Bekhorot 48b — the Talmud in English

It is not considered like a debt written in a document -

And everyone agrees with Rav Pappa’s statement, for Rav Pappa said:

An oral loan is collected from the heirs, but it is not collected from purchasers.

It follows that, according to everyone, after their division the kohen has a right only to half the inheritance—for they have the status of heirs with regard to it—which is half the debt, since the father left only five sela'im; and according to this, the reason for their dispute will be explained:

And here

in our Mishna,

with five

sela'im

and not half

of

five

sela'im,

they disagree

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah:

For Rabbi Meir holds: five and not half of five;

and therefore Rabbi Meir holds that before the division, while they are still heirs with regard to all five sela'im, the kohen takes all five sela'im by virtue of the father’s lien. But after they divided and became like purchasers with regard to half the inheritance, it follows that the kohen can take only half of five, and once again he takes nothing.

And

if

Rabbi Judah holds: five

sela'im

and even half of five,

and therefore, whether they divided or whether they did not divide, the kohen will take: before they divided, he will take five sela'im, and after they divided, he will take half of the five sela'im.

And we raise an objection against it:

If so,

according to your interpretation, does the wording

“Rabbi Judah says: the property became liable”

fit? It implies that Rabbi Judah introduced the idea that a lien takes effect upon the property! But this is not what they disputed. Even according to Rabbi Meir, the property became encumbered while it was in the father’s possession; rather, since he lost half when the sons became purchasers, Rabbi Meir holds that he lost everything, whereas according to Rabbi Judah, whatever he can take, he should take, and Rabbi Judah’s innovation does not concern the lien itself.

But

“the man is liable”

he should have said!? That is, he should have taught: “And Rabbi Judah says: they are liable,” meaning that they are not entirely exempt, as Rabbi Meir says; rather, at least they should give half the redemption!?

And further it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Judah says: brothers who divided, if there are ten zuz [

which are two and a half sela'im, since a sela is four zuz]

to

this

brother, and ten zuz to

this

brother, these are the heirs

liable

to give five sela'im,

but if not, these are

exempt -

And

what does

“ten zuz to this one, and ten zuz to that one” mean!?

If you say

that each one has two and a half sela'im

both

from the half that is

of the inheritance and

both

from the half that is

of the purchasers, this cannot be said, for:

It follows [

necessarily] that according to Rabbi Judah,

“five and even half of five”! For between the two of them they will give only ten zuz, since from the half that is the purchasers they will give nothing -

And

if so, what is the reason specifically for ten, when

even if each one has

less [

than]

ten, they would also each give half of his portion, even though altogether it does not amount to even half of five? For what difference is there between half of five and less than this?

Rather, it is obvious: Rabbi Judah’s intention is to say that they are liable only if there are

ten zuz from the inheritance for this one and ten zuz from the inheritance for that one, for then altogether they will give five complete sela'im; but if they inherited less than this, they will give nothing, because “five and not half of five” -

It follows that he holds: five and not half of five,

unlike what you said concerning his view, that he holds “five and even half of five”!?

Rather,

the Gemara explains the reason for their dispute in another manner. And here, what are we dealing with?—as was explained in the first interpretation—with a case where their father left only five sela'im, two and a half sela'im for this one and two and a half sela'im for that one -

And

everyone—both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah—holds

five and not half of five,

and the reason for Rabbi Meir is clarified as it was clarified in the previous interpretation. Rabbi Judah also agrees with him concerning this basic law, but he holds: the kohen will take all five sela'im, as will be explained. This is what we say in the beraita, that even Rabbi Judah made them liable only when there are altogether five sela'im there -

and here they disagree concerning Rav Asi’s statement—who said, “half heirs and half purchasers”—and

Rav Pappa, who said that an oral loan is not collected from purchasers—

they disagree.

That is:

Rabbi Meir agrees with Rav Asi and Rav Pappa, and therefore takes nothing, as was explained in the previous interpretation. But concerning Rabbi Judah, it is possible to explain in two ways:

The first: Rabbi Judah holds that, with regard to the entire inheritance, they are considered heirs; and it follows that the kohen has a right to all five sela'im.

The second: Rabbi Judah disagrees with Rav Pappa and holds that an oral loan is collected even from purchasers; and therefore it does not matter to us that half the inheritance consists of purchasers, and the kohen has a right to all five sela'im, and therefore he collects.

everyone—

both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda—holds

five and not half of five. This explains Rabbi Meir’s reasoning as explained in the earlier interpretation. Rabbi Yehuda also agrees with him regarding this basic law, but he holds that the kohen takes all five sela, as will be explained. This is what is meant by the baraita: Rabbi Yehuda holds that the heirs are liable only when together they possess five sela—

and Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is explained as in the earlier interpretation. Rabbi Yehuda also agrees with him concerning this basic law, but he maintains that the kohen takes all five sela, as will be explained. This is what we say in the beraita: Rabbi Yehuda likewise obligates them only when together they have five sela -

and here they disagree concerning Rav Asi—

who said, “Half has the status of inherited property and half has the status of purchased property”—and

Rav Pappa,

who said that an oral loan cannot be collected from purchasers—

they disagree.

The Gemara adds to explain:

and there are those who transmit it—as a give-and-take—

on the final clause, that is, concerning Rabbi Judah. That is:

According to the sugya above, the difficulty was with Rabbi Meir’s words alone, which we did not know how to interpret, and therefore we had to interpret them as we did. But there are those who require an interpretation not according to the simple meaning because of Rabbi Judah’s words, which are difficult. For we learned:

“Rabbi Judah says: the property became liable,” and the difficulty is: when did the father die [ when did the father die]? If you say he died after thirty days, does it follow that Rabbi Meir holds: when they divided, they are exempt, even though the father died after becoming liable? But this cannot be, for the property became encumbered [ the father’s property became encumbered], and why should the kohen not take it? - Rather, say that our Mishna is to be explained as referring to a case where the father died within thirty

days. But the words of Rabbi Judah still present a difficulty:

Since the father died within thirty days, the property did not become encumbered by virtue of the father, and we come to collect only by virtue of the sons’ obligations. If so:

when they divided, why does Rabbi Judah make them liable,

when

let him go to this one and have him reject him, and let him go to that one and have him reject him [

if he claims from this one’s portion, he will reject him, saying: “I am not the firstborn”; and the second one will likewise reject him]? -

and the following difficulty arises:

When did the father die?

[That is, at what point did the father die?]

And concerning this

Rabbi Yirmeya said

in another manner:

This is to say: two Yosef ben Shimon in one city,

and a promissory note was issued against Yosef ben Shimon, but it is not known which one he is -

and one of them purchased a field from the other,

the

creditor collects

it

from him,

because

he says to him: the lender says to the purchaser, “In either case, I have a right to this field,” for:

If I am owed by you,

I am taking your portion, and

if I am owed by your fellow,

you became encumbered to me first [ if I am owed by you, I take it; and even if I am owed only by your fellow, I have priority over you with regard to this field, since it became encumbered to me while it belonged to the one who sold it to you]. The same is true in our Mishna: the kohen can collect in either case, because Rabbi Judah holds, “brothers who divided are purchasers,” and the redemption of the firstborn can be collected from purchasers, and therefore he collects in either case:

Rabbi Yirmeya said

If you are the firstborn, all is well; and if your brother is the firstborn, then you purchased your portion from him, and I collect by virtue of your brother.

This means: If there were two people named Yosef ben Shimon in one city,

and a promissory note was issued against Yosef ben Shimon, but it was unknown which of the two men it concerned—

and one of them purchased a field from the other,

Rava

said, perplexed:

Since a person’s property is guarantor for him [

a person’s property guarantees the repayment of his debts], and for this reason they collect from the property. But is there such a thing, that

with regard to him [

the creditor himself]

he cannot claim from him

because he rejects him, saying, “I do not owe,”

but

if

he can claim from the guarantor!?

And we learned: “

One who lends to his fellow through a guarantor may not collect from the guarantor,”

and it is established for us to interpret the Mishna: that he may not claim from the guarantor first,

but must first claim from the borrower. Included in this is that if he cannot claim from the borrower, he cannot claim from the guarantor either. If so, he cannot say to the purchaser that the field is encumbered to him on account of the seller’s debt!?

Said

And the entire matter follows the first wording,

that is, Rava interpreted it as he interpreted it above, and we return and explain that they disputed Rav Asi’s statement or Rav Pappa’s statement. Mishna:

1.

Two women

belonging to one man

who had not previously brought forth firstborns, and bore two males,

and it is not known which one belongs to which:

The father

gives ten sela'im to the kohen,

for he has two firstborns.

And if

one of them dies within thirty days:

If he gave the two redemptions to one kohen,

he must

return five sela'im to him,

for he was exempt from redeeming one of them.

But if he gave them to two kohanim, he cannot take it from them,

for each kohen says: “The living firstborn is mine, and my fellow’s is the dead firstborn.”

that is, Rava explained it as he explained it earlier, and we return and explain that the dispute concerns either Rav Asi’s principle or Rav Pappa’s principle.

Mishna:

1.

Two women

And if they bore

a male and a female, or

even

two males and a female [

a male to this one, and a male and a female to that one], but it is not known whether the female was born first or the male:

because he has two firstborn sons.

And if

one of them dies within thirty days of birth:

If he gave

the two redemption payments to one kohen,

that kohen must return five sela to him,

because he was exempt from redeeming one of the sons.

But if he gave the payments to two kohanim, he cannot reclaim the money from them,

because each kohen can say: “The living firstborn is mine, and the dead firstborn belonged to the other kohen.”

And if they gave birth to

a male and a female, or

even

two males and a female

[a male to one woman and a male and a female to the other, but it is unknown whether the female was born before the male or the male before the female]:

this is

giving five selaim

only

to the kohen,

because he is not obligated to redeem the second one due to doubt.

And if they gave birth to

two females and a male

a female to this one, and a female and a male to that one, and it is not known who was born first,

or

if they gave birth to

two males and two females

a male and a female to each one, and it is not known who was born first:

there is nothing here for the kohen,

for it is doubtful that perhaps there is no firstborn here at all.

b. If, of the two women,

one

already

had previously given birth, and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males:

this is

giving five selaim to the kohen,

for certainly his wife—who had not yet previously given birth—gave birth to a male child.

And if

one of them died within thirty days,

then

the father is exempt

entirely, because perhaps the firstborn died.

And if

the father died, and the sons are alive:

Rabbi Meir says: If they gave it before they divided,

they have given it, and if not, they are exempt.

And as we explain his position in a similar manner above in the Gemara concerning the preceding Mishna.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The property became obligated,

and as we explain his position in a similar manner above in the Gemara concerning the preceding Mishna.

And if the two women gave birth to

a male and a female, there is nothing here for the kohen,

for it is possible that the female is the one belonging to the woman who had not previously given birth, and there is no firstborn here.

c.

Two women belonging to two men who had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males:

This one gives five selaim to the kohen, and this one gives five selaim to the kohen.

And if

one of them died within thirty days:

If they gave it to one kohen, he must return five selaim to them,

for certainly he has in his possession five selaim that are not his, and they shall divide them between themselves. However, in the Gemara it raises an objection against this: Since it is not known to whom he is obligated, he can dismiss each one and say to him, “I am obligated to your fellow,” and we explain it as referring to one who comes with authorization.

And

if they gave it to two kohanim, they cannot take it out of their hands,

for each kohen says: “My firstborn is the living one, and my fellow’s is the deceased one.”

And if they gave birth to

a male and a female

and it is not known which belongs to which:

the fathers are exempt,

for it is doubtful whether there is a firstborn in their homes,

and

if

the son

who is certainly a firstborn

would be obligated to redeem himself.

And if they gave birth to

two females and a male, or two females and two males,

in such a manner that it is doubtful that perhaps there is no firstborn here at all:

there is nothing here for the kohen.

d. If

one

of the women

had previously given birth, and one had not previously given birth,

and they were

belonging to two men, and they gave birth to two males:

The one whose wife had not previously given birth gives five selaim to the kohen.

And if they gave birth to

a male and a female

and it is not known which belongs to which:

there is nothing here for the kohen,

for perhaps there is no firstborn here at all, because the male belonged to the one who had already previously given birth.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Two women belonging to two men who had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males: this one gives five selaim to the kohen, and this one gives five selaim to the kohen. One of them died within thirty days: If they gave it to one kohen, he must return five selaim to them; if they gave it to two kohanim, they cannot take it out of their hands. And we object to what we learned, that if they gave it to one kohen, he must return five selaim to them, since he is certainly obligated to return it:

What is different,

that if they gave it to

two kohanim

that neither of them is obligated to return it, and because

each father goes

every father

to this

kohen

and dismisses him,

saying: “Mine is the living one.”

And each father goes

every father

to this

kohen

and dismisses him,

saying: “Mine is the living one”—

But if both of them gave it to

one kohen as well, let the kohen go

the kohen

to

one father,

and let him dismiss him

saying: “I am obligated to your fellow, because the deceased one is his”;

and let the kohen go

the kohen further

to

this father,

and let him dismiss him

saying: “I am obligated to your fellow”!?