Chullin 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

And we conclude the proof:

They contradict one another:

this beraita contradicts itself. For in the first clause it teaches that one who slaughters with something attached to the ground, his slaughter is valid, whereas in the latter clause it teaches that one who slaughters with a rock or reed attached to the ground, his slaughter is invalid

! Rather, is it not apparent from this that there is a distinction between something attached from the outset,

for example, a rock that protrudes from a wall that was not built by a person, but rather was dug out of the ground and a wall formed there on its own; and likewise, a reed that grew on its own. In these cases, the slaughter is invalid even after the fact,

and

between

something detached and subsequently attached,

which is what the first clause of the beraita is discussing, in which case the slaughter is valid after the fact.

The conclusion follows from this,

that indeed a distinction must be made between something attached from the outset and something detached and subsequently attached. If so, one may say that Rabbi also holds accordingly, and the apparent contradiction we found in his statements is resolved.

The Master said: One who slaughters with a wheel, his slaughter is valid.

And we raise an objection:

But was it not taught in a beraita: His slaughter is invalid?

And we answer:

It is not difficult: This

that teaches that his slaughter is valid

refers to a pottery wheel,

a wheel that a person turns, with the knife attached to it. Since the slaughter is performed through human force, it is therefore valid.

That

that teaches that his slaughter is invalid

refers to a water wheel.

This is a wheel that turns through the force of a current of water. Since the slaughter is not performed through human force, it is therefore invalid, as slaughter must be performed by a person.

And if you wish, say instead: Both this and that,

the two beraitot, are speaking

of a water wheel. And it is not difficult: This one

that teaches that it is valid

— refers to the first force,

when the person removed the barrier preventing the water from flowing, and as soon as the water began to flow and turn the wheel, the animal was slaughtered by the wheel. This is considered slaughter performed through human force, and therefore the slaughter is valid.

That one

that teaches that it is invalid

— refers to the second force,

after the wheel had turned once or twice and the animal was then slaughtered. This is already considered slaughter performed through the force of the water, and it is therefore invalid.

We find this distinction between the first force and the second force elsewhere as well,

as in that which Rav Pappa said: If one bound another person,

binding him with ropes,

and directed a water channel upon him,

as he opened a water dam and thereby diverted the current of water toward him,

and he died,

by drowning in the water,

the one who bound him is liable,

the one who bound him being liable as a murderer.

What is the reason

that he is liable? After all, the victim was killed by the force of the water, and the person merely caused the event.

Because

his arrows are what acted upon him,

as though he had shot an arrow at him. For the force of this water, which he diverted toward him, is considered his arrows; it is therefore as though he killed him directly, and not merely through indirect causation

. And this applies

that he is considered to have killed him directly only

with the first force.

This is when he bound him close to the place where the water emerged from the dam, and the water reached him immediately when he diverted it toward him. In that case, the act is considered to have been performed through the force of the person who diverted the water.

But with the second force,

if he bound him far from the place where he opened the dam and diverted the water toward him, and only afterward did the water reach him and drown him, he is exempt, because

it is merely indirect causation,

and it is not considered as though he killed him directly.

Rav sat behind Rabbi Hiyya, and Rabbi Hiyya

was sitting

before Rabbi. And Rabbi sat and said: From where is it derived that slaughter must

be performed specifically with an object that is

detached

from the ground?

As it is stated: “And he took the slaughtering knife to slaughter,”

and a slaughtering knife is an object that is not attached.

Rav said to Rabbi Hiyya: What is Rabbi saying

Rabbi?

Rav did not understand how this could be derived from this verse, as will be explained below.

He said to him,

Rabbi Hiyya said to Rav:

He is saying that the vav written on a log is meant.

That is, Rabbi said something that is not correct. The matter is analogous to someone who writes the letter vav on a log: Since the log is full of grooves, the vav appears broken rather than smooth. So too, what Rabbi said is not sound.

The Gemara asks:

But Rabbi cited a verse,

so why can one not derive from it that slaughter with something attached is invalid?

And we answer:

The verse comes to teach us about Abraham’s alacrity,

for he brought a slaughtering knife with him because he was concerned that he might not find anything with which to slaughter at the place of the Binding, not even an attached object. It was not because an attached object is invalid for slaughter.

Rava said: It is obvious to me

that an object that is

detached and subsequently attached

to the ground is

considered detached with regard to idolatry.

The law is that when one worships an object as idolatry, the object that he worshipped becomes forbidden to derive benefit from. But if the object he worshipped was attached to the ground, it does not become forbidden, specifically when it was attached to the ground from the outset. However, if it was initially detached and was subsequently attached to the ground, Rava says that its status is not that of an attached object. Even if he worshipped it only now, after attaching it, it becomes forbidden to derive benefit from, like a detached object.

As Rav said: One who bows down to his house renders it forbidden,

to derive benefit from it [but he cannot render a house that does not belong to him forbidden].

A house is an object attached to the ground that was initially detached, since the stones from which the house was built had previously been detached.

And if it enters your mind

that something detached and subsequently attached

is considered attached,

why should the house become forbidden? After all, an attached object does not become forbidden as idolatry, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “You shall utterly destroy

their gods upon the mountains,”

and we expound: Specifically

their gods

that are

upon the mountains

must be destroyed,

but not the mountains

themselves, which were

their gods,

for they need not be destroyed, since they are attached to the ground; rather, they remain permitted to derive benefit from. Rather, certainly the reason the house becomes forbidden is that something detached and subsequently attached has the status of a detached object.

Any food does not contract ritual impurity unless it was first prepared to contract impurity. This preparation is accomplished by wetting the food once with water or another liquid; from that point onward, it can contract impurity.

Water can prepare food for ritual impurity only if it was given significance through a person’s desire for it, meaning that he intended to use this water. It need not be specifically for the food that will be prepared through it; even if he intended to use it for another purpose, that is sufficient [provided that the purpose concerns an object detached from the ground]. Then, even if the water came upon the food against his will, the food is prepared for ritual impurity, since water that he had deemed significant came upon it.

Likewise, if initially he had no intention of using the water, but the water’s coming upon the food was according to his will, this too constitutes use of the water and gives it significance, and the food is prepared to contract ritual impurity.

Rava further said: It is obvious to me that

with regard to the preparation of produce [

a term for any food], the dispute

is a dispute between tanna’im

concerning whether something detached and subsequently attached is considered detached or attached.

As we learned in a Mishna, [

Makhshirin 4:5]:

One who overturns a bowl,

placing the bowl upside down and propping it

against the wall

during rainfall, if he did so

so that it would be washed,

by the rainwater, and afterward this water fell upon food, even against his will,

this is considered “when water is placed,”

and the food is prepared to contract ritual impurity. The statement written concerning it has thereby been fulfilled: “And if water is placed upon seed, and any of their carcasses falls upon it, it is impure for you.” From this we learn that food is prepared to contract impurity only through water coming upon it.

Since he intended to use the water for the bowl, which is an object detached from the ground, the water thereby acquired significance and can prepare the food that it touches, even though he did not deem it significant for the sake of the food; on the contrary, the water’s coming upon the food was against his will.

But if he overturned the bowl against the wall

so that the wall would not be damaged

by the rain,

this is not considered “when water is placed,”

and the food that touched this water was not prepared to contract ritual impurity. Since this rainwater did not acquire significance, as he did not express any desire for it, it cannot prepare food to contract ritual impurity [unless the water’s coming upon the food was according to his will].

The Gemara asks:

This matter itself is difficult,

for the Mishna contradicts itself. For

you said

in the first clause: “

so that it would be washed—

this is considered ‘when water is placed,’”

and it follows that the rain prepares the food only if he wanted it for the sake of the bowl.

But

if he overturned the bowl

so that the wall would be washed,

for example, he placed the bowl beside the wall, intending that the water fall from the bowl onto the wall and wash it,

this is not considered “when water is placed”!

For the wall is considered an attached object, and water acquires significance only when he intends to use it for an object that is detached.

And then it teaches: “If it was so that the wall would not be damaged

—

it is not considered ‘when water is placed.’”

This implies that specifically because he had no desire at all for the rain, it does not prepare the food.

But

if he overturned the bowl

so that the wall would be washed, it is considered “when water is placed.”

Thus, the wall is considered a detached object, and the first clause contradicts the latter clause

? And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said: It is broken.

Indeed, the first clause contradicts the latter clause, and we are forced to say that

the one who taught this did not teach that.

The first and latter clauses were not taught by one tanna, but by two tanna’im. One of them taught the first clause and holds that the wall is considered attached; the other taught the latter clause and holds that the wall is considered detached. Their dispute depends on the question of whether something detached and subsequently attached is considered attached or detached with regard to the preparation of produce. For the wall about which they disagree was initially detached, since the stones of the wall were detached before the wall was built, and afterward, once it was built, it became attached to the ground. Rava’s opinion is also in accordance with that of Rabbi Elazar, and therefore he said that with regard to the preparation of produce, it is a dispute between tanna’im.

Rav Pappa said: The entire

Mishna concerning one who overturns a bowl

was taught by one tanna.

This tanna holds that something detached and subsequently attached is considered detached. The first clause does not contradict the latter clause, because

this

first clause, which implies that the wall is considered attached, is speaking

of the wall of a cave,

where the wall was not built by a person, but rather one dug around it in the ground and it formed there on its own. Its status is therefore that of an attached object, since it was attached from the outset. And

this

latter clause, which implies that the wall is considered detached, is speaking

of the wall of a building,

that is, an ordinary wall built of stones. Its status is therefore that of a detached object, since this wall was detached and subsequently attached.

And this is what the Mishna is saying: One who overturns a bowl against the wall so that

the bowl

would be washed, this is considered “when water is placed.”

But

if he places it

so that the wall would be washed, this is not considered “when water is placed,”

because the wall is considered an attached object.

When does this statement apply

that it is considered attached?

With regard to the wall of a cave. But with regard to the wall of a building,

then specifically if he places it

so that the wall will not be damaged, is it not considered “when water is placed,”

for he has no desire at all for this rain.

But if it is so that the wall would be washed, it is considered “when water is placed,”

because such a wall is considered a detached object, and he intended to use this rain for the sake of a detached object.