Chullin 23b — the Talmud in English

For if you raise the question according to the view of Bar Peda, ![](pamud.bmp "

")

who says

that the palges is a matter of uncertainty, and consequently no verse is needed to teach that the libations of a ram are brought with the palges; rather, because of the uncertainty one

brings

ram libations, which are more abundant than the libations of a lamb,

and stipulates,

making the following condition: If the palges is a ram, all the libations shall be applied toward the obligation of the offering; and if it is a lamb, the libations required for a lamb shall be applied toward the obligation of the offering, while the remainder shall have the status of a voluntary offering.

It may now be uncertain:

Do we say that he stipulates only concerning a ram and a lamb,

that

he stipulates,

since in his condition he mentions only these two possibilities, that perhaps the palges is a ram or a lamb, but

he does not stipulate concerning an independent creature,

that he does not say that if the palges is an independent creature and is not subject to libations at all [as Bar Peda does not derive from the verse that the palges is included with regard to libations], all the libations shall have the status of a voluntary offering. This is because according to Bar Peda there is no possibility of uncertainty that the palges is an independent creature; the entire uncertainty is only whether it is a ram or a lamb. Therefore, if one who takes a vow says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering from a ram or from a lamb,” and he brings a palges, he has fulfilled his obligation in either event, since what is before us is either a ram or a lamb?

Or perhaps he also stipulates concerning an independent creature,

that this too is included in the uncertainty, that perhaps the palges is an independent creature,

who says

that in addition to the stipulation that it may be a ram or a lamb, he must also say:

If it is an independent creature

and is not subject to libations at all,

let all of it be

libations

a voluntary offering.

And with regard to our issue, one who took a vow and brought a palges has not fulfilled his obligation, as perhaps the palges is neither a ram nor a lamb.

The Gemara concludes:

Teyku!

Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring

принести

the loaves of a todah-offering from leavened bread or from unleavened bread,

as one is required to bring forty loaves with a todah-offering, thirty of unleavened bread and ten of leavened bread, and he took a vow to bring only ten loaves [without an offering], of whichever type he wishes, either leavened or unleavened bread,

and he brought shi'ur,

a loaf made from dough that began to leaven but did not fully leaven; consequently, it has left the category of unleavened bread but has not yet reached the category of leavened bread, and it is called “shi'ur.”

What

is the halakha: Has he fulfilled his vow?

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree concerning what “shi'ur” is and what its status is. According to Rabbi Meir, dough whose surface has become pale, meaning that it has whitened on the outside, is “shi'ur.” If it leavens further, until cracks form in it, even if the cracks are thin and appear like the antennae of locusts [a crack in one direction and a crack in another], it is complete leaven, and one is liable to receive karet for eating it on Passover. But when it is “shi'ur,” one is not liable to receive karet for it; nevertheless, one is flogged for it on account of “You shall not eat any leavened substance,” like any hard leaven that is unfit for eating. This shi'ur too, which has leavened slightly but has not completed the leavening process, is unfit for eating.

Rabbi Yehuda is more lenient than Rabbi Meir in two respects: a. If “its surface has become pale,” it is still unleavened bread; only when it has “the antennae of locusts” is it considered “shi'ur,” until the cracks multiply and intersect with one another, at which point it is complete leaven. b. One is not flogged for eating “shi'ur”; rather, it is prohibited to eat.

The Gemara now considers this dilemma of Rabbi Zeira:

Whose shi'ur

is under discussion, and according to whose view did Rabbi Zeira raise his uncertainty?

If

it is

Rabbi Meir’s shi'ur,

whose surface has become pale but has not yet cracked like the antennae of locusts, and the uncertainty is

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

whether the one who took the vow fulfills it with bread made from this shi'ur or not, this is difficult: This bread

is excellent unleavened bread

according to Rabbi Yehuda, and certainly one fulfills his obligation with it as unleavened bread.

If

it is

Rabbi Yehuda’s shi'ur,

once it has cracked like the antennae of locusts, and the uncertainty is

according to Rabbi Meir,

there is likewise no uncertainty in this case, since

it is leavened bread

complete

it is

according to Rabbi Meir, and one fulfills his obligation with it as leavened bread.

And if

it is

Rabbi Meir’s shi'ur

according to

Rabbi Meir,

this too is difficult, for

one is flogged for it

according to Rabbi Meir;

it is leavened bread. [One is not liable to receive karet for it because it is unfit for eating.] If so, the one who took the vow fulfills it with this as leavened bread, so what is Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty?

[А то, что за него не полагается карет, объясняется тем, что он непригоден для еды.] Следовательно, человек, принявший обет, исполняет им свою обязанность как хамецом. В чём же тогда состоит сомнение Рабби Зеиры?

And we conclude:

Rather,

the dilemma concerns

Rabbi Yehuda’s shi'ur

according to

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that shi'ur is prohibited to eat but is not subject to flogging; it is therefore not certainly leavened bread, and the question is:

What

is the status of shi'ur? Is it

a matter of uncertainty,

an uncertainty whether it is leavened bread or unleavened bread,

and he fulfills

the one who took the vow

in either event,

since he vowed to bring leavened or unleavened bread, and indeed he brought shi'ur, which is either leavened or unleavened bread?

Or perhaps

it is neither leavened nor unleavened bread, but

it is an independent entity, and he does not fulfill

his vow? And we raise an objection to the dilemma:

But didn’t Rav Huna say: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring only the loaves of a todah-offering

—

he must bring a todah-offering and its loaves.

This one who took the vow as well, who vowed to bring only ten loaves of a todah-offering, is obligated to bring a todah-offering with forty loaves.

And since he has become obligated to bring it, the todah-offering and its loaves,

this person must bring thirty loaves of unleavened bread and ten of leavened bread. If so, even if we maintain that shi'ur is a matter of uncertainty, he cannot use bread that is shi'ur for his vow, because

this man does not know whether what he brought is leavened bread

the shi'ur

so that he should bring

additional loaves of

unleavened bread

to complete them,

or if it is unleavened bread, so that he should bring

loaves of

leavened bread

in addition to the shi'ur. Necessarily, he must bring thirty loaves of unleavened bread and ten of leavened bread that are certainly of the required types. If so, what is Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty?

And we answer Rabbi Zeira:

It is necessary

to raise the dilemma only in a case

where he said,

the one who took the vow:

It is incumbent upon me to bring a loaf,

meaning ten loaves, in order

to exempt

with them

so-and-so’s todah-offering.

If so, he need not bring the todah-offering and the forty loaves; he need bring only ten loaves.

We nevertheless raise an objection:

Ultimately,

since the one who took the vow said, “in order to exempt so-and-so’s todah-offering,” he fulfills his obligation only if that person actually uses the shi'ur that the one who took the vow brings for his offering, so that from among the forty loaves he will be exempt from bringing ten loaves of his own. But he will not be able to use them, because

that man does not know

that person

whether it is leavened bread

the shi'ur

so that he should bring unleavened bread; or if it is unleavened bread, so that he should bring leavened bread.

Necessarily, the one who took the vow must bring ten loaves that are certainly either leavened or unleavened bread in order to exempt so-and-so’s todah-offering, and the difficulty concerning Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty remains.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to raise Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma only in a case

where he did not say

“It is incumbent upon me”

to exempt,

but rather said: “It is incumbent upon me to bring ten loaves for so-and-so’s todah-offering, from leavened or unleavened bread.” This is not in place of the loaves for which so-and-so is obligated, but in addition to them, as he thinks that it is possible to add a voluntary offering to the forty loaves of the todah-offering.

The dilemma of Rabbi Zeira now concerns a case in which the one who took the vow brought shi'ur: Is shi'ur an uncertainty whether it is leavened or unleavened bread, and

the person does fulfill his vow.

For he brought an item that is either leavened or unleavened bread, as he indeed vowed.

Or

perhaps it is an independent entity, and

he does not fulfill

his vow, since he brought neither leavened nor unleavened bread.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Mishna:

A red heifer is fit only if it was slaughtered. A heifer whose neck is broken is fit only if its neck was broken.

It follows that what is

valid for the red heifer

—

is invalid for the heifer whose neck is broken.

And what is

valid for the heifer whose neck is broken

—

is invalid for the red heifer.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: With regard to a red heifer,

if one performed its rite

by slaughtering it, it is fit.

If one performed its rite

by breaking its neck, it is invalid.

With regard to a heifer

whose neck is broken, if one performed its rite

by breaking its neck, it is fit.

If one performed its rite

by slaughtering it, it is invalid.

It follows that one learns: What is valid for the red heifer is invalid for the heifer whose neck is broken; what is valid for the heifer whose neck is broken is invalid for the red heifer.

And the Gemara discusses this:

But let the red heifer be fit when its neck is broken by means of a kal va-chomer: Just as a heifer whose neck is broken, which is not rendered fit through slaughter, is rendered fit through breaking its neck, all the more so a red heifer, which is rendered fit through slaughter, should it not be rendered fit through breaking its neck?