Bekhorot 48a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

If his wife had not previously given birth

yet,

and she gave birth to two males

twins, and it is not known which is the firstborn, the father

gives five sela to the kohen,

for it is certain that a firstborn was born to him.

And if

one of them dies within thirty days,

before the time when the obligation takes effect:

then

the father is exempt,

since it is uncertain whether the living child is the firstborn or not, and in a case of uncertainty he does not give, because the kohen is the claimant seeking to extract payment from another, and the burden of proof is upon him.

And if

the father dies

of the twins,

and the sons—

it being unknown which of them is the firstborn—

remain alive,

this is their law with regard to redemption:

Rabbi Meir says:

If they gave

the redemption money to the kohen

before they divided

their father’s estate,

they have given it,

and they cannot recover it from the kohen.

But if not,

if they first divided the estate, then they are

exempt,

and the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Judah says: The property became liable

to the kohen like a creditor’s claim, and the two brothers must pay it between them; the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And if she gave birth to twins,

a male and a female, the kohen has no claim here at all,

even against the sons, since it is unknown whether there is any firstborn male here at all, and the kohen is the claimant seeking to extract payment from another, and the burden of proof is upon him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “If the father dies and the sons remain alive, Rabbi Meir says: If they gave the payment before they divided the estate, they have given it; but if not, they are exempt. Rabbi Judah says: The property became liable.”

And we raise an objection:

When did the father die

[at what point did the father die]!? For:

If you say

in a case where

the father died

отец

after thirty days,

when the obligation of redemption had already taken effect, this is difficult:

And is it indeed the case that

in such a situation Rabbi Meir says that once they divided—

they are exempt, although his property had become pledged

during the father’s lifetime—for the redemption!?

Rather,

say that our Mishna deals with a case where

the father died

отец

within thirty days,

when his property had not yet become pledged, since the obligation had not yet taken effect. But this too is difficult, because:

What difference is there once they divided

that they are exempt according to Rabbi Meir? It is because

he goes to this one and he dismisses him, and he goes

also

to that one and he dismisses him

[each of the sons rejects him, saying: I am not the firstborn]—

but when they have not divided as well,

and they are partners in their father’s inheritance,

let him go to this one and let him dismiss him, and let him go to that one and let him dismiss him

[each one should reject him, saying: I am not the firstborn, and you may not take from my share]!?

Rabbi Yirmeya

answered:

Rabbi Yirmeya:

Our Mishna deals with a case in which the father died within thirty days, and the property had not become pledged while it was in the father’s possession. And concerning your difficulty—that each one should reject the kohen—I would say to you:

This indicates,

our Mishna teaches:

If there were two men named Yosef ben Shimon in one city, and they jointly purchased a field,

then

a creditor

who holds a document in the name of one of the partners, but it is not known which one borrowed the money,

may collect the field from them.

And this is because

he says to him

the creditor says to each of them: In either event I can take this field, because:

If I am owed by you, I am taking your share

[if you are the one to whom I lent the money, I am taking your share of the field];

and if I am owed by your fellow, I am taking your fellow’s share

I am taking it

[and if I am the creditor of your fellow, I am taking his share].

So too in our Mishna: Since the kohen certainly has a claim of five sela against one of the sons, and until they divide the inheritance they are partners in what they inherited from their father, the kohen can take payment in either event.

Rava

challenged

Rava

on the basis of Rabbi Yirmeya’s principle:

Since a person’s property serves as guarantor for him

[a person’s property guarantees payment of his debts], and for this reason debts are collected from property, is it possible that

there is such a thing

—

with regard to him

—

he cannot sue him

because he rejects him, saying: I am not liable,

but

if so,

he can sue the guarantor!?

But we learned: “

One who lends money to another through a guarantor may not collect from the guarantor”

and it is established

that the Mishna means:

He may not sue the guarantor first,

before first suing the borrower. Included in this is that if he cannot sue the borrower, he may not sue the guarantor either!?

Rather, Rava said: Actually,

our Mishna deals with a case in which

the father died

отец

after thirty days.

For if the father died before thirty days, the kohen cannot collect anything, in accordance with Rava’s reasoning. And concerning your difficulty—that the father became obligated and his property became pledged—I would say to you:

And if there are abundant assets, then here too he takes [

if our Mishna were dealing with a case in which there were in the assets—which the father left and which became subject to the lien—enough for twice the amount of the debt, indeed there would be no doubt that the priest would take from the assets that had become subject to the father’s lien] even after they divided, as will be explained, for from half of the inheritance there is indeed no doubt that the priest can take

and

however

here

in our Mishna

what are we dealing with:

In a

case where there are not

in the assets that the father inherited

but

only

five sela

alone. For in this manner, although he ought to have taken half of the five sela, nevertheless Rabbi Meir holds that after the division he takes nothing. And the reason for all this is:

For an oral loan [that is, any debt that is not written in a document] the creditor can collect it only from an heir, but he cannot collect it from purchasers, as will be explained—

and consequently, in the case of two heirs who divided, he can collect only half,

and

because

everyone [

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah, who differ in our Mishna]

holds the ruling of Rav Asi, for Rav Asi said: Brothers who divided

their father’s inheritance, with regard to

half

of the inheritance they are considered

heirs, and

with regard to

half

the remaining they are considered

purchasers.

It follows that they are not obligated to give from their assets to an oral creditor, but only from the half with regard to which they are considered heirs—

And the debt of the redemption of the firstborn is an oral loan,

and

because

everyone [

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah] holds that

a loan written in the Torah

such as the redemption of the firstborn