Chullin 12a — the Talmud in English

And if you would say

no,

this is indeed so,

and Rabbi Meir did not eat meat, this would be difficult: After all, what can be said regarding the Paschal offering,

which

the Torah commanded that it be eaten, as it is written: “And they shall eat the meat on this night,”

and sacrificial meat,

whose atonement is also dependent on their being eaten, as it is written: “And they shall eat them, through which they were atoned for,”

what is there to say?

Rather,

necessarily, according to Rabbi Meir,

where it is possible

to clarify,

it is possible.

And

where it is not possible, it is not possible,

and then we rely on the majority. If so,

here too

for us, there is no proof from all the cases cited above that in every matter we follow the majority; rather, perhaps

where it is possible, it is possible,

and

where it is not possible, it is not possible.

According to the Gemara’s conclusion, the source of the law of “a majority that is not present before us,” in a case where clarification is possible, was not explained.

Rav Naḥman said that Rav said: If one saw someone slaughtering,

then

if he saw him from the beginning to the end

of the slaughter,

, he may eat from his slaughter. But if not

—he may not eat from his slaughter.

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances? If he knew

about the slaughterer

that he was learned

in the laws of slaughter,

, why do I need

him to

see

him during his slaughter?

And if he knew

about him

that he was not learned, it is obvious

that if he sees him slaughtering, he may eat from his slaughter, since he sees that he slaughtered according to law. And if he does not see him, it is obvious that it is prohibited, as perhaps he paused or pressed during the slaughter. And what does Rav Naḥman teach us?

And we answer:

Rather,

it is referring to a case

where he did not know

regarding the slaughterer

whether he was learned

in the laws of slaughter

or whether he was not learned.

And Rav Naḥman teaches us that we do not rely on the assumption that presumably he is learned, until one recognizes that he knows how to slaughter according to law.

And we raise a difficulty: Why is it necessary that he see him?

Let us say: “The majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts,”

and even though he does not recognize him, we may rely on his slaughter.

Was it not taught in a beraita: If one found a slaughtered hen in the marketplace, or if he said to his agent, “Go slaughter,” and he went

the agent

and found

that the bird had already been

slaughtered—

it is permitted to eat it, because

its presumption

is that it was

slaughtered

properly.

Apparently,

although we do not know who slaughtered it,

we say: “The majority of those engaged in slaughter

are experts.”

And if so,

here too, let us say: “The majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts.”

Why, then, did Rav Naḥman require that one see the slaughter?

And we answer:

Actually,

Rav Naḥman is speaking of a case where he

knew

about the slaughterer

that he was not learned. And

the fact that he needed to prohibit it is referring to a case

such as one in which he slaughtered one siman properly before us.

Lest you say: Since he slaughtered this siman

properly, this

second siman

also

he slaughtered

properly,

and it is unnecessary to supervise him until the slaughter is completed,

he teaches us

Rav Naḥman that we do not rely on his slaughter. Rather, we say:

This

siman

happened to come out well for him,

by chance, in that it was slaughtered properly; but with regard to

the other

siman, there is still reason for concern:

perhaps he paused

or

perhaps he pressed

during his slaughter.

Therefore, it is necessary to see him from the beginning of the slaughter until its end.

Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Naḥman: If one says to his agent, “Go and slaughter,” and he went

the homeowner

and found

it

slaughtered,

but it is not known who slaughtered it,

what is the law?

Do we assume that it was slaughtered by the agent and permit eating it, or are we concerned that someone else, who was not an expert, slaughtered it, and it is prohibited?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

Its presumption

is that it was

slaughtered

properly, and it is permitted.

And furthermore, Rav Dimi asked Rav Naḥman:

If one says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma

from my untithed produce,”

and he went

the homeowner

and found

the untithed produce

with teruma separated,

but the homeowner does not know who separated it,

what is the law?

Do we assume that the agent separated it and his teruma is valid, or are we concerned that someone else separated it? Since he was not sent by the homeowner, his teruma is not valid, and he must separate teruma again.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

Its presumption is not that teruma was separated,

and it is still untithed produce.

Rav Dimi understood that the reason Rav Naḥman had ruled unequivocally, in the case of an agent sent to slaughter, that “its presumption is that it was slaughtered,” was that we say that the agent certainly slaughtered it. Therefore, he challenged him:

From

a fortiori, if

we hold

that there is a presumption

that

an agent fulfills his agency,

and therefore we attribute the slaughter to the agent,

even

in the case of

teruma as well

let us say that the agent certainly separated it. Why, then, did you say, “Its presumption is not that teruma was separated”?

And if there is no presumption

that

an agent fulfills his agency,

and that is why we are concerned that someone else separated it,

even

in the case of

slaughter as well, do not

rely on the assumption that the agent slaughtered it; rather, let us be concerned that someone else, who was not an expert, slaughtered it!?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rav Dimi:

When you eat a kor of salt!

When you measure out a kor of salt as my wage, I will answer you. This was said jokingly. And this is the explanation of the matter:

Actually,

we hold that

“there is no presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.”

And when we say, “Its presumption is that it was slaughtered,” this is not because we assume specifically that the agent slaughtered it. Rather, in

slaughter,

even

if another person heard

the sender telling his agent to slaughter,

and went

he

and slaughtered

it, the slaughter is valid, because

the majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts.

But

with regard to teruma,

since there is no presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, we are concerned

that perhaps another person heard

him telling his agent to separate teruma

, and went

he and

separated it.

His teruma is not effective, since

he is one who separated teruma without the owners’ knowledge

of the owners.

And one who separates teruma without the knowledge

of the owners—

his teruma is not valid!

The reason for this is that we derive agency with regard to teruma from the verse: “So shall you also raise the teruma of the Lord.” We expound: “Also” includes your agents. Agency with regard to teruma, however, applies specifically with the owners’ knowledge. This is because we compare the agent to the owner: Just as “you” means with your knowledge, so too your agent may separate teruma only with your knowledge.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say that this matter of

«

the majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts”

is the subject of a dispute between

tannaim:

whether we rely on this majority.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one’s kids and chickens were lost, and he went and found them slaughtered,

but it is not known whether they were slaughtered properly or not—

Rabbi Yehuda prohibits

the meat from being eaten.

Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, permits

the meat to be eaten.

Rabbi said: The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear

—that he prohibits—in a case

where he found

the slaughtered kids

in a refuse heap.

This is because it is evident that they became carcasses, since it is customary to throw carcasses into a refuse heap.

And

the

words of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who permits, appear in a case

where he found them in the house.

From Rabbi’s words it is implied that Rabbi Yehuda prohibits even when they are found in the house, and Rabbi Ḥanina permits even when they are found in a refuse heap.

And they disagree in every circumstance.

Is it not that they disagree about this: One

Rabbi Ḥanina

holds that we say: “The majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts.”

And that is why he permits.

And the other

Rabbi Yehuda

holds that we do not say: “The majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts.”

And that is why he prohibits, as we are concerned that perhaps one who was not learned slaughtered it.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No,

this is not the issue over which they disagree.

Rather, everyone

holds that

“the majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts.”

And actually, if he found them slaughtered

in the house, everyone agrees that it is permitted,

because of this majority. And if he found them

in a refuse heap in the marketplace, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.

This is because it is evident that they became carcasses during slaughter, from the fact that they were thrown into a refuse heap.

They disagree

when he found them

in a refuse heap in the house.

One,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds that a person may place his carcass in a refuse heap in the house.

And if he placed it there, presumably it is a carcass, and it is prohibited.

And the other,

Rabbi Ḥanina,

holds that a person does not place his carcass in a refuse heap in the house.

Because it emits a foul odor, he places it only in a refuse heap in the marketplace. Since he found it in the house, it was certainly slaughtered properly.

The Master said: Rabbi said: The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear,

to prohibit, in a case

where he found them in a refuse heap.

And the Gemara discusses:

What

is that

“refuse heap”

in which Rabbi prohibited them?

If we say it is a refuse heap in the marketplace—

you already said that everyone agrees

with regard to it

that it is prohibited.

For it is evident that it is a carcass. And from the fact that Rabbi needed to rule in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s words, it is implied that he is speaking of the circumstance in which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Ḥanina disagreed.

Rather, obviously

Rabbi is speaking

of a refuse heap in the house.

For in this case the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits it, since a person may place his carcass there.

But if so, this is difficult:

Say the latter clause,

which we learned:

And

the

words of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

to permit, appear in a case

where he found them in the house.

What does “house”

mean in which Rabbi permitted them?

If we say that he found them in a

literal house, you already said that everyone agrees

that

it is

permitted

in this case. Yet Rabbi’s words imply that they disagree even in this case.

Rather, obviously,

the case in which Rabbi permitted them was

a refuse heap in the house.

And if so,

this is difficult:

the statement that

Rabbi

said,

“The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear in a refuse heap,”

while

the statement that

Rabbi

said,

“The words of Rabbi Ḥanina appear in the house.”

For you have established both of them as referring to the same circumstance, and they contradict one another.

Ведь ты установил, что оба высказывания относятся к одному и тому же случаю, а они противоречат друг другу.