Chullin 137a (קלז.) — the Talmud in English

Both of them are sanctified from the outset,

in sanctity,

because a firstborn animal is sanctified from its mother’s womb, whereas with the first shearing there is no need to perform an act to sanctify it. This is not so with animal tithe, which becomes sanctified by passing beneath the staff.

These two are subject to

sale,

as the kohen may sell a firstborn animal and the first shearing, but a tithed animal may not be sold.

And these

details in which the first shearing is similar to a firstborn

are more numerous

[literally, “many”] than the details in which the first shearing is similar to animal tithe. If so, apparently it would be preferable to derive from the firstborn that the first shearing applies even to a tereifa?!

And we answer: Nevertheless, since the first shearing applies to

an ordinary animal, whereas

animal tithe applies to

an ordinary animal—

it is preferable for it

to be derived from one of these, rather than from a firstborn, which applies specifically to the firstborn animal born first.

We learned in our Mishna:

“The first shearing applies only to sheep.”

From where are these matters derived?

Rav Ḥisda said: It is derived

by means of a gzera shava,

“shearing”

from “shearing.” It is written here,

with regard to the first shearing,

“The first shearing of your flock you shall give him,” and it is written there,

in the Book of Job,

“And with the shearing of my sheep I warm myself.” Just as there—

sheep, so here

the reference is specifically to

sheep. 2.

And we challenge this:

Let us derive

this gzera shava of

“shearing”

from “shearing” from a firstborn animal!

For there, even the amount of shearing obtained from an ox is called “shearing.” Let us say, then: Just as the prohibition against shearing there applies even to an ox, so too here, the first shearing should apply even to an ox?

And from where do we know that the prohibition against shearing a firstborn applies even to an ox?

As it was taught:

It is written:

“You shall not work with the firstborn of your ox, nor shear the firstborn of your flock.” I have only

that it is forbidden

to work with an ox and to shear a sheep. From where do we derive that what is stated with regard to one—

namely, the prohibition against working, which is stated with regard to an ox—

applies to the other—

the sheep—

and what is stated with regard to the other—

the prohibition against shearing, which is stated with regard to the sheep—

applies to the one—

the ox?

The verse states: “You shall not work” and “nor shear”; the

letter vav in “nor shear,” which is stated with regard to the sheep, adds it to the first subject, namely, the ox, and they are derived from one another.

And we answer:

The verse says

with regard to the first shearing: “You shall give him,” to the kohen. And we expound:

“You shall give him”

for the purpose of his garments,

and not for

the purpose of

his sack,

and the shearing of an ox is suitable for making only a sack, not a garment. Therefore, there is no basis for saying that an ox should be obligated in the first shearing.

And we challenge this:

But if that is so,

since you say that, for this reason, there is no obligation of the first shearing with regard to an ox—because it is not suitable for making a garment—then

goat down should be liable,

since it is suitable for making a garment?

And we answer:

We require

something that comes through

shearing. And

with regard to goats,

there is none,

because goat down is not sheared; rather, it is plucked.

And we challenge this:

Whom have you heard

who holds

this view,

that we derive from the wording “shearing” that we require specifically something obtained through shearing? It is

Rabbi Yosei

below!

But Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to something whose usual manner

is to remove it without shearing, such as here, with goats, whose usual manner is removal by plucking. If so, the first shearing should apply to goats as well?

Rather,

the statement that the first shearing applies only to sheep

is as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said,

who expounded from the verse written in the passage concerning the first shearing:

“To stand and serve.”

We require

something suitable for service; here too,

we require

something suitable for service,

namely, wool from which the garments of the kohanim are made. Wool is found only among sheep, and therefore the first shearing applies specifically to sheep.

And

rather,

the gzera shava of

“shearing”

from “shearing,” through which we derived above the law of the first shearing from the verse in Job, “And with the shearing of my sheep I warm myself”

—

what does it come to teach?

In accordance with the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, for the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Sheep whose wool is coarse are exempt from the first shearing. As it is stated: “And with the shearing of my sheep I warm myself,”

the implication is that only wool that provides warmth is called “shearing,” whereas coarse wool does not provide warmth.

One teaching states:

The one who

shears the goats, and the one who

washes

the sheep

in the river in order to beautify them, thereby causing wool to be pulled from them—

is exempt.

The reason is: one who shears goats is exempt, as we have said, because the first shearing applies only to sheep. And one who washes sheep is exempt because the wool is not removed through shearing; rather, it is pulled out by itself.

And it was taught in another baraita: One who shears the goats -

is exempt, but one who washes the sheep -

is liable!

This is contradictory!

And we say:

This is not difficult; that

baraita that teaches that he is liable -

is the opinion of the Rabbis,

whereas

that

baraita that teaches that he is exempt -

is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

As it was taught:

It is written:

“The gleanings of your harvest.”

And we derive that only from produce that is harvested must one give leket,

but not

must one give

leket

if it was gathered by

plucking.

Rabbi Yosei says: There is no leket except that which comes as a result of harvesting!

And we consider this:

Rabbi Yosei is identical to the first tanna;

so what is the disagreement here?

And we explain:

The entire baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. And this is what it teaches: Rabbi Yosei says, says: There is no leket except that which comes as a result of harvesting.

And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosei there.

If so, the baraita that teaches that he is exempt is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who precisely interprets the verse; here too, he precisely interprets the word “shearing”—specifically wool that comes through shearing, and not wool that comes through washing. And the baraita that teaches that he is liable is the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not interpret the verse in this manner.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of something whose customary manner

is to gather it by plucking rather than by harvesting, that he is liable for leket.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yosei says:

It is written:

“From the harvest

of your land.”

I have derived only harvesting; uprooting

with the roots, as is done when pulling out lentils,

from where

do I know that one is liable for leket?

The verse states: “When you harvest.”

This comes to include uprooting.

Pulling out

by hand without the roots, as is done with beans,

from where

do I know that one is liable for leket?

The verse states: “When you harvest.”

This comes to include pulling out.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: We too have learned

that Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of something whose customary manner is so.

As we learned:

The rows

[of onions]

among the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says:

He places

pe’a from each and every one

of the rows, since the vegetables separate the rows, as vegetables are not subject to pe’a. Specifically, anything that is food, is guarded, and is stored for preservation is subject to pe’a. Vegetables are not stored for preservation, whereas onions and garlic are stored for preservation, and therefore they are subject to pe’a.

And the Sages say:

He leaves pe’a

from one

of the rows

for them all.

We see that Rabbi Yosei holds that onions are subject to pe’a, even though they are not harvested with a sickle. Therefore, he concedes that one is liable for something whose customary manner is so .

We learned in our Mishna: “And it applies only to a large flock.”

And how large is it,

the House of Shammai say: Two sheep, etc., and the House of Hillel say: Five, etc.

And we consider this:

Granted, according to the House of Shammai,

we find

two

sheep

also

that

are called a flock,

as the verse cited in the Mishna states: “A man shall sustain one young ox and two sheep.” Therefore, two are also liable, since they are included in the verse, “And the first shearing of your flock.”

But according to the House of Hillel, what is the reason

that specifically five are required for liability? Two are also called “a flock.”

Rav Kahana said: The verse states “Five sheep

that are made,”

“made,”

and we derive:

That perform two mitzvot!

And these are

the first shearing and the gifts,

for when there are fewer than five sheep, there is only one mitzva, namely the gifts, which one is obligated to give even from a single animal.

And we raise an objection:

Perhaps

this phrase, “that perform two mitzvot,” refers to

the firstborn and the gifts

?

And we answer: It cannot be said in this manner. Does the firstborn offering not become obligatory with

one

animal

as well?

If so, why does the verse state, “Five sheep that are made”—that they perform two mitzvot? With a single animal as well, we find an animal that performs two mitzvot. Rather, it certainly refers to the first shearing and the gifts.

And we challenge this:

But according to your reasoning, the gifts

as well—does

one

animal not become obligated? If so, we find that two mitzvot are performed even with a single animal, namely the gifts and the firstborn. Necessarily, we cannot interpret the phrase “that are made” as meaning that they perform two mitzvot, since two mitzvot are performed even with fewer than five sheep?!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

This is how the verse is expounded:

“That are made”—

that make their owners

liable for a mitzva in which they had not been liable with fewer than five sheep,

and say to him: Arise and perform a mitzva

of the first shearing!

It was taught: The school of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: Four

sheep are liable for the first shearing,

as it is stated: “And four sheep in place of the sheep.”

We see that four are called a flock .

It was taught: Rabbi said:

Even

if

[if]

the words

of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel were

words of Torah

—which were stated in the Torah that was given for all generations—

and the words of the great Rabbi

[Rabbi Yosei; barיבי is an appellation for the greatest sage of his generation, and we say in tractate Eruvin: “Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning accompanies him”] were words of

tradition

—that is, the words of the Prophets [and they are called words of tradition because they received these matters through the Holy Spirit, each prophecy according to the needs of its time, generation, and circumstance]—

we would heed the words of the great Rabbi

as the reason is explained below.

And all the more so

here,

where their words are words of tradition,

as they derive their position from the words of the Prophets,

and the words of the great Rabbi are words of Torah,

as he derives his position from a verse .

And we might now have thought that the reason that even when his words are words of tradition we heed him is that his words constitute a third הכרעה, a decisive ruling. The House of Shammai said two, the House of Hillel said five, and Rabbi Yosei decided between their positions and said four.

And we raise an objection:

But did the Master not say: A third הכרעה does not constitute a decisive ruling?!

[And see Rashi, who explained when we say that it is decisive and when we do not.]