Chullin 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear:

an objection to Rav from a beraita:

If one slaughtered half of the windpipe and paused during it,

the measure of a pause that invalidates the slaughter, which is

the time required for another slaughter, and then completed it—

his slaughter is valid,

and the pause does not invalidate it, because the first part of the slaughter is regarded as an act of cutting that does not render the animal a tereifa, since most of the windpipe had not been cut.

And if you say that half is considered like a majority,

it is impossible to regard the cutting of half the windpipe as merely cutting, since half is like a majority, and

it has become a tereifa!

And we answer:

Do you think

that this

animal

is the subject of the beraita, in which it is certain that the slaughter was not completed when half the windpipe was cut?

No,

rather, it is speaking

of a bird,

with which

in either case

the slaughter is valid. For

if half is considered like a majority,

as is indeed the Torah law,

he has already performed the majority

before the pause, and a bird is rendered fit through the slaughter of one סימן. And

if half is not considered like a majority,

as provided by the Sages, who were stringent and required the slaughter of a majority, then with regard to rendering it a tereifa as well,

he has done nothing

by cutting half the windpipe, and the slaughter takes place after the pause.

Come and hear:

a proof from a beraita that states a law similar to that of the preceding beraita, but it cannot be reconciled in the same manner as the preceding beraita.

As it was taught:

If half the windpipe had been defective

before the slaughter,

and the slaughterer added to it

the slaughterer

even the slightest amount and completed it—

his slaughter is valid.

And if you say that half is considered like a majority,

then even before he slaughtered,

it was already a tereifa!

Rava said

in answer: Indeed, throughout the Torah half is considered like a majority; however,

with regard to rendering an animal a tereifa, it is different, for we require

in those contexts where a majority is mentioned, such as with regard to the windpipe,

a majority perceptible to the eye,

and the animal or bird becomes a tereifa not through a majority established by legal calculation, but through an actual majority.

Abaye said to him: Is this not an a fortiori inference

that with regard to slaughter, the majority must be an actual majority?!

And with regard to a tereifa,

where a general law requiring a majority is not stated,

for

in many places

even the slightest amount

is sufficient for it to

become a tereifa,

as, for example, in the case of the esophagus—and nevertheless,

where we require a majority

in a place where a majority is required,

we require a majority perceptible to the eye.

Slaughter,

which has a major general principle,

that it is not rendered valid until there is a majority—surely it is all the more so necessary that there be

a

majority perceptible to the eye!

The Gemara therefore retracts and says:

Rather, everyone

holds that throughout the Torah

half is not considered like a majority.

And when the dispute was stated

between

Rav and Rav Kahana, it was stated only with regard to

the offering of

the Paschal offering.

alone;

That

is the context of the dispute. If the majority of the Jewish people were impure due to contact with the dead, they offer the Paschal offering in a state of ritual impurity, because impurity was permitted for the community. At that time, the pure people also offer it together with those who are impure. But if only a minority of the Jewish people were impure due to contact with the dead, the impure minority is deferred to the Second Pesaḥ.

Rav and Rav Kahana disputed the following case:

If the Jewish people were half

of them

pure and half

of them

impure.

Rav said: Half is considered like a majority.

The pure people offer the Paschal offering separately and do not include an impure person with them, because with regard to the pure people impurity was not permitted, since in terms of their half they are considered a majority of pure people. The impure people, who are neither a majority of impure people nor a minority of impure people, have the status of a majority of impure people, who offer the Paschal offering in impurity. However, they offer it separately and are not deferred to the Second Pesaḥ, because with regard to them impurity was permitted, as in the case of a majority of impure people.

And Rav Kahana said: Half is not considered like a majority.

The impure people, who constitute a minority rather than a majority, are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ.

And we challenge this:

And there,

with regard to the Paschal offering,

what is Rav’s reason?

For throughout the Torah half is not considered like a majority, and since the majority of the community was not impure, impurity should not be permitted!

And we answer: With regard to the Paschal offering, there is a derivation teaching that the permission of impurity is not dependent upon a majority of the community. Rather, it was not stated with regard to individuals, who are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ,

as it is written: “Any man who will become impure through contact with a dead person”

[Numbers 9:10].

And we interpret:

“A man” is deferred, but a community is not deferred,

and half of Israel has left the category of individuals.

We learned in our Mishna:

A majority of one [of the סימנים] in a bird

and a majority of two in an animal—its slaughter is valid.

And we raise the following question:

Did we not learn this once already

at the beginning of the Mishna:

The majority of one

is like the entirety of it,

so why did the Mishna repeat this law twice?

[unclear: the expression in the source is corrupted]

Rav Hoshaya said: One

clause speaks

of non-sacred animals, and one

clause speaks

of sacrificial animals.

And we explain:

It was necessary

for our Mishna to teach this law both with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals.

For had it taught

the Mishna with regard to

non-sacred animals,

one might have said:

There, it is sufficient for it with a majority

only there,

because he does not require the blood

but only the extraction of the soul.

But

with regard to

sacrificial animals, for he requires the blood

to perform the sacrificial service with it,

say that a majority is not sufficient for it

[perhaps a majority of the סימנים is insufficient]

until there is the entirety

and all the blood fit to be sprinkled upon the altar has emerged; otherwise the slaughter is not valid.

And had it taught

the Mishna with regard to

sacrificial animals,

one might have said: With regard to sacrificial animals specifically, one must slaughter a majority and less is insufficient,

because he requires the blood; but

with regard to

non-sacred animals, since he does not require the blood, say that half is sufficient for him

[perhaps half of the סימן is sufficient],

it teaches us

that with regard to non-sacred animals the slaughter is not valid with less than a majority of a סימן, whereas with regard to sacrificial animals the slaughter is valid with a majority of a סימן.

And we clarify:

Which clause concerns non-sacred animals and which concerns sacrificial animals?

[Which part of the Mishna speaks of non-sacred animals, and which part speaks of sacrificial animals?]

Rav Kahana said: It stands to reason

that the

first clause

speaks

of non-sacred animals, and the latter clause of sacrificial animals. From where

is this evident? Because it teaches

“The one who slaughters

one in a bird,” and

if it enters your mind

that the

first clause

speaks

of sacrificial animals,

then

it should have had to teach: “The one who pinches,”

since the law of sacrificial birds is melika, not slaughter.

And we challenge this:

Rather, what

are

the

latter clause

speaking

of sacrificial animals? But then the same difficulty applies to the latter clause, which states

“its slaughter is valid,”

whereas in truth

it should have had to say: “its pinching is valid”!

And we say:

That is not difficult

with regard to the latter clause, for the latter clause states: “A majority of one in a bird and a majority of two in an animal—its slaughter is valid,” and

since it concluded with an animal

[and since the tanna concluded his statement with an animal,

he also taught

a formulation appropriate to the matter stated immediately afterward—

“its slaughter is valid.” But the first clause

certainly presents a difficulty,

since

the expression “the one who slaughters”

refers to a bird,

as immediately after “the one who slaughters” it says “one in a bird,” and afterward it says “two in an animal,”

if it enters your mind

that the tanna is speaking

of sacrificial animals, it should have had to say: “The one who pinches”!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said:

There is proof that the

first clause

speaks

of non-sacred animals from here, for it teaches

in the first clause: “The one who slaughters

one in a bird

—its slaughter is valid.”

And if it enters your mind

that the first clause speaks

of sacrificial animals,

it is true that only in the case of a bird sin-offering is it necessary to pinch one סימן, but

there is also a bird burnt-offering, which requires two סימנים!

And we challenge this:

Rather, what

according to your words, does the

latter clause

speak

of sacrificial animals?

For then, too, the statement in the latter clause presents a difficulty:

“A majority of one in a bird”—there is also a bird burnt-offering, which requires two סימנים!

And we answer: The latter clause can be interpreted as follows:

What does “a majority of one” mean? It means

the majority of each and every one

of the two סימנים.

And

although in truth, if two סימנים must be pinched,

it would be proper for it to teach “a majority of two”

with regard to a bird,

since there is

among sacrificial animals also

a sin-offering

of a bird

for which one סימן is sufficient, for that reason he could not state it unequivocally

[he could not definitively say “a majority of two”], and the tanna used wording that can be interpreted according to the truth both in the case of a sin-offering and in the case of a burnt-offering. In the first clause, however, the Mishna cannot be interpreted as referring to a bird burnt-offering at all.

Rav Pappa said:

There is proof that the

first clause

speaks

of non-sacred animals from here, for it teaches

in the first clause:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he slaughters the veins”

in order to extract the blood,

and the Rabbis disagree with him

and hold that it is not necessary to extract the blood.

Granted, if you say

that it is speaking

of non-sacred animals, it is well understood

[that the Rabbis do not require the blood to be extracted].

But if you say

that it is speaking

of sacrificial animals, why do the Rabbis disagree with him,

for

it

[the offering]

itself

and its essential purpose

require the blood

to be sprinkled upon the altar, upon which the atonement depends, and certainly, ideally, one must slaughter the veins so that more blood will emerge!

Rav Ashi said:

It can be learned that the

latter clause

speaks

of sacrificial animals from here, for it teaches

in the latter clause of the following Mishna:

“The one who slaughters two [animals], the first

of the animals

at once—

his slaughter is valid.”

Rav Ashi inferred: The wording

“the one who slaughters”

implies

after the fact, yes; ideally, no,

he should not slaughter two at the same time.

Granted, if you say

that it is speaking

of sacrificial animals, this is

the reason

that ideally he should not, because

there is a beraita that derives from the verse that two offerings should not be slaughtered simultaneously.

For Rav Yosef taught:

The Torah states: “When you slaughter a peace-offering to the Lord, you shall slaughter it for your acceptance” [Leviticus 19:5]. From the part of the word

“you shall slaughter”

that is written in the singular, it is derived

that two people may not slaughter one offering 76 ,

and from the end of the word, which is written

“you shall slaughter it,”

it is derived that he must slaughter only that offering, and

that one person may not slaughter two offerings.

The question is raised: How can the word “you shall slaughter it” be expounded to mean that one person must slaughter it, rather than two? On the contrary, it is written in the plural!

And Rav Kahana said:

Although the pronunciation is tizbeḥuhu,

“you shall slaughter it” is written

in the singular, and the written form is authoritative.

And we return to our matter and say:

But if you say

that the latter clause speaks

of non-sacred animals,

then

even ideally

the slaughterer may slaughter two animals simultaneously.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish likewise held: The first clause concerns non-sacred animals and the latter clause sacrificial animals,

in accordance with the view of all these amoraim.

For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Since we learned

in the first clause of the Mishna

“The majority of one is like the entirety of it,” why did we learn

it once again in the latter clause,

“A majority of one in a bird and a majority of two in an animal”?

Because the latter clause introduces this law with regard to sacrificial animals, since one might err in understanding another Mishna and infer from it that the offering is not valid until all the סימנים have been slaughtered.

Since we learned

in tractate Yoma:

They brought him

to the High Priest

the daily offering

of the morning of Yom Kippur. He had to perform all the sacrificial rites himself, because the service of Yom Kippur is valid only when performed by the High Priest. Therefore,

he made the initial cut,

he quickly cut through the majority of both סימנים of the daily offering, and immediately received the blood in a vessel,

and completed,

and another priest completed

its slaughter on his behalf

[for him].

One might have thought: If he did not complete it, it is invalid,

because with regard to sacrificial animals it is insufficient to slaughter the majority of two סימנים; rather, they must be cut entirely.

For this reason we learned, “A majority of one in a bird and a majority of two in an animal,”

to teach that after the fact, cutting through a majority of the סימנים is sufficient even with regard to sacrificial animals.

The Master said: One might have thought

[it could have been said] that if

he did not complete it, it is invalid.