Chullin 29a — the Talmud in English

Ta shma

an objection to Rav from a beraita:

If he slaughtered half of the windpipe and paused in it

the measure of a pause that invalidates, which is

the time required for another slaughter, and he completed it —

his slaughter is valid,

and the pause does not invalidate it, because the first part of the slaughter is treated as an act of cutting that does not render the animal a tereifa, since the majority of the windpipe was not cut.

And if you say that half is like a majority,

it is impossible to regard the slaughter of half the windpipe as cutting, for half is like a majority, and

it became a tereifa!

And we answer:

Do you hold

that this beraita is discussing

an animal

in which it is certainly the case that the slaughter was not completed when he slaughtered half the windpipe?

No,

rather, it is discussing

a bird,

in which

in either event

the slaughter is valid. For

if half is like a majority,

as is indeed the law by Torah law,

he has already made it a majority

before the pause, and a bird is valid through the slaughter of one sign. And

if half is not like a majority,

as is the enactment of the Sages, who were stringent and required slaughtering a majority, then with regard to rendering it a tereifa as well

he did not accomplish anything

when he slaughtered half the windpipe, and the slaughter occurs after the pause .

Come and hear a proof

from a beraita that states a law similar to that of the previous beraita, but cannot be explained in the same way as the previous one.

For it was taught:

If half the windpipe was defective

before the slaughter,

and he added to it

the slaughterer

anything at all and completed it —

his slaughter is valid.

And if you say that half is like a majority,

then before he slaughtered, it was already

a tereifa!

Rava said

as an answer: Indeed, everywhere in the Torah half is considered like a majority, but

it is different with regard to rendering it a tereifa, for we require

in places where a majority is mentioned, such as with the windpipe,

a majority apparent to the eyes,

and the animal or bird becomes a tereifa not through a majority according to the law, but through a majority in actuality.

Abaye said to him: And is it not all the more so

that with slaughter the majority must be an actual majority!

And with regard to a tereifa,

where the law of a majority is not generally stated,

for

in many places

with anything at all

it

becomes a tereifa,

such as in the esophagus, and nevertheless,

where we require a majority

in a place where a majority is required,

we require a majority apparent to the eyes.

Slaughter,

which has a great general principle,

that until there is a majority it does not become valid—how much more so do we require

that there be

a majority apparent to the eyes!

The Gemara therefore retracts and says:

Rather, everyone

holds that throughout the Torah

half is not like a majority.

And when

the dispute

of Rav and Rav Kahana was stated, it was stated with regard to

the offering of

the Pesaḥ

alone;

it was stated.

If the majority of Israel were impure with corpse impurity, they offer the Pesaḥ offering in impurity, because impurity was permitted for the community. Then even the pure person offers it together with the impure. But if only a minority of Israel were impure with corpse impurity, the few impure people are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ.

And Rav and Rav Kahana disputed:

If Israel were half

of them

pure and half

of them

impure.

Rav said: Half is like a majority.

The pure people perform the Pesaḥ by themselves and do not join an impure person to them, because with regard to the pure people impurity was not permitted, since on account of their half they are like a majority of pure people. And the impure people, who are neither a majority of impure people nor a minority of impure people, have the status of a majority of impure people, who perform the Pesaḥ in impurity, but they perform it by themselves and are not deferred to the Second Pesaḥ, because with regard to them impurity was permitted, as is the law of a majority of impure people.

And Rav Kahana said: Half is not like a majority.

The impure people, who are a minority and not a majority, are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ.

And we object:

And there,

with regard to the Pesaḥ,

what is Rav’s reason?

For throughout the Torah half is not considered a majority, and since the majority of the community is not impure, impurity is not permitted!

And we answer: With regard to the Pesaḥ offering there is a derivation that the permission of impurity does not depend on a majority of the community, but it was not stated with regard to individuals, and they are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ:

as it is written: “Any person who will become impure through a corpse”

[Numbers 9:10].

And we expound:

“A person” is deferred, but a community is not deferred,

and half of Israel has left the category of individuals.

We learned in our Mishna:

A majority of one [sign] in a bird

and a majority of two in an animal—its slaughter is valid.

And we inquire:

Did we not learn this once

at the beginning of the Mishna:

The majority of one —

is like the whole of it,

so why did the Mishna repeat this law twice?

[unclear: corrupt source wording]

Rav Hoshaya said: One

clause speaks

of non-sacred animals, and one

clause speaks

of sacrificial animals.

And we explain:

And it is necessary

for our Mishna to teach this law both with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals.

For had it taught us

the Mishna with regard to

non-sacred animals,

it could have been said:

There it is sufficient for it with a majority

there specifically is a majority sufficient

because he does not need the blood

but only the release of the soul,

but

with regard to

sacrificial animals, for he needs the blood

to perform the service with it,

say that a majority is not sufficient for it

perhaps a majority of the signs is not sufficient

until there is the whole of it

and all the blood fit to be sprinkled upon the altar emerges, and otherwise the slaughter is not valid.

And had it taught us

the Mishna with regard to

sacrificial animals,

it could have been said: With sacrificial animals specifically one must slaughter a majority and not less,

because he needs the blood, but

with regard to

non-sacred animals, for he does not need the blood, say that half is sufficient for it

perhaps half of a sign is sufficient for it,

it teaches us

that with non-sacred animals the slaughter is not valid with less than a majority of a sign, while with sacrificial animals the slaughter is valid with a majority of a sign.

And we clarify:

Which is [the clause] with regard to non-sacred animals and which is [the clause] with regard to sacrificial animals?

Rav Kahana said: It is reasonable

Rav Kahana said: It is reasonable

that the

first clause

speaks

of non-sacred animals, and the final clause of sacrificial animals. From where [do we know this]? Since it teaches

in the first clause

“The slaughterer

one in a bird,”

and if it enters your mind

that the

first clause

speaks

of sacrificial animals,

then

“the one who performs melika” should have been required to be taught,

for the law of a sacrificial bird is melika and not slaughter.

And we object:

Rather, what

do you say, that the

final clause

speaks

of sacrificial animals?

But then the same objection applies to the final clause, in which it is written

“its slaughter is valid,”

whereas in truth

“its melika is valid” should have been required!

And we say:

This is not difficult

with regard to the final clause, for the final clause says: A majority of one in a bird and a majority of two in an animal—its slaughter is valid, and

since he concluded with an animal

and since the tanna completed his words with an animal,

he also taught

the wording belonging to the matter written immediately afterward —

“its slaughter is valid”; but the first clause

certainly has an objection to be raised against it:

since

the wording “the slaughterer”

refers to a bird,

for immediately after “the slaughterer” it says “one in a bird,” and afterward it says “two in an animal,”

if it enters your mind

that the tanna is dealing

with sacrificial animals, “the one who performs melika” should have been required to be taught!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said:

There is proof that the

first clause

speaks

of non-sacred animals from here, for it teaches

in the first clause: “The slaughterer

one in a bird

—its slaughter is valid.”

And if it enters your mind

that the first clause speaks

of sacrificial animals,

it is indeed true that only in the bird sin-offering is it necessary to perform melika on one sign, but

there is the bird burnt-offering, for which two signs are required!

And we object:

Rather, what

according to your words, the

final clause

speaks

of sacrificial animals?

But then too there is a difficulty from what is written in the final clause:

“A majority of one in a bird”—there is the bird burnt-offering, for which two signs are required!

And we answer: In the final clause it can be interpreted:

What does “a majority of one” mean? —

The majority of each and every one

of the two signs,

and

although in truth, if two signs must be performed by melika,

it would be proper for it to teach “a majority of two”

with regard to a bird, but

since there is

among sacrificial animals also

a sin-offering

of a bird

for which one sign is sufficient, therefore it was not definite for him

[unclear: source bracket closes after “not definite for him”] to say “a majority of two,” and the tanna used wording that can be interpreted with regard to the sin-offering according to the truth and with regard to the burnt-offering according to the truth, whereas in the first clause it is impossible to interpret the Mishna as referring to the bird burnt-offering at all.

Rav Pappa said:

There is proof that the

first clause

speaks

of non-sacred animals from here: for it teaches

in the first clause:

“Rabbi Judah says: Until he slaughters the veins”

in order to remove the blood,

and the Sages disagree with him

and hold that it is not necessary to remove the blood.

Granted, if you say

that it is speaking

of non-sacred animals, it is well

[unclear: source’s parenthetical says “the matter is understood”] that according to the Sages it is not necessary to remove the blood,

but if you say

that it is speaking

of sacrificial animals, why do the Sages disagree with him,

for

it

the offering

itself

and its essence

is for the blood that he needs

to sprinkle upon the altar, on which the atonement depends, and certainly one should initially slaughter the veins so that more blood will emerge.

Rav Ashi said:

It can be learned that the

final clause

speaks

of sacrificial animals from here, for it teaches

in the final clause of the following Mishna:

One who slaughters two firstborn animals

of animals

at once —

his slaughter is valid.

And Rav Ashi analyzed: From the wording

“the slaughterer”

it implies

after the fact, yes; initially, no,

he should not slaughter two together.

Granted, if you say

that it is speaking

of sacrificial animals, this is

the reason

that initially he should not, because

there is a beraita that derives from the verse that two offerings should not be slaughtered at once.

For Rav Yosef taught:

It is written in the Torah, “When you slaughter a peace-offering to the Lord, you shall slaughter it for your acceptance” [Leviticus 19:5], and they expound from part of the word

“you shall slaughter”

which is in the singular,

that two should not slaughter one offering 76 ,

and from the end of the word, which is written

“you shall slaughter it,”

they expound that he should slaughter only it,

and that one should not slaughter two offerings.

And the question is asked: How do they derive from the word “you shall slaughter it” that one person should slaughter and not two? On the contrary, a plural wording is stated here!

And Rav Kahana said:

Even though the pronunciation is tizbeḥuhu,

“you shall slaughter it” is written

in the singular, and the written form is authoritative.

And we return to our matter and say:

But if you say

that the final clause speaks

of non-sacred animals,

then

even initially as well

the slaughterer may slaughter two animals at once.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish likewise held: The first clause is about non-sacred animals and the final clause about sacrificial animals

like all these amoraim.

For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Since we learned

in the first clause of the Mishna

“The majority of one is like the whole of it,” why did we learn

it once again in the final clause,

“A majority of one in a bird and a majority of two in an animal”?

For the final clause innovates the law with regard to sacrificial animals, since there is room for an error in understanding another Mishna and to infer from it that the offering is not valid until all the signs have been slaughtered.

Since we learned

in tractate Yoma:

They brought him

to the High Priest

the daily offering

of the morning of the Day of Atonement. He must perform all the services of the offering himself, because the service of the Day of Atonement is valid only through the High Priest. Therefore

he cut,

he quickly cut the majority of the two signs of the daily offering, and immediately received the blood in a vessel,

and completed,

and another priest completed

his slaughter on his behalf

[for him].

One might think: If he did not complete it, it should be invalid,

because with sacrificial animals slaughtering a majority of two is insufficient; rather, they must be cut completely.

For this reason we learned, “A majority of one in a bird and a majority of two in an animal,”

to say that after the fact, cutting a majority of the signs is sufficient even with sacrificial animals.

The master said: One might think

[it could have been said] that if

he did not complete it, it should be invalid.