Chullin 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

There

the reason for the tanna’im who prohibit saying, “Two log of wine, etc.,” is not that they hold that there is no retroactive clarification; rather, even though they hold that there is retroactive clarification, they maintain that it is prohibited,

as the reason is taught

in the beraita, as it is taught:

They said to him

—the tanna’im who prohibit it—

to Rabbi Meir: Do you not concede

that one must be concerned

lest the wine vessel burst

containing the wine before he separates the teruma and tithes from it,

and it will turn out

that he is

retroactively drinking untithed produce? For he said that the teruma and tithe would take effect upon the wine that he would subsequently separate, and since ultimately there was no separation, as the vessel burst, even if you say that there is retroactive clarification, it will not help, since there is nothing here to be clarified: teruma and tithes never took effect anywhere, and consequently everything remains untithed produce.

He said to them

Rabbi Meir:

When it bursts

the vessel, we will then prohibit drinking the wine; but as long as it has not burst, there is no need for concern, since this is an uncommon occurrence.

We still ask: From where do we know that Rabbi Yehuda holds that “there is no retroactive clarification”?

And we answer:

Rather, from what Ayo taught

—[a sage named Ayo]—it can be proven that Rabbi Yehuda’s view is that “there is no retroactive clarification.”

As Ayo taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: A person may not make a condition concerning two matters simultaneously

—that is, when two sages are destined to come, a condition is ineffective—

but

only when one sage is destined to come, and he does not know from which direction, may he stipulate and say:

If a sage comes to the east,

his

eruv shall be to the east,

and if he comes

to the west,

his

eruv shall be to the west. But

when two sages come, one

here and

one

not here.

And we analyze it

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s view:

What is different about “here and there” that it is not effective?

It must be because Rabbi Yehuda holds

that there is no retroactive clarification—

that is, we do not say that once, on Shabbat, he decides which sage he wishes to visit, it is retroactively clarified that already on the eve of Shabbat—when the eruv acquires residence—his intention had indeed been to go to that side, and consequently the eruv on that side acquired residence for him. Rather, it remains uncertain to which side he intended to go on the eve of Shabbat, and consequently it is unknown which of the two eruvin he acquired on the eve of Shabbat. Therefore, he cannot go on Shabbat in either direction: if he acquired the eruv to the east, he cannot leave the city toward the west, and vice versa.

And if so, this is difficult:

east and west,

that is, when only one sage comes, and the person stipulates that wherever he comes—to the east or to the west—his eruv will acquire residence there,

also

the condition should not be effective, because

there is no retroactive clarification?

And we explain:

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

that is not how the incident occurred; rather,

a sage had already come

before Shabbat to one of the study halls, but this person did not know where he had arrived. Therefore, he stipulated that the eruv on whichever side he would be told the next day that the sage had arrived on the eve of Shabbat would acquire residence for him from now. Accordingly, this is not a matter of retroactive clarification but rather a “disclosure of information,” since the eruv is not uncertain and left dependent upon anyone’s will; one of the two eruvin acquired residence with certainty, but the person did not yet know which eruv he had acquired until the matter was disclosed to him the following day.

In any event, we find that according to Rabbi Yehuda there is no retroactive clarification. If so, it is impossible to say that Rabbi Yehuda of the statement concerning “preparation” is the one who holds that it is prohibited to eat an animal slaughtered on Shabbat, as stated above. We still ask: From which ruling of Rabbi Yehuda did we learn that he prohibits eating from an animal slaughtered on Shabbat? And we answer:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: It is Rabbi Yehuda of the tractate Kelim.

From his ruling we can learn that it is prohibited to eat the animal slaughtered on Shabbat.

As we learned: All vessels that may be moved on Shabbat,

as they are not muktzeh, even

their fragments may be moved,

and even if the vessel broke on Shabbat, it is permitted to move the fragments,

provided that they are

the fragments

capable of serving a function resembling a labor.

That is, it must still be possible to use these fragments for some task, even if it is not a substantial task, such as:

fragments of a kneading trough

—a vessel in which dough is kneaded—must be suitable

for covering the mouth of a barrel; fragments of glass must be suitable for covering the mouth of a flask,

because the fragments thereby still retain the status of a vessel.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Provided that they are

the fragments

capable of serving a function resembling their original function,

meaning that their current use must resemble their use before they broke, for example:

fragments of a kneading trough

must be suitable

for pouring stew into them [a thick dish resembling dough placed in a kneading trough];

fragments of glass

must be suitable

for pouring oil into them.

And we infer: “

a function resembling their original function”—

no: only then is it permitted to move the fragments, but if they serve

a different function,

it is not permitted.

This is so even though they still have the status of a vessel, since they can serve some function.

Apparently, since they were not prepared,

since the fragments had not been prepared

from the previous day for this function

that they are capable of serving today,

they are prohibited

from being moved because of muktzeh.

Here too,

with regard to an animal slaughtered on Shabbat,

since it was not prepared

this animal

from the previous day

for eating, since it was not fit to be eaten yesterday while it was alive,

it is prohibited

today because of muktzeh.

And we challenge this:

Abaye said to him: Are they comparable—an animal slaughtered and a broken vessel? For

there,

with regard to a broken vessel,

initially,

before the vessel broke, it had the status of a

vessel, and now

it has become

a fragment of a vessel,

so there has been a change in the nature of the object,

and it is considered something newly created, and is prohibited.

But

here, initially,

before slaughter, it was

food,

for we proved above that according to Rabbi Yehuda an animal while alive is designated for eating [for otherwise it would be prohibited to slaughter an animal on a Festival],

and ultimately,

after slaughter, it is also

food. If so,

it is. If so,

it is food that has merely been divided—

food whose form has changed, meaning that this is merely food whose form has changed—

and we have heard Rabbi Yehuda say: Food that has merely been divided is entirely acceptable.

It is not considered something newly created.

As we learned: One may not squeeze fruits

on Shabbat in order

to extract liquids from them,

since squeezing is a principal category of labor on Shabbat.

And if

the liquids

emerge on their own,

they are prohibited to drink. The Sages decreed that if they permitted him to drink them, he might come to squeeze the fruits in order to extract their liquids.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If

the fruits are designated

for eating—

that is, for eating and not for squeezing—then

what emerges from them is permitted.

Since he is not pleased that the liquids emerged from them, there is no concern that he might squeeze them.

But if

the fruits are designated

for

squeezing them and extracting

liquids,

then

what emerges from them is prohibited,

because since he is pleased with the liquids that emerge, there is concern that he might come to squeeze them.

It is therefore demonstrated that Rabbi Yehuda does not prohibit liquids that emerge from fruits because they are “newly created,” since food whose form has changed is not considered something newly created. If so, why would he prohibit an animal slaughtered on Shabbat, which likewise is not something newly created?

And we answer:

Was it not stated concerning it,

with regard to that Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi Yehuda conceded to the Sages with regard to baskets of olives and grapes

that even if one designated them for eating, the liquids that emerge from them are prohibited.

Apparently,

Rabbi Yehuda holds that

since they are normally used for squeezing,

since olives and grapes are generally designated for squeezing, one must therefore be concerned that although this person initially designated them for eating,

he may set his mind

to change his mind later and designate them for liquids. Therefore, the Sages decreed that liquids that emerge from them are prohibited to drink, lest he squeeze them.

Here too,

since an animal

is normally used for slaughter,

he sets his mind upon it so that he will eat from it after it is slaughtered. One must therefore decree that if he is permitted to eat from this animal slaughtered on Shabbat, he might on another occasion come to slaughter an animal ab initio on Shabbat.

And we challenge this:

Is that the reason?

For everything we are laboring to find is where Rabbi Yehuda says that an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is prohibited, and this is

only according to Rav,

who said that the Mishna that prohibits eating the animal follows Rabbi Yehuda’s view. How, then, can you say to Rav that Rabbi Yehuda prohibits olives and grapes?

For Rav said: Rabbi Yehuda disagreed

with the Sages

even with regard to baskets of olives and grapes,

and there is no decree in their case lest one squeeze them. If so, why should we decree with regard to an animal slaughtered on Shabbat?

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said:

Our Mishna, which prohibits eating the animal on Shabbat, is

Rabbi Yehuda of the laws of lamps. As it is taught: One may move

on Shabbat

a new lamp,

a clay lamp in which no one has yet kindled a flame,

but not an old one,

because it is repulsive to a person and is muktzeh due to repulsiveness,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Just as Rabbi Yehuda prohibits an object that is muktzeh due to repulsiveness, so too he should prohibit this animal, which is muktzeh due to a prohibition, since at the onset of Shabbat it was muktzeh because it was subject to the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal. And we have the principle that an object that was muktzeh during twilight on the eve of Shabbat remains muktzeh throughout that Shabbat.

And we object:

You may say that you heard Rabbi Yehuda

only

with regard to an object that is muktzeh due to repulsiveness,

because a repulsive object is set aside by a person intentionally; but

with regard to an object that is muktzeh due to a prohibition, have you heard him say

that it is muktzeh?