Chullin 12b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

This is what he is saying:

Rabbi:

The words of Rabbi Judah appear [correct]

who forbids [it],

in accordance with Rabbi Hanina, son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean,

when they were found

in a refuse heap in the marketplace.

For

even Rabbi Hanina, son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, did not disagree with him

with Rabbi Judah

except with regard to a refuse heap in a house. But with regard to a refuse heap in the marketplace, he agrees with him.

And this is also what he says:

And the words appear [correct]

the words of Rabbi Hanina with regard to a refuse heap in a house. For Rabbi Hanina, too, permitted only [what was found] in a refuse heap in a house. And Rabbi did not come to decide between them in this matter, but rather to explain their dispute.

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone slaughters, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter.

And the Gemara infers:

“Lest they ruined [it],”

which implies that this is a reason to forbid their slaughter after the fact,

it does not teach. Rather, it teaches, “lest they ruin [it],”

which implies that it is speaking before the slaughter.

Rava said: This is to say

that for this reason of “lest they ruin [it],

we do not entrust to them

to slaughter even

non-sacred animals ab initio!

And even when an adult stands over them, because they are always likely to ruin [the slaughter], and this involves “do not destroy.” We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them who slaughtered, while others see them—

their slaughter is valid.

And although it is explained at the beginning of our chapter that the word “and all of them” comes to include several laws, each one according to his view, nevertheless it certainly also refers to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor.

And the Gemara discusses:

Who is

this

tannaitic authority

who validates the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, in a case where it is clear to us that they slaughtered according to the law, despite the fact that they do not possess the understanding to direct their intention for the sake of slaughter, but rather they intend merely to cut, for he holds

that we do not require intention for slaughter?

Rava said: It is [the view of] Rabbi Natan.

For Hoshaya, the junior of the fellowship, taught,

the youngest of the group of the members of the academy:

He threw a knife

with the intention

of driving it into a wall, and it went and slaughtered in its usual manner,

a slaughter according to the law—

Rabbi Natan validates

the slaughter, although it was performed without intention.

And the Sages disqualify,

because slaughter requires intention.

And the Gemara adds:

He

Hoshaya,

taught it,

he taught this beraita,

and he stated it

as a halakhic ruling on his own authority, and decided:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Natan.

For we do not require intention.

And we object: How do we validate the slaughter merely by throwing the knife?

But we require

that he

draw and return

the knife over the neck, whereas in throwing there is only a drawing forward!?

And we answer: With what are we dealing here?

That

That the knife

went and came in its usual manner.

For example, it cut the neck as it went and continued until the wall, and as a result of striking the wall, the knife returned backward and cut the neck again. And this is drawing forward and returning.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yohanan raised the question:

whether

a minor possesses intention

and knows how to direct his intention for the sake of what he is doing, and therefore is valid for everything in which intention is required, such as the slaughter of sacrificial animals, for which intention “for its sake” is required—

or he does not possess intention,

and he is not one capable of intention, and therefore he is disqualified for the slaughter of sacrificial animals.

Rabbi Ami said to him

to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba:

And let him raise the question

for Rabbi Yohanan whether a minor possesses intention even in a place where there is

an act

along with the intention, so that the act demonstrates his intention, whether his intention is effective. For example, an olah that is standing in the south of the Temple courtyard, and the minor said: “I am bringing it to the north, for that is where its law is that it be slaughtered!” And he brought it to the north and slaughtered it. For the act of bringing it to the north demonstrates that his intention is for sacrificial animals, and he also explicitly says that he is slaughtering for the sake of sacrificial animals. And why does Rabbi Yohanan raise the question specifically with regard to intention alone, without an act?

And Rabbi Ami concluded his objection:

What is different about

intention together with

an act

in the case of a minor

that he does not raise the question about it,

and it is obvious to him that a minor possesses intention together with an act—is it not because

we learned: “They have an act

that demonstrates their intention”

?

As brought below, and if so,

intention

alone in the case of a minor

he should likewise not raise the question about it,

for he certainly does not possess intention. For once he has heard that Mishna,

which we learned

in it also: “

They do not possess intention.”

For we learned

in tractate Kelim [17:15]:

The acorn, the pomegranate, and the nut that children hollowed out

and made into a vessel by making a hole in their side and emptying their contents, so that they could

measure [

measure]

earth with them, or prepared them as a pan of a balance,

then they acquire the status of “vessels.” Therefore, if impurity touches them, they are

impure, because they have

for the minors

an act

that demonstrates their intention. For where their acts demonstrate their intention, and they also say verbally that this is what they intend—for example, here, where they say that they intend to make a vessel, and they also make the vessel through an act—their intention is considered intention!