Chullin 14b — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

there

the reason of the tannaim who prohibit saying “two log and so forth” is not because “there is no retroactive clarification”; rather, even though they hold “there is retroactive clarification,” their opinion is to prohibit, and

as the reason is taught

in the beraita, for it is taught:

They said to him

the prohibiting tannaim

to Rabbi Meir: Do you not concede

that one must be concerned

lest the wineskin burst

which contains the wine, before he separates from it the teruma and tithes,

and it will be found

that he

is retroactively drinking untithed produce

for he said that the teruma and tithe would take effect upon the wine that he would separate afterward; and since in the end there was no separation, for the wineskin burst, even if you say “there is retroactive clarification,” it will not help, for there is nothing here that can be clarified, since teruma and tithe took effect nowhere, and consequently everything remains untithed produce.

He said to them

Rabbi Meir:

When it bursts

the wineskin, then we will prohibit drinking from the wine; but as long as it has not burst, there is no need to be concerned about this, since it is something that is uncommon.

And still we ask: From where do we know that Rabbi Yehuda holds “there is no retroactive clarification”?

And we answer:

Rather, from what Ayyo taught

[a sage whose name was Ayyo], it is possible to prove that Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that “there is no retroactive clarification.”

For Ayyo taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: A person cannot stipulate concerning two things simultaneously

that is, when two sages are destined to come, the stipulation is ineffective,

but

specifically if one sage is destined to come and he does not know where, he can stipulate and say:

If a sage comes to the east

his

eruv shall be to the east, and if he comes

and if he comes

to the west,

his

eruv shall be to the west; whereas

when two sages came, one

here and

one

not here.

And we examine it

with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion:

What is different about “here and here,” that it is not [effective]?

It must be because Rabbi Yehuda held

that “there is no retroactive clarification,”

that is, we do not say that after he decided on Shabbat which sage he wished to go to, it became retroactively clear that already on the eve of Shabbat [when the eruv acquires residence] his intention had been to go there, and through this the eruv on that side was acquired for him. Rather, it remains uncertain toward which side he wished to go on the eve of Shabbat, and consequently it is not known which of the two eruvin he acquired on the eve of Shabbat. Therefore, he cannot go on Shabbat to either side, for if he acquired the eruv on the eastern side, he cannot leave the city toward the west, and likewise in the opposite case.

And if so, this is difficult:

east and west,

that is, when only one sage came, and that person stipulates that wherever he comes, to the east or to the west, there his eruv will acquire residence for him,

also

the stipulation should not be effective, because

there is no retroactive clarification?

And we explain:

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

the incident did not take place in this manner, but rather

a sage had already come

before Shabbat to one of the batei midrash, but this person did not know where he had arrived. Therefore, he stipulates that whichever side they tell him tomorrow that the sage had reached on the eve of Shabbat, the eruv on that side will acquire residence for him from now. Accordingly, this is not a matter of retroactive clarification but “revealing the matter,” since the eruv is not uncertain and suspended, dependent upon the will of someone; rather, one of the two eruvin acquires residence now with certainty, except that this person still does not know which eruv he acquired until the matter is revealed to him on the following day.

In any event, we have found that according to Rabbi Yehuda “there is no retroactive clarification.” If so, it is impossible to say that Rabbi Yehuda in the matter of “preparation” is the one who holds that it is prohibited to eat the animal slaughtered on Shabbat, as stated above. And still we ask: From which law of Rabbi Yehuda have we heard that he prohibits eating from an animal slaughtered on Shabbat? And we answer:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: It is Rabbi Yehuda’s [opinion] concerning vessels.

From it one can learn to prohibit eating the animal slaughtered on Shabbat.

For we learned: All vessels that may be moved on Shabbat,

which are not muktze, even

their fragments may be moved,

and even if the vessel broke on Shabbat, it is permitted to move the fragments,

provided that they be

the fragments

capable of a semblance of a function.

For it is still possible to use these fragments for some function, even if it is not an actual function, such as

fragments of a kneading trough

—a vessel in which dough is kneaded—they must be fit

to cover with them the mouth of a barrel; fragments of glass, to cover with them the mouth of a flask,

for through this the status of a vessel still applies to the fragments.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Provided that they be

the fragments

capable of a semblance of their original function,

so that their present use be similar to the use they had before the breakage, such as:

fragments of a kneading trough

must be fit

to pour stew into them [

a thick cooked dish that is similar to dough placed in a kneading trough],

fragments of glass

must be fit

to pour oil into them.

And we infer: “

a semblance of their function”—

no, only then is it permitted to move the fragments, but if they perform

a different function,

a semblance of another function, no.

And this is so even though the status of a vessel still applies to them, since they perform some function.

Apparently, since it was not prepared,

that the fragments were not prepared

from yesterday for this function

that they are fit to perform today,

they are prohibited

to move because of muktze.

Here too,

in the case of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat,

since it was not prepared

this animal

from yesterday

for eating, since it was not fit for eating yesterday while it was alive,

it is prohibited

today because of muktze.

And we challenge this:

Abaye said to him: Are they comparable

an animal slaughtered and a broken vessel? But

there,

in the case of a broken vessel,

originally,

before the vessel broke, it had the status of a

vessel, and now

it becomes

a fragment of a vessel,

and there is here a change in the essence of the object,

and it is a “newly formed entity,” and it is prohibited.

But

here, originally,

before slaughter, it was

food,

for we proved above that according to Rabbi Yehuda an animal while alive is designated for eating [for if not, it would be prohibited to slaughter an animal on a Festival],

and in the end,

after slaughter, also

food

it is. If so,

it is food that has been divided,

food that has split, that is, there is here only food whose form has changed,

and we have heard Rabbi Yehuda say: “Food that has been divided is entirely acceptable.”

It is not considered a “newly formed entity.”

For we learned: One may not squeeze fruit

on Shabbat in order

to extract liquids from it,

for squeezing is a “principal labor” on Shabbat.

And if they emerge

the liquids

by themselves,

they are prohibited for drinking, for the Sages decreed that if they permit him to drink, perhaps he will come to squeeze the fruit in order to extract the liquids from it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If

the fruit was designated

for eating,

that is, for eating and not for squeezing, then

that which emerges from it is permitted.

Since he is not pleased that the liquids emerged from it, there is no concern that he might squeeze it.

And if

the fruit was designated

for

squeezing it and extracting from it

liquids,

then

that which emerges from it is prohibited,

since he is pleased with the liquids that emerge, there is concern that he might come to squeeze it.

It is thus proven that Rabbi Yehuda does not prohibit the liquids emerging from fruit because of a “newly formed entity,” since food whose form changed is not considered a “newly formed entity.” If so, why would he prohibit an animal slaughtered on Shabbat, which likewise is not a “newly formed entity”?

And we answer:

Was it not stated concerning it

concerning that Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi Yehuda conceded to the Sages concerning baskets of olives and grapes

that even if he designated them for eating, the liquids emerging from them are prohibited.

Apparently,

Rabbi Yehuda holds:

since they are designated for squeezing,

since olives and grapes are designated by most people for squeezing, therefore there is concern that this person, who initially designated them for eating,

will turn his attention

and later change his mind and designate them for liquids; therefore the Sages decreed concerning them that the liquids that emerge are prohibited for drinking, lest he squeeze them.

Here too,

since an animal

is designated for slaughter,

he turns his attention to it, intending to eat from it after it is slaughtered. And one must decree that if we permit him to eat from this animal slaughtered on Shabbat, perhaps on another occasion he will come to slaughter an animal ab initio on Shabbat.

And we challenge this:

Is that the reason?

But everything for which we are exerting ourselves to find where Rabbi Yehuda says that an animal slaughtered on Shabbat is prohibited is

only according to Rav,

for he said that our Mishna, which prohibits the animal for eating, is according to Rabbi Yehuda. How, then, can you say to Rav that Rabbi Yehuda prohibits in the case of olives and grapes?

For Rav said: Rabbi Yehuda disagreed

with the Sages

even concerning baskets of olives and grapes,

that one does not decree concerning them lest he squeeze them. If so, why should we decree concerning an animal slaughtered on Shabbat?!

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi said:

our Mishna, which prohibits eating the animal on Shabbat—

it is Rabbi Yehuda’s [opinion] concerning lamps. For it is taught: One may move

on Shabbat

a new lamp

of earthenware in which one has not yet lit,

but not an old one,

because it is repulsive in a person’s eyes, and it is muktze on account of repulsiveness,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Just as Rabbi Yehuda prohibits in the case of muktze on account of repulsiveness, so he should prohibit this animal, which is muktze on account of prohibition, since when Shabbat entered it was muktze because it had the prohibition of a limb from a living creature. And we have the rule that something that was muktze during twilight on the eve of Shabbat remains muktze for the entire Shabbat.

And we ask:

You may say that you heard Rabbi Yehuda

only

concerning muktze on account of repulsiveness,

because a repulsive object is set aside by the person intentionally, but

did you hear him concerning muktze on account of prohibition

that it is muktze?