Chullin 14a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who slaughters on Shabbat and on Yom Kippur,

even though through the slaughtering he becomes liable for his life, for one who slaughters on Shabbat is liable to stoning, and on Yom Kippur he is liable to karet, nevertheless

his slaughtering is valid.

Gemara:

Rav Huna said: Hiyya bar Rav expounded in the name of Rav:

This animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat, concerning which the Mishna teaches that its slaughtering is valid, nevertheless

is forbidden

it

for eating that day

on the day of Shabbat. [It is explained below in the Gemara that Rav proved this from the fact that the Mishna also stated Yom Kippur, to say: just as on Yom Kippur the animal is forbidden for eating, so too on Shabbat.

And the colleagues came to say,

the members of the academy conceived it to say that Rav maintains that the tanna of the Mishna, who forbids eating it on that same day,

is Rabbi Yehuda.

For we find that Rabbi Yehuda says so.

And the Gemara discusses:

Which Rabbi Yehuda?

From which law stated by Rabbi Yehuda did Rav prove that he forbids eating it on that day?

And we explain:

Rabbi Abba said: It is Rabbi Yehuda of “preparation,”

who forbids moving on Shabbat something that had not been prepared from the previous evening, on the eve of Shabbat, for the purpose that it serves today on Shabbat, for it has the status of muktzeh.

For we learned: “One cuts the pumpkins”

that were detached on the eve of Shabbat, cutting them on Shabbat into small pieces

before the animal

so that it may eat from them,

“and the unslaughtered carcass”

one cuts

before the dogs,

even if the animal died and became an unslaughtered carcass today, on Shabbat.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was not an unslaughtered carcass from the eve of Shabbat, it is forbidden

for moving

because it is not prepared.

For on the eve of Shabbat the animal was not prepared and designated for the food of dogs, since it was still alive; therefore this carcass is muktzeh today.

Thus,

Rabbi Yehuda maintains:

since it was not prepared from the previous day,

this animal was not prepared for the purpose that it serves today, therefore it is

forbidden.

Here too, in our Mishna, where the animal was slaughtered on Shabbat,

since it was not prepared

this animal, which was not prepared

from the previous day

for eating, for it was not yet slaughtered on the previous day,

it is forbidden

today to move it because of muktzeh, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we raise an objection:

Abaye said to Rabbi Abba:

to Rabbi Abba:

Are they comparable?

Is the case of our Mishna comparable to Rabbi Yehuda’s law? For

there,

in the case of an animal that became an unslaughtered carcass on Shabbat,

initially,

before it became an unslaughtered carcass, it was in the category of

“prepared” for

the eating of

a person,

and now it is

“prepared” for dogs.

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda said that it has the status of muktzeh. But

here,

in the case of an animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat,

initially,

before it was slaughtered, it too was

“prepared” for a person,

for it was designated to be slaughtered and eaten by a person,

and now

that it has been slaughtered, it is

“prepared” for a person. If so, why should this animal be muktzeh? For from the eve of Shabbat it was already prepared for what it now serves?

Почему же это животное должно считаться мукце? Ведь еще накануне Шабата оно было подготовлено для того, чему служит теперь.

And Rabbi Abba answers:

Do you think that an animal during its lifetime is designated for eating?

You are saying that this animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat was prepared from the eve of Shabbat for human consumption. That is not so. Rather,

an animal during its lifetime is designated for raising

offspring

and is designated

and it was not prepared from the previous day for human consumption. Only now, when it was slaughtered, did it become prepared for a person; therefore it has the status of muktzeh according to Rabbi Yehuda, and it is forbidden to eat it on the day of Shabbat.

And Abaye raises a difficulty:

If so,

that an animal during its lifetime is designated for raising offspring, if so, raise this difficulty:

with regard to every animal, according to Rabbi Yehuda, on Yom Tov, how do we slaughter it?

For when it is slaughtered it will be muktzeh, since only now did it become prepared for a person, as on the previous day it was designated for raising offspring and not for human consumption!?

And we answer:

He said to him,

Rabbi Abba said to Abaye: An animal during its lifetime

is designated for eating and is designated for raising

offspring. That is, as long as every animal is alive, it has not yet been determined for what it is designated; rather, the matter remains pending until it is slaughtered.

If it was slaughtered,

then after the slaughtering

it becomes clear that it was designated for eating

and was

designated

from the outset. Therefore it is permitted to slaughter it on Yom Tov, since after it is slaughtered it becomes retroactively clear that this animal had been designated for eating and had been prepared for a person from the previous day.

If it was not slaughtered,

that is, this animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat, and had not been slaughtered on the eve of Shabbat, then at the onset of Shabbat

it became clear that it was designated for raising

offspring and

was designated,

for this person had not intended to slaughter it on Shabbat. Therefore, one cannot say that this slaughtering on Shabbat retroactively clarifies that it had initially been designated for eating; rather, on the contrary, we say that its not being slaughtered on the eve of Shabbat clarifies that at that time it had been designated for raising offspring. Therefore, after it was slaughtered on Shabbat it is muktzeh, since it was not prepared for a person from the eve of Shabbat.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Yehuda does not hold of “retroactive determination”

with regard to anything that is not clear in the present and will become clear in the future. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that we do not say that once the matter becomes clear, it is as though retroactively it had been destined to be so; rather, as long as it has not become clear, the matter remains in the category of doubt.

And since there is no retroactive determination, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that while alive an animal has not yet been determined for what it is designated, whether for eating or for raising offspring, you cannot say that after slaughtering it became clear retroactively that it was designated for eating. Rather, we say that until its slaughtering this animal remains uncertain as to what it is designated for. If so, it is still difficult: how is it possible to slaughter an animal on Yom Tov, since from the eve of Yom Tov it was not certainly prepared for a person, but there was a doubt that perhaps it was designated for raising offspring!?

Rather, we are certainly forced to say that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that an animal during its lifetime is certainly designated for human consumption, and therefore it is permitted to slaughter it on Yom Tov. If so, the difficulty returns: why would Rabbi Yehuda forbid eating an animal that was slaughtered on Shabbat? For from the eve of Shabbat it was prepared for human consumption.

And we consider this in the Gemara’s question:

From where do we know

that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that there is no retroactive determination?

If you say

that from here we know that he maintains that there is no retroactive determination,

from what was taught: “One who purchases wine from among the Cutheans”

who do not separate terumot and tithes, and he now has no vessels into which to separate the terumot and tithes, and he wishes to rectify the wine and remove it from the status of tevel so that he can drink it now while leaving the terumot and tithes inside the barrel until he finds vessels into which to separate the tithes; or the matter occurred on the eve of Shabbat close to nightfall, and he did not have time to separate into vessels before Shabbat entered [for on Shabbat it is forbidden to tithe], and therefore he wishes to rectify the wine without separation, he

says: “Two log

out of the one hundred log that are in the barrel

that I am destined to separate

after Shabbat for the purpose of teruma,

they are

from now

teruma in

the barrel.

Ten

log that I am destined to separate, they are

first tithe.

Nine log, which are a tenth of what remains after the separation of the first tithe, are

second tithe. And he may begin”—he now redeems the second tithe that is in the barrel—

And he may redeem it—that is, he now redeems the second tithe located in the barrel—

and drink immediately

from the wine.

This rectification is possible by saying that there is retroactive determination. That is, after Shabbat, when he separates the teruma and tithes into a separate barrel, it will become retroactively clear that the wine that was separated is indeed the wine that was initially made teruma and tithes, and consequently all the remainder was completely non-sacred from the outset. Through this he can drink from the wine before the actual separation, without concern that perhaps he is drinking teruma,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon forbid

doing so, because they maintain that there is no retroactive determination. That is, we do not say that it became retroactively clear that the wine that was separated is the teruma; rather, as long as the teruma and tithes have not been separated from the barrel, the entire barrel contains a mixture of non-sacred produce, teruma, and tithes. We do not know where the teruma and tithes are and where the non-sacred produce is. Therefore, one who drinks from the wine before the separation must be concerned that perhaps he is drinking teruma, which is forbidden to one who is not a koen. It is explicitly established that Rabbi Yehuda’s view is that there is no retroactive determination.