Chullin 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

Rava raised a dilemma:

an object that was

detached and then attached

to the ground—

with regard to slaughtering, what is the halakha? Was the slaughter performed with it invalid, like slaughter performed with an object attached to the ground [according to the one who says that an attached object invalidates slaughter], or perhaps it is considered a detached object and slaughter with it is valid?

Ta shma

from that which was taught in a beraita:

If a sharp stone

protruded from a wall, or

if a reed grew on its own,

not planted by a person but growing spontaneously, and

he slaughtered with it—

his slaughter is invalid.

The wall from which the stone protrudes is an object that was detached and then attached; thus, detached and then attached is considered attached, and the slaughter performed with it is invalid.

And we reject this:

What are we dealing with here? With the wall of a cave,

which is attached from the outset. But an ordinary wall, which was detached and then attached, may have the status of a detached object.

The wording is also precise

that the beraita is speaking of the wall of a cave:

For it teaches “

A sharp stone protruded from the wall,”

analogous to “a reed grew on its own.”

Just as a reed that grows on its own is attached from the outset, so too, the wall mentioned is a wall attached from the outset, i.e., the wall of a cave.

Conclude from this.

Ta shma

from that which was taught:

If he stuck a knife into

the inside of a

wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid!

Thus, even though the knife is now attached to the wall, nevertheless slaughter with it is valid because it was previously detached. This proves that an object detached and then attached is considered detached.

And we reject this:

A knife is different, because he does not nullify it.

He does not intend to leave it permanently inside the wall; therefore, it is not considered attached. But when one attaches a detached object and intends to leave it that way permanently, one may say that it has the status of an attached object.

Ta shma

from that which was taught: He slaughtered

with an object attached to the ground; his slaughter is valid!

Earlier, in the discussion [15b], we established that this refers to an object detached and then attached, and therefore slaughter with it is valid.

And we reject this:

Perhaps it is explaining the matter

and the beraita itself explains later which attached object it is referring to. For afterward the beraita states the law concerning one who stuck a knife into a wall, and this is what the beraita is saying:

What is the “object attached to the ground”

that we said slaughter with it is valid?

A knife

stuck into a wall, because

he does not nullify it.

But an attached object that he has permanently assigned to the ground is considered attached even if it was initially detached, and slaughter with it is invalid.

The Master said: If he stuck a knife into a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid.

Rav Anan said that Shmuel said: They taught

that slaughter with a knife stuck into a wall is valid

only when the knife

is

above

the animal’s neck,

and the neck

of the

animal

is

below

it, beneath the knife; and the slaughterer moves the animal’s neck back and forth beneath the knife stuck into the wall.

But

if the

knife

is

below, and the neck

of the

animal

is

above

the knife, the slaughter is invalid, because

we are concerned that perhaps

due to the weight of the neck on the knife it will

press down

on the סימanim, i.e., the neck will be cut all at once before the slaughterer has time to move the neck back and forth over the knife. Slaughter is thereby invalid because of “pressing.”

And we raise an objection:

But it teaches

in the beraita cited earlier [15b] that one may slaughter with anything, whether detached or attached,

whether the knife is below and the neck

of the

animal is above, or whether the knife is above and the animal’s neck is below!

Apparently, the statement in the latter clause concerning the knife being below applies to both cases stated earlier in the first clause: whether the knife is detached or attached, slaughter is valid in either case, whether the knife is below or above. But this is difficult for Rav Anan, who invalidates slaughter with an attached knife when the knife is below?

And we answer:

Rav Zevid said:

That is not the interpretation of the beraita. Rather,

it teaches the cases asymmetrically,

meaning that each case in the latter clause is valid with a different case from the first clause.

And this is what the tanna is saying in the beraita:

When the knife is below and the animal’s neck is above,

it is valid only

with a

knife that is

detached,

because then there is no concern about pressing: the slaughterer can hold the knife from below and move it back and forth against the animal’s neck, which is suspended in the air, and the neck does not weigh upon the knife.

But with an attached knife, slaughter is not valid when the knife is below, lest he press down; and this accords with Rav Anan.

And when the

knife is above and the animal’s neck is below,

slaughter is valid even

with an attached object.

Rav Pappa said:

Actually, the beraita is to be understood simply: the latter clause refers to both cases of the first clause, and according to this, slaughter with an attached object is valid even when the knife is below and the animal’s neck is above. Nevertheless, this is not difficult for Rav Anan, because the beraita is speaking

of a bird, which is light,

in the slaughter of a bird [and the animal mentioned in the beraita is not specifically an animal]. Since it is light, there is no concern that the neck will weigh upon the knife and invalidate the slaughter because of “pressing”; therefore, slaughter with it is valid even when the knife is below. Rav Anan, however, is speaking of an animal, whose neck may weigh upon the knife, and therefore he invalidates slaughter when the knife is below.

Rav Ḥisda said that Rav Yitzḥak said—and some say that a tanna taught it in a beraita: Five statements were said concerning a split reed,

a lengthwise-split section of a reed:

One may not slaughter with it—

because when the reed is pressed while cutting with it, it releases thin splinters from within, and they may puncture the סימanim in the animal’s neck.

And one may not circumcise with it—

because the splinters may puncture the organ.

And one may not cut meat with it.

And one may not scrape

clean

one’s teeth with it,

because the splinters may penetrate the flesh and puncture the flesh between the teeth.

And one may not wipe with it,

lest the splinters puncture the intestines.

And we raise an objection: It teaches

“One may not slaughter with it,” but it was taught: One may slaughter with anything, whether with a sharp stone, with glass, or with a split reed?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said:

This beraita, which permits slaughtering with a split reed, is speaking

of a reed from a marsh,

a reed that grows in bodies of water and does not release splinters.

We learned further:

And one may not cut meat with it.

Rav Pappa

would

cut fish entrails with it

because they are

clear,

and if a splinter entered them, it would be visible.

Rabba bar Rav Huna

would

cut a bird with it

because

it is soft,

and there is no need to press the reed while cutting; in this manner it does not release splinters.

We learned further:

And one may not wipe with it.

And we raise an objection: Why is it necessary to prohibit wiping with a reed because of the concern about splinters?

Let it follow

that it is prohibited

because the Master said: One who wipes his

mouth with something over which

fire has power,

meaning that it can burn it,

his teeth,

the teeth of the mouth and the teeth of the lower intestine,

fall out!

But a reed is something over which fire has power.

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: We were speaking of wiping the mouth of a wound,

which is prohibited because of the concern that splinters might puncture the wound.

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone may slaughter, and one may always slaughter.

And we explain: “

Everyone may slaughter”

means as follows:

Everything requires slaughter.

That is, everything must be slaughtered,

even a bird,

which is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, as it says only, “From your cattle and from your flocks you shall slaughter.”

And as for that which the Mishna teaches,

“one may always slaughter,”

this means that it is always permitted to slaughter with the intention of eating the meat.

And the Gemara asks:

Who

is the

tanna

who taught this? That is, who is the tanna according to whom there is a novel point here, since apparently the matter is obvious?

And we answer:

Rabba said:

It is Rabbi Yishmael, as it was taught: It is written:

“When the Lord your God expands your boundary, as He spoke to you, and you say, ‘I will eat meat,’

because your soul desires to eat meat, you may slaughter from your cattle and from your flocks.”

Rabbi Yishmael says: This verse came

not

only to permit them

when they would enter Eretz Yisrael to eat

ordinary meat.

That is, non-sacred meat without first dedicating the animal as a peace-offering.

Initially,

when they were in the wilderness,

ordinary meat was prohibited to them,

and anyone who wished to eat meat could eat it only by bringing an animal to the Tabernacle and offering it as a peace-offering, and he would eat from its meat after the blood was sprinkled and the fats were burned, as required for a peace-offering eaten by its owners. If he slaughtered an animal that was not a sacrifice outside the Tabernacle, he would transgress what is stated: “And they did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting … and that man shall be cut off.” And now,

once they entered Eretz Yisrael,

this verse permitted them to eat

ordinary meat

through slaughter alone.

And Rabba concludes his explanation of our Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael:

And now that they have been exiled

from Eretz Yisrael,

could they return to their original prohibition,

as it was before they entered Eretz Yisrael, and no longer be permitted to slaughter a non-sacred animal?

Therefore we learned

in our Mishna,

“one may always slaughter,”

meaning that even after the exile, it is permitted to slaughter a non-sacred animal and eat its meat.

Rav Yosef strongly objected to this:

If so, that the Mishna did not come to teach us a novel point in the laws of slaughter but to permit eating non-sacred meat outside Eretz Yisrael,

this statement, “one may always slaughter,”

which the Mishna teaches is imprecise. For

it should have taught, “one may always slaughter and eat,”

since the essential novelty is that it is permitted to eat the meat?

And furthermore,

there is another difficulty. How could we have mistakenly said that it is prohibited to slaughter a non-sacred animal after the exile? On the contrary,

initially,

when they were in the wilderness,

for what reason was it prohibited

to slaughter a non-sacred animal?

Because they were close to the Tabernacle,

and each person could easily bring his animal to the Tabernacle, offer it as a peace-offering, and eat its meat.

And ultimately,

when they entered Eretz Yisrael,

for what reason was it permitted

to slaughter an animal without bringing it as a sacrifice? Because

they were far from the Tabernacle,

as the land is extensive, and it was difficult for those who lived far away to come to the Tabernacle or to Jerusalem whenever they wished to eat meat in order to offer a sacrifice there.