Chullin 127b (קכז:) — the Talmud in English

And if, while they are dangling,

the animal was slaughtered,

the dangling limb and flesh no longer require preparation from another source in order to become susceptible to tum'at okhlin, since

they were prepared through its blood.

For the blood of slaughter renders all the flesh of the animal susceptible to impurity, including the dangling limb and flesh,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Shimon says: They were not prepared

through its blood. And they require preparation from another source in order to become susceptible to tum'at okhlin.

But if, while they are dangling,

the animal died

—the

dangling

flesh requires preparation

in order to be able to contract tum'at okhlin from a creeping creature, but the flesh does not itself convey impurity. For with regard to the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, it does not convey impurity, because we maintain that “death causes detachment,” meaning that once the animal dies, the dangling limb and flesh are considered as though they had completely fallen from it before its death, and they do not become an unslaughtered carcass together with it at the moment of its death. And with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living animal, it does not convey impurity, because only an entire limb conveys impurity.

But

the limb

dangling from it

conveys impurity as a “limb from a living animal,” but does not convey impurity as a “limb

from an

unslaughtered carcass,”

because since it is considered as though it “fell” from the animal before its death, it has only the impurity of a “limb from a living animal,”

the words of Rabbi Meir.

There is a distinction between a case in which the animal was slaughtered and one in which the animal died. If it was slaughtered, the slaughter applies also to the dangling limb and flesh, and this is considered as though they too were slaughtered; therefore, they do not have the impurity of a limb from a living animal. [Nevertheless, they are forbidden for consumption, as we derive earlier from the verse “and flesh in the field torn by a predator”]. This is not so when the animal died: the death does not apply to the dangling limb and flesh; rather, they are considered to have fallen before the animal’s death. Therefore, their status is that of a limb and flesh from a living animal: the limb conveys severe impurity, while the flesh conveys only tum'at okhlin. [Earlier, in that passage, Rava derives from a verse that “death causes detachment, but slaughter does not cause detachment”].

And Rabbi Shimon declares it pure!

[The Gemara will explain what this statement refers to and what its rationale is.]

Gemara:

The Mishna teaches that the dangling limb conveys the impurity of food, implying:

the impurity of food

—

yes!

But not the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass.

For the dangling limb is not considered completely detached, such that it should convey impurity on its own as a “limb from a living animal,” which conveys impurity like an unslaughtered carcass; rather, with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living animal, it is considered attached.

We raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances

in which there is a distinction between the impurity of food and the impurity of a limb from a living animal?

If it can heal,

meaning that the limb is destined to become reattached to the animal, then

should it not even convey the impurity of food?

For the limb is considered completely attached, and living creatures do not contract impurity.

And if it cannot heal,

then

the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass

[that is, the impurity of a “limb from a living animal”]

should it not also convey?

For it is like a limb that became completely separated from a living animal. [This is presumably the reason that it conveys the impurity of food.]

We answer:

Actually, it cannot heal,

and nevertheless it does not convey the impurity of a limb from a living animal, because

the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass is different, as the Torah said:

“And

when it falls

from their carcasses”; and we derive that it is not called an unslaughtered carcass

until it falls

completely. But as long as it remains slightly attached, even though it can no longer heal, it nevertheless does not convey impurity.

It was taught likewise

that this is derived from that verse:

The limb and flesh dangling from an animal, and attached

—

remaining suspended

by a strand of hair—could one say that they convey the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass? The verse states:

“And when it

falls

”—

until it falls!

It is explained in the beraita [and it is likewise precise in the Mishna] that the dangling limbs are considered attached to the animal with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living animal,

and even so, they convey the impurity of food,

for with regard to becoming susceptible to the impurity of food, they are already considered detached—

this supports Rav Hiyya bar Ashi.

For Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: Figs that shriveled

[dried out]

on their stalks,

while still attached to the tree, even while they remain on the tree

convey the impurity of food,

for they are considered detached.

And

if one

plucks them on Shabbat

—

he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

That is, Shmuel holds that it is possible to distinguish between the subjects: although with regard to liability for Shabbat the figs are still considered attached, with regard to the impurity of food they are already considered detached.

There is support for this from the law of dangling limbs: they are considered attached with regard to the impurity of a limb from a living animal, yet they are considered detached with regard to the impurity of food. [The support is only for the possibility of distinguishing between the subjects. There is still no proof of the fundamental point that fruit that dried on the tree is considered like a dangling limb.]

Let us say that this supports

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi, who said in the name of Shmuel that fruit that dried on a tree is considered detached with regard to the impurity of food:

For it was taught:

Vegetables that shriveled

—that dried while still attached

on their stalks, such as cabbage and gourd

do not convey the impurity of food.

For after these vegetables have dried, they are no longer considered “food,” since they are entirely unfit for consumption; rather, they are merely like wood. [They are intended for making utensils or for fuel.]

But if one

cut them

while they were moist

and they dried

afterward, they

convey the impurity of food.

We raise a difficulty: Is it conceivable that if one

cut them and they dried

they convey the impurity of food? They are surely

merely wood,

and are entirely unfit for consumption!?

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

This is what it means: He cut them while they were moist

with the intention of drying them.

In this manner, the beraita teaches that as long as they are moist, they are considered food and convey the impurity of food, even though they are not intended for eating, but for drying them and making utensils or using them as fuel; nevertheless, at present they are food.

We now conclude the proof for Rav Hiyya bar Ashi: The first clause teaches that cabbage and gourd that dried while still on the tree do not convey the impurity of food. Necessarily, the beraita did not come merely to teach this law, since it is obvious that they are merely like wood. Rather, it comes to infer that the

reason

they do not convey impurity is because

it is cabbage and gourd,

and they,

once they have dried,

are not fit for eating! But other fruit,

which is fit for consumption even when dry,

does convey impurity

after drying, even while it is still on the tree.

What are the circumstances? If

the beraita is discussing a case

in which they and their stalks dried,

and it comes to teach that other fruit becomes susceptible to the impurity of food because it is considered detached, this law is

obvious,

since if the fruit and its stalks dried, even with regard to Shabbat it is considered detached. What, then, does the beraita come to teach?

Rather, is it not

the case that the beraita is discussing fruit that dried

without its stalks,

and it comes to teach that other fruit becomes susceptible to impurity because it is considered detached? This is proof of the statement of Rav Hiyya bar Ashi in the name of Shmuel.

We reject this:

Actually,

the beraita is discussing fruit that dried

together with its stalks,

and there is no proof for Rav Hiyya bar Ashi, since even with regard to Shabbat it is considered detached. And what about our difficulty that the first clause is obvious? Indeed, it is! Rather, it is the latter clause,

“he cut them with the intention of drying them,”

that

was necessary for it

to teach us: Although cabbage and gourd are not intended for food, nevertheless they convey the impurity of food while they are moist.

Ta shma

to raise a difficulty against Rav Hiyya bar Ashi: For it was taught:

A tree whose branch was broken off,

meaning that a branch was detached from it,

and it had fruit on it,

even if the fruit is moist—

it is considered detached.

For it is no longer connected to the ground at all.

But if the branch was not detached, rather, the fruit

dried

while it was attached to the tree,

it is considered attached.

Even though it is dry.

We infer:

Is it not the case that just as “detached”

in the first clause, concerning a tree whose branch was broken off, means that it is detached

with regard to all its laws,

both with regard to Shabbat and with regard to the impurity of food,

so too “attached”

in the case of a tree whose branch was not broken off but whose fruit dried means that it is considered attached

with regard to all its laws,

even with regard to not conveying the impurity of food? This is a difficulty against Rav Hiyya bar Ashi.

We answer:

Are the cases necessarily equivalent?

They may be distinguished:

each case is as it is.

The fruit on a branch that broke off is indeed detached with regard to all its laws, whereas fruit that dried while attached to a tree whose branch did not break off is considered attached only with regard to Shabbat, but not with regard to impurity, in accordance with the statement of Rav Hiyya bar Ashi in the name of Shmuel.

We learned in the Mishna:

The animal was slaughtered

—it was rendered susceptible through its blood, the words of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon says: It was not rendered susceptible.

We raise a difficulty:

With regard to what do

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree?

If the case concerns blood of the slaughter that spattered onto the limb, then certainly the limb was rendered susceptible; about what do they disagree? And if we say that the slaughter itself renders the flesh susceptible to impurity, even though no blood of the slaughter spattered onto the flesh, that would be only where the slaughter permits the flesh for consumption, since by virtue of permitting it for consumption it renders it susceptible to impurity. But the dangling limb and flesh are not permitted for consumption by the slaughter, and the slaughter does not render them susceptible to impurity?

The Gemara explains several ways in which the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon might be understood:

1.

Rabba said:

The case is one in which no blood of the slaughter spattered onto the dangling limb, and it was not rendered susceptible through the blood of the slaughter. Rather, we maintain that “there is a handle for preparation”: Just as the “handle” [the part by which food is held] of food brings impurity to the food, so too the handle of food brings preparation to the food. If the handle became wet while the food itself did not become wet, the food is nevertheless considered to have been rendered susceptible.

And

with regard to the animal,

if it

becomes a handle for the limb,

one

disagrees.

One master

—Rabbi Shimon—

holds: There is no

entire

animal

in its entirety that

becomes a handle for one limb.

For it is not customary to move the limb by means of the entire animal, and the animal does not serve as a means of holding a single limb. Therefore, the dangling limb and flesh were not rendered susceptible through the blood of the slaughter that flowed onto the animal but not onto the limb.

And

Rabbi Meir

held: An animal can serve as a handle for a limb.

Therefore, the entire animal, which was rendered susceptible by the blood of slaughter, conveys that susceptibility to the dangling limb, and from that point onward the limb is fit to contract ritual impurity.

b.

Abaye said:

The case is one in which none of the blood of slaughter was splashed onto the limb. Nor does the animal render the limb susceptible by serving as a “handle for susceptibility,” since everyone agrees that an animal cannot serve as a handle for a single limb.

Rather, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to whether the animal, the limb, and the dangling flesh are considered one entity, in which case the animal’s susceptibility is effective for them as well—for it is not necessary that the entire food be moistened with water; rather, once part of it has been moistened, all of it is rendered susceptible to impurity—or whether they are not one entity, in which case the susceptibility of the animal does not render the dangling limb and flesh susceptible,

and

in grasping the

smaller part,

and the

larger part

does not rise with it—

but falls away from it—

they disagree

whether the larger part and the smaller part are considered one thing or not. For if one grasps the dangling limb and flesh, the entire animal does not follow them, but is torn away from them; whereas, if one grasps the animal, the dangling limb and flesh follow it.

Rabbi Meir

held:

Even though he

is

grasping the smaller part, and the larger part does not rise with it,

nevertheless

the

smaller part

is like it

is like the larger part, which is considered attached to it, since when one grasps the larger part, the smaller part rises with it, and that is sufficient. Therefore, the animal’s susceptibility is effective for the dangling limb and flesh, since they are considered one thing.

And Rabbi Shimon

held:

Since

when one grasps the smaller part, the larger part does not rise with it, therefore it

is not like it.

It is not considered attached to the larger part. Therefore, the limb and flesh are not considered attached to the animal, and the animal’s susceptibility is not effective for them.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise held

like Abaye, that

“They disagree in a case where one grasps the smaller part and the larger part does not rise with it.”

For Rabbi Yohanan raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir:

Did Rabbi Meir say

[in our Mishna, that the dangling limb and flesh do not require susceptibility because]

when one grasps the smaller part and the larger part does not rise with it, it is like it?

And he raised a contradiction:

For we learned in the tractate Tevul Yom:

Food that was sliced

into two parts, but it

remains partially attached,

not completely separated—and the question now arises whether they are considered one part, such that if an impure person touches one of them, the other is impure like it, or perhaps they are not considered one part, and if an impure person touches one part, only that part becomes impure, whereas the other part remains pure.