Chullin 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

It is speaking

of a case where

the slaughterer

had a dangerously ill patient

already

before Shabbat,

and it was permitted to slaughter on his behalf on Shabbat. Therefore, this animal, which was slaughtered on Shabbat for the ill patient, is not subject to the prohibition of muktzeh, since it had been designated before Shabbat to be slaughtered for this purpose on Shabbat.

However, it must be prohibited for another reason: so that one should not benefit from work performed on Shabbat. If so, we can establish the Mishna only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as stated above.

But that tanna who taught before Rav that one who cooks on Shabbat may eat what he cooked was not speaking of a case in which there had been an ill patient before Shabbat. Therefore Rav silenced him, since in that case even Rabbi Meir agrees that it is prohibited to eat from the animal because of muktzeh.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

that our Mishna is speaking of a case in which there is an ill patient,

what is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits

eating from the animal on that very day? For the entire reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is to prevent one from benefiting from something done through a violation involving work on Shabbat; yet here, it was initially permitted to slaughter for an ill patient on Shabbat!?

And we answer: Our Mishna is speaking

of a case in which he had an ill patient

before Shabbat,

and he recovered

on Shabbat. After he recovered, they slaughtered the animal [inadvertently], and this slaughter involved a prohibition. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is prohibited to eat.

According to Rabbi Meir, however, it is permitted to eat, since Rabbi Meir did not prohibit an act performed on Shabbat when it was done inadvertently.

In any event, according to Rabbi Meir the animal should not be prohibited because of muktzeh, since the status of muktzeh for the entire Shabbat is established at twilight on the eve of Shabbat. Whenever an object did not have the status of muktzeh at that time, we do not say: “Since it was set aside at twilight, it was set aside for the entire day.” This animal was not muktzeh at twilight, since the ill patient had not yet recovered then, and the animal was designated for slaughter on his behalf. Only when the ill patient recovered did the animal become muktzeh; and once it was slaughtered inadvertently and became permitted for consumption, the prohibition of muktzeh is removed from it.

As for what we said—that Rav silenced the tanna who taught before him because the law in a case where one slaughters inadvertently on Shabbat differs from the law in a case where one cooks on Shabbat, since in the case of slaughtering, in addition to the prohibition against benefiting from work performed on Shabbat, there is also the prohibition of muktzeh—this is

as in that statement of Rav Aḥa bar Adda in the name of Rav; and some say, Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda said in the name of Rav.

From their words we learn that this is what they said in Rav’s name:

One who slaughters for

the sake of an

ill patient on Shabbat,

when that patient was healthy yesterday and became ill today, on Shabbat, although no prohibition involving work on Shabbat was committed here, nevertheless

it is prohibited for a healthy person

to eat from the animal because of muktzeh. For yesterday the animal was not designated and prepared to be slaughtered on Shabbat, since there was not yet an ill patient.

But

one who cooks

meat [that was slaughtered before Shabbat]

for an ill patient on Shabbat,

even if the patient became ill only on Shabbat, it is

permitted for a healthy person

to eat from the cooked dish!

What is the reason?

This one was fit to be eaten raw,

since the slaughtered meat was fit to be eaten even before it was cooked. Therefore, it is not muktzeh, since it was fit for consumption already on the eve of Shabbat [and there is also no work performed on Shabbat here, since it was permitted to cook for the ill patient].

But this one was not fit to be eaten raw.

The meat of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is not fit for consumption before slaughter; therefore, it is muktzeh, since yesterday it was not fit for consumption.

Rav Pappa said: There are times when one who slaughters

for an ill patient is

permitted

to allow a healthy person to eat from the meat:

for example, when he had an ill patient before Shabbat

and the patient did not recover on Shabbat. In that case there is no prohibition of muktzeh, since the animal was designated before Shabbat for slaughter on behalf of the ill patient. Nor is there a prohibition against benefiting from work performed on Shabbat, since it was initially permitted to slaughter on behalf of the ill patient.

And there are times when

one who cooks

for an ill patient on Shabbat is

prohibited

from allowing a healthy person to eat from the cooked dish:

for example,

when the patient became ill on Shabbat and he

cut for him

something attached to the ground, a

pumpkin,

and cooked it. Although it was permitted for him to detach it for the ill patient, the pumpkin is nevertheless muktzeh, since at twilight on the eve of Shabbat it was not fit for consumption, as it was prohibited to detach it from the ground. And since the patient had not yet become ill on the eve of Shabbat, one cannot say that the pumpkin had been prepared and designated from before Shabbat to be detached for him on Shabbat.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: The halakha is

: One who slaughters for an ill patient on Shabbat

when the patient became ill yesterday and has still not recovered today

is permitted for a healthy person

to eat from the meat

raw,

without cooking it on Shabbat, since there is neither a prohibition of muktzeh nor a prohibition against benefiting from work performed on Shabbat.

What is the reason

that we do not issue a decree lest, while slaughtering for the ill patient, he also slaughter for the healthy person?

Since it is impossible

to eat

an olive-bulk of meat

from the animal

without slaughtering

the entire animal,

when he slaughters, he slaughters with the ill patient in mind!

There is no concern that, while slaughtering for the ill patient, he may add to the act of slaughter for the sake of the healthy person, since the entire act of slaughtering this animal is necessary for the single olive-bulk that the ill patient will eat.

But

one who cooks for an ill patient on Shabbat is prohibited for a healthy person

to eat from the cooked dish, even in a case where there is neither a prohibition of muktzeh nor a prohibition against benefiting from work performed on Shabbat.

This is a decree lest

while cooking for the ill patient, he

increase the amount for him,

meaning that the cook will add to the quantity of food being cooked so that the healthy person, too, will eat from it.

Mishna:

1.

One who slaughters with a hand sickle,

which is used on both sides—one side is smooth like a knife, while the other side has serrations—and he slaughtered with the smooth side, or

with a flint,

a sharp stone, or

with a reed,

a sharp wooden reed,

his slaughter is valid.

2.

Everyone may slaughter, one may always slaughter, and one may slaughter with any instrument

[all this will be explained in the Gemara]

except with a harvesting sickle,

which is used to harvest grain and is used only on one side; that side has serrations, all of which are bent and slope in one direction.

And a saw,

a knife filled with serrations standing straight,

and teeth,

two teeth attached to the jaw of the animal, with which one grasps the jaw [detached from the animal] and slaughters with the teeth—the space between the teeth being like a serrated knife—

and a fingernail,

which is attached to a person’s body. If one slaughters with any of these, his slaughter is invalid

because they strangle,

since, on account of their serrations, they do not cut the animal’s סימנים in its neck but tear them.

This reason does not apply to a fingernail, whose disqualification is because it is attached to a person’s body.

Gemara:

The Gemara proves: Since our Mishna teaches

“one who slaughters

with a hand sickle,” rather than “one may slaughter with a hand sickle,” it follows

that after the fact, yes,

meaning that the slaughter is valid with these instruments only after the fact, but

initially, no;

one should not slaughter with them.

The Gemara now raises a difficulty:

Granted, with regard to a hand sickle,

it is understandable that one should not slaughter with it initially, since one side is serrated. Although he slaughters with the smooth side, there is concern

lest he come to perform

the slaughter

with the other side,

the serrated side.

But with regard to a flint and a reed,

it follows from the Mishna that

initially, no;

one should not slaughter with them.

But we raise a contradiction

to this from that

which was taught

in a beraita: One may slaughter with any instrument, whether with a flint, with glass, or with a sliver of a reed, a lengthwise-cut side of a reed. Since it teaches “one may slaughter with any instrument,” it follows that it is permitted even initially to slaughter with a flint and a reed. This contradicts the Mishna, does it not?

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

Here,

the beraita, which permits slaughter initially, is speaking

of something detached,

meaning that the flint and the reed were not attached to the ground.

Here,

our Mishna, which prohibits slaughter initially, is speaking

of something attached

to the ground.

As Rav Kahana said: With regard to one who slaughters with

something

attached to the ground,

Rabbi deems

the slaughter invalid,

and Rabbi Ḥiyya deems it valid.

Our Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who deems slaughter with something attached to the ground valid; nevertheless, one should not slaughter with something attached initially. This is because

Rabbi Ḥiyya deems it valid only after the fact,

as indicated by the wording “one who slaughters with something attached,”

but initially, no.

The Gemara analyzes this:

In accordance with whose view did you establish it?

In accordance with whose view did we establish our Mishna?

In accordance with Rabbi Ḥiyya,

and we said that it is specifically

after the fact

that Rabbi Ḥiyya deems slaughter with something attached valid.

And we raise a difficulty:

But with regard to that which was taught in a beraita: One may slaughter with any instrument, whether detached or attached, whether the knife

is

above

the animal’s neck,

and the

of the

animal’s

neck is

below,

beneath the knife—that is, he slaughtered in the usual manner—

or whether the knife is below,

beneath the neck,

and the

of the

animal’s neck is above,

resting on the knife. Even in this manner it is permitted to slaughter, and we are not concerned lest the weight of the neck on the knife cause the neck to be severed all at once, before he performs the back-and-forth motion with the knife.

The difficulty now is: This beraita, which teaches “one may slaughter with any instrument,” implying that it is permitted even initially to slaughter with something attached,

whose opinion is it?

It is

neither Rabbi nor Rabbi Ḥiyya!

For

if it is Rabbi

Ḥiyya, we said that he holds that slaughter with something attached is valid

after the fact, but initially, no.

If it is Rabbi,

did he not say that

even after the fact, it is also not

valid if one slaughtered with something attached?

And we answer:

Actually,

the beraita is the opinion of

Rabbi Ḥiyya.

However, Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that

even initially

it is permitted to slaughter with something attached.

And the fact that they disagree with regard to the case after the fact

—and therefore the dispute between Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi was formulated in terms of after the fact, as indicated by the wording “one who slaughters with something attached,” [although Rabbi Ḥiyya deems it valid even initially]—is

to convey Rabbi’s power,

namely, that he disqualifies slaughter with something attached even after the fact.

The Gemara continues to challenge this:

But with regard to our Mishna, which teaches, “One who slaughters …

with a flint or a reed,” implying

after the fact, yes; initially, no,

and above we established that our Mishna permits slaughter with a flint and a reed only after the fact because it is speaking of something attached—

whose opinion is it?

It is

neither Rabbi nor Rabbi Ḥiyya!

For

if it is Rabbi Ḥiyya,

did he not say:

even initially

it is valid when attached? And

if it is Rabbi,

did he not say that

even after the fact, it is also not

valid when attached?

And we answer:

Actually, Rabbi Ḥiyya

holds that

even initially

slaughter with something attached is valid, as we said.

And the Mishna, which teaches “one who slaughters,”

implying that it is valid only after the fact, is the opinion of

Rabbi.

Rabbi agrees that, after the fact, slaughter with something attached is valid.

And we wonder:

There is a difficulty from one statement of Rabbi to another statement of Rabbi.

For Rav Kahana said above that Rabbi disqualifies slaughter with something attached, implying that it is invalid even after the fact!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

Here,

where Rav Kahana said that Rabbi disqualifies it even after the fact, it is speaking

of something attached from the outset,

meaning that when he slaughtered, he used something that had never been detached but had been attached to the ground from the time it was created.

Here,

our Mishna, where Rabbi deems the slaughter valid after the fact, is speaking of one who slaughtered

with

something that had previously been

detached and was subsequently attached

to the ground.

And from where do you say that a distinction is made

between

something attached from the outset and

something

detached and subsequently attached?

This can be learned from the following:

As it was taught in a beraita: One who slaughters with a wheel,

a wheel to which a knife was attached, which a person turns so that it slaughters—

his slaughter is valid.

And if he slaughtered

with something attached to the ground,

his slaughter is valid.

And if he

stuck a knife into

the interior of

a wall and slaughtered with it,

by moving the animal’s neck back and forth over the knife—

his slaughter is valid!

But if

a flint projected from the wall,

meaning that a sharp stone protruded from among the stones of the wall,

or a reed grew on its own,

meaning that no person planted it but it grew by itself,

and he slaughtered with it

—his slaughter is invalid!