Chullin 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

And Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov

will answer you: This case, in which the priest quarantines the house from within his own house, is referring to a situation

where the men are standing in a row [

line]

of men

from the afflicted house to the priest’s house. The one standing at the threshold of the afflicted house says to the person behind him,

and

so on,

they say

to one another,

“The affliction has not intensified,”

the affliction,

“The affliction has not intensified; as it stands”—

“it stands,”

until the report reaches the priest in his house, and he quarantines it on that basis.

The Gemara discusses:

From where is this matter that the Sages said, “Follow the majority”!?

And we wonder:

From where do we know this?!

What is puzzling you? But it is an explicit verse,

as it is written: “Follow the majority to incline”!?

And we explain:

A majority that is present before us, such as the case of nine shops

that sell kosher meat, while one sells neveila meat, and meat is found in the city, but it is not known from which shop it came.

And

likewise,

a Sanhedrin,

in which 12 judges find the defendant innocent, while 11 judges find him liable.

In all such cases,

we do not ask

from where we know that we follow the majority. For the verse “Follow the majority to incline” speaks of judges, where the majority of opinions finding the defendant innocent is evident and before us, opposed to the minority of opinions finding him liable; and the Torah instructed us to determine the truth of the law on the basis of the majority. From here we likewise derive the ruling concerning nine shops that sell kosher meat and one that sells neveila meat, where there is a majority evident before us in contrast to the one shop selling neveila meat.

When we ask about a majority that is not present before us, such as

a levir,

a minor

and a yevama,

a minor girl,

concerning whom the Sages said, “Let these two grow up together,” and we are not concerned that perhaps the boy will prove to be a eunuch when he grows up, and the girl an aylonit [in which case they are not subject to the mitzva of levirate marriage, since the Merciful One said, “To establish a name for his brother,” and these are not capable of establishing a name; consequently, he would be having relations with his brother’s wife where there is no mitzva], but rather we follow the majority who are not eunuchs and the majority who are not ayloniyot. This majority is not a majority existing and standing before us; rather, it is an assessment based on the nature of the world. And concerning such a majority we ask:

From where do we know

that we follow it?

Rabbi Elazar said:

Mnemonic: Time, praise, assembled.

It is derived from the head

of

an olah,

which is brought to the altar as it is, without examining it to ascertain that it has no signs of tereifa; rather, we rely on the natural majority of animals that are kosher.

For the verse says

concerning the olah:

“And he shall cut it into its pieces.”

And we derive:

“It” into its pieces, but not

cut its

pieces into additional pieces

Therefore, he cannot split the head and examine the membrane of the brain.

And

if so,

let us suspect that perhaps the membrane of the brain was perforated,

which is one of the eighteen conditions that render an animal tereifa. And a tereifa is unfit for the altar, as we exclude it from the verse “from cattle,” excluding a tereifa.

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the reason we are not concerned about this is

because we say: “Follow the majority.”

The majority of animals are not tereifot, even though the majority is not standing before us but is a majority based on nature.

From here we learn for the entire Torah that we follow the majority, even when the majority is not present before us.

And we reject this:

From where

do we know that we rely on the majority? Perhaps, indeed, they do not burn the olah until

he splits [

breaks open]

it

at the head of the olah in a manner that does not divide it into two parts,

and examines it

for the membrane of the brain.

And if

you find this difficult, for this may not be done

because of

the exposition of the verse,

“It into its pieces, but not its pieces into additional pieces,”

there is no difficulty, for

this applies

to the prohibition

where he cuts it completely

into two pieces.

But where

he cuts it without separating it into two,

as

it still

remains attached [

connected],

we have no concern

with this prohibition, and it is permitted to do so. If so, there is no proof that we rely on the majority.

Mar, son of Ravina, said: It is derived

the principle of majority

from breaking a bone on Pesaḥ. For the Merciful One said

concerning the Pesaḥ offering:

“And you shall not break a bone of it!”

And it is prohibited to break a bone of the skull.

And

if so,

let us suspect that perhaps the membrane of the brain was perforated,

and how is it permitted to eat it? It is a case of possible tereifa.

Rather, is it not because we say, “Follow the majority,”

the majority of animals that are not tereifot? From here we learn the principle of majority for the entire Torah.

And we reject this:

From where

do we know that we do not examine it?

Perhaps he places a glowing coal [

ember]

and burns it

through the skull bone,

and

after it is burned, he can

examine it

for the membrane. In fact, we never rely on the majority. It is permitted to do this, since we learned that this does not constitute breaking a bone in the Pesaḥ offering.

As

it was taught in a baraita: One who cuts through the sinews

of the Pesaḥ offering, even though they are as hard as bones,

and one who burns the bones—

there is no violation of breaking a bone.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is derived

the principle of majority

from the tail fat

of a lamb peace-offering, which is offered whole on the altar together with the sacrificial fats, without being cut, even though the spinal cord passes through it, beginning at the brain and ending at the tail fat. It is prohibited to cut it; rather, it is offered whole on the altar, because

the Merciful One said [

Leviticus 3]

“Its fat”—

“the tail fat, whole.”

Opposite the kidneys, he shall remove it. And since it is impossible to cut it,

let us suspect that perhaps the spinal cord passing through it was severed

and thereby the animal became a tereifa. For we do not find that it is examined.

Rather, is it not

that we are not concerned about this

because we say, “Follow the majority.”

And if you would say

in rejection

that he cuts it from below

at the tail fat [he cuts it not at its very beginning, but beyond the place called “between the excretions,” which is opposite the thighs, where the spinal cord ends]. From there to the end of the tail is the “tail fat,” and no more. Therefore, it does not require examination, since the cord passing through it no longer has the status of a spinal cord. Even if it were severed there, the animal would not thereby become a tereifa. It is only from there upward, to the brain, that it must not be severed, and there it could indeed be examined—this cannot be said.

For

“opposite the kidneys

he shall remove it,”

the Merciful One said.

And “kidneys” is an expression referring to the kidneys themselves. [As we say: “The heart understands and the kidneys counsel.”] This indicates that the beginning of the tail fat is at

the place where the kidneys counsel.

And that place is still inward, on the side of “between the excretions,” and it has the status of spinal cord. If the cord is severed there, the animal thereby becomes a tereifa.

And since it is impossible to split it open in order to examine whether the spinal cord has not been severed within it—for “whole” is required—it is clearly demonstrated that we rely on the majority of animals that are kosher.

And we reject this again:

From where

do we know that we do not examine it?

Perhaps he opens it

at the tail fat

and examines it. And if it is because of “whole,”

that it is impossible to open it,

this applies

to what is prohibited, specifically

where he cuts it completely

and separates it into two parts.

But where

he opens it in a manner that does not completely separate it into two,

as

it still

remains attached, we have no concern

with this prohibition, because it is still called “whole.” In such a manner, he can examine it to ensure that it has not become a tereifa.

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: It is derived

the principle of majority

from the heifer whose neck is broken. For

concerning it

the Merciful One said [

Deuteronomy 21]: “And all the elders of that city that are nearest to the slain shall wash their hands over the heifer whose neck was broken in the valley,” and we derive:

“The heifer whose neck was broken”—

when it is whole,

so that

it shall remain

whole forever, as it was at the time its neck was broken.

And

since it is impossible to cut it open and examine it,

let us suspect that perhaps it is a tereifa.

Rather, is it not

that it does not require examination

because we say, “Follow the majority.”

And if you would say

that the reason it does not rely on the majority, but that in any event it does not require examination, is because

what difference does it make

whether it is a tereifa or not, since it is not an offering—this cannot be said.

For

the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited for benefit, because

the heifer whose neck is broken

is described as “atonement”

in the Torah,

just as

in the case of

sacrificial offerings.

As it is stated concerning it: “Atone for Your people Israel … and the blood shall be atoned for them.” The same principle applies with regard to tereifa: Just as a tereifa is unfit for the altar, so too it is unfit as a heifer whose neck is broken.

Necessarily, because we rely on the majority, we are not concerned about this. Thus, the principle of majority is properly demonstrated from here.

Rabba bar Rav Sheila said: It is derived

the principle of majority

from the red heifer. For

concerning it

the Merciful One said, “And he shall slaughter

it before him,” and in the following verse it says

“and he shall burn

the heifer

before his eyes.” And we derive:

Just as its slaughter is performed when it is whole, so too its burning is performed when it is whole.

And since it is impossible to cut it open and examine it before burning it,

let us suspect that perhaps it is a tereifa.

Rather, is it not

that the fact that it does not require examination is

because we say, “Follow the majority.”

And the majority of animals are kosher.

And if you would say

in rejection, that the reason it does not require examination is because it is not an offering, and therefore

what difference does it make

whether it is a tereifa or not—this cannot be said.

For

the Merciful One calls it a “sin-offering.”

As it is written concerning it: “For the water of sprinkling; it is a sin-offering.” And we derive from this that the law of the red heifer is like that of offerings of the altar, even though its sanctity is the sanctity of Temple maintenance. And with regard to the fact that a tereifa disqualifies it as well, it is like offerings of the altar. Thus, the principle of majority is properly demonstrated from it.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: It is derived

the principle of majority

from the goat sent away

of Yom Kippur

. For the Merciful One said, “And he shall take the two goats.”

And we derive:

They must both be

the two goats [the goat for the Lord and the goat for Azazel]

equal.