Chullin 136b (קלו:) — the Talmud in English

And we say:

The Mishna

is not in accordance with Rabbi Elai.

For according to Rabbi Elai, also with regard to Reishit HaGez, wool that grew while the obligation applied is obligated, whereas wool that grew while the exemption applied is exempt, as we derive from teruma.

Could it be derived as follows: Just as, with regard to teruma, from one species for a different species—

no

may be taken,

so too

with regard to

Reishit HaGez

let us say that

from one species for a different species may not be taken?

And with regard to teruma, from where do we derive

that one may not take teruma from one species for a different species?

As it is taught in a beraita: If one had two species of figs, black and white

1 , and likewise

if he had

two species of wheat, he may not take teruma or tithes from one for the other. Rabbi Yitzḥak says in the name of Rabbi Elai: Beit Shammai say: One may not take teruma

from one species for a different species,

but Beit Hillel say: One may take teruma!

For they maintain that they are not considered two species, since they are one fruit [whereas the first tanna maintains that Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning this matter; rather, everyone agrees that they are two species].

Could one say that

also

with regard to

Reishit HaGez, from one species for a different species may not be taken?!

And we say:

Indeed! For didn’t we learn

[as an unchallenged statement]:

“If one had two types, pale and white, and he sold him the pale but not the white,”

since he sold him all the pale and retained nothing of that type for himself,

“each one gives for himself”

[and although he did not purchase sheep but only their wool, he acquired the koen’s gifts and is therefore obligated to give them]. We see that one does not take from one species for a different species. For if one may take from one species for a different species, then all the wool—the pale and the white—would be considered one shearing, and the purchaser would have left with the seller part of the shearing, namely the white wool. Yet we learned: “If one purchased the shearing of another’s flock, if he retained [part of it], the seller is obligated”—and so on.

And we challenge this:

If so, in the latter clause, where it teaches:

he sold him

the males but not the females, each one gives for himself, is it likewise

to be said that

it is because they are two species?

But males and females are certainly one species!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the retained wool is considered to have remained with the seller, and it is incumbent upon him to give Reishit HaGez from all the wool.

And here

the tanna teaches us sound advice

—

that

since the wool of females is soft, whereas the wool of males is coarse [hard], he should not give the koen Reishit HaGez from the male wool that he purchased, using the female wool that remains in his possession; rather,

he should give it from this—

the female wool,

which is soft—

for the females, and he should purchase from the buyer male wool equal to the amount of Reishit HaGez that he is obligated to give for the males,

and

he should give it to the koen

from this, which is coarse 3 .

Here too, with pale and white wool, the white wool is better than the pale wool.

The tanna teaches us sound advice

that he should not give Reishit HaGez from the white wool for the pale wool; rather, he should purchase from the buyer pale wool equal to the amount of Reishit HaGez that he must give for the pale wool, and give the koen from both: from the white wool for the white wool, and from the pale wool for the pale wool.

If so, our difficulty returns to its place. On the contrary, we see from the Mishna that one may take from one species for a different species, and it teaches only sound advice!

And we say: This is not a difficulty, for

we established the Mishna as not being in accordance with Rabbi Elai!

Could it be derived as follows: Just as, with regard to teruma, we require that there be recognizable remnants—so that if one says, “All of my grain is teruma,” he has said nothing, since there are no remnants at all, but everything is teruma—

so too, with regard to Reishit HaGez,

let us say that

we require that its remnants be recognizable?

And we say:

Indeed!

In truth, we require that its remnants be recognizable.

For didn’t we learn

[as an unchallenged statement]:

“One who says, ‘All of my grain is teruma,’ and

likewise one who says,

‘All of my dough is ḥalla,’ has said nothing.”

It follows that

if

he says

“All my shearings are Reishit

HaGez,”

his statement takes effect

6 . And another beraita teaches

that if he says, “All my shearings are Reishit”—

he has said nothing.”

And these statements contradict one another!

Rather, is it not to be inferred from this: The statement

in the Mishna that he has said nothing

—

is Rabbi Elai’s view, who compares Reishit HaGez to teruma,

whereas the statement

in the beraita that his statement takes effect

—

is the Rabbis’ view.

Infer from this!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Nowadays, the world follows the opinions of these three elders:

according to Rabbi Ila'i -

the first shearing

8. As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Ila'i says: The mitzva of the first shearing applies only in Eretz Yisrael 9.

And in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira -

concerning words of Torah. As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Words of Torah do not contract ritual impurity,

and therefore one who has experienced a seminal emission need not immerse in order to study Torah.

And in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiyya -

concerning diverse kinds. As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yoshiyya says: One is never liable unless he sows wheat, barley, and a grape seed

together,

in a single casting [

that he casts all three together at the time of sowing].

We learned in our Mishna:

There is a stringency with regard to the foreleg

and so on .

And we examined it:

Let it teach

another matter in which the first shearing is more stringent than the gifts:

There is a stringency with regard to the first shearing, which applies

also

to animals with a condition rendering them tereifa, unlike the gifts,

which do not apply to animals with a condition rendering them tereifa. For the verse says: “And he shall give it to the koen,” implying that it must be given for the koen himself to eat, and not for his dog to eat?

Ravina said: Whose opinion is this?

the anonymous Mishna -

It is Rabbi Shimon's.

11. As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon exempts animals with a condition rendering them tereifa from the first shearing!

And according to him, the first shearing and the gifts are equivalent.

What is Rabbi Shimon's reason? He derives

a gzera shava,

“giving” -

“giving” from the gifts

of the priesthood.

Just as

with regard to the

gifts,

an animal with a condition rendering it tereifa is not

liable,

so too

with regard to the

first shearing as well,

an animal with a condition rendering it tereifa is not!

And we challenge this:

And if he derives

the gzera shava of

“giving” -

“giving” from the gifts, let him derive

this gzera shava of

“giving” -

“giving”

also

from teruma,

since there too “giving” is written, and let us say as follows:

Just as with regard to teruma, in Eretz Yisrael it does not

apply,

and outside Eretz Yisrael it does not, so too with regard to the first shearing, in Eretz Yisrael

it does not, and outside Eretz Yisrael

it does not

!?

And if you would say that this is indeed so, that this is truly the law,

why, then, did we learn: The first shearing applies in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael!

If so, it is proven that we do not expound this gzera shava?!

Rather, this is Rabbi Shimon's reason: He derives

a gzera shava of

“flock” -

“flock” from animal tithe. Just as

with regard to

animal tithe,

an animal with a condition rendering it tereifa is not

liable [as stated below],

so too, with regard to the first shearing,

an animal with a condition rendering it tereifa is not. 13.

And there,

in the case of animal tithe,

from where do we know

that it does not apply to an animal with a condition rendering it tereifa?

For it is written

in the passage concerning animal tithe:

“Everything that passes under the staff.”

And we expound:

To exclude an animal with a condition rendering it tereifa, which does not pass,

that is, it cannot pass under the staff because it cannot walk—for example, its legs were severed above the joint. From this, he derives the law concerning all animals with conditions rendering them tereifa, that they are not liable for animal tithe.

And we examine this:

Let him derive

by a gzera shava

“flock” -

“flock” from the firstborn. Just as the law of a

matter of a

firstborn

applies

even

to an

animal with a condition rendering it tereifa [

as it became sacred from its mother's womb, and it cannot be offered and must be buried],

so too, with regard to the first shearing,

let us say that it applies

even

to an

animal with a condition rendering it tereifa?

And we answer:

It is reasonable that he should derive the first shearing from animal tithe,

the first shearing,

since

the first shearing is comparable to animal tithe in the following respects:

Both apply not only to

males 15,

but also to females. This is unlike the firstborn, which applies specifically to a male.

Both did not apply to

impure animals [

an impure domesticated animal]. This is unlike the firstborn, which also applies to an impure animal, namely, the firstborn donkey.

Both applied specifically to

a

flock

of many animals.

Animal tithe applies specifically to ten animals, and the first shearing to five ewes. This is unlike the firstborn, which applies even to a single animal.

The firstborn becomes sacred

from the womb.

This is unlike animal tithe and the first shearing, which do not become sacred from the womb.

Both did not apply to

human beings,

but only to animals. This is unlike the firstborn, since a human firstborn also becomes sacred and requires redemption.

Both also applied to a

non-firstborn.

This is unlike the firstborn, which applies specifically to the firstborn offspring and not to the ordinary offspring born after it.

Both did not apply

before the Revelation,

that is, before the giving of the Torah. This is unlike the firstborn, which already applied in Egypt.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary! He should have derived

the first shearing

from the firstborn,

since they are comparable in the following respects:

Both—the firstborn and the first shearing—apply to an

orphan,

that is, an animal whose mother died at the time of its birth. This is unlike animal tithe, which does not apply to an orphan, since the firstborn is derived by a gzera shava from consecrated offerings, concerning which it is written, “It shall be under its mother for seven days,” thereby excluding an orphan.

Those acquired in partnership are given -

that is, both of these laws apply also to an acquired animal, a partner-owned animal, and an animal received as a gift. This is unlike animal tithe, which does not apply to an acquired animal , or to a partner-owned animal, as it is written, “It shall be yours”—but not a partnership, not an acquired animal, and not an animal received as a gift.

Both of them apply even when not

before

the Temple, unlike tithe, which applies only when the Temple is standing.

Both are gifts given to

kohen

they are, unlike tithe, which is eaten by the owners.