Chullin 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

And let us be concerned

perhaps one of them is

the goat designated for Azazel

a tereifa

and therefore it cannot effect atonement.

Rather, is it not

that we are not concerned that it is a tereifa

because we say: “Follow the majority”?

And if you would say

in rejection of this proof: Since it does not ascend upon the altar,

what difference does it make to us

whether it is a tereifa, as we are not concerned with that matter—this cannot be said.

For

it

is taught in a beraita:

The lottery does not establish

the goat to be sent

for Azazel except with regard to something

[the goat]

that is fit for the Lord.

For at the time of the lottery, it is not known which goat will be designated for the Lord and which for Azazel; therefore, both of them must be fit for the Lord. And if one of them is a tereifa, then just as it is unfit for the Lord, so too it is unfit for Azazel. Rather, it is certainly because we rely on the majority of animals being fit that we are not concerned that it is a tereifa.

And if you would say

in rejection of this:

, we examine it

the goat after pushing it to the cliff, and see that it is not a tereifa—this cannot be said.

For

did we not learn: The goat did not reach

the goat

halfway down the mountain before it was reduced to limb after limb.

And by then it is no longer possible to examine whether it was a tereifa, since we do not know which of its limbs were broken while it was alive and which were broken after its death.

Rav Mari said: The principle of the majority is derived

from the law of the majority

from the case of one who strikes his father or mother, as the Torah says

about him:

“Put him to death!”

And let us be concerned that perhaps

the one who was struck

is not his father,

as perhaps his mother became pregnant from another man. And how can we put one who strikes his father to death based on uncertainty?

Rather, is it not so

that we assume that he is his father

because we say: “Follow the majority,” and the majority of acts of intercourse

are

with the husband

? Although this assessment is a “majority that is not present before us,” we rely upon it to say that certainly his mother became pregnant from her husband, who is his father. And from here we learn the principle of the majority for the entire Torah.

And we reject this:

From where

do you know that the reason is because of the majority?

Perhaps

the Torah rendered one who strikes his father liable to death specifically

when his father and mother were imprisoned in a prison,

and his mother became pregnant there. In such a circumstance, there is no concern that another man may have had intercourse with her, since they were alone until the fetus was recognizable.

And we reject this:

Even so,

there is concern that perhaps another man happened to be there and committed adultery with her, because the principle is

“There is no guardian with regard to forbidden sexual relations,”

meaning that it is impossible to guarantee that a woman will not commit adultery. Necessarily, then, the fact that one who strikes his father is put to death is only because we follow the majority.

Rav Kahana said: The principle of the majority is derived

from the law of the majority

from one who murders a person, as the Merciful One said: “Put him to death,”

the murderer.

And let us be concerned that perhaps the murdered person was a “tereifa,”

and one is not liable to death for murdering a person who is classified as a tereifa. Since he does not possess the vitality of a healthy person, the murderer killed a “dead man.” And how can we put the murderer to death based on uncertainty?

Rather, is it not so

that we are not concerned that perhaps the murdered person was a tereifa

because we say: Follow the majority,

and the majority of people are not tereifot.

And if you would say

in rejection of this, that in fact we do not rely on the majority, but rather

we examine him

the murdered person, to establish that he is not a tereifa—

This cannot be said, since in order to examine him it would be necessary to cut him open and dissect him, and

this would disfigure

him through the dissection. And it is forbidden to do so, because it is forbidden to disgrace the body of the dead. It is thus clearly proven that we put the murderer to death on the basis of the majority, without examination.

And if you would say

in rejection of this

, that although it would disfigure

the murdered person to examine him, nevertheless, because of the concern of

the loss of the life of this

murderer gratuitously [if in fact the murdered person is a tereifa]

we disfigure him

the murdered person and cut open his body in order to examine him—

Even so, we have not escaped uncertainty. For,

let us be concerned that perhaps at the place

where the

sword

of the murderer cut the murdered person,

there had already been a perforation

in him beforehand, and because of that perforation the murdered person was already a tereifa; and we could never clarify this. Rather, necessarily, we rely on the majority.

Ravina said: The principle of the majority is derived

from the law of the majority

from conspiring witnesses

who testified concerning a certain man that he was liable to death, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses,

as the Merciful One said

[Deuteronomy 19]

“And you shall do to him as he conspired

to do to his brother,”

and we put them to death. But let us be concerned: perhaps this

man

about whom they testified

was liable to death

, was a tereifa.

And if so, they are not liable to death, since the verse “as he conspired” does not apply to them: they did not conspire to kill a complete person, but only a “dead man.”

Rather, is it not so

that we are not concerned about this

because we say: “Follow the majority”?

And if you would say

in rejection of this,

that

here too

we examine him

the one about whom they testified, to establish that he is not a tereifa—this cannot be said.

For

it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi says:

Conspiring witnesses who testified concerning a person that he was liable to death, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses, as long as

they have not killed

the accused through the agency of the court on the basis of their testimony,

they are put to death,

the conspiring witnesses.

But if they have already killed

the accused,

the

conspiring witnesses are not

put to death.

For we expound: “as he conspired,” and not “as he did.” It follows that the entire law of conspiring witnesses applies specifically when the accused is alive. If so, how could he be examined while alive to determine whether or not he was a tereifa? Necessarily, we rely on the majority.

Rav Ashi said: The principle of the majority is derived

from the law of the majority

from the slaughter itself. As the Merciful One said: “Slaughter and eat!” But let us be concerned that perhaps at the place of the perforation

that was already present at the site of the slaughter while the animal was still alive,

he is slaughtering.

And an animal whose gullet has been perforated is a tereifa even if the perforation is only the slightest amount. If so, we would never be able to eat meat.

Rather, is it not so

that we are not concerned about this

because we say: “Follow the majority,”

and most animals do not have a perforation and are fit.

Rav Ashi said: I stated this

matter

before Rav Kahana. And some say

that

Rav Kahana

stated it

before Rav Shimi. And he said to him: But perhaps where it is possible

to clarify the uncertainty,

, it is possible,

meaning that it must be clarified, and one may not rely on the majority. Therefore, every animal must be examined to establish that it is not a tereifa, with regard to all eighteen types of tereifa.

And similarly, with regard to the levirate marriage of a minor boy and a minor girl, one may not rely on the majority. Rather, one must wait until they mature, at which point it will become clear that they are not a saris or an aylonit.

But

where it is not possible

ever to clarify the uncertainty,

it is not possible!

Therefore, it is only in cases such as those above, where there is no possibility of clarification, that we rely on the majority.

For if you do not say this, according to Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority,

and holds that a minor boy and minor girl may not enter into levirate marriage because he is concerned that the boy may prove to be a saris and the girl may prove to be an aylonit, should it be

the same that he does not eat meat,

because he is concerned that perhaps he is slaughtering at a place where there is a perforation, and we do not rely on the majority?