Chullin 10a — the Talmud in English

And he answered:

Because it is the way of creeping creatures to uncover.

And although it is also the way of a person to uncover, there is likewise room to attribute it to a pure person, and it follows that there is a majority of possibilities for declaring it pure: perhaps creeping creatures uncovered it, and even if a person uncovered it, perhaps he is pure. The possibility that an impure person uncovered it is a minority. Therefore, we follow the majority.

And

however, in the case of “uncovered, and he found it covered,” there is no room to attribute it to creeping creatures that covered it, because

it is not their way

of creeping creatures

to cover,

but rather certainly a person covered it, and it is an even uncertainty: perhaps he is pure, perhaps impure.

In any event, learn from it that danger is more stringent than prohibition. For with regard to prohibition, we follow the majority. But with regard to the danger of uncovered water, even though there is a majority favoring leniency—for perhaps a person uncovered it, and even if creeping creatures uncovered it, perhaps they were creeping creatures that had no venom—in any event, we are stringent and are concerned for the minority of snakes that contain danger.

Alternatively,

there is another way to prove this. For

the reason

that we disqualify water of the red heifer is specifically because

she left it

in the small flask when it was

uncovered, and he came and found it covered,

or

covered, and he came and found it uncovered. But

if

he found it as she had left it, there is no

concern of

impurity

because an impure person touched it,

and there is no

concern of

disqualification

because a snake or a weasel drank from it

either,

because without there being a defect before us through our having seen a change in it, no uncertainty at all is aroused for us.

But

because of the

uncertainty

that exists with regard to

uncovered water,

they are

forbidden,

even when he left them uncovered and found them as he had left them, for although we have no reason to doubt them, nevertheless, since the water remained uncovered for enough time for a snake to be able to drink from it, they are forbidden.

Learn from it: “Danger is more stringent than prohibition.”

And we conclude:

Learn from it!

We learned there: Three liquids are forbidden because of exposure: water, wine, and milk,

because when these liquids are exposed, it is the way of a snake to drink from them.

How much

time

must

the liquids remain when they are exposed,

and they will be forbidden

because of concern for snake venom?

When a period of time has passed in which there is

enough for the creeping creature to emerge

[the creeping creature, that is, the snake]

from a nearby place, and drink

from the vessel.

And the Gemara asks:

And how much

is the distance of

“a nearby place”?

Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: Enough for it to emerge

the snake

from beneath the ear

of the

vessel and drink.

For we are concerned that perhaps the snake was found there.

And we challenge: Is it only during this short period of time, in which it will “emerge and

drink”

that there is cause for concern?

But

if a snake came there, it would be

seen by him

when returning to its hole, and since he did not see it, certainly it did not come.

And we answer:

Rather,

the measure of time during which they become forbidden is that if they remained exposed for a period of time sufficient for the snake to emerge from beneath the ear of the vessel,

drink and return to its hole

that is beneath the ear of the vessel.

It was stated: One who slaughters with a knife

checked for a nick

and

did not check it immediately after slaughter, and after some time it

was found nicked—

Rav Huna said: Even

if after slaughter and before he checked it he

broke bones with it

all day, the slaughter is

disqualified.

For we do not attribute the knife’s becoming nicked to the fact that he broke bones with it after slaughter, but

we are concerned that perhaps in the hide

of the animal

it became nicked

before he slaughtered its identifying organs. And it follows that he slaughtered with a nicked knife, and the animal becomes an unslaughtered carcass through this. Since the identifying organs are not slaughtered but are torn by the nick in the knife. And the Torah said: “And you shall slaughter.”

And Rav Ḥisda said:

The slaughter is

valid.

For since before slaughter he checked the knife and found it free of a nick, we say

perhaps in the bone

that he broke with it after slaughter

it became nicked.

And it follows that at the time of slaughter it was still valid.

And the Gemara asks:

Granted, Rav Huna,

who disqualifies, his reasoning is logical. For he

follows his teaching,

for we establish the animal upon its presumption of prohibition. As he said above, “An animal during its lifetime stands with a presumption of prohibition.” And whenever an uncertainty regarding the validity of the slaughter arises, we forbid it because of the uncertainty, until it is known with certainty that it was slaughtered properly.

But Rav Ḥisda, what is the reason

that he declares it valid, and how does he remove it from its presumption of prohibition because of an uncertainty?

And we answer:

He would say to you,

Rav Ḥisda:

A bone certainly causes a nick

in the knife when it is broken, but

the hide

of the animal

possibly causes a nick, possibly does not cause a nick,

and if so,

it is

the hide

an uncertainty

as the cause of the nick,

whereas

the bone is

certain

as the cause of the nick,

and an uncertainty does not remove from the certain.

And therefore we attribute the nick to the breaking of the bone after slaughter and not to the cutting of the hide. For this determination of “an uncertainty does not remove from the certain” is preferable to the determination of presumption.

Rava challenged this in support of Rav Huna:

It was taught in a beraita: An impure person who

immersed and emerged

from his immersion,

and there was found upon him

after he emerged

a thing

that

interposes

in the immersion, and it is uncertain whether at the time of immersion that interposing thing was already upon his body and his immersion was invalid, or whether only after the immersion that interposition adhered to him and his immersion was valid,

even though he occupied himself with that same type

of interposing thing

the entire day,

after he immersed,

his immersion did not avail him, until he says: It is certain to me that it was not upon me

the interposition

before then.

And this is difficult for Rav Ḥisda, who said, “An uncertainty does not remove from the certain,” for

here, he certainly immersed,

and

it was uncertain whether the interposition was upon him or was not upon him

at the time of immersion.

And

nevertheless,

the uncertainty

of the interposition

comes and removes from the certain

immersion.

And we answer:

It is different there, for one can say: Establish the impure person upon his presumption.

For until he immersed, he was certainly impure. And we establish him upon his initial presumption,

and say: He did not immerse.

And we reject this:

Here too,

with regard to the knife, let us say

Establish the animal upon its presumption,

that during its lifetime it stands with a presumption of prohibition,

and say: It was not slaughtered

properly, and let us forbid it.

And we answer: It is different here, for it has already departed from its presumption, since

it is slaughtered

and

before you.

And we again reject this:

Here too,

with regard to the interposition,

he immersed

and is

before you,

and let us say that he departed from his initial presumption of impurity.

And we answer: It is different there, for

indeed, it arose in him

while immersing

a defect,

for behold, an interposition was found upon him, and perhaps it already existed at the time of immersion. And there is no certain immersion before us that would remove him from his presumption of impurity. Therefore, he still stands in his initial presumption.

And we again reject this:

Here too,

with regard to the knife, let us say that the slaughter does not remove the animal from its presumption of prohibition, since

there arose in it

during the slaughter

a defect,

through the nick in the knife.

And we answer: It is different here, for

the knife was impaired,

but

the animal

itself

was not impaired.

And since the defect did not actually arise in its body, but rather in another thing, it is not comparable to immersion, for the defect is in the body of the one immersing. Therefore, the uncertain defect of the knife does not come and remove it from the certain slaughter. And we attribute the knife’s becoming nicked to the bone.

He raised an objection:

It was taught:

If he slaughtered

a bird

the gullet

[and with a bird, slaughtering only one required sign is sufficient]

and afterward the windpipe became dislocated—

it is valid.

If the windpipe became dislocated and afterward he slaughtered the gullet—

If the trachea was dislocated and afterward he slaughtered the esophagus

it is disqualified .

If he slaughtered the esophagus and

If he slaughtered the gullet and

after slaughter

it was found

that

the windpipe was dislocated, and he does not know whether it became dislocated before slaughter,

in which case the bird is a tereifa, or

whether it became dislocated after slaughter,

but at the time of slaughter it was still valid—

this was an incident

that occurred,

and

the Sages

said: Any uncertainty in slaughter—

—

it is disqualified.

For it stands with a presumption of prohibition.

And the Gemara asks: “

Any uncertainty in slaughter,”

the expression “any”—

what does it come to include?

Is it not to include a case such as this, in which the knife was found nicked after slaughter, for in this case too we disqualify because of the uncertainty and establish it upon its presumption of prohibition, and this is difficult for Rav Ḥisda?

And we reject this:

No,

this is not what it came to include. Rather,

to include an uncertainty whether he paused

during slaughter, or

an uncertainty whether he pressed

during slaughter. For we establish it upon the presumption of prohibition in which it stood during its lifetime. For in such a case it is not an uncertainty against a certainty, and Rav Ḥisda concedes in this matter.