Chullin 15b — the Talmud in English

It deals with a case

such as when

the slaughterer

had a dangerously ill person

in his care

from before the day,

and it was permitted to slaughter for him on Shabbat. Therefore, there is no prohibition of muktzeh regarding this animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat for the dangerously ill person, since it was designated from before the day for this purpose, that they should slaughter it on Shabbat.

Rather, it must be prohibited for another reason, so that one should not benefit from work performed on Shabbat. And if so, we can establish the Mishna only according to Rabbi Yehuda, as stated above.

But that tanna who taught before Rav that one who cooks on Shabbat is permitted, did not speak of a case in which there had been a dangerously ill person from before the day; and therefore Rav silenced him, since in that case even Rabbi Meir agrees that it is prohibited to eat from the animal because of muktzeh.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

that our Mishna speaks of a case in which there is a dangerously ill person,

what is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits

eating from the animal on that very day? For the entire reason of Rabbi Yehuda is so that one should not benefit from something that was done through a transgression of work on Shabbat, whereas here, surely, it was initially permitted to slaughter for a dangerously ill person on Shabbat?!

And we answer: Our Mishna speaks of a case

such as when he had a dangerously ill person

from the eve of Shabbat

and he recovered

on Shabbat! And after he recovered, they slaughtered the animal [in error], and a prohibition was caused by this slaughter. Therefore, it is prohibited to eat it according to Rabbi Yehuda.

But according to Rabbi Meir it is permitted to eat it, for Rabbi Meir did not prohibit an act of Shabbat that was performed in error.

In any event, according to Rabbi Meir, the animal should not be prohibited because of muktzeh, since the status of “muktzeh” for the entire Shabbat is established at twilight on the eve of Shabbat, and whenever the status of muktzeh did not apply to it then, we do not say, “Since it was set aside at twilight, it was set aside for the entire day.” And this animal was not muktzeh at twilight, since at that time the dangerously ill person had not yet recovered, and the animal was designated for slaughter for him; only when the dangerously ill person recovered did the animal become muktzeh. And from the time that it was slaughtered in error and became permitted for eating, the prohibition of muktzeh is removed from it.

And what we said—that Rav therefore silenced the tanna who taught before him, because the law regarding one who slaughters in error on Shabbat differs from that of one who cooks on Shabbat, since in slaughtering there is, in addition to the prohibition against benefiting from work performed on Shabbat, also a prohibition of muktzeh—this is

like that which Rav Aḥa bar Adda said in the name of Rav; and some say, Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda said in the name of Rav.

For from their words we learn that this is what they said in Rav’s name:

One who slaughters for

the needs of

a dangerously ill person on Shabbat,

and this sick person was healthy yesterday and became ill today, on Shabbat, although no prohibition of work on Shabbat was committed here, nevertheless

it is prohibited for a healthy person

to eat from the animal because of muktzeh. Since yesterday the animal was not designated and prepared to be slaughtered on Shabbat, for there was not yet a sick person.

But

one who cooks

meat [that was slaughtered before Shabbat]

for a dangerously ill person on Shabbat,

even if the sick person became ill only on Shabbat,

it is permitted for a healthy person

to eat from the cooked dish!

What is the reason?

This one is fit to be eaten raw,

the slaughtered meat was fit to eat even before it was cooked; therefore it is not muktzeh, since it was fit for eating also yesterday, on the eve of Shabbat [and there is also no work performed on Shabbat here, since it was permitted to cook for the dangerously ill person].

And this one is not fit to be eaten raw.

The meat of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is not fit for eating before slaughter; therefore it is muktzeh, since yesterday it was not fit for eating.

Rav Pappa said: Sometimes one who slaughters

for a dangerously ill person

is permitted

for a healthy person to eat from the meat.

For example, he had a dangerously ill person from before the day

and he did not recover on Shabbat, so there is neither a prohibition of muktzeh, since the animal was designated from the eve of Shabbat for slaughter for the dangerously ill person, nor a prohibition against benefiting from work performed on Shabbat, since it was initially permitted to slaughter for the dangerously ill person.

And sometimes one who

cooks

for a dangerously ill person on Shabbat

is prohibited

for a healthy person to eat from the cooked dish,

for example

when the sick person became ill on Shabbat and he

cut for him

from what was attached to the ground a

pumpkin

and cooked it. For although it was permitted for him to detach it for the dangerously ill person, nevertheless the pumpkin is muktzeh, since at twilight on the eve of Shabbat it was not fit for eating, as it was prohibited to detach it from what was attached to the ground. And since the sick person had not yet become ill on the eve of Shabbat, we cannot say that the pumpkin was prepared and designated from the eve of Shabbat so that it would be detached for him on Shabbat.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: The halakha is—

one who slaughters for a dangerously ill person on Shabbat

and the sick person became ill yesterday and has still not recovered today,

it is permitted for a healthy person

to eat from the meat

raw,

without cooking it on Shabbat, since there is neither a prohibition of muktzeh nor benefit from work performed on Shabbat here.

What is the reason

that we do not issue a decree, lest, when he slaughters for the dangerously ill person, he also slaughter for the healthy person?

Since it is impossible

to eat

an olive-sized portion of meat

from the animal

without slaughtering

the entire animal,

when he slaughters, it is for the sake of the dangerously ill person that he slaughters!

There is no concern that perhaps, while slaughtering for the dangerously ill person, he will add to the work of slaughtering for the healthy person, since for that olive-sized portion which the sick person will eat, all the work of slaughtering this animal is required.

But

one who cooks for a dangerously ill person on Shabbat is prohibited for a healthy person

to eat from the cooked dish, even in a case in which there is neither a prohibition of muktzeh nor benefit from work performed on Shabbat.

A decree, lest

while cooking for the dangerously ill person he

increase for him,

the cook will add to the quantity of food being cooked so that the healthy person will also eat from it.

Mishna:

a.

One who slaughters with a hand sickle

, which is used on both sides—on one side it is smooth like a knife, and on the other side it has notches—and he slaughtered with the smooth side, or

with a flint,

a sharp stone, or

with a reed

of sharp wood,

his slaughtering is valid.

b.

Everyone slaughters, and one always slaughters, and with everything one slaughters

[all this will be explained in the Gemara]

except with a reaping sickle

, with which grain is reaped, and which is used on only one side; and on that side it has notches, all of them bent and inclined to one side at an angle.

And a saw,

a knife full of notches standing upright,

and teeth,

two teeth attached to the jaw of the animal, with which one grips the jaw [detached from the animal] and slaughters with the teeth; and the space between the teeth is like a notched knife,

and a fingernail,

which is attached to the human body. One who slaughters with any of these, his slaughtering is invalid,

because they strangle,

for because of the notches in them they do not cut the signs in the animal’s neck, but tear them.

This reason does not apply to a fingernail, whose invalidity is because it is attached to the body.

Gemara:

The Gemara proves: From the fact that our Mishna teaches

“one who slaughters”

with a hand sickle, and does not teach, “one slaughters with a hand sickle,” it follows

that after the fact, yes,

that only after the fact is slaughtering with them valid, but

initially, no,

he should not slaughter with them.

And now it is difficult:

Granted, with a hand sickle

it is understandable that one should not slaughter with it initially, since one of its sides is notched. And although he slaughters with the smooth side, there is concern

lest he come to perform

the slaughtering

with the other side,

with the notched side.

But a flint and a reed,

as it follows from the Mishna, that

initially, no,

he should not slaughter with them,

yet we raise a contradiction

to this from that

which was taught

: One slaughters with everything, whether with a flint, whether with glass, whether with a reed splinter—the side of a reed cut along its length. And from the fact that it teaches, “with everything one slaughters,” it follows that it is permitted to slaughter with a flint and a reed even initially, which is difficult against the Mishna?

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

Here,

the beraita, which permits initially, deals

with something detached,

where the flint and the reed were not attached to the ground.

Here,

our Mishna, which prohibits initially, deals

with something attached

to the ground.

For Rav Kahana said: One who slaughters with

a thing

attached to the ground

Rabbi invalidates

the slaughtering,

and Rabbi Hiyya validates.

And our Mishna follows Rabbi Hiyya, who validates when attached, and nevertheless initially one should not slaughter with something attached. Because

Rabbi Hiyya validates only after the fact,

as is implied by the wording, “one who slaughters with something attached,”

but initially, no.

And the Gemara discusses:

According to what did you establish it?

According to whose method did we establish our Mishna?

According to Rabbi Hiyya,

and we said that it is specifically

after the fact

that Rabbi Hiyya validates something attached.

And we raise an objection:

But concerning that which was taught: One slaughters with everything, whether with something detached or with something attached, whether the knife

is found

above,

on the animal’s neck,

and the

animal’s

neck

is

below,

beneath the knife—that is, he slaughtered in the usual manner—

whether the knife is below,

beneath the neck,

and the

animal’s

neck is above,

on the knife, so that it is also permitted to slaughter in this manner, and we do not fear that because of the weight of the neck on the knife, the neck will be cut all at once before he performs forward and backward movement with the knife.

And now it is difficult: This beraita, which teaches in it, “with everything one slaughters,” implying that it is permitted even initially to slaughter with something attached,

whose

is it?

Not Rabbi’s and not Rabbi Hiyya’s!

For

if it is Rabbi Hiyya’s,

surely we said that he holds that something attached is valid

after the fact, yes; initially, no.

If it is Rabbi’s,

he said: Even

after the fact also not

valid if he slaughtered with something attached?

And we answer:

Actually,

the beraita

is Rabbi Hiyya’s.

Rather, Rabbi Hiyya holds that

even initially

it is permitted to slaughter with something attached.

And this that they disagree after the fact,

and therefore the dispute between Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi was taught in the language of after the fact, as implied by the fact that it teaches, “one who slaughters with something attached” [even though Rabbi Hiyya validates even initially], is

to inform you of Rabbi’s power,

that he invalidates something attached even after the fact.

And we still raise an objection:

But the Mishna, which teaches, “One who slaughters ...

with a flint and a reed,” implying

after the fact, yes; initially, no,

and above we established our Mishna as teaching that it validated with a flint and a reed only after the fact because it deals with something attached,

whose

is it?

Not Rabbi’s and not Rabbi Hiyya’s!

For

if it is Rabbi Hiyya’s,

he said:

even initially

it is valid with something attached; and

if it is Rabbi’s,

he said: Even

after the fact also not

valid with something attached?

And we answer:

Actually, Rabbi Hiyya

holds that

even initially

it is valid with something attached, as we said;

and the Mishna, which teaches, “one who slaughters,”

implying only after the fact,

is Rabbi’s.

For Rabbi concedes that after the fact slaughtering with something attached is valid.

And we wonder:

There is a difficulty between Rabbi and Rabbi.

For Rav Kahana said above that Rabbi invalidates something attached, implying that it is invalid even after the fact!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

Here,

that which Rav Kahana said—that Rabbi invalidates even after the fact—is

something attached from the outset,

when he slaughtered with something that had never been detached, but from the beginning of its creation was attached to the ground.

Here,

our Mishna, in which Rabbi validates after the fact, deals with one who slaughtered

with

something that was previously

detached and afterward he attached it

to the ground.

And from where do you say that the matter differs for us

that one must distinguish

between something attached from the outset and

between something

detached and afterward he attached it?

From here this may be learned:

For it was taught: One who slaughters with a mechanism,

a wheel to which he attached a knife, and the person turns the wheel and slaughters—

his slaughtering is valid.

And if he slaughtered

with something attached to the ground

his slaughtering is valid.

And if he

stuck a knife into

the inside of the

wall and slaughtered with it,

by moving the animal’s neck back and forth over the knife—

his slaughtering is valid!

And if

a flint was protruding from the wall,

where a sharp stone protruded from among the stones of the wall,

or a reed was growing by itself,

which no person planted, but it grew by itself,

and he slaughtered with it

—his slaughtering is invalid!