Bekhorot 48b (מח:) — the Talmud in English

It is not considered like a document written in a deed -

And everyone agrees with the ruling of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa said:

An oral loan is collected from the heirs, but it is not collected from purchasers.

It follows that, according to everyone, after the division the kohen has rights only to half of the inheritance—the half with regard to which they have the status of heirs—which is half of the debt, since the father left only five sela; and accordingly, the reason for their dispute can be explained:

And here

in our Mishna,

with regard to five

sela

and not half

of

five

sela,

they disagree—Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda:

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda:

For Rabbi Meir maintains: Five, but not half of five,

and therefore Rabbi Meir holds that before the division, while they still have the status of heirs with regard to all five sela, the kohen takes all five sela by virtue of their father’s lien. But after they divide and acquire the status of purchasers with regard to half of the inheritance, it emerges that the kohen can take only half of five, and consequently he takes nothing at all.

And

if

Rabbi Yehuda maintained: Five

sela

and even half of five,

therefore, whether they divided or did not divide, the kohen takes his due: before they divided, he takes five sela, and after they divided, he takes half of the five sela.

And we challenge this:

If so,

according to your interpretation, is the wording

“Rabbi Yehuda says: The property became liable”

appropriate? This implies that Rabbi Yehuda introduced the idea that a lien takes effect upon the property. But that is not the subject of their dispute: even according to Rabbi Meir, the property became encumbered while it was in the father’s possession. Rather, since half was lost when the sons acquired the status of purchasers, Rabbi Meir holds that the kohen loses everything, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda, whatever he can take, he takes; Rabbi Yehuda’s innovation does not concern the basic existence of the lien.

After all, he should have said

“the person is liable”

he should have said!

That is, he should have formulated the Mishna as follows: “And Rabbi Yehuda says: They are liable,” meaning that they are not entirely exempt, as Rabbi Meir maintains; rather, they must at least give half of the redemption!

And it was further taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to brothers who divided their inheritance, if there are ten zuz

[which are two and a half sela, since a sela is four zuz]

for

one brother

and ten zuz for

the other brother

,

these heirs

are liable

to give five sela,

but if not,

these heirs are

exempt -

And

what does “

ten zuz for this one and ten zuz for that one” mean?

If you say

that each one has two and a half sela

both

from the half

of the inheritance and

from the half

of the purchased property,

this cannot be said, for:

It is evident

[necessarily] that according to Rabbi Yehuda,

“five and even half of five”!

For together they would give only ten zuz, since they would give nothing from the half that has the status of purchased property -

And

if so, why specifically ten?

After all,

even if each one has

less than

ten

[less]

zuz,

also

each would give half of his portion, even though together it does not amount to even half of five; for what difference is there between half of five and less than that?

Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Yehuda means that they are liable only if there are

that Rabbi Yehuda means that they are liable only if there are

ten zuz from the inheritance for this one and ten zuz from the inheritance for that one,

for then together they will give five complete sela. But if they inherited less than this, they give nothing, because “five but not half of five” -

It is evident that he maintains: Five but not half of five,

contrary to what you said concerning his view, that he maintains, “five and even half of five”!

Rather,

the Gemara explains the reason for their dispute differently. And here, with what case are we dealing? As was explained in the earlier interpretation: with a case in which their father left only five sela, two and a half sela for this one and two and a half sela for that one -

And

everyone—

both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda—maintains

five but not half of five,

and Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is explained as in the earlier interpretation. Rabbi Yehuda also agrees with him concerning this basic law, but he maintains that the kohen takes all five sela, as will be explained. This is what we say in the beraita: Rabbi Yehuda likewise obligates them only when together they have five sela -

and here they disagree concerning the ruling of Rav Asi

who said, “half has the status of inheritance and half has the status of purchased property,” and

Rav Pappa,

who said that an oral loan is not collected from purchasers—

they disagree.

That is:

Rabbi Meir agrees with Rav Asi and Rav Pappa, and therefore takes nothing, as was explained in the earlier interpretation. But Rabbi Yehuda’s position can be explained in two ways:

One: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that with regard to the entire inheritance they are considered heirs, and it follows that the kohen has rights to all five sela.

Two: Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rav Pappa and maintains that an oral loan is collected even from purchasers. Consequently, it does not matter that half of the inheritance has the status of purchased property; the kohen has rights to all five sela, and therefore he collects them.

The Gemara further explains:

And some teach it—

as part of the discussion

on the latter clause,

that is, concerning the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. This means:

According to the earlier sugya, the difficulty concerned only Rabbi Meir’s statement, whose meaning we did not know how to explain; therefore, we were compelled to interpret it as we did. Others, however, required an interpretation that was not according to the plain meaning because of the difficulty posed by Rabbi Yehuda’s statement. For we learned:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: The property became liable,”

and the following difficulty arises:

When did the father die?

[When did the father die?]

If you say he died

after the father

thirty days after the birth, then by implication Rabbi Meir maintains: Once they divided, they are exempt,

even though the father died after the obligation had taken effect; and this cannot be, for

the property had already become encumbered

[the father’s property had become encumbered], so why should the kohen not take it -

Rather,

say that our Mishna is dealing with a case in which the father died

within thirty days

of the birth. But Rabbi Yehuda’s statement still presents a difficulty:

Since the father died within thirty days, the property did not become encumbered by virtue of the father, and we are coming to collect only by virtue of the sons’ obligations. If so:

Once they divided, why does Rabbi Yehuda obligate them?

After all,

let him go to this one and have him reject him, and let him go to that one and have him reject him

[if he claims the portion of one, he will reject him by saying, “I am not the firstborn,” and the other will reject him as well] -

And concerning this,

Rabbi Yirmeya said

in another manner:

This is to say: If there were two people named Yosef ben Shimon in one city,

and a promissory note was issued against Yosef ben Shimon, but it is not known which of them is the debtor -

and one of them purchased a field from the other,

then the

creditor collects

it

from him,

because

he says to him,

the creditor says to the purchaser: In either event, I have rights to this field, for:

If I am collecting from you,

then

I am taking your portion; and if I am collecting from your fellow,

then

my lien preceded yours

[if you are the debtor, I am taking it from you; and even if only your fellow is the debtor, I precede you in my rights to this field, since it became encumbered to me while it was in the possession of the one who sold it to you].

The same applies to our Mishna: The kohen can collect in either event, because Rabbi Yehuda maintains that “brothers who divided their inheritance have the status of purchasers,” and the redemption of the firstborn can be collected from purchasers, and therefore he collects in either event:

If you are the firstborn, all is well; and if your brother is the firstborn, then you purchased your portion from him, and I collect by virtue of your brother.

Said

the puzzled

Rava:

Since a person’s property serves as security for him

[a person’s property guarantees payment of his debts], and for this reason debts are collected from property. But is there

anything that, with regard to him

[the debtor himself],

the creditor cannot claim from him

because he rejects the claim by saying, “I am not liable,”

yet

if

he can claim from the guarantor!?

But we learned: “

One who lends money to another through a guarantor may not collect from the guarantor,”

and it is established

that the Mishna is to be interpreted as follows:

He may not first claim from the guarantor

until he has first claimed from the borrower. This includes the case in which he cannot claim from the borrower; he likewise may not claim from the guarantor. If so, he cannot say to the purchaser that the field is encumbered to him on account of the seller’s debt!?

And the entire passage follows the first formulation,

that is, Rava explained it as he explained it earlier, and we return and interpret the matter as follows: They disagree with regard to the ruling of Rav Asi or the ruling of Rav Pappa.

Mishna:

a.

Two women

belonging to one man

who had not previously given birth to a firstborn, and each gave birth to a male,

and it is not known which child belongs to which woman:

The father

gives ten sela to the kohen,

for he has two firstborn sons.

And if

one of them dies within thirty days:

If he gave

the two redemptions to one kohen, then

that kohen returns five sela to him,

for he was exempt from redeeming one of them.

But if he gave them to two kohanim, he cannot take the money back from them,

for each kohen says: My firstborn is the living one, and my fellow’s firstborn is the deceased one.

And if they gave birth to

a male and a female, or

even

two males and a female

[a male to one woman and a male and a female to the other; but it is not known whether the female was born before the male or the male before the female]:

This

gives five selaim

alone

to the koen,

because he is not obligated to redeem the second one due to the uncertainty.

And if they gave birth to

two females and a male

[a female to one of them, and a female and a male to the other, and it is not known which was born first],

or

gave birth to

two males and two females

[a male and a female to each one, and it is not known which was born first]:

There is nothing here for the koen,

for it is uncertain that there is any firstborn here at all.

b. If, of the two women,

one

had already

given birth previously and the other had not, and they gave birth to two males:

This

gives five selaim to the koen,

for certainly his wife—the one who had not previously given birth—gave birth to a male.

And if

one of them died within thirty days,

then

the father is exempt,

completely, since perhaps the firstborn died.

And if

the father died, while the sons remain:

Rabbi Meir says: If they gave the money before they divided it—

they gave it, but if not, they are exempt.

And this is as we explained his position in a similar case earlier in the Gemara, concerning the preceding Mishna.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The property became liable,

and this is as we explained his position in a similar case earlier in the Gemara, concerning the preceding Mishna.

And if the two women gave birth to

a male and a female, there is nothing here for the koen,

for it is possible that the female belongs to the woman who had not previously given birth, and therefore there is no firstborn here.

c.

Two women belonging to two men who had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males:

This one gives five selaim to the koen, and that one gives five selaim to the koen.

And if

one of them died within thirty days:

If they gave the money to one koen, he must return five selaim to them,

for certainly he has in his possession five selaim that do not belong to him, and they divide them between themselves. However, the Gemara raises an objection concerning this: Since it is not known to which one he is obligated, he can send each one away by saying to him, “I am obligated to your fellow,” and we explain this as referring to a case in which one came with authorization to act on behalf of the other.

And

if they gave the money to two koanim, they cannot recover it from them,

for each koen says: “The living one is my firstborn, and the dead one belongs to my fellow.”

And if they gave birth to

a male and a female,

and it is not known which belongs to which:

The fathers are exempt,

for it is uncertain whether there is a firstborn in their homes,

and

if

the son

who is certainly a firstborn

were obligated to redeem himself.

And if they gave birth to

two females and a male, or two females and two males,

in such a manner that it is uncertain that there is any firstborn here at all:

There is nothing here for the koen.

d. If

one

of the women

had previously given birth, and the other had not,

and they were

the wives of two men, and they gave birth to two males:

The one whose wife had not previously given birth gives five selaim to the koen.

And if they gave birth to

a male and a female,

and it is not known which belongs to which:

There is nothing here for the koen,

for perhaps there is no firstborn here at all, since the male belonged to the woman who had already given birth.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Two women belonging to two men who had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males; this one gives five selaim to the koen, and that one gives five selaim to the koen. If one of them died within thirty days, if they gave the money to one koen, he must return five selaim to them; if they gave it to two koanim, they cannot recover it from them. And we raise an objection concerning what we learned—that if they gave the money to one koen, he must return five selaim to them, since he is certainly obligated to return it:

What is the difference,

that if they gave it to

two koanim,

neither of them is obligated to return it, because

he goes

each father

to this

koen

and sends him away,

saying: “The living one is mine.”

And he goes

each father

to this

koen

and sends him away,

saying: “The living one is mine”—

But if both of them gave the money to

one koen, he too should go

the koen

to him

of one father

and send him away,

saying: “I am obligated to your fellow, because the dead one is his,”

and he should go

the koen further

to him

of this father

and send him away,

saying: “I am obligated to your fellow”!