Chullin 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

However,

minors do not have

minors

intent

where there is no action that demonstrates it.

For example, if a minor found a walnut shell and intended to make it into a vessel with which to measure earth, or even if he had already measured with it, since he performed no action to it, the walnut shell is not considered a vessel. And although an adult of sound mind creates a “vessel” through thought alone, as we learned in the Mishna: “All vessels become susceptible to ritual impurity through thought,” the thought of a minor is not considered thought wherever it is not accompanied by an action. This concludes the language of the Mishna.

If so, we explicitly learned that through thought alone, a minor’s intention is not considered intention; then what was Rabbi Yohanan uncertain about?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba

said to Rabbi Ami:

As for thought alone,

indeed,

Rabbi Yohanan was not uncertain

about it—certainly a minor does not have it, as is demonstrated by that Mishna.

Likewise, where there is an action demonstrating the minor’s intention, and he also explains and says what his intention is, certainly his thought is effective.

What Rabbi Yohanan was uncertain about

was whether a minor has thought when

his thought is discernible

only

from his actions,

according to what appears to our eyes, but he does not state his intention; in that case, we do not know with certainty whether he performed this action for the sake of this intention, since he does not say explicitly that this is what he intends.

For example, an elevation offering was standing in the south

of the Temple courtyard, and

the minor brought it

and stood it

in the north

of the altar, where the place of its slaughter is,

and slaughtered it.

And Rabbi Yohanan was asking: What

is the law?

Do we say:

Since he brought it to the north and slaughtered it,

taking care not to slaughter it in the south, it is evident that he

intended it

for the sake of an elevation offering,

or perhaps the place in the south did not happen to be available to him,

and he therefore brought it to the north, not because he intended it as an elevation offering—for he did not explicitly explain that he did so because it was an elevation offering?

And we raise an objection:

This

matter—“his thought is discernible from his actions”—

Rabbi Yohanan also stated once before,

that it is effective in the case of a minor. What, then, was he uncertain about again?

Food does not become susceptible to ritual impurity until liquids are placed upon it, rendering it fit to become impure.

As it is written: “And if water is placed upon seed, and any of their carcasses falls upon it, it is impure for you.” It is written, “if he places,” implying that a person places it, but it is read, “if it is placed,” implying that it was placed even on its own. And we derive from this: When the liquids are placed on their own, they render food fit to become impure only if they were placed in a manner analogous to “if he places,” i.e., with the person’s consent. Just as “if he places” means that it is placed with the person’s awareness, so too “if it is placed” on its own renders food fit only if it was placed with the person’s awareness.

And this is

what we learned [Makhshirin 6:1]:

One who brings his produce up to the roof because of the worms

in it,

and spreads it out to dry so that it will not rot,

and dew falls upon it—

it is not included in “if it is placed,”

and it has not yet become fit to contract ritual impurity. Since he brought it up to the roof not so that dew would fall upon it, but because of the worms, the dew’s rendering it fit was not with his awareness, and he does not desire this result. Therefore, the produce is not subject to the law of “if it is placed,” and it is not rendered fit to become impure.

But

if he intended this,

that dew should fall upon it, and he was pleased with this before the dew dried—whether he was pleased with it at the time he brought up the produce or afterward—

it is included in “if it is placed,”

and it has become fit to contract ritual impurity, since this was done with his awareness, analogous to “if he places.”

And if

a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor brought the produce

up to the roof, and dew fell upon it—

even though they intended this,

that dew should fall upon the produce,

it is not included in “if it is placed,” because they have

only

action.

Their intention is considered intention only through an action. But

they do not have

the status of intention through

thought

alone, and here there was thought alone.

And

Rabbi Yohanan

said: It was not taught

that their intention is ineffective—

except

where

the minor did not turn the produce over

in order that dew would fall upon it from all sides, but merely intended through thought alone that it be for the sake of the dew.

But if he turned it over

for the sake of the dew after he had brought it up—

it is included in “if it is placed,”

even if he did not state his intention.

Thus, Rabbi Yohanan holds that where his thought is discernible from his actions, he has intention.

If so, this is difficult: What was Rabbi Yohanan uncertain about here?

And we answer: Rather,

this is what Rabbi Yohanan was uncertain about:

As for the effectiveness of a minor’s intention where his thought is discernible from his actions, is it

from Torah law

and do we apply this even leniently, as in the case of slaughtering an elevation offering,

or

is it only a law

of rabbinic origin,

so that his intention is effective specifically to be stringent and render produce fit to contract ritual impurity, but not to be lenient and validate their slaughter of sacrificial animals, since according to Torah law it is not considered intention?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak taught this passage in this manner:

He taught this tradition as follows:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: Rabbi Yohanan asked:

Does a minor have action, or does he not have action?

That is, where he performed an action that demonstrates his thought and also explicitly stated his intention, is his intention effective or not?

Rabbi Ami said

to Rabbi Hiyya:

And Rabbi Yohanan should also have asked

whether

thought

alone, without an action, is effective in the case of a minor.

What is different about thought

alone

that he was not uncertain about it,

and it was obvious to him that a minor does not have it, because

we learned: “They do not have thought”?

If so,

he should likewise not have been uncertain about action,

since he does have it,

for

we

learned

in that same Mishna:

“They have action.”

And we answer:

This is what Rabbi Yohanan was uncertain about:

As for the effectiveness of “his thought is discernible from his actions,” as we learned, “they have action,” is it

from Torah law

that it is effective, even leniently,

or

is it only

of rabbinic origin,

and only for stringency?

And Rabbi Yohanan resolved

his uncertainty:

They have action, even according to Torah law,

and his thought, which is discernible from his actions together with his expressing his intention, is effective even leniently, to validate it through the slaughter of sacrificial animals.

But they do not have thought, and even according to rabbinic law

we do not treat it as intention and render produce fit for ritual impurity through it.

And where

his thought is discernible from his actions,

but he did not state his intention verbally,

according to Torah law he does not have

intention, and it is not effective for the slaughter of sacrificial animals; but

according to rabbinic law he does have

intention for stringency—for example, to render produce fit under the law of “if it is placed,” if he turned it over so that dew would fall upon it from all sides.

Shmuel asked Rav Huna: From where do we derive that one who is occupied with sacrificial animals

—for example, he is occupied with a knife, lifting it or throwing it, and in the meantime slaughtered a sacrificial animal unintentionally — from where do we derive

that it is invalid?

Rav Huna answered: We derive it from what

is stated: “And he shall slaughter the cattle.”

And we expound:

The slaughter must be for the sake of the cattle,

and not merely for throwing or cutting.

Shmuel said to him:

This

drash is already known to us;

we learned from it that it is a mitzva to intend for the sake of slaughter. But I am not asking you about this; rather, I am asking the following: -

The fact that the law of one occupied with something else applies even

to invalidate

and disqualify the offering even after the fact—

from where

is this derived? For all disqualifications of sacrificial animals do not invalidate them after the fact unless the verse repeats the matter.

He said to him:

We derive it from that which is written:

“For your acceptance

you shall slaughter it.”

This implies:

Slaughter it with your awareness!

And one who is occupied with something else does not act with your awareness. In this verse, the Torah repeated this law in order that it be indispensable.

Mishna:

The slaughter performed by an idolater,

even if others stood over him and saw that he slaughtered properly, is

an animal carcass.

This is because a gentile is unfit to slaughter, and an animal slaughtered by him is considered as though it died on its own; it

imparts impurity through carrying,

as is the law of every animal carcass: one who carries it, even without touching it, becomes impure.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this: Since the Mishna teaches that the slaughter performed by an idolater is an animal carcass, it implies:

An animal carcass—

yes!

It has only the status of an animal carcass, but

the prohibition against deriving benefit does not

apply to the animal as it would to an offering to idolatry.

Who

is the

tanna

of the Mishna who holds that it is not prohibited to derive benefit from it?

Rabbi Hiyya, son of Rabbi Abba, said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

This tanna holds

not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. For if it were Rabbi Eliezer, he said:

Rabbi Eliezer said that even if a Jew slaughtered an animal belonging to a gentile, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, since

the presumed intention of an idolater

is

for idolatry.

The gentile certainly intended that the slaughter performed by the Jew for him be for the sake of idolatry, and through his intention this animal became an offering to idolatry; therefore, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. All the more so, if the gentile himself slaughtered an animal, it would be prohibited to derive benefit from it according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Ami said: This is what the Mishna teaches:

This is how we should infer from our Mishna: Specifically,

the slaughter performed by an idolater

is merely

an animal carcass

and is not prohibited to derive benefit from it [and this is Rabbi Yohanan’s inference; Rav Ami does not disagree with Rabbi Yohanan, but holds that because the inference is so obvious, there is no need to state it]. Since an ordinary gentile does not intend for idolatry,

but

his slaughter,

that of a heretic,

if the slaughterer was devoted to idolatry [whether he was a gentile or a Jew], the animal is prohibited even to derive benefit from it, since the heretic devoted to idolatry directs all his thoughts toward idolatry, and certainly the slaughter was also for the sake of

idolatry.

We learned this

in a baraita—the inference that we drew from this Mishna, that a heretic’s intention is always directed toward idolatry.

As the Sages taught: The slaughter of a heretic

is

for the sake of idolatry. His bread

has the status of

Kuti bread,

which is prohibited to derive benefit from.

His wine is libation wine.

His books

—the Torah, Prophets, and Writings that the heretic wrote—are

“books of sorcerers,”

whose law is like that of books written by the prophets of Baal, and they are burned, since the heretic wrote them for the sake of idolatry.

His produce is untithed produce,

and forbidden to eat, because he does not separate terumot and tithes [the baraita is referring to a Jewish heretic].