Chullin 10b (י:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

And what is different

about this uncertainty, in which we do not know when the windpipe was dislocated, or whether the uncertainty is that he paused or that he pressed, from the uncertainty that arose with regard to the knife, which Rav Ḥisda deems fit for slaughter?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to a windpipe that was dislocated and to the uncertainty whether he paused or pressed,

a defect arose in

the body of

the animal,

but

here, the knife became defective,

whereas

the animal

itself

did not become defective.

And an external uncertainty concerning a defect in the knife does not override the certain status of the animal’s slaughter, when there is no defect at all in its body.

And we conclude:

And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna,

that if the knife is found to have a defect after slaughter, the slaughter is invalid—

when he did not break a bone with it

after slaughter. For then there is nothing to which to attribute the defect except the hide, before slaughter.

And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda,

that the slaughter is valid—

when he broke a bone with it

after slaughter. For we attribute the defect to the bone, because an uncertainty does not override a certainty.

And we challenge this: From what you said, that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Huna where he did not break a bone,

by inference

you learn

that Rav Ḥisda

deems the slaughter valid

even though he did not break a bone with it.

But how could he have said this? It is necessarily the case that the knife became defective through the hide before slaughter. For if not,

through what else did it become defective?

And we answer: The reason Rav Ḥisda deems it valid even where there is nothing to which to attribute the defect in the bone is that

say that it became defective through the bone of the spine,

which is beneath the slaughtering סימנים,

it became defective.

And in any event, it became defective only after the slaughtering סימנים had been severed. And in this matter we do not hold in accordance with his opinion. For in such a case there is no genuine comparison between an uncertainty and a certainty: there is no greater reason to attribute the defect to the bone of the spine after slaughter than to attribute it to the hide before slaughter. But where he broke a bone with it after slaughter, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, because in that case there is greater certainty that the knife was damaged by the bone than that it was damaged by the hide before slaughter.

An incident occurred

in which the knife was found to have a defect after slaughter,

and Rav Yosef declared thirteen animals non-kosher

that had all been slaughtered with that same knife, and they had not inspected the knife between one animal and the next.

And the Gemara discusses:

In accordance with whose opinion

did Rav Yosef hold when he declared them all non-kosher?

Did he hold

in accordance with Rav Huna,

who maintains that we attribute the defect to the hide before slaughter,

and

therefore he invalidated

even the

first

animal?

And we reject this:

No,

rather,

he held

in accordance with Rav Ḥisda, who maintains that we do not attribute the defect to the hide, but to the bone of the spine,

and

he invalidated all of them

except the first.

For with regard to the first animal that was slaughtered, one may attribute the matter and say that the knife broke while cutting the bone of the spine, after the slaughtering סימנים had already been severed. But all the later animals are certainly non-kosher even according to Rav Ḥisda, because perhaps the knife became defective already through the spine of the first animal, and the animals slaughtered after it were slaughtered with a defective knife.

And if you wish, say instead: In fact,

Rav Yosef held

in accordance with Rav Huna,

who attributes the defect to the hide.

For if he held in accordance with Rav Ḥisda,

who attributes the defect to the bone of the spine, he should not have declared the later animals non-kosher either.

For

since, in any event, we attribute the matter

in order to permit the slaughter of the first animal, and surely contact of the knife with the spine does not damage it more than contact with the hide, since the knife does not strike the spine forcefully, and nevertheless we attribute the matter leniently in the case of the first animal, saying that the knife became defective through the bone of the spine, if so,

from where do we know that it became defective through the bone of the spine of the first animal

and that all the later animals became non-kosher?

Perhaps it became defective through the bone of the spine of the last animal,

after he had finished slaughtering all of them, in which case they are all fit.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Rav Kahana requires an inspection

of the knife

between each one and the next

animal, in order to ascertain that it has not become defective.

And the Gemara discusses:

In accordance with whose opinion

did Rav Kahana hold? Did he hold

in accordance with Rav Huna,

who says that we are concerned lest the knife became defective through the hide before slaughter, and the reason he requires it to be inspected between one animal and the next is

to invalidate

the

first

animal if a defect is found after its slaughter?

And we reject this:

No!

Rav Kahana

held in accordance with Rav Ḥisda. And the first animal would be deemed fit even if a defect were found in the knife after its slaughter, since we are not concerned that it became defective through the hide.

The first animal remains kosher even if a defect is found in the knife after its slaughter, since we are not concerned that the knife became defective on the hide.

And

the reason he requires an inspection between the animals is

to render the later animals fit. For if he did not inspect the knife until after he had finished slaughtering all the animals, and then found a defect in it, all the later animals would be declared non-kosher, because we would be concerned that it had become defective through the bone of the spine of the first animal, before the later animals were slaughtered. But now, when he inspects it between each animal and the next and the knife is found to be fit, it is certain that it became defective only after slaughter, and they are all fit.

If he were not to check the knife until after completing the slaughter of all the animals, and then found a defect in the knife, all the later animals would become non-kosher, since we would be concerned that the knife became defective on the spinal column of the first animal, before the later animals were slaughtered. But now, since he checks the knife between each animal and the next and finds it fit, it is certain that it became defective only after the slaughter, and all the animals are kosher.

And we challenge this:

If so,

since you are concerned with regard to the later animals that perhaps the knife had already become defective—the defect would still have arisen before their slaughter; if so,

an inspection by a Sage should also be required

before the slaughter of each and every one, and why is an inspection by the slaughterer sufficient for us?

And we answer:

One witness is trusted with regard to prohibitions.

For the Torah trusted each individual with regard to matters of prohibition and permission.

And for this reason an inspection by the slaughterer is sufficient, and we rely upon him.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if one witness is trusted with regard to prohibitions,

from the outset,

before the slaughter of the first animal,

also it should not be necessary

to have an inspection by a Sage; an inspection by the slaughterer should suffice.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They required that the knife be shown to a Sage only for the honor of the Sage!

And the Gemara discusses:

From where is this matter that the Sages said, “Establish the matter on its presumptive status,”

derived—that one does not remove an object from its initial presumptive status until it is known to us with certainty that it has changed, whether toward permission or toward prohibition?

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: The verse states

in the passage concerning the afflictions of houses:

“And the priest shall go out of the house to the entrance of the house, and he shall quarantine the house for seven days.”

This teaches that the priest must first leave the entire house, and only afterward quarantine its entrance.

But there is a minimum measure for the affliction, for if it is smaller than a gris, the affliction does not render the house impure. If so, how can the priest render the house impure after leaving it?

Perhaps while he was going out

the priest

and came

outside,

it became smaller,

it lost

the minimum measure

of a gris, and it is considered as though it is not present, so his quarantine is not a valid quarantine!?

Rather, is it not

that the reason we are not concerned for this possibility is

because we say, “Establish

the affliction

on its presumptive status,”

the initial status it had when the priest saw it, at which time it was of the measure of a gris. And from here we learn for the entire Torah that we follow the initial presumptive status.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov raised an objection:

But how is it demonstrated from the afflictions of houses that we follow the presumptive status?

Perhaps

the priest quarantines the house only

when he leaves

the house

backward,

with his face toward the affliction,

so that he sees it

and knows that it has not diminished from its measure until

he leaves

the house. In such a case, there is no reason for concern.

Abaye said to him: There are two answers to the matter

—to Rav Aḥa’s objection.

One:

It cannot be established that he leaves backward, because

leaving backward is not called “leaving.”

And the verse says: “And the priest shall go out of the house.”

And furthermore:

If the affliction is found

behind the door,

on the wall to which the door is attached, then when he opens the door in order to leave the house, the affliction is behind the door, and he does not see the affliction at the time of his departure, even if he leaves backward. If so, in such a case,

what can one say?

But perhaps, while he was going out and came outside, it became smaller? Rather, necessarily, it is because of the presumptive status that we are not concerned that the condition of the affliction changed.

And if you would say

that the priest can still see that it has not diminished from its measure until he leaves, as when

he made

in the door

a window [

window] before quarantining it, through which he sees the affliction from outside,

it cannot be said so. For

we learned

in Tractate Nega'im [2:3]:

A dark house [

a house that is dark because it has no windows],

one may not open windows in it in order to see its affliction.

It is not necessary to breach a window in the house so that the priest will be able to see the affliction; rather, the house remains in its state of purity.

For the Torah says: “When an affliction appears to me in the house,” meaning “to me,” but not by means of my lamp [or: “to me,” but not by means of my lamp]. If he can see the affliction only by the light of a lamp, he is not required to show the affliction to the priest, and the house is pure.

And just as he is not required to light a lamp in order to be able to show the affliction, so too he is not required to breach a window in the house in order to show the affliction to the priest.

However, if the house has windows but they are closed, he is required to open them and show the affliction to the priest.

Rava said to Abaye: Concerning what

The point

you said

to answer, “

Leaving backward is not called leaving,”

this is not so. For

the High Priest on Yom Kippur proves

that leaving backward is called leaving.

For

it

is written concerning him, “leaving.”

For after he removes the pan and the censer from the Holy of Holies, it is written: “And he shall go out and perform his burnt-offering and the burnt-offering of the people.”

And we learned: “He leaves, and comes by the way he entered.”

That is, at the time of his departure his face is toward the Holy of Holies, as it was when he entered. This is leaving backward. And nevertheless, the verse calls this “and he shall go out.”

And

Rava further said to him: Concerning what

you said,

that it cannot be established that he made a window in the door, because we learned,

“A dark house—one may not open windows in it in order to see its affliction,”—

that is not proof from there.

For

this applies—

that they exempt him if it is impossible to see it—

where it has not been established

for us that there is an affliction here, since the priest has not yet seen its appearance, as the house is dark.

But where it has been established

that the affliction is fit to be quarantined on the basis of the priest’s sight,

it has already been established. And he is not exempted without reason; if it is necessary to open a window in order to see that it has not diminished, one opens it.

And if so, the law of presumptive status cannot be proven from the laws of afflictions, since it is possible that it is speaking of such a case, where one opens a window and it is clear to us that the affliction has not diminished.

If so, the law of presumptive status cannot be proven from the laws of lesions, since the case may be one in which a window is opened and it is clear to us that the lesion has not become smaller.

It was taught in a beraita not in accordance with Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov,

who said that we do not establish the affliction on its presumptive status, assuming that it has not diminished; rather, the case is that the priest leaves backward, seeing that it has not diminished until he quarantines it, and therefore the law of presumptive status cannot be derived from here.

For it was taught [in the Mishna in Tractate Nega'im 12:6, and in the beraita cited in Nedarim 56b]: It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning the afflictions of houses [Leviticus 14],

“And the priest shall go out of the house

to the entrance of the house, and he shall quarantine the house for seven days.”

One might have thought that he may go

after seeing the affliction

into his house,

and afterward return to the afflicted house

and quarantine

its door.

The verse states: “

To the entrance of the house,” teaching that he must quarantine it as he leaves the house.

meaning that as he leaves the house, he must quarantine it.

If “to the entrance of the house,” one might have thought that he may stand beneath the lintel

of the afflicted house,

and

there

quarantine

it.

The verse therefore states: “And the priest shall go out

“The priest shall leave

from the house,”

until he has left the entire house!

How, then,

does he quarantine it?

He stands beside the lintel 85 ,

outside,

and quarantines it.

And from where [do we know] that if he went into his house and quarantined it, or stood inside the house [

namely, under the lintel]

and quarantined it—

post facto,

is his quarantine valid?

The verse states: “And the priest shall quarantine the house,”

which implies

in any event!

This is difficult for Rav Aḥa. For in the case where the priest went into his house, the lesion has indeed become hidden from his eyes, and it is possible that by the time he reaches his house and returns, it has diminished below the requisite measure. Necessarily, then, this is because we maintain the lesion on the basis of its presumptive status. And from the fact that the Torah expanded the phrase “and the priest shall quarantine the house” to include any situation, it follows well that the law of presumptive status can be derived.