Chullin 136b — the Talmud in English

And we say:

the Mishna! ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

is not in accordance with Rabbi Ila'i.

For according to Rabbi Ila'i, also with regard to the first shearing: that which grows while subject to the obligation is obligated; that which grows while exempt is exempt, for we derive it from teruma.

If so, just as teruma is from one species for that which is not its species—

not

is given,

also

with regard to

the first shearing

let us say that

from one species for that which is not its species is not [given]?

And with regard to teruma, from where do we know

that one may not separate from one species for that which is not its species?

As it was taught in a beraita: If one had two species of figs, black and white,

1, and likewise

if he had

two species of wheat, one may not separate tithes from one for the other. Rabbi Yitzhak says in the name of Rabbi Ila'i: Beit Shammai say: One may not separate

from one species for that which is not its species,

but Beit Hillel say: One may separate!

For they hold that two species are not considered two species, since it is one fruit, [whereas the first tanna holds that Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning this matter, but according to everyone they are two species].

May we say that

also

with regard to

the first shearing, from one species for that which is not its species is not [given]?!

And we say:

No! For we learned

[agreeably]:

“If he had two species, pale and white, and he sold him the pale but not the white,”

since he sold him all the pale and left nothing with himself,

this one gives for himself and that one gives for himself

[and although he did not acquire sheep but only sheared wool, he acquired the koen’s gifts, and therefore he is obligated to give]. We see that one does not separate from one species for that which is not its species. For if one does separate, then all the shearing—of pale and white—would be considered one shearing; yet the purchaser left with the seller part of the shearing, namely the white. And we learned: “If one acquired the shearing of his fellow’s flock, if he left over [some shearing], the seller is obligated.”

And we challenge:

“If so, the latter clause, which teaches:”

He sold him

“the males but not the females, this one gives for himself and that one gives for himself”—is it likewise

let us say that

it is because they are two species?

But males and females are certainly one species!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that it is considered retention with the seller, and it is incumbent upon him to give the first shearing from all the shearing.

And here

it teaches us good advice

the tanna,

that

since the shearing of the females is soft and the shearing of the males is hard [difficult], he should not give the koen the first shearing from the shearing of the males that he sold, from the shearing of the females that remains in his possession, but rather

he should give him from this—

the shearing of the females,

which is soft—

for the females, and he should purchase from the purchaser male shearing in the measure of the first shearing that he is obligated to give for the males,

and

he should give it to the koen

from this, which is hard 3.

Here too, with regard to pale and white, for the shearing of the white is better than that of the pale,

it teaches us good advice

the tanna: he should not give the first shearing from white for pale, but should purchase from the purchaser pale shearing in the measure of the first shearing that he needs to give for the pale, and give them to the koen from both: from white for white and from pale for pale.

If so, the difficulty returns to its place: on the contrary, we see from the Mishna that one does separate from one species for that which is not its species, and it teaches us only good advice!

And we say: this is not a difficulty, for

we established the Mishna as not in accordance with Rabbi Ila'i!

If so, just as with teruma we require a first portion whose remnants are recognizable—for if he said, “All my grain is teruma,” he has said nothing, since there are no remnants at all, but everything is teruma—

so too, the first shearing

let us say that

we require that its remnants be recognizable?

And we say:

No!

In truth, we require that its remnants be recognizable.

For we learned

[agreeably]:

“One who says, ‘All my grain is teruma,’ and

likewise one who says

‘All my dough is hallah,’ has said nothing.”

It follows:

if

he said

“All my shearings are the first shearing”

of the shearing,

his words take effect

6. And another beraita taught

for if he said, “All my shearings are the first shearing,”—

he has said nothing.”

And they contradict one another!

Rather, is it not [that]—derive from it: the

one that we learned, “he has said nothing,” is

Rabbi Ila'i,

for he compares the first shearing to teruma;

and the

one that was taught, “his words take effect,” is

the Rabbis

it is.

Derive from it!

Rabbi Nahman bar Yitzhak said: Nowadays the world conducts itself according to these three elders:

Like Rabbi Ilai -

the first of the fleece

8. For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Ilai says: the first of the fleece applies only in the Land 9.

And like Rabbi Judah ben Beteira -

concerning words of Torah. For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Judah ben Beteira says: words of Torah do not contract impurity,

and therefore a man who has experienced a seminal emission does not need immersion in order to study Torah.

And like Rabbi Yoshiyah -

concerning diverse kinds. For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yoshiyah says: he is never liable until he sows wheat, barley, and a grape seed

together

in one act of scattering

[that he cast all three together at the time of sowing].

We learned in our Mishna:

The stringency of the foreleg

etc. .

And we raised the following question:

And let it teach

another matter in which the first of the fleece is more stringent than the gifts:

the stringency of the first of the fleece, which applies

also

to animals with a fatal defect, unlike the gifts

which do not apply to animals with a fatal defect, for the verse says, “And he shall give it to the kohen,” implying that it must be given for the kohen himself to eat, and not for his dog to eat?

Ravina said: Whose view is this?

the Mishna—

it is Rabbi Shimon’s view.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon exempts animals with a fatal defect from the first of the fleece!

And according to him, the first of the fleece and the gifts are equal.

What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason? He derives

a gzera shava

“giving” -

“giving” from the gifts

of the priesthood.

Just as

in

the gifts -

an animal with a fatal defect does not

become liable,

so

in

the first of the fleece as well -

an animal with a fatal defect does not!

And we object:

And if he derives

the gzera shava of

“giving” -

“giving” from the gifts, let him derive

this gzera shava of

“giving” -

“giving”

also

from teruma,

for there too “giving” is written, and let us say thus:

just as teruma in the Land does not

apply,

outside the Land -

not, so too the first of the fleece: in the Land -

yes; outside the Land -

no!?

And should you say that this is indeed so, that this truly is the law,

why, then, did we learn: the first of the fleece applies in the Land and outside the Land!

If so, it is proven that we do not expound this gzera shava?!

Rather, this is Rabbi Shimon’s reason: he derives

a gzera shava

“flock” -

“flock” from the animal tithe. Just as

in

the animal tithe -

an animal with a fatal defect does not

become liable [as follows],

so too the first of the fleece -

an animal with a fatal defect does not. 13.

And there,

in the animal tithe,

from where do we know

that it does not apply to an animal with a fatal defect?

For it is written

in the section concerning the animal tithe:

“Everything that passes under the staff.”

And we expound:

excluding an animal with a fatal defect, which does not pass,

that is, which cannot pass under the staff because it cannot walk, such as one whose legs were severed above the knee. And from it he derives concerning all animals with fatal defects, that they are not liable for the animal tithe.

And we raised the following question:

And let him derive

by a gzera shava

“flock” -

“flock” from the firstborn. Just as the law of the

matter of the

firstborn

applies

even

to an

animal with a fatal defect

[for it became sacred from its mother’s womb, and it is impossible to sacrifice it, and it requires burial],

so too the first of the fleece

let us say that it applies

even

to an

animal with a fatal defect?

And we answer:

It is reasonable that he should derive the first of the fleece from the animal tithe,

the first of the fleece,

for

the first of the fleece is equal to the animal tithe in these details:

Both apply not specifically to

males 15,

but also to females. Unlike the firstborn, which applies specifically to a male.

Both did not apply to

impure animals

[an impure animal]. Unlike the firstborn, which applies also to an impure animal, namely the firstborn of a donkey.

Both applied specifically

to

flocks

in numbers.

The animal tithe specifically requires ten, and the first of the fleece five ewes. Unlike the firstborn, which applies to a single animal.

The firstborn becomes sacred

from the womb.

Unlike the animal tithe and the first of the fleece, which do not become sacred from the womb.

Both did not apply to

a human being

but only to an animal. Unlike the firstborn, for a human firstborn also becomes sacred and requires redemption.

Both applied also to

an ordinary one.

Unlike the firstborn, which applies specifically to the firstborn who is born first, and not to the ordinary ones born after him.

Both did not apply

before the utterance

that is, before the giving of the Torah. Unlike the firstborn, which already applied in Egypt.

And we object:

On the contrary! He should have derived the first of the fleece from the firstborn

because of the first of the fleece,

for

they are equal in these details:

Both—the firstborn and the first of the fleece—apply to

an orphan

that is, one whose mother died at the time of its birth. Unlike the animal tithe, which does not apply to an orphan, for the firstborn was learned by a gzera shava from sacrificial animals, concerning which it is written, “For seven days it shall be under its mother,” and an orphan was excluded.

That which they purchased in partnership, they gave

that is, these two laws apply also to something purchased, held in partnership, and given as a gift. Unlike the animal tithe, which does not apply to something purchased , and not to a partnership, for it is written, “It shall be yours”—and not a partnership, not something purchased, and not something given as a gift.

Both of them apply even when not

in the presence of

the Temple, unlike tithe, which applies only when the Temple exists.

Both are gifts given to a

priest

they are, unlike tithe, which is eaten by the owners.