Chullin 16a — the Talmud in English

And we conclude the proof:

They contradict one another:

This beraita contradicts itself. For in its beginning it teaches that if one slaughters with [the knife] attached to the ground, his slaughtering is valid, while at the end it teaches that if one slaughters with a stone or a reed attached to the ground, his slaughtering is invalid!?

Rather, is it not [that] you may learn from this: there is a difference between something attached from the outset

such as the stone that projects from a wall that was not built by a person, but rather he dug in the ground and a wall came into being there by itself. And likewise, the reed grew by itself; in these cases the slaughtering is invalid even after the fact,

and

between

something detached and subsequently attached,

which is what the beraita speaks about at the beginning, in which case the slaughtering is valid after the fact.

Learn from this,

that indeed one must distinguish between something attached from the outset and something detached and subsequently attached. If so, it may be said that Rabbi also holds accordingly, and the apparent contradiction that we found in his words is resolved.

The Master said: If one slaughters with a machine, his slaughtering is valid.

And we raise an objection:

But was it not taught: His slaughtering is invalid?

And we answer:

It is not difficult: this

that teaches that his slaughtering is valid

is referring to a potter’s wheel,

a wheel that a person turns and to which the knife is attached, so that the slaughtering is performed through the force of the person; therefore it is valid.

This

that teaches that his slaughtering is invalid

is referring to a water wheel.

It is a wheel that turns through the force of the flow of water, so that the slaughtering is not performed through the force of the person; therefore it is invalid. For the slaughtering must be performed by a person.

And if you wish, say instead: Both this and that

the two beraitot speak

of a water wheel. And it is not difficult: this

that teaches that it is valid

is with the first force,

when the person removed the barrier preventing the water from flowing, and immediately when the water began to flow and to move the wheel, the animal was slaughtered by the wheel. This is considered slaughtering performed through the force of a person, and therefore the slaughtering is valid.

This

that teaches that it is invalid

is with the second force,

after the wheel had turned once or twice, and then the animal was slaughtered. This is already considered slaughtering performed through the force of the water, and therefore it is invalid.

And this distinction between the first force and the second force is found elsewhere as well:

And is this not what Rav Pappa said: One who binds his fellow,

he binds him with ropes,

and directs a water-channel against him,

he opened a water dam, and thereby directed the flow of water toward him,

and he dies,

by drowning in the water,

he is liable,

the one who bound him, as a murderer.

What is the reason

that he is liable? Was he not killed through the force of the water, while the person merely caused the matter?

Because

it is his arrows that benefited against him,

as though he had shot an arrow at him. For the force of this water, which he directed toward him, is considered like his arrows; and it is as though he killed him with his own hands, and not as an indirect causation.

And this applies

when he is considered like a murderer with his own hands, only

with the first force.

He bound him close to the place where the water emerged from the dam, and the water reached him immediately when he directed it toward him. In that case, the matter is considered to have been done through the force of the person who directed the water.

But with the second force,

if he bound him far from the place where he opened the dam and directed the water toward him, and only afterward the water reached him and drowned him, he is exempt, because

it is merely indirect causation,

and it is not considered as though he killed him with his own hands.

Rav was sitting behind Rabbi Hiyya, and Rabbi Hiyya

was sitting

before Rabbi. And Rabbi was sitting and saying: From where [do we know] that for slaughtering he

must slaughter specifically by means of something

detached

from the ground?

As it is stated: “And he took the slaughtering knife to slaughter”,

and a slaughtering knife is something that is not attached.

Rav said to Rabbi Hiyya: What is he saying

Rabbi?

Rav did not understand how it was possible to derive this from that verse, as will be explained below.

He said to him,

Rabbi Hiyya said to Rav:

He is saying the vav written on a log.

That is to say, Rabbi said something that is not correct. The matter resembles one who writes the letter vav on a split log: because the log is made of grooves, the vav appears broken and not smooth. So too, the matter that Rabbi said is not smooth.

And the Gemara discusses:

But Rabbi cites a verse,

so why should one not learn from it to invalidate slaughtering with something attached?

And we answer:

The verse comes to teach us Abraham’s zeal,

that he brought a slaughtering knife with him because he was concerned that he might not find at the place of the binding something with which to slaughter, even something attached. It was not because something attached is invalid for slaughtering.

Rava said: It is obvious to me

that something

detached and subsequently attached

to the ground is

considered detached with regard to idolatry.

For the law is that one who worships idolatry renders the object that he worshiped forbidden for benefit, but if the object that he worshiped was attached to the ground, it is not rendered forbidden, and this is specifically when it was attached to the ground from the beginning. But if it was initially detached and afterward attached to the ground, Rava says that its law is not like that of something attached. And even if he worshiped it now, after attaching it, it is rendered forbidden for benefit, like a detached object.

For Rav said: One who bows to his house renders it forbidden,

for benefit [but if the house is not his, he cannot render it forbidden].

And a house is something attached to the ground that was initially detached, for the stones from which the house was built had previously been detached.

And if it enters your mind

that something detached and subsequently attached

is considered attached,

why should the house be rendered forbidden? For something attached is not rendered forbidden through idolatry, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 12], “You shall utterly destroy …

their gods upon the mountains”;

and we interpret: specifically

their gods

that are

upon the mountains

must be destroyed,

but not the mountains

themselves, which were

their gods,

for they do not need to be destroyed, since they are attached to the ground, but they are permitted for benefit. Rather, certainly the reason the house is rendered forbidden is that something detached and subsequently attached has the status of something detached.

Every food item does not contract ritual impurity unless it was previously made fit to contract impurity. The making fit is accomplished by wetting it once with water or with other liquids, and from that point it can contract impurity.

Water has the power to make food fit only if importance was conferred upon it, in that a person desired it, meaning that he intended to use this water. It is not specifically required that this be for the food that is destined to be made fit through it; even if he intended to use it for another matter, that is sufficient [provided that it is something detached from the ground]. Then, even if the arrival of the water upon the food was against his will, the food was made fit, since water that he had deemed important came upon it.

And likewise, if initially he did not intend to use the water, but the arrival of the water upon the food was according to his will, then through this as well the water was used and became important through that, and the food was made fit to contract impurity.

Rava further said: It is obvious to me that

with regard to making produce fit

[a designation for every food item], the dispute

is a dispute among the tannaim

with regard to something detached and subsequently attached, whether it is considered detached or attached.

As we learned, [Makhshirin 4:5]:

by the rainwater, and afterward this water fell onto food, even against his will,

One who overturns a bowl,

who placed the bowl upside down and leaned it

against the wall

during the rainfall, if he did so

so that it would be washed,

the bowl by the rainwater, and afterward this water fell upon food even without his will,

it is in the category of “when it is put”,

meaning that the food was made fit to contract impurity, and what is written was fulfilled concerning it: “And if water is put upon seed and any of their carcass falls upon it, it is impure for you.” For from here we learn that only through the water coming upon the food is it made fit to contract impurity.

Since he intended to use the water for the bowl, which is something detached from the ground, the water became important through this, and it has the power to make food that touches it fit, even if he did not deem it important for the food; rather, on the contrary, the water’s arrival upon the food was against his will.

But if he overturned the bowl against the wall

so that the wall would not be struck

by the rain,

it is not in the category of “when it is put”,

and the food that touched this water was not made fit to contract impurity. Since these rainwaters did not become important, for he did not show desire for them, they do not have the power to make food fit to contract impurity [unless the arrival of the water upon the food was according to his will].

And the Gemara discusses:

This itself is difficult,

the Mishna contradicts itself. For

you said

at the beginning, “

So that it would be washed —

it is in the category of ‘when it is put’,”

and it implies specifically that if he desired the rain for the bowl, it makes [the food] fit.

This

is so if he overturned the bowl

so that the wall would be washed,

for example, he placed the bowl near the wall and intended that the water fall from the bowl upon the wall and wash it;

this is not in the category of “when it is put”!

Because the wall is considered something attached, and the water becomes important only if he intended to use it for something detached.

And afterward it teaches: “So that the wall would not be struck —

—

it is not in the category of ‘when it is put.’”

And it implies that specifically because he did not desire the rain at all, therefore it does not make [the food] fit.

This

is so if he overturned the bowl

so that the wall would be washed, it is in the category of “when it is put.”

Thus, the wall is considered something detached, and the beginning contradicts the end!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said: It is split.

Indeed, the beginning contradicts the end, and we are compelled to say that

the one who taught this did not teach that.

The beginning and the end were not taught by one tanna, but by two tannaim: one of them taught the beginning, and he holds that the wall is considered something attached; and the other taught the end, and in his view the wall is considered something detached. Their dispute depends upon this question: whether something detached and subsequently attached is considered attached or detached with regard to making produce fit. For the wall over which they disputed was initially something detached, since the stones of the wall were detached before the wall was built, and afterward, when it was built, it became attached to the ground. Rava’s view is also like Rabbi Elazar’s, and therefore he said that with regard to making produce fit, it is a dispute among the tannaim.

Rav Pappa said: The entire

Mishna of the one who overturns a bowl

is [the teaching of] one tanna.

And this tanna holds that something detached and subsequently attached is considered detached. And the beginning does not contradict the end, because

this,

the beginning, from which it is implied that the wall is considered attached, speaks

of the wall of a cave,

where the wall was not built by a person, but rather he dug around it in the ground and it came into being there by itself; therefore its law is like that of something attached, since it was attached from the outset. And

this,

the end, from which it is implied that the wall is considered something detached, speaks

of a building wall,

that is, an ordinary wall built from stones; therefore its law is like that of something detached, because this wall was detached and subsequently attached.

And this is what it is saying: One who overturns a bowl against the wall so that the bowl would be washed,

the bowl,

it is in the category of “when it is put.”

This

is so if he places it

so that the wall would be washed; it is not in the category of “when it is put,”

because the wall is considered something attached.

When are these words stated,

that it is considered attached?

With regard to the wall of a cave. But with regard to a building wall,

it is specifically if he places it

so that the wall would not be struck that it is not in the category of “when it is put,”

since he has no desire at all for these rains.

But if it is so that the wall would be washed, it is in the category of “when it is put,”

because such a wall is considered something detached, and he did intend to use these rains for something detached.