Chullin 10b — the Talmud in English

And we object:

And what is different

about this uncertainty—that we do not know when the windpipe was dislocated, or an uncertainty whether he delayed, and an uncertainty whether he pressed—than the uncertainty that arose concerning a knife with which Rav Hisda renders fit?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of a windpipe that was dislocated, and in the uncertainty whether he delayed or whether he pressed,

a deficiency arose in

the body of

the animal,

but

here, the knife became defective,

whereas

the animal

itself

did not become defective.

And an external uncertainty concerning the knife does not displace the certain slaughtering of the animal, in whose body there is no deficiency at all.

And we conclude:

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav Huna:

if the knife is found defective after slaughtering, the slaughtering is invalid—

when he did not break a bone with it

after slaughtering. For then there is nothing to which to attribute it except that it became defective on the hide, before slaughtering.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav Hisda,

that the slaughtering is fit—

when he broke a bone with it

after slaughtering. For we attribute it to the fact that it became defective on the bone, because an uncertainty does not displace a certainty.

And we object: From what you said, that the halakha is like Rav Huna where he did not break [a bone],

by inference

you learn

that Rav Hisda

renders fit

even though he did not break a bone with it.

And how could he say this? For necessarily it became defective on the hide before slaughtering. If not,

but through what did it become defective?

And we answer: Rav Hisda’s reason for rendering fit even where there is nothing to which to attribute it on account of a bone is:

say that it became defective on the bone of the neck-joint,

which is beneath the signs,

it became defective.

And in any event, it became defective only after the signs had been slaughtered. But in this matter we do not hold in accordance with him. For in such a case it is not an uncertainty against a certainty, since there is no greater reason to attribute it and say that it became defective on the bone of the neck-joint after slaughtering than to attribute it to the hide before slaughtering. But where he broke a bone with it after slaughtering, the halakha is in accordance with him, because in this there is greater certainty that it became defective on the bone than that it became defective through the hide before slaughtering.

There was an incident

in which the knife was found defective after the slaughtering,

and Rav Yosef declared thirteen animals unfit

that had all been slaughtered with that same knife, and they had not examined the knife between one animal and another.

And the Gemara discusses:

In accordance with whom

did Rav Yosef hold, who declared all of them unfit?

Was it

in accordance with Rav Huna,

who holds that we attribute it to the fact that it became defective on the hide before slaughtering,

and

therefore he invalidated it

even in

the

first animal?

And we reject this:

No,

rather,

in accordance with Rav Hisda

he holds, who does not attribute it to the hide, but to the bone of the neck-joint,

and

he invalidated all of them

except the first.

For concerning the first animal that was slaughtered, one may attribute it and say that the knife broke while cutting the bone of the neck-joint, after the signs had already been slaughtered. But all the later animals are certainly unfit even according to Rav Hisda, because perhaps the knife had already become defective on the neck-joint of the first animal, and the animals slaughtered after it were slaughtered with a defective knife.

And if you wish, say: in fact

Rav Yosef held

in accordance with Rav Huna,

who attributes the defect to the hide.

For if he held in accordance with Rav Hisda,

who attributes the defect to the bone of the neck-joint, he should not have declared the later animals unfit either.

For

since we attribute

to permit the slaughtering of the first animal—and surely the knife’s contact with the neck-joint does not cause a defect more than the hide, since he does not strike it with force, and nevertheless we attribute leniently concerning the first animal, saying that the knife became defective on the bone of the neck-joint—if so,

from where

is it known that it became defective on the bone of the neck-joint of the first animal,

perhaps it became defective on the bone of the neck-joint of the later animal,

after he finished slaughtering all of them, and it turns out that all of them are fit?

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Rav Kahana requires examination

of the knife

between each one and each one,

between each animal, to examine it so that it should not have become defective.

And the Gemara discusses:

In accordance with whom

did Rav Kahana hold? Was it

in accordance with Rav Huna,

who says that we are concerned that perhaps it became defective on the hide before slaughtering, and the reason he requires examination between one animal and another is

to invalidate

the

first

animal if a defect is found after its slaughtering?

And we reject this:

No!

Rav Kahana

held in accordance with Rav Hisda. And the first animal would be rendered fit even if a defect were found in the knife after its slaughtering, since we are not concerned that it became defective on the hide.

The first animal remains kosher even if a defect is found in the knife after its slaughter, since we are not concerned that the knife became defective on the hide.

And

the reason he requires examination between the animals is

to render the later animals fit.

For if he does not examine it until after the completion of the slaughtering of all the animals, and then finds a defect in the knife, all the later animals will be rendered unfit. For we are concerned that perhaps it became defective on the bone of the neck-joint of the first animal, before the slaughtering of the later animals. But now, when he examines it between each one and each one and the knife is found fit, it is known that it became defective after slaughtering, and all of them are fit.

And we object:

If so,

since you are concerned for the later animals, that perhaps the knife had already become defective—for this is still before their slaughtering—if so,

an examination by a Sage should also be required

before the slaughtering of each and every one, and why is the examination of the slaughterer sufficient for us?

And we answer:

One witness is trustworthy concerning prohibitions.

For the Torah trusted every individual concerning prohibition and permission.

And for this reason the examination by the slaughterer is sufficient, and we rely on him.

And we object:

If so,

that one witness is trustworthy concerning prohibitions,

from the outset,

before the slaughtering of the first animal,

also not

should an examination by a Sage be required, and the examination by the slaughterer should be sufficient?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: They said that one must show the knife to a Sage only on account of the honor of the Sage!

And the Gemara discusses:

From where is this matter, that the Sages said, “Establish the matter on its presumption,”

that one does not remove a matter from its first presumption until it is known to us with certainty that it has changed, whether to permit it or to prohibit it?

Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: The verse says

in the passage concerning lesions of houses, “

And the priest shall go out from the house to the entrance of the house, and he shall quarantine the house for seven days.”

For it is required that the priest first leave the entire house, and afterward quarantine its door.

But there is a measure for a lesion, since when it is less than a “grain-size” the lesion does not render the house impure. If so, how can the priest render the house impure after leaving it? For

perhaps, as he went out

the priest

and came

outside,

it became deficient,

it became lacking

the measure

of a grain-size, and it is considered as though it is not present, and his quarantining is not a quarantining!?

Rather, is it not so that the reason we are not concerned for this is

because

we say, “Establish

the lesion

on its presumption,

the first one, at the time when the priest saw it, when it had the measure of a grain-size. And from here we learn for the entire Torah that we follow the original presumption.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov strongly objected to this:

How is it demonstrated from lesions of houses that we follow the presumption?

Perhaps

the priest quarantines the house only

when he went out

from the house

backward,

with his face toward the lesion,

so that he sees it,

that it has not become lacking from its measure until

when he left

the house? For in such a case there is no reason for concern.

Abaye said to him: There are two answers to the matter,

to what Rav Aha objected.

One:

it cannot be established as referring to one who goes out backward, because

going out backward is not called “going out.”

And the verse says, “And the priest shall go out from the house.”

And furthermore:

if the lesion is found

behind the door,

on the wall on which the door is located, then when he opens the door in order to leave the house, the lesion is behind the door, and at the time of his leaving he does not see the lesion, even if he leaves backward. If so, in such a case,

what can one say?

For perhaps, as he went out and came outside, it became deficient? Rather, necessarily, on account of the presumption we are not concerned that the condition of the lesion changed.

And if you would say,

the priest can still see that it has not become lacking from its measure until he leaves, as when

he opened in it

in the door

a window [

window] before quarantining it, through which he sees the lesion from outside—

it cannot be said so. For

we learned

in tractate Lesions [2:3]:

A dark house [

a dark house because it has no windows],

one does not open windows in it to see its lesion.

One need not break open a window in the house so that the priest will be able to see the lesion; rather, the house remains pure.

For it is stated in the Torah, “Like the appearance of a lesion has appeared to me in the house,” which implies “to me,” and not by my lamp [or “to me,” and not to my lamp]: if he can see the lesion only by the light of a lamp, he is not obligated to show the lesion to the priest, and the house is pure.

And just as he is not obligated to light a lamp so that he will be able to show the lesion, so he is not obligated to break open a window in the house in order to show the lesion to the priest.

However, if the house has windows, but they are closed, he is obligated to open them and show the lesion to the priest.

Rava said to him

to Abaye: This

that you said

to answer, “

Going out backward is not called going out,”

is not so. For

the High Priest on the Day of Atonement proves

that going out backward is called going out.

For

it

is written concerning him, “going out.”

For after he removed the pan and the censer from the Holy of Holies, it is written, “And he shall go out and perform his burnt-offering and the burnt-offering of the people.”

And we learned: “He went out, and he came by the way he entered.”

That is, at the time of his leaving, his face would be toward the Holy of Holies, as when he entered. And this is going out backward. Nevertheless, we apply to him “and he shall go out.”

And

Rava further said to him: This

that you said

that it cannot be established as referring to opening a window in it, because we learned,

“A dark house—one does not open windows in it to see its lesion,”

is not proof from there.

For

this applies—

that they exempt him if it is impossible to see it—

where it has not been established

for us that there is a lesion here, for the priest has not yet seen its appearance, since the house is dark.

But where it has been established

that the lesion is fit to be quarantined on the basis of the priest’s seeing it,

it has been established

already. And they do not exempt him without reason; rather, if he must open a window in order to see that it has not become lacking, they open it.

And if so, one cannot prove from lesions the law of presumption, since it is possible that it is speaking of such a case, where he opens a window, and it is clear to us that it has not become lacking.

It was taught in a baraita not in accordance with Rav Aha bar Yaakov,

who said that we do not establish the lesion on its presumption that it has not become lacking; rather, it is speaking of the priest leaving backward, so that he sees that it has not become lacking until he quarantines it, and therefore the law of presumption cannot be learned from here.

For it was taught [a Mishna in tractate Lesions 12:6, and a baraita cited in Nedarim 56b]: It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning lesions of houses [Leviticus 14], “

And the priest shall go out from the house

to the entrance of the house, and he shall quarantine the house for seven days.”

It might be that he should go

the priest, after seeing the lesion,

into his house,

and afterward return to the afflicted house

and quarantine

its door?

The verse says “

to the entrance of the house,” meaning that when he leaves the house he shall quarantine it.

meaning that as he leaves the house, he must quarantine it.

If “the entrance of the house,” it might be that he should stand beneath the lintel

of the afflicted house

and

there

quarantine

it?

The verse says “And the priest shall go out

“The priest shall leave

from the house,”

until he has left the entire house!

How then

does he quarantine it?

He stands at the side of the lintel 85 ,

outside,

and quarantines it.

And from where [do we know] that if he went inside his house and shut it in, or stood inside the house [ [A0002]namely, beneath the lintel]

that is, beneath the lintel,

and shut it in—

post facto,

his confinement is valid?

The verse states: “And he shall shut up the house,”

which implies,

in any case!

And this is difficult for Rav Aḥa. For in the case where the kohen went into his house, the affliction was hidden from his eyes, and it is possible that by the time he reached his house and returned, it had diminished from its measure. Necessarily, then, this is because we maintain the affliction according to its presumption. And from the fact that the Torah expanded the law, from “and the kohen shall shut up the house,” to apply in any case, it is indeed possible to derive the law of presumption.