—

render their garments impure

because they engaged with it while it was still valid; whereas those engaged with it

after its disqualification—

do not render their garments impure

because they did not engage with a valid red cow.

And

Rabbi Zeira asks:

If you say that slaughter applies from the beginning through the end,

and the beginning of the cow’s slaughter is fit to render the person engaged with it impure, then

let the tanna also distinguish

[the tanna could also make a distinction]

with regard to its slaughter

and say:

If a disqualification occurred in its slaughter,

for example, he paused in the middle of the slaughter, then the one who slaughtered it

before its disqualification—

renders his garments impure,

whereas the one who slaughtered it

after its disqualification,

if it was another person—

does not render his garments impure

!

Rava said:

In

the case where the slaughter became defective, you are speaking

—is there room to distinguish between before the disqualification and after the disqualification? That is not so. Rather, even according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that the beginning of the slaughter is called slaughter,

there it is different,

in the case where the slaughter became defective,

the matter is retroactively revealed

[that the matter was clarified retroactively]

that it is not slaughter at all,

and only when the entire slaughter was valid is its beginning called slaughter .

Rava said: If this Mishna presents me with a difficulty

[if it is difficult for me]—I do not find it difficult from this Mishna with regard to Rabbi Yohanan. Rather,

this is what is difficult for me: According to the one who says that slaughter applies only at the end, let the tanna distinguish

[let the tanna make a distinction] in the first clause of the Mishna, which deals with

the fitness of the cow,

and states that all those engaged with the cow render garments impure, and let it say that the one who begins the slaughter does not render garments impure, and

for example, they slaughtered it through two men

[through two people],

so that the first man does not render garments impure, whereas the second man renders garments impure!

Rav Yosef said

to Rava:

Are you saying that two men performed one slaughter?!

[You mean that the Mishna should speak of two men who slaughtered a single offering?!]

Put that aside

[remove this possibility from your mind], because this may not be done, and it is not customary for people to act improperly in this manner .

For we learned: “You shall slaughter”

teaches

that two people should not slaughter one offering. “You shall slaughter it”

teaches

that one person should not slaughter two offerings.

And Rav Kahana said: “You shall slaughter it” is written 93 .

From this beraita, Rav Yosef learned that a red cow should not be slaughtered by two people, since the procedure of the red cow follows the law of an offering. Rav Yosef understood that there is no difference between two people slaughtering together and two people slaughtering one after the other.