Chullin 127b — the Talmud in English

And if, while they are hanging loosely,

the animal was slaughtered,

then the hanging limb and flesh no longer require qualification from another source in order to receive food impurity, since

they were qualified by its blood.

For the blood of slaughter qualifies all the flesh of the animal to receive impurity, including the hanging limb and flesh,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Shimon says: They were not qualified

by its blood. And they require qualification from another source in order to receive food impurity.

But if, while they are hanging loosely,

the animal died—

the flesh

that is hanging loosely

requires qualification

so that it can receive food impurity from the creeping creature, but the flesh does not itself impart impurity. For with the impurity of an animal carcass it does not impart impurity, because we hold: “death causes falling,” meaning that once the animal dies, the limb and flesh hanging loosely are considered as though they had fallen entirely from it before death, and they do not become a carcass together with it at its death. And with the impurity of a limb from a living creature it does not impart impurity, because specifically an intact limb imparts impurity.

But

the limb

hanging loosely from it—

imparts impurity on account of “a limb from a living creature,” and does not impart impurity on account of “a limb

from a

carcass,”

because since it is considered as though it “fell” from the animal before its death, it has only the impurity of “a limb from a living creature,”

the words of Rabbi Meir.

There is a distinction between when the animal was slaughtered and when the animal died: if it was slaughtered, the slaughter also relates to the limb and flesh hanging loosely, and this is considered as though they too were slaughtered; therefore, they do not have the impurity of a limb from a living creature. [Nevertheless, they are forbidden for eating, as we derived earlier on page 74a from “and flesh in the field torn by a predatory animal” ]. This is not so when the animal died: the death does not relate to the limb and flesh hanging loosely, but it is considered that they fell before the animal’s death. Therefore, their law is like that of a limb and flesh from a living creature: the limb imparts severe impurity, while the flesh imparts only food impurity. [Earlier there, Rava derives from a verse that “death causes falling; slaughter does not cause falling” .]

And Rabbi Shimon declares it pure!

[In the Gemara it will be explained what this refers to and what his reason is.]

Gemara:

It is taught in the Mishna that the limb hanging loosely imparts food impurity, and this implies:

food impurity—

yes!

That it has only food impurity, but

not the impurity of a carcass.

For the limb hanging loosely is not considered entirely detached, so that it would impart impurity on its own on account of “a limb from a living creature,” which imparts impurity like a carcass; rather, with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living creature it is considered attached.

And we raised a difficulty:

What are the circumstances

in which there is a distinction between food impurity and the impurity of a limb from a living creature?

If it can heal,

that the limb is destined to reunite with the animal, then

should it not even impart food impurity?

For the limb is considered entirely attached, and living creatures do not receive impurity.

And if it cannot heal,

then

the impurity of a carcass

[that is, the impurity of “a limb from a living creature”]

should it not also impart?

For it is like a limb that has separated entirely from a living creature, [and this is the reason that it imparts food impurity].

And we answer:

Actually, it cannot heal,

but nevertheless it does not impart the impurity of a limb from a living creature, for

the impurity of a carcass is different, since the Merciful One said: “

And

when it falls

from their carcasses,” and we expound: it is not called a carcass

until it falls

entirely; but while it is still slightly attached, even though it can no longer heal, nevertheless it does not impart impurity.

It was also taught so

that this is derived from this verse:

the limb and flesh hanging loosely from an animal, and attached

that remained suspended

by a strand of hair—

could one say that they impart the impurity of a carcass? The verse says: “

And when it

falls”—

”—

until it falls!

It is explained in the beraita [and this is also precise in the Mishna] that the limbs hanging loosely are considered attached to the animal with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living creature,

and even so, they impart food impurity,

for with regard to receiving food impurity they are already considered detached—

this supports Rav Hiyya bar Ashi.

For Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Shmuel: Figs that shriveled

[dried]

on their stem,

while they were attached to the tree, even while they are still on the tree

impart food impurity,

for they are like detached produce,

and

if

one plucks them on Shabbat—

—

he is liable for a sin-offering.

That is, Shmuel holds that it is possible to distinguish between the subjects: although with regard to liability for Shabbat it is still considered attached, nevertheless, with regard to food impurity it is already considered detached.

There is proof for this from the law of limbs hanging loosely: they are considered attached with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living creature, yet they are considered detached with regard to food impurity. [The proof is only that it is possible to distinguish between the subjects. There is still no proof of the essential law that fruit that dried on the tree is considered like a limb hanging loosely.]

Let us say that it supports him

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi in the name of Shmuel, that fruit that dried on the tree is considered detached with regard to food impurity:

For it was taught:

vegetables that shriveled

that dried while still attached

on their stems, such as cabbage and gourd—

do not impart food impurity.

For after these vegetables dry, they no longer have the status of “food,” since they are entirely unfit for eating; rather, they are merely like wood [and are designated for making utensils or for fuel].

And if one

cut them

while they were still moist

and they dried

afterward, they

impart food impurity.

And we raised a difficulty: Is it conceivable that

if he cut them and dried them,

they impart food impurity? But

it is merely wood,

and they are entirely unfit for eating!?

And Rabbi Yitzhak said:

This is what it means: that he cut them while moist

with the intention of drying them.

And in this manner the beraita teaches a novelty: as long as they are moist, they are considered food and impart food impurity, even though they are not intended for eating, but for drying them and making utensils from them or using them as fuel; nevertheless, at present they are food.

And now we conclude the proof for Rav Hiyya bar Ashi: at the beginning it teaches that cabbage and gourd that dried while still on the tree do not impart food impurity. Perforce, the beraita did not come to teach us this law, for it is obvious that they are merely like wood. Rather, it comes to infer from this that

the reason

they do not impart impurity is because

it is cabbage and gourd,

and they,

since they dried—

are not fit for eating! But other fruit,

which is fit for food even when dry,

does impart impurity

after it dries, even while it is still on the tree.

What are the circumstances? If

the beraita is speaking of a case

in which they and their stems dried,

and the beraita comes to teach that other fruit receives food impurity because it is considered detached, this law is

obvious,

for if they and their stems dried, even with regard to Shabbat they are considered detached . What, then, does the beraita come to teach by this?

Rather, is it not

that the beraita is speaking of a case in which the fruit dried

without their stems,

and the beraita comes to teach that other fruit receives impurity because it is considered detached? Here, then, is proof for the words of Rav Hiyya bar Ashi in the name of Shmuel.

And we reject this:

Actually,

the beraita is speaking of fruit that dried

together with its stems,

and there is no proof for Rav Hiyya bar Ashi, for even with regard to Shabbat they are considered detached. And as for what troubled us—that the beginning is obvious? Indeed, so it is! Rather, it is the latter clause,

“he cut them with the intention of drying them,”

that

was necessary for it

to teach us: although cabbage and gourd are not intended for food, nevertheless they impart food impurity while they are still moist.

Come and hear

to raise a difficulty against Rav Hiyya bar Ashi: for it was taught:

a tree that was split off,

from which a branch was detached,

and on it were fruit,

even if they are moist—

they are considered detached.

For they are not attached to the ground at all.

And if the branch was not detached, but

the fruit dried

while it was attached to the tree—

it is considered attached.

Despite the fact that it is dry.

And we infer:

What, is it not that “detached”

which we say at the beginning, concerning a tree that was split off, means that they are detached

for all their laws,

both with regard to Shabbat and with regard to food impurity,

and “attached”

which we say concerning a tree that was not split off, but whose fruit dried, means that they are considered attached

for all their laws,

even with regard to the fact that they do not impart food impurity? And this is a difficulty against Rav Hiyya bar Ashi?

And we answer:

Are the matters necessarily identical,

that they are equal? It is possible to say that

this is according to its circumstance, and that is according to its circumstance.

The detached produce, in the case of a tree that was split off, is indeed detached for all its laws; but the fruit that remains attached and dried on a tree that was not split off is considered attached only with regard to Shabbat, but not with regard to impurity, in accordance with the words of Rav Hiyya bar Ashi in the name of Shmuel.

We learned in the Mishna:

the animal was slaughtered

—it was qualified by its blood, the words of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon says: It was not qualified.

And we raised a difficulty:

Over what do

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree?

If it is speaking of a case in which blood from the slaughter splashed onto the limb, then certainly the limb was qualified, and over what do they disagree? And if we say that the slaughter itself qualifies the flesh to receive impurity, even though no blood from the slaughter splashed onto the flesh, that applies only when the slaughter permits the flesh for eating, for since it permits it for eating, it also qualifies it to receive impurity. But the limb and flesh hanging loosely are not permitted for eating by the slaughter, and the slaughter does not qualify them to receive impurity?

The Gemara explains several possibilities on which it is possible to base the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon:

1.

Rabba said:

It is speaking of a case in which blood from the slaughter did not splash onto the limb hanging loosely, and it was not qualified by the blood of slaughter. Rather, we hold: “there is a hand for qualification”; that is, just as the “hand” [the place by which it is held] of food brings impurity to the food, so the hand of food brings qualification to the food: if the hand became wet but the food did not become wet, this is considered as though the food too was qualified,

and

the animal,

if it

becomes a hand for the limb

of one—

they disagree.

One master,

Rabbi Shimon,

holds: There is no

whole

animal

does not

that becomes a hand for one limb.

For people are not accustomed to move the limb by means of the entire animal, and the animal does not serve as a handle for one limb. Therefore, the limb and flesh hanging loosely were not qualified by the blood of slaughter that flowed onto the animal but not onto the limb.

And

Rabbi Meir

held: An animal becomes a handle for a limb.

Therefore, the entire animal, which was qualified by the blood of the slaughtering, brings the qualification to the dangling limb, and from now on the limb is fit to receive impurity.

b.

Abaye said:

It is speaking of a case in which none of the slaughtering blood was splashed onto the limb, and the animal likewise does not avail as a “handle for qualification” to qualify the limb, since everyone agrees that an animal does not become a handle for one limb.

Rather, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagreed over whether the animal, the limb, and the dangling flesh are considered one body, and therefore the qualification of the animal is effective also for them, [for it is not necessary that all the food be wetted with water; rather, if part of it was wetted, all of it was qualified to receive impurity], or whether they are not one body, and through the animal having been qualified, the dangling limb and flesh were not qualified,

and

in holding

a small

part, and the

large

part does not rise with it—

but rather falls away from it—

they disagree,

whether the large part and the small part are considered one thing or not. For if he holds the dangling limb and flesh, the entire animal will not follow them, but rather it will be torn away from them; whereas, if he holds the animal, the dangling limb and flesh will follow it.

As for

Rabbi Meir

he held:

Even though he

holds the small part and the large part does not rise with it,

nevertheless

the

small part

is like it,

the large part, for it is considered attached to it, since when he holds the large part, the small part rises with it, and that is sufficient. Therefore, the qualification of the animal is effective for the dangling limb and flesh, since they are considered one thing.

And as for

Rabbi Shimon

he held:

Since when he holds the small part, the large part does not rise with it, therefore it

is not like it.

For it is not considered attached to the large part. Therefore, the limb and flesh are not considered attached to the animal, and the qualification of the animal is not effective for them.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise held

as Abaye, that

“They disagree in holding the small part, and the large part did not rise with it.”

For Rabbi Yohanan raised a contradiction between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Meir:

Did Rabbi Meir say

[in our Mishna, that the dangling limb and flesh do not require qualification because]

when he holds the small part and the large part does not rise with it, it is like it?

And he raised a contradiction:

For we learned in tractate Tevul Yom:

A food that was sliced

and divided into two, but it is

partially attached,

not completely separated; and now it is necessary to consider whether they are considered one part, such that if an impure person touches one of them, the other is impure like it, or whether they are not considered one part, and if an impure person touches one part, only that part is impure, whereas the other part is pure.