Bekhorot 47b — the Talmud in English

It was stated:

A kohen who died and left a disqualified son,

such as one who was born from a divorcee, and he is a complete Israelite and is obligated in the redemption of the firstborn, but the father was exempt from redeeming him, since he himself was a kohen and fit to receive the redemption of the son:

Rav Hisda said:

The father is indeed exempt from his redemption, but

the son is obligated to redeem himself,

since he is not a kohen.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: There is no

son

obligation to redeem himself.

And the Gemara explains in what manner they disputed:

Whenever the father died after thirty

days, when he had already become obligated in the redemption, as the verse says, “And its redeemed ones—from a month old shall you redeem,”

everyone—

both Rav Hisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna—

does not dispute that the son is not obligated to redeem himself, for his

father—

who himself is a kohen—

acquired his redemption.

the money of his redemption.

When they dispute—

Rav Hisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna—

is where the father died within thirty days,

when the obligation of redemption had not yet taken effect:

Rav Hisda said:

The son is obligated to redeem himself, for his father did not acquire his redemption,

since he had never become obligated; rather, the son is the one who became obligated after his father’s death, and he became obligated to give it to another kohen.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

The son is not obligated to redeem himself,

because

he says to him,

the son to any kohen who demands his redemption:

“I come by force of a man with whom you cannot conduct a legal proceeding” [that is, I come by force of one with whom you cannot litigate and from whom you cannot collect],

for if his father had redeemed him, he would have taken the redemption money for himself.

And we raise an objection against Rabba bar Rav Huna from that which

we learned

in our Mishna:

A pregnant woman converted

and had never yet given birth; the child whom she gives birth to is

a firstborn for a kohen—

and

according to Rabba bar Rav Huna this is difficult:

Why

must the son redeem himself? Let

him say

the son to the kohen:

“I come by force of a man [that is, I come by force of my father, who was a gentile]

[that is: “I come by virtue of my father, who was a gentile,]

with whom you cannot conduct a legal proceeding!”

And we answer:

A gentile is different, for he has no paternal relationship

to his Israelite son, and the son does not come by his force.

It was stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Yasina said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

A kohen who died within thirty days and left a disqualified son—the son is obligated to redeem himself, for the father did not acquire his redemption,

and this is like the words of Rav Hisda.

If he died after thirty days, the son is not obligated to redeem

himself, for his father acquired his redemption.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, one who did not remain after her husband for three months,

but married and gave birth, and it is not known whether the child is nine months old from the first husband or seven months old from the second, is a firstborn for a kohen but is not a firstborn for inheritance:

And we raise an objection: Is

a firstborn for inheritance

only to receive a double portion

that he is not—

the son whose father is uncertain—

but

one portion

as

the rest of a

non-firstborn

he does receive!?

And why

should he receive any inheritance at all, whether from the property of the first or from the property of the last? For:

Let him go to this one and let him reject him,

if he comes to the other sons of the first to receive with them their inheritance, they will reject him toward the sons of the second, on account of the uncertainty;

and to this one and let him reject him,

and when he comes to the sons of the second to receive with them their inheritance, they will reject him toward the sons of the first, on account of the uncertainty!?

He said—

he answered—

Rabbi Yirmeya:

It was necessary

for our Mishna to teach us that he is not a firstborn for inheritance

only concerning the one who comes after him,

to teach that one who is born to the second after this uncertain son also does not receive a firstborn portion,

and this is what the

tanai says:

The uncertain son is

a firstborn for a kohen,

for he is certainly one who opened the womb,

and

even

the one who comes after him is not a firstborn for inheritance,

for his brothers will say to him: The first one too is our father’s son, and he is the firstborn; and although he did not take a firstborn portion because of the uncertainty, you too shall not take one because of the uncertainty. However, he will certainly take an ordinary portion, for he is certainly their father’s son.

And we still raise an objection: Why should the uncertain son and the one who comes after him not take a firstborn portion equally!?

And let them write authorization for one another,

let one write authorization to the other to take the firstborn portion in his place, and let him come with the authorization to the brothers and say to them: If I am the firstborn, give me a firstborn portion; and if the uncertain one is the firstborn, I have been authorized by him to take his portion!?

And if you would say: The Mishna is without authorization,

perhaps you would say: Indeed, if they wrote authorization to one another, they would take a firstborn portion, but our Mishna deals with a case without authorization. This cannot be said, for

we establish it

as the Mishna later in the chapter

before us [

49a],

which

deals

with authorization!?

And we answer:

Our Mishna supports

Rabbi Yannai!

For Rabbi Yannai said:

They were recognized

at first—the offspring were known, and it was known whose child was whose—

and in the end they became mixed up,

the offspring, and it was not known whose son was whose; these

write authorization to one another

in order to take their portions in the inheritance. But if

they were never recognized

at all,

they do not write authorization to one another. Therefore, in our Mishna too, since it was never recognized who the firstborn was, they cannot write authorization to one another.

Therefore, in our Mishna as well, since it was never known which child was the firstborn, they cannot grant authorization to one another.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the third division at the beginning of the preceding Mishna:

Which is a firstborn for inheritance and for a kohen,

even though he is not literally the firstborn:

One who miscarries a sac, [

the skin of a fetus,]

full of water, full of blood, full of colors [

hues]—or

one who miscarries something resembling fish, locusts, reptiles, and creeping things—

And

likewise

one who miscarries

up

to the fortieth day [

including the fortieth day] of the pregnancy—

In all these cases,

the one who comes after them

is

a firstborn for inheritance and for a kohen.

The Mishna adds an explanation of the fourth division in the preceding Mishna:

One born by an abnormal opening [

a fetus whom they removed through the side of the woman, and not through the opening of her womb,]

and the one who comes after him

through the womb,

neither of them is a firstborn, neither for inheritance nor for a kohen.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The first [

the one who emerged through the side] is a firstborn

for inheritance, and the second

the one who came after him is a firstborn

for five sela.

That is, he is obligated in redemption, and the reason for the Sages and Rabbi Shimon will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A child born by an unusual exit and the one born after him, both are not firstborn, neither for inheritance nor for the priest. Rabbi Shimon says: The first is [firstborn] for inheritance, and the second [is subject] to five sela.

And we explain the reason of the Sages:

The first is not [firstborn] for inheritance

because

“and they bear him”

“sons... and the firstborn son shall be hers who is hated”

is required,

and this firstborn is not by way of birth.

And

the first is also not [subject] to five sela

for the first, because

“opener of the womb”

is required.

The second is not [firstborn] for inheritance,

because although he is the first with regard to “and they bear him,”

“first of his strength”

is required,

and the second is not the first of his strength.

The second is also not [subject] to five sela

he is not [subject], even though he is the first to open the womb, because

he holds

the first tanna:

a firstborn for one matter

that is, one who is firstborn with regard to the womb but not with regard to the offspring

is not a firstborn.

that a firstborn with regard to one matter —meaning one who is a firstborn with regard to the womb but not with regard to the children— is not a firstborn. Shulchan Arukh wrote in Yoreh De'ah [305:22]: “A child delivered by caesarean section and the child born after him in the usual manner are both exempt: the first, because he did not emerge from the womb, and the second, because another preceded him.” And the Taz wrote there a novel point: Even though that other child [the first] did not open the womb, nevertheless, since the child born after him is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, as he is not the first of his vigor, he is likewise not a firstborn with regard to the koen, because a firstborn with regard to one matter—namely, with regard to the womb but not with regard to the children—is not a firstborn. This is what we say in the chapter Yesh Bekhor, folio 47. Similarly,

Rabbi Shimon says: The first is [firstborn] for inheritance, and the second [is subject] to five sela,

because

Rabbi Shimon follows his reasoning, as he says:

that which is written with regard to a woman who gives birth [Leviticus 12]: “And if she gives birth to a female,

she shall give birth

[and she shall be impure for two weeks, as in her menstruation...],”

to include a child born by an unusual exit

for whom she sits through the days of impurity and purity; and since with regard to a woman who gives birth, birth by way of the side is considered birth, the same law applies with regard to a firstborn.

And

if

the second [is subject] to five sela,

because

Rabbi Shimon holds:

Rabbi Shimon:

a firstborn for one matter

such as one who is firstborn with regard to the womb but is not firstborn with regard to the offspring

is a firstborn.

a firstborn with regard to one matter —one who is a firstborn with regard to the womb but is not a firstborn with regard to the children— is a firstborn.