Chullin 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

And we resolve it:

This is what he is saying:

Rabbi:

The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears more plausible

who prohibits it,

to Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

in a case where they were found

in a refuse heap in the marketplace.

This is because

even Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, did not disagree with him

with Rabbi Yehuda

except with regard to a refuse heap in a courtyard. But with regard to a refuse heap in the marketplace, he agrees with him.

And this is also what he is saying:

And the statement

of Rabbi Ḥanina appears more plausible with regard to a refuse heap in a courtyard. For even Rabbi Ḥanina permitted the slaughter only in a refuse heap in a courtyard. Rabbi did not come to decide between them in this matter, but rather to explain their dispute.

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone may perform slaughter except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they spoil their slaughter.

And the Gemara infers:

“Perhaps they spoiled it,”

which would indicate that this is the reason to prohibit their slaughter after the fact,

it does not teach that. Rather, it teaches: “Lest they spoil it,”

which indicates that it is speaking of the time before the slaughter.

Rava said: This indicates

that for this reason of “lest they spoil it,”

they are not entrusted

to perform even

non-sacred slaughter initially!

And this is so even when an adult is standing over them, because they are prone to spoil it constantly, and this involves the prohibition of “Do not destroy.” We learned in the Mishna:

And in the case of all of them who performed slaughter and others observe them —

their slaughter is valid.

And although it was explained at the beginning of our chapter that the word “all of them” comes to include several laws, each sage according to his view, nevertheless it certainly also refers to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor.

And the Gemara discusses:

Who

is this

tanna

who deems the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor valid, when it is clear to us that they performed the slaughter properly, despite the fact that they lack the mental capacity to direct their action for the sake of slaughter, but intend merely to cut, for he maintains

that intent for slaughter is not required?

Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan.

For Hoshea, the youngest of the group, taught:

the youngest member of the yeshiva scholars:

If one threw a knife

with the intention

of driving it into a wall, and it proceeded and performed slaughter in its usual manner,

proper slaughter —

Rabbi Natan deems

the slaughter valid, although it was performed without intent.

But the Sages deem it invalid,

because slaughter requires intent.

And the Gemara adds:

He

Hoshea

taught it,

he taught this beraita,

and he stated it

as a ruling based on his own understanding, and decided:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Natan.

Intent is not required.

And we raise an objection: How can we deem the slaughter valid through merely throwing the knife?

But we require

that he

move the knife forward and backward

across the neck, whereas in throwing it there is only a forward motion!?

And we resolve: What are we dealing with here?

That

the knife

proceeded and returned in its usual manner.

For example, it cut the neck as it moved forward and continued until it reached the wall; then, as a result of striking the wall, the knife rebounded and cut the neck again. This constitutes both forward and backward movement.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yoḥanan raised the following dilemma:

whether

a minor has intent

and knows how to direct his intention toward the purpose of his action, and therefore is fit for all matters in which intent is required, such as the slaughter of sacrificial offerings, where intent lishma — for the sake of the offering — is required,

or he has no intent,

and is not capable of forming the requisite intent, and therefore is disqualified from slaughtering sacrificial offerings.

Rabbi Ami said to

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan should have raised the dilemma

whether a minor has intent even in a case where there is

an action

alongside the intent, so that the action demonstrates his intent, and whether his intent is effective. For example, an animal designated as an elevation-offering is standing in the south of the Temple courtyard, and the minor says: “I am bringing it to the north, since that is where it must be slaughtered!” And he brings it to the north and slaughters it. The action of bringing it to the north demonstrates that his intent is for sacrificial purposes, and he also explicitly says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a sacrificial offering. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan raise the dilemma specifically with regard to intent alone, without an action?

And Rabbi Ami concluded his objection:

What is the difference

between intent together with

an action

in the case of a minor

that he did not raise as a dilemma,

and it was obvious to him that a minor possesses intent together with an action — is it not because

we learned: “They have an action

that demonstrates their intent,”

”

as will be cited below? And if so,

intent

alone in the case of a minor

should likewise not have been raised as a dilemma,

for it is certainly the case that he has no intent. For once he had heard that Mishna, he had also heard

what we learned

there: “

They have no intent.”

For we learned

in tractate Kelim [17:15]:

An oak nut, a pomegranate, and a walnut that children hollowed out

and made into a utensil by making a hole in their side and emptying out their contents, so that they could

measure

[measure]

earth with them, or that they prepared them as the pan of a balance,

they thereby acquire the status of utensils. Therefore, if ritual impurity touches them, they are

impure, because they have

the minors

an action

that demonstrates their intent. For when their actions demonstrate their intention, and they also say verbally that this is what they intend — as in this case, where they say that they intend to make a utensil, and they also make the utensil through an action — their intent is considered intent!