Chullin 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

With regard to one who slaughters on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur,

even though he incurs liability for his life through the slaughter, since one who slaughters on Shabbat is liable to stoning, and on Yom Kippur he is liable to karet, nevertheless

his slaughter is valid.

Gemara:

Rav Huna said: Ḥiyya bar Rav expounded in the name of Rav:

This animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat, concerning which the Mishna teaches that its slaughter is valid, nevertheless

it is forbidden

to him

to be eaten that day,

on Shabbat. [It is explained below in the Gemara that Rav proved this from the fact that the Mishna also mentions Yom Kippur, thereby saying: Just as on Yom Kippur the animal is forbidden to be eaten, so too on Shabbat.]

And the members of the academy were inclined to say,

the members of the academy thought that Rav holds that the tanna of the Mishna, who forbids eating it on that very day,

is Rabbi Yehuda.

For we find that Rabbi Yehuda says so.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Which statement of Rabbi Yehuda

is this? From which ruling stated by Rabbi Yehuda did Rav infer that he forbids eating it on that day?

And we explain:

Rabbi Abba said: It is Rabbi Yehuda’s statement concerning “preparation”

who forbids moving on Shabbat an item that was not prepared from the previous day, on Friday evening, for the purpose for which it serves today, on Shabbat, since it is considered muktze.

As we learned in a Mishna: One may cut the pumpkins

that were detached before Shabbat; one cuts them on Shabbat into small pieces

before the animal

so that it may eat them,

and the animal carcass

one may cut it

before the dogs,

even if the animal died and became a carcass that very day, on Shabbat.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was not a carcass from before Shabbat, it is forbidden

to move it

because it is not prepared.

For before Shabbat the animal was not prepared and designated as food for dogs, since it was still alive. Therefore, this carcass is muktze today.

Apparently,

Rabbi Yehuda holds that

since it was not prepared from the previous day,

this animal was not prepared for the purpose for which it serves today, and therefore it is

forbidden.

Here too, in our Mishna, where the animal was slaughtered on Shabbat,

since it was not prepared

the animal, as it was not prepared

from the previous day

for eating, since it had not yet been slaughtered the previous day,

it is forbidden

to move it today because of muktze, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we raise an objection:

Abaye said to Rabbi Abba

:

Are

the case in our Mishna and Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling

comparable?

There,

initially,

before it became a carcass, it was in the category of

“prepared for

the consumption of

people,”

whereas now it is

“prepared for dogs.”

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda said that the status of muktze applies to it. But

here,

in the case of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat,

initially,

before it was slaughtered, it too was

“prepared for people,”

since it was designated to be slaughtered and eaten by people,

and now

that it has been slaughtered, it is

“prepared for people” as well. If so, why should this animal be muktze? It was already prepared from before Shabbat for the purpose for which it now serves.

Rabbi Abba answers:

Do you think that while alive an animal is designated for eating?

Before you say that this animal slaughtered on Shabbat was prepared from before Shabbat for human consumption, that is not so. Rather,

while alive, an animal is designated for raising

offspring and

is designated

for that purpose, and it was not prepared from the previous day for human consumption. Only now, when it was slaughtered, did it become prepared for people. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the status of muktze applies to it, and it is forbidden to eat it on Shabbat.

Abaye challenges this:

If so,

that while alive an animal is designated for raising offspring, then the following difficulty arises:

With regard to every animal, according to Rabbi Yehuda, on a Festival, how can we slaughter it

? Once it is slaughtered, it should be muktze, since only then does it become prepared for people; for on the previous day it was designated for raising offspring and not for human consumption!

And we answer:

He said to him

Rabbi Abba said to Abaye: While alive, an animal

is designated for eating and is designated for raising

offspring. That is, as long as every animal is alive, it has not yet been determined for which purpose it is designated; the matter remains pending until it is slaughtered.

If it was slaughtered,

then, after the slaughter,

it is clarified that it was designated for eating

and was

designated

for that purpose from the outset. Therefore, one may slaughter it on a Festival, since once it has been slaughtered it becomes retroactively clear that this animal had been designated for eating and had been prepared for people from the previous day.

If it was not slaughtered,

that is, this animal, which was slaughtered on Shabbat and had not been slaughtered on the eve of Shabbat, was, when Shabbat began,

clarified as designated for raising

offspring and

designated

for that purpose. For this person had not intended to slaughter it on Shabbat. Therefore, one cannot say that this slaughter on Shabbat retroactively clarifies that it had originally been designated for eating. On the contrary, we say that its not having been slaughtered on the eve of Shabbat clarifies that at that time it had been designated for raising offspring. Consequently, after it was slaughtered on Shabbat it is muktze, since it had not been prepared for people from before Shabbat.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Yehuda does not accept “retroactive clarification”

in any matter that is not clear in the present but will become clear in the future. Rabbi Yehuda holds that we do not say that once the matter becomes clear, it is as though it had retroactively been destined to be so. Rather, as long as it has not become clear, the matter remains in the category of uncertainty.

Since “there is no retroactive clarification,” if you say that Rabbi Yehuda holds that while alive it has not yet been determined whether an animal is designated for eating or for raising offspring, you cannot say that after the slaughter it becomes retroactively clear that it was designated for eating. Rather, we say that until its slaughter the animal remains uncertain as to its designation. If so, the difficulty remains: How can one slaughter an animal on a Festival, since on the eve of the Festival it was not certainly prepared for people, but perhaps it was designated for raising offspring?

Rather, one must certainly say that Rabbi Yehuda holds that while alive an animal is certainly designated for human consumption, and therefore one may slaughter it on a Festival. If so, the original difficulty returns: Why would Rabbi Yehuda forbid eating an animal slaughtered on Shabbat? It was prepared for human consumption from before Shabbat.

And we consider the Gemara’s question:

From where do we know

that Rabbi Yehuda holds that “there is no retroactive clarification”?

If you say

that we know that he holds “there is no retroactive clarification”

from what is taught in a beraita: One who purchases wine from among the Samaritans

who do not separate terumot and tithes, and he does not currently have vessels into which to separate the terumot and tithes, and he wishes to rectify the wine and remove it from the status of tevel so that he can drink it now while leaving the terumot and tithes in the barrel until he finds vessels into which to separate them; or if it was Friday, close to nightfall, and he had no time to separate them into vessels before Shabbat began [since it is forbidden to tithe on Shabbat]—and he therefore wishes to rectify the wine without actually separating the portions—he

says: Two log

out of the one hundred log contained in the barrel

that I will eventually separate

after Shabbat for teruma,

they shall be

now

teruma within

the barrel.

Ten

log that I will eventually separate shall be

the first tithe.

Nine log, which are one-tenth of what remains after the separation of the first tithe, shall be

the second tithe.

And he may redeem it—that is, he now redeems the second tithe located in the barrel—

and drink immediately

from the wine.

This rectification is possible because we say, “There is retroactive clarification.” That is, after Shabbat, when he separates the teruma and tithes into a separate barrel, it will become retroactively clear that the wine he separated is the wine that was initially designated as teruma and tithes; consequently, all the remainder was entirely non-sacred produce from the outset. In this manner he may drink from the wine before the actual separation, without concern that perhaps he is drinking teruma,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon forbid

doing so, because they hold that “there is no retroactive clarification.” That is, we do not say that it becomes retroactively clear that the wine separated was the teruma. Rather, as long as the teruma and tithes have not been separated from the barrel, the entire barrel contains a mixture of non-sacred produce, teruma, and tithes. It is not clear to us where the teruma and tithes are and where the non-sacred produce is. Therefore, one who drinks the wine before the separation must be concerned that perhaps he is drinking teruma, which is forbidden to one who is not a koen. It is thus explicitly established that Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that “there is no retroactive clarification.”