Chullin 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Yes! For we learned:

All

the

metal lamps may be moved

on Shabbat, even if they are old, because lamps made of metal are not repulsive.

Except for the lamp that they lit on that Shabbat,

which had a burning wick inside it when Shabbat began, and which may not be moved throughout the entire Shabbat, even after the flame has gone out, because it is muktzeh due to a prohibition. For as long as the flame is burning, it is prohibited to move the lamp, lest moving it cause the flame to be extinguished; therefore, it is muktzeh for the entire Shabbat.

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is muktzeh due to a prohibition.

And we reject this:

Perhaps there it is different

with regard to the lamp,

as

by lighting it

he actively set it aside

and removed it from his mind, so that he would not use it on Shabbat. But with regard to an animal, although it is prohibited, he did not perform an act that would set it aside from his mind. Therefore, one might say that it is not muktzeh.

We still ask: From which ruling of Rabbi Yehuda can it be proven that an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is prohibited?

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Ashi said: It is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to one who cooks.

As we learned: One who cooks on Shabbat,

if it was

unwitting, he may eat it.

He is permitted [and all the more so, other people] to eat the dish even that same day, on Shabbat.

But if he cooked

intentionally, he may not eat it,

neither he nor others may eat the dish until Shabbat has ended and a period of time has passed during which this dish could have been cooked. All this is in order that one not benefit from prohibited labor performed on Shabbat; by waiting until the stated period has passed, he does not benefit from the labor,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he cooked

unwittingly, he may eat it

only

after Shabbat,

both he and others, because even when it was cooked unwittingly, a transgression was committed, and one may not benefit from something produced through a transgression.

If intentionally, he may never eat it

the person who cooked on Shabbat

forever

from the dish, as the Sages penalized him by prohibiting him from eating it forever, since he desecrated Shabbat. But other people may eat the dish after Shabbat.

And this is the same Rabbi Yehuda who, according to Rav, holds in our Mishna that an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is prohibited to everyone that day.

For our Mishna is speaking of one who slaughtered unwittingly, as will be explained below, and it is Rabbi Yehuda who holds that one who cooks unwittingly may not eat it, neither he nor others, until after Shabbat; and the same law applies to slaughtering.

And the beraita continues:

Rabbi Yohanan the Sandlar says:

If he cooked

unwittingly, others may eat it after Shabbat.

In this, he agrees with Rabbi Yehuda that one may not benefit from labor performed on Shabbat. But he is more stringent than Rabbi Yehuda and says:

But not he!

The one who cooked, even if he did so unwittingly, may never eat from the dish, because the Sages penalized one who transgressed unwittingly as though he had acted intentionally.

If intentionally, he may never eat it, neither he nor others.

For according to Rabbi Yohanan the Sandlar, it is prohibited by Torah law for anyone ever to eat something with regard to which a prohibition was intentionally violated on Shabbat.

The Gemara asks: Why did we establish our Mishna, which prohibits eating on Shabbat an animal slaughtered that day, as referring to Rabbi Yehuda?

Let us establish it

as referring to a case in which he slaughtered

intentionally, and it is Rabbi Meir’s

opinion, since with regard to an intentional act, he too agrees that it is prohibited for everyone to eat it that day?

And we answer:

It should not enter your mind

that our Mishna is speaking specifically of an intentional act.

As it teaches

in the Mishna: “Shabbat and Yom Kippur.”

And we say: Shabbat is

analogous to Yom Kippur,

that is, it resembles it:

Just as with regard to Yom Kippur, it makes no difference whether

he slaughtered

unwittingly or whether

he slaughtered

intentionally, he may not eat it,

as it is impossible to eat the animal on that day, since it is a day of fasting,

so too here,

on Shabbat,

it makes no difference whether he acted unwittingly or whether he acted intentionally: he may not eat it.

It must therefore be Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, as he prohibits eating it that day even when the act was unwitting.

And we are astonished:

Can you establish it

our Mishna

as referring to an unwitting act and

according to

Rabbi Yehuda, when it teaches: “Even though he incurs a capital liability”?

It is impossible to say that, in an unwitting act, he incurs a capital liability.

And we answer:

This is what it is saying:

Even though one who slaughters

intentionally incurs a capital liability, here, since he acted unwittingly,

he slaughtered,

his slaughtering is valid.

We still challenge this:

Let us establish

our Mishna

according to Rabbi Yohanan the Sandlar, who says: It makes no difference whether he acted unwittingly or whether he acted intentionally: he may not eat it

that day, neither he nor others.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan the Sandlar distinguishes with regard to after Shabbat,

for concerning permission to eat it after Shabbat, in his view there is a distinction between the one who cooked and other people. Specifically,

others

may eat it after Shabbat,

but not he,

as he is prohibited from eating it forever, even when he acted unwittingly. Whereas

the tanna of our Mishna,

of the Mishna that states,

“his slaughtering is valid,” teaches

which implies that

it makes no difference whether for him or whether for others

the animal is permitted to be eaten after Shabbat. It is therefore necessarily the case that the Mishna does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandlar.

A tanna recited before Rav,

that is, a student recited this beraita while standing before Rav:

One who cooks on Shabbat: if unwittingly, he may eat it; if intentionally, he may not eat it.

This is in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s opinion,

and Rav silenced him

the one who said this.

The Gemara asks:

Why did he silence him

Rav?

If you say it was because Rav held

that Rav held

like Rabbi Yehuda, while the tanna taught

a beraita that holds

like Rabbi Meir.

But

because Rav held

that Rav held

like Rabbi Yehuda, should he silence one who teaches like Rabbi Meir?!

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

Did Rav in fact hold

that Rav held

like Rabbi Yehuda?!

For Rav Hanan bar Ami said: When Rav issued a ruling to his students,

when he ruled for each of them individually concerning one who cooks on Shabbat,

he ruled for them like Rabbi Meir,

who is the most lenient of them all.

But when he lectured publicly,

when he taught before the multitude,

he lectured in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who is more stringent than Rabbi Meir,

because of the unlearned,

so that they would not come to be lenient with regard to the prohibition of Shabbat. Thus, Rav fundamentally holds like Rabbi Meir; why, then, did he silence the tanna?

And if you would say

that he silenced him because this

tanna was reciting it in his public lecture,

on the day of the public discourse, he

was reciting it before him

Rav, and Rav was concerned that the unlearned would hear his voice, so he silenced him.

This cannot be said.

Do all the people obey the tanna?

Do those present at the lecture incline their ears to hear from the students sitting there the Mishna that each of them is reciting individually? Rather,

they obey the amora,

the one who was standing before Rav and proclaiming to the public what Rav had whispered to him; it was him whom they would heed.

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

He silenced him because this

tanna

did not recite the beraita concerning “one who cooks on Shabbat”; rather, he recited the beraita concerning

“one who slaughters”

before Rav.

For this is how he recited it:

One who slaughters on Shabbat: if unwittingly, he may eat it; if intentionally, he may not eat it!

And thus

he said to him

Rav:

What is your opinion,

according to whose opinion did you recite this?

According to Rabbi Meir?!

You are mistaken!

Rabbi Meir permits

eating it that day when the act was unwitting

only in the case of one who cooks

on Shabbat, since

it was fit

for this food even before it was cooked

to be eaten raw,

that is, to eat it uncooked; therefore, it is not subject to the prohibition of muktzeh, since at twilight it was fit to be eaten.

But

the

one who slaughters

on Shabbat,

as

the animal

is not fit to be eaten raw,

before slaughter,

Rabbi Meir did not

say that it is permitted that day. For although it should not be prohibited on account of the prohibited labor performed on Shabbat, the animal is nevertheless subject to the prohibition of muktzeh, since at twilight on the eve of Shabbat it was muktzeh, as it was not fit to be eaten.

And we challenge this:

But our Mishna concerns “one who slaughters”?!

For in our Mishna we taught “one who slaughters on Shabbat,” and not “one who cooks on Shabbat,”

and Rav Huna said that Ḥiyya bar Rav expounded in the name of Rav: It is prohibited to eat it that day,

on Shabbat.

And the scholars proceeded to say

that Rav holds that our Mishna

is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion,

as it is only according to Rabbi Yehuda that an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is prohibited to be eaten that day.

This

according to

Rabbi Meir, is permitted

to eat it today!? This is difficult for Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who says that Rav silenced the tanna because he holds that, in the case of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat, Rabbi Meir agrees that it is prohibited to eat the animal that day, on account of muktzeh!?

And we answer:

When Rabbi Meir permits,

that is, when Rav said that according to Rabbi Meir it is permitted to eat the animal that day,‑