Chullin 128a (קכח.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Meir says: If he holds the smaller part and the larger part rises with it, it is considered like it,

because they are regarded as connected to one another; and if a tevul yom touched one of them, its fellow also becomes impure [when they are teruma, as teruma is disqualified by a tevul yom]],

and if not—

it is not considered like it,

and its fellow does not become impure. [One part cannot render the other impure, because a tevul yom has the status of a sheni le-tumah, and the part that he touched is a shelishi; and a shelishi does not create a revi'i with regard to teruma]].

It follows that Rabbi Meir held the opposite: that it is not considered like it?

And Rabbi Yohanan said: The positions are reversed!

In tractate Tevul Yom, he reversed his position. But everywhere else he holds that if he holds the smaller part and the larger part rises with it, it is considered like it.

It is therefore clear that Rabbi Yohanan too explained that the reason Rabbi Meir holds that the limb does not require hechsher is that he maintains that if one holds the smaller part and the larger part does not rise with it, it is considered like it—like Abaye.

We raise an objection:

What difficulty

did Rabbi Yohanan find in Rabbi Meir's words in our Mishna, in light of his words in tractate Tevul Yom?

Perhaps Rabbi Meir distinguishes between a tevul yom and other forms of impurity?!

The impurity of a tevul yom is less severe, since he has already immersed, and therefore Rabbi Meir is lenient and says that when a tevul yom touches one part, the other part does not become impure along with it, because for this purpose they are not considered connected.

However, if a person whose impurity is severe, or a creeping creature, touches one part, the other part also becomes impure along with it, since they are considered connected. Likewise, in our Mishna concerning hechsher, both the dangling limb and the dangling flesh were rendered susceptible together with the animal, since they are considered connected. If so, there is no difficulty at all in Rabbi Meir's statements?

We answer: This

was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says: A tevul yom and other forms of impurity are alike

in that what is considered contact with regard to other forms of impurity is also considered contact with regard to a tevul yom. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection from one statement of Rabbi Meir against the other statement of Rabbi Meir.

We nevertheless ask:

Perhaps Rabbi does not distinguish between a tevul yom and other forms of impurity, whereas Rabbi Meir does distinguish between them

—so what difficulty did Rabbi Yohanan have?

We answer:

Rabbi Yoshiya said: This is what Rabbi Yohanan said: According to Rabbi

—who holds that a tevul yom and other forms of impurity are alike—

the positions are reversed

with regard to Rabbi Meir: concerning a tevul yom he said that it is not considered like it, whereas here he retracted and said that it is indeed considered like it.

g.

Rava said:

The case is one in which no blood from the slaughter splashed onto the dangling limb. Everyone agrees that an animal becomes a yad for one limb; rather,

they disagree

[whether we say that just as there is the law of a yad with regard to impurity, so too there is the law of a yad with regard to hechsher, or not]—

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon.

One master

—

Rabbi Shimon—

holds: There is a yad for impurity but not for hechsher.

The law of a yad was instituted only with regard to transmitting impurity from a creeping creature to food, and from impure food to pure food. But with regard to hechsher—so that if the yad was rendered susceptible, the food too is rendered susceptible—the law of a yad was not instituted. Therefore, although the animal becomes a yad for one limb, it nevertheless does not convey the hechsher to the limb.

And the other master

—Rabbi Meir—

holds: There is a yad both for impurity and for hechsher.

Just as the law of a yad was instituted with regard to transmitting impurity to food, so too it was instituted with regard to hechsher. Therefore, when the animal was rendered susceptible, it conveys the hechsher to the dangling limb, since the animal becomes a yad for one limb. [Rav and Rabbi Yohanan already disagreed about this dispute above, on page 118b].

d.

Rav Pappa said:

The case is indeed one in which the limb had already been rendered susceptible by the blood of slaughter, [this is possible for two reasons: first, where blood from the slaughter splashed onto the limb; and second, because everyone agrees that there is a yad for hechsher, and an animal becomes a yad for one limb]. Rather, the hechsher occurred before he formed the intention that it be eaten, so that the limb did not yet have the status of food when it was rendered susceptible, [and without intention the dangling limb is not fit to receive impurity, because it is forbidden to eat]],

And

with regard to hechsher

that occurred

before

the

intention, they disagree

—Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon—whether that hechsher is effective.

Rabbi Shimon holds that just as impurity does not take effect upon something that is not designated for eating, so hechsher does not take effect upon something that is not designated for eating. Accordingly, the dangling limb and flesh were not rendered susceptible by the blood of slaughter. Rabbi Meir, however, holds that hechsher takes effect even before they are designated for eating; once he forms the intention that they be eaten, they become fit to receive impurity through the hechsher that occurred initially.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said—

This is how Rabbi Akiva used to teach: Milk

of a kosher animal,

after slaughter—

in villages—

requires intention.

One must intend it for human consumption, and only then does it acquire the status of “food” for purposes of receiving impurity. Milk is eaten only under pressing circumstances. In villages, where there are few people, the meat is sufficient for them, and they do not eat milk. In cities, however, where there are many people, meat alone is insufficient, and therefore they also eat milk [the gentiles], so there the milk is designated for eating even without intention.

Alternative explanation: Milk is more expensive than meat. The villagers are poor and cannot afford to buy milk, whereas the wealthy townspeople also eat milk. Therefore, there the milk is designated for eating even without intention.

And it does not require

the milk

hechsher,

because

it

was

already rendered susceptible at

the time of

slaughter,

even though the hechsher occurred before the intention.

And

I said before him

—before Rabbi Akiva:

You taught us, our teacher: Chicory

[a type of herb]

that one gathered and washed

with water in order to feed it

to an animal,

[and something designated for animal consumption does not receive food impurity],

and

afterward

changed his mind concerning it,

so that it would be

for

human

consumption,

and from that point it is fit to receive food impurity,

they

require a second hechsher.

The first hechsher, at the time he washed them, occurred before the intention, and hechsher is effective only when it takes place after the item is fit to receive impurity. How, then, can you say that with regard to milk after slaughter a hechsher that occurred before intention is effective?

And Rabbi Akiva reverted to teaching in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Indeed, milk after slaughter also requires a second hechsher after he forms the intention that it be used for human consumption.

Once we have found that the tannaim debated this matter, it is now possible to say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disputed this very issue in our Mishna:

One master

—Rabbi Meir—

adopts

the position Rabbi Akiva stated

originally,

that hechsher is effective even when it occurs before intention; therefore, the hechsher of the slaughter blood rendered the dangling limb susceptible.

And the other master

—Rabbi Shimon—

adopts the position

held by Rabbi Akiva after his

retraction,

that hechsher does not take effect before intention. Therefore, the dangling limb requires a second hechsher after he forms the intention that it be eaten.

e.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika, said:

The case is one in which blood from the slaughter splashed onto the limb,

and

the blood

of the slaughter dried

between

the slaughtering of the first

siman

and

the slaughtering of the second

siman

—

they disagree

—Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon.

“Blood” is considered a liquid for purposes of hechsher only when it is “blood of the slain,” meaning that the animal was killed by being cut lengthwise. Blood of slaughter renders susceptible for a different reason: slaughter blood is compared to water. Therefore, it renders susceptible only when it has the designation “blood of slaughter.”

One master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds: “Slaughter exists from beginning to end,”

and already at the slaughter of the first siman the act has the designation of slaughter.

And this

blood, although it dried before the completion of the slaughter,

is “blood of slaughter,”

and it rendered the dangling limb and flesh susceptible.

And the other master

—Rabbi Shimon—

holds: “Slaughter does not exist,”

the act is not called slaughter

except at the end

of the slaughter.

And this

blood, which dried before the end of the slaughter, is not “blood of slaughter”; rather,

it is blood from a wound,

which does not render susceptible. Therefore, the dangling limb and flesh were not rendered susceptible.

And

Rav Ashi said:

The case is one in which blood from the slaughter splashed onto the limb,

And

they disagree

whether slaughter renders the flesh susceptible

and not the blood

of the slaughter renders it susceptible, or perhaps the blood of slaughter renders it susceptible.

They disagree.

Rabbi Shimon follows his position [above, 35b] that “blood of slaughter” is not called a liquid at all and does not render an item susceptible to receive impurity. Rather, the slaughter itself renders the flesh susceptible to receive impurity: since it permits the flesh to be eaten, it gives it the status of “food” also with regard to receiving impurity [hechsher is comparable to the “completion of the work” of the food]. Since the slaughter does not permit the dangling limb and flesh to be eaten, it likewise does not render them susceptible to receive impurity.

Rabbi Meir, however, holds that slaughter blood is called a liquid and renders an item susceptible to receive impurity. Accordingly, the dangling limb and flesh were rendered susceptible by the slaughter blood. Rabba inquired:

According to Rabbi Meir, who holds in the explanation of Rabba above that an animal becomes a yad for a limb at the time of slaughter—

while the animal is alive, can it become a yad for the limb?

The animal itself, while alive, cannot receive impurity at all, whereas the dangling limb can receive food impurity through intention and hechsher. The question therefore arises in a case where impurity touched the animal,

whether the animal transmits the impurity to the limb by virtue of the law of yad [a yad transmits impurity into and out of the food], or perhaps, since living creatures cannot receive impurity at all, they likewise cannot transmit impurity by virtue of the law of yad.

Does it bring the impurity into the limb by the law of a “handle” [a handle brings in and takes out impurity], or perhaps, since living creatures do not receive impurity at all, they cannot transmit impurity even by the law of a handle?

And we conclude:

Teyku! Abaye said: They said

in tractate Uktzin:

a cucumber that was planted in an unperforated flowerpot ,

which is not perforated, whose status is that of produce detached from the ground and which can contract ritual impurity like any food,

and it grew

the cucumber

and extended beyond the flowerpot,

leaning over the ground—

the entire cucumber is pure.

This is because the part extending from the flowerpot draws nourishment from the scent of the earth beneath it, while what is inside the flowerpot draws nourishment from the part leaning outward; thus, the entire cucumber is considered connected to the ground, and an object connected to the ground cannot contract ritual impurity.

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the status

of the cucumber inside the flowerpot

that it should become pure!?

Why should the inner part, which is inside the flowerpot, also be declared pure? After all, it does not draw nourishment from the ground.

Rather, the impure remains in its impurity!

What is inside the flowerpot retains the status of produce detached from the ground even after the cucumber has grown, and can contract ritual impurity.

And the pure remains in its purity.

Only the part leaning outward has the status of an object connected to the ground and cannot contract ritual impurity.

Abaye raised a dilemma:

According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that what grows inside the flowerpot can contract ritual impurity, whereas what is outside the flowerpot cannot contract ritual impurity,

can

the cucumber leaning outward

become a “hand” for its counterpart,

the part inside the flowerpot? That is, if ritual impurity touches the outer part, does it transmit the impurity to the cucumber inside the flowerpot by virtue of the law of a “hand,” or perhaps, since an object connected to the ground cannot contract ritual impurity, it likewise cannot transmit impurity as a “hand”?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rabbi Yirmeya said: They said: One who prostrates himself before half a gourd—

forbids it

from benefit. That half of the gourd before which he prostrated himself is forbidden from benefit under the law of an object of idolatrous worship. However, the other half of the gourd, before which he did not prostrate himself, is permitted for benefit.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma:

According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that substances forbidden for benefit cannot contract ritual impurity because they are not considered food, it follows that the half of the gourd before which he prostrated himself cannot contract ritual impurity, whereas the half of the gourd before which he did not prostrate himself can contract ritual impurity,