Chullin 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

And he answered:

Because it is the way of creeping creatures to uncover them.

And although it is also the way of a person to uncover them, nevertheless, it is likewise possible to attribute it to a pure person. Thus, there is a majority basis for deeming the water pure: perhaps creeping creatures uncovered it, and even if a person uncovered it, perhaps he was pure. The possibility that an impure person uncovered it is the minority. Therefore, we follow the majority.

And

however, in the case of “uncovered, and he found it covered,” it is impossible to attribute this to creeping creatures having covered it, because

it is not the way

of creeping creatures

to cover

, but certainly a person covered it, and it is an even uncertainty: perhaps he was pure, perhaps impure.

In any event, learn from this that danger is more stringent than prohibition. For with regard to a prohibition, we follow the majority. But with regard to the danger of exposed water, although there is a majority basis for leniency—perhaps a person uncovered it, and even if creeping creatures uncovered it, perhaps they were creatures without venom—in any event, we are stringent and are concerned for the minority of snakes that pose a danger.

Alternatively,

there is another way to prove this. For

the reason

that we invalidate the water of purification is specifically because

he left it

in the flask when it was

uncovered, and he came and found it covered

, or

covered, and he came and found it uncovered. Now

if

he found it as he had left it, there is no

concern for

impurity

on account of an impure person who touched it,

and there is no

concern that it is

invalid

on account of a snake or weasel having drunk from it

either,

because without a discernible defect before us, through having seen that it changed, no uncertainty arises for us at all.

But

because of the

uncertainty

concerning

exposed water

it is

forbidden

, even when he left it exposed and found it as he had left it. For although there is no reason to raise an uncertainty concerning it, nevertheless, since the water remained exposed for the amount of time in which a snake could drink from it, it is forbidden.

Learn from this: “Danger is more stringent than prohibition.”

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

We learned there: Three liquids are forbidden because of exposure: water, wine, and milk,

because when these liquids are exposed, it is the way of a snake to drink from them.

How long

a

period

must the liquids remain exposed

for them to be forbidden

because of concern for snake venom?

Once a period of time has passed equal to the time in which

the creature can emerge

[the creeping creature, meaning the snake]

from a nearby place and drink

from the vessel.

And the Gemara asks:

How long

is the distance of

“a nearby place”?

Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: The time in which it can emerge

—the snake—

from beneath the ear

of

the vessel and drink.

For we are concerned that perhaps the snake was there.

And we challenge this: Is it only during this brief period, when it “emerges and

drinks

,” that there is cause for concern?

But

if a snake came there, it would be

visible to him

as it returned to its hole; and since he did not see it, certainly it did not come.

And we answer:

Rather,

the period during which they become forbidden is when they remained exposed for the amount of time in which the snake could emerge from beneath the ear of the vessel,

drink and return to its hole

beneath the ear of the vessel.

It was stated: One who slaughters with a knife

that had been checked for nicks,

and

did not check it immediately after slaughtering, and after some time it was

found to be nicked—

Rav Huna said: Even

if, after slaughtering and before checking it, he

broke bones with it

throughout the entire day, the slaughtering is

invalid.

For we do not attribute the nick in the knife to the fact that he broke bones with it after slaughtering; rather,

we are concerned that the knife became nicked through the hide

of the animal

before he slaughtered

its required signs. It follows that he slaughtered with a defective knife, and the animal becomes an unslaughtered carcass in this manner, since the required signs were not severed but torn by the knife’s nick. And the Torah said: “And you shall slaughter.”

But Rav Ḥisda said:

The slaughtering is

valid.

Since before slaughtering he checked the knife and found it free of a nick, we say:

Perhaps the bone

that he broke with it after slaughtering

caused the nick.

It follows that at the time of slaughtering it was still valid.

And the Gemara asks:

Granted, Rav Huna

, who invalidates it, has a logical basis for his opinion. For he

follows his teaching

, as we establish the animal according to its presumption of prohibition, as he said above: “An animal during its lifetime is presumed prohibited.” Whenever an uncertainty arises concerning the validity of the slaughtering, we prohibit it because of the uncertainty, until it is known with certainty that it was slaughtered properly.

But Rav Ḥisda, what is his reason

for deeming it valid, and how does he remove it from its presumption of prohibition because of an uncertainty?

And we answer:

He could say to you,

Rav Ḥisda:

A bone certainly causes a nick

in the knife when it is broken, but

the hide

of the animal

may or may not cause a nick,

and if so,

the hide is

a

doubtful

cause of the nick,

whereas a

bone is

certainly

the cause of the nick,

and a doubt cannot displace a certainty.

Therefore, we attribute the nick to the breaking of the bone after slaughtering and not to the cutting of the hide, because the determination that “a doubt cannot displace a certainty” takes precedence over the determination based on a presumption.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Huna’s support

: It was taught in a beraita: An impure person who

immersed and emerged

from his immersion,

and there was found upon him

after he emerged

something

that

interposes

with regard to the immersion, and it is uncertain whether the interposition was already upon his body at the time of immersion, in which case his immersion was invalid, or whether that interposition adhered to him only after the immersion, in which case his immersion was valid, nevertheless,

even though he was occupied with that type

of interposing substance

the entire day,

after immersing,

his immersion is not effective for him, until he says: I am certain that it was not upon me

the interposition

before then.

This is difficult for Rav Ḥisda, who said, “A doubt cannot displace a certainty,” for

here, he certainly immersed,

and

it is uncertain whether the interposition was upon him or was not upon him

at the time of immersion.

And

nevertheless,

the doubt

concerning the interposition

comes and displaces the certainty

of the immersion.

And we answer:

There it is different, as it is possible to say: Establish the impure person according to his presumption.

For until he immersed, he was certainly impure. And we establish him according to his initial presumption,

and say that he did not immerse.

And we reject this:

Here too,

with regard to the knife, let us say:

Establish the animal according to its presumption,

for during its lifetime it is presumed prohibited,

and say that it was not slaughtered

properly, and prohibit it.

And we answer: It is different here, because it has already departed from its presumption, for

it is slaughtered

and

before you.

And we again reject this:

Here too,

with regard to the interposition,

he immersed

and

before you,

so let us say that he departed from his original presumption of impurity.

And we answer: It is different there, because

a defect arose in him

—the person who immersed—

a disqualifying factor,

for an interposition was found upon him, and perhaps it was already present at the time of immersion. There is no certain immersion before us that can remove him from his presumption of impurity. Therefore, he still remains in his original presumption.

And we again reject this:

Here too,

with regard to the knife, let us say that the slaughtering does not remove the animal from its presumption of prohibition, since

a defect arose in it

during the slaughtering,

a disqualifying factor,

through the nick in the knife.

And we answer: It is different here, because

the knife became subject to the defect,

but

the animal

itself

did not become subject to the defect.

Since the defect did not actually arise in the animal itself but in another object, this case is not comparable to immersion, where the defect is in the body of the person immersing. Therefore, the doubtful defect in the knife does not come and displace the certainty of the slaughtering. Rather, we attribute the nick in the knife to the bone.

He raised an objection

: It was taught in a beraita: If one

slaughtered

a bird by severing

the esophagus

[and with a bird, slaughtering only one required sign is sufficient]

and afterward the trachea was dislocated

—

it is valid.

If the trachea was dislocated and afterward he slaughtered the esophagus

—

it is invalid

[for it had already become a tereifa at the outset]. If he slaughtered the esophagus and

afterward

it was found

that

the trachea was dislocated, and he does not know whether it was dislocated before the slaughtering

, in which case the bird is a tereifa, or

whether it was dislocated after the slaughtering

, while at the time of slaughtering it was still valid—

this was the case

that occurred,

and

the Sages said:

Any uncertainty concerning slaughtering

—

it is invalid.

For it remains under its presumption of prohibition.

And the Gemara asks: “

Any uncertainty concerning slaughtering

”—the expression “any”

comes to include what?

Does it not come to include a case such as this, in which the knife was found defective after slaughtering? In that case as well, we invalidate the animal because of the uncertainty and establish it according to its presumption of prohibition, which would be difficult for Rav Ḥisda.

And we reject this:

No,

that is not what it comes to include. Rather,

it comes to include an uncertainty whether he paused

during the slaughtering, or

an uncertainty whether he pressed

during the slaughtering. In such cases, we establish the animal according to its presumption of prohibition, which it possesses during its lifetime. For in such a case there is no certainty against a doubt, and Rav Ḥisda concedes this.