Chullin 136a (קלו.) — the Talmud in English

According to Rabba. As Rabba said:

It is inferred from that which is written, “upon the doorposts of your house”:

the way of your entering

the house—you affix the mezuzah! And a person’s way of entering is

from the right,

as when he enters a house, he first brings in his right foot. Therefore, the right side is the way of entering, and consequently one affixes the mezuzah on the right side of the doorway.

And Rabbi Ela’i also concedes with regard to

tithe.

For

although the Merciful One writes, “your tithe of your grain,”

which implies

that it is yours—

yes, that of a partnership—

no; the Merciful One writes, “your tithes,”

which also implies a partnership.

But

what purpose does that which is written

“your tithe of your grain” serve? To exclude a partnership with a gentile!

And he likewise concedes with regard to

the priestly gifts.

For

although the Merciful One writes, “and he shall give,”

it

could be said that we should derive

a gzera shava

from “giving”—

“giving” from the first shearing: Just as there

a partnership is not—

so too here a partnership is not; the Merciful One writes, “from those who slaughter the slaughtered animal,”

which implies that a partnership is also liable. And we challenge this:

But the reason is that the Merciful One writes, “from those who slaughter the slaughtered animal”;

that is why one does not derive the law from the first shearing.

Had it not been so, would I have said that we should derive the law from the first shearing? On the contrary! We should derive it

by a gzera shava of “giving”—“giving”

from teruma,

where one is also liable in a partnership? And we say:

Indeed, so it is;

in truth, we derive it from teruma, where one is liable. And this verse,

“from those who slaughter the slaughtered animal”—what purpose does it serve? To teach the principle of Rava. As Rava said: The claim is against the slaughterer,

as the kohen’s claim to receive the gifts is always directed against the slaughterer [as above, 132a]. And he likewise concedes with regard to

first fruits,

for

although the Merciful One writes, “your land,”

which implies

that it is yours—

yes, that of a partnership—

no; the Merciful One writes, “the first fruits of all that is in your land,”

which also implies a partnership.

And

but

what purpose does that which is written

“your land” serve?

To exclude outside Eretz Yisrael!

For there is no mitzva of first fruits there.

And he likewise concedes with regard to

ritual fringes,

for

although the Merciful One writes, “your garment,”

which implies

that it is yours—

yes, that of a partnership—

no; the Merciful One writes, “on the corners of their garments throughout their generations,”

which implies a partnership.

But “your garment,”

which the Merciful One wrote,

why is it necessary?

To teach the principle of Rav Yehuda. As Rav Yehuda said: A borrowed cloak is exempt from ritual fringes for all thirty days,

because it is not considered a garment belonging to you.

And he likewise concedes with regard to

a parapet,

for

although the Merciful One writes, “for your roof,”

which implies

that it is yours—

yes, that of a partnership—

no; the Merciful One writes, “when the one who falls falls from it,”

for “the one who falls” implies anyone liable to fall, even one who falls from the roof of a partnership. And

but

what purpose does that which is written

“your roof” serve? To exclude synagogues and study halls,

which are not obligated in a parapet because they are not “your roof,” as no individual owns them; rather, they belong to everyone. There is an additional reason: They are not dwelling houses.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye said: These general principles are not valid,

which we stated, that Rabbi Ela’i concedes in all these matters.

As it is taught in a beraita: An animal belonging to partners is liable for the firstborn, but Rabbi Ela’i exempts it;

we see that Rabbi Ela’i does not concede with regard to the firstborn!

What is the reason of Rabbi Ela’i?

For it is written, “your cattle and your flock,”

which implies excluding a partnership.

But it is written, “your cattle and your flock,”

which implies including a partnership?

through it”

What is the alternative?

In

teruma

the rule is that what

grew while subject to the obligation,

in a Jew’s possession, is

obligatory, while what

grew

while exempt—

that is, in the possession of a gentile—

is exempt. Even

with regard to

the first shearing

we should likewise say:

what grew while subject to the obligation—

is obligatory; what grew while exempt—

is exempt?

And with regard to teruma, from where do we know

this rule, that what grew while subject to the obligation is obligatory, whereas what grew while exempt is exempt?

As it was taught in a beraita: If a Jew purchased a field in Syria from a gentile,

and Syria is Aram Tzova, which David conquered; and a conquest by an individual is not considered a conquest, so the sanctity of the Land did not apply to it, אלא only a lesser sanctity. Therefore, in Syria a gentile’s ownership can exempt produce from tithes, if a Jew purchased it from the gentile

before it had brought forth

the produce

a third

of its growth—

he is obligated

to tithe it. If he purchased it

after it had brought forth

the produce

a third, Rabbi Akiva obligates

him to tithe

the addition,

that is, the two-thirds that grew under the Jew’s ownership,

but the Sages exempt him.

For they hold that once it brought forth a third while in the gentile’s possession, it is as though the entire crop had been completed in his possession, as we maintain that produce follows the one-third stage [but if he purchased it from a gentile in Eretz Yisrael, he is obligated to tithe the entire crop, since a gentile’s ownership in Eretz Yisrael cannot exempt it from tithes].

We see, then, that if the produce grew in the possession of a gentile, who is exempt from tithes, it is exempt, whereas if it grew under Jewish ownership, it is obligatory!

And if you would say: Here too,

indeed, the same rule applies to the first shearing,

but

that is not so! For

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who purchases the fleece of a gentile’s sheep is exempt from the first shearing,

because the obligation rests upon the owner of the sheep and not upon one who owns only the fleece; this implies:

but

if he purchased

his flock

of a gentile

in order to shear it,

meaning that he purchased his flock when it was ready to be shorn—

he is obligated!

Even though it grew in the gentile’s possession .