Bekhorot 47b (מז:) — the Talmud in English

It was stated:

If a priest died and left a ben ḥalal,

for example, one born of a divorcee, so that he is a complete Israelite and is liable for the redemption of the firstborn, but the father was exempt from redeeming him, since the father himself was a priest and was fit to receive the redemption payment:

Rav Ḥisda said:

The father is indeed exempt from redeeming him, but

the son is obligated to redeem himself,

for he is not a priest.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: No,

the son

is not obligated to redeem himself.

And the Gemara explains in what manner they disagree:

Wherever the father dies after thirty

days, when he has already become obligated in the redemption, as the verse states: “And its redeemed ones, from one month of age you shall redeem,”

everyone—

both Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna—

agrees that they do not disagree: The son is not obligated to redeem himself, for

his father

—who was himself a priest—

acquired the redemption payment.

the money of his redemption.

When they disagree—

Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna—

is where the father dies within thirty days,

before the obligation of redemption has taken effect:

Rav Ḥisda said:

The son is obligated to redeem himself, for his father did not acquire the redemption payment,

since he never became obligated; rather, the son became obligated after his father’s death, and he became obligated to give the payment to another priest.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

The son is not obligated to redeem himself,

because

he can say to him—

the son can say to any priest who demands his redemption payment:

“I come by virtue of a man with whom you cannot litigate.”

[That is: “I come by virtue of one with whom you cannot conduct a legal proceeding and from whom you cannot extract payment,”] for had his father redeemed him, he would have taken the redemption payment for himself.

And we raise an objection against Rabba bar Rav Huna from what

we learned

in our Mishna:

If a pregnant woman converted

and had never previously given birth, the child she subsequently gives birth to

is a firstborn with regard to a priest—

and

according to Rabba bar Rav Huna there is a difficulty:

Why

must the son redeem himself? Could

he not say

to the priest:

“I come by virtue of a man

[my father, who was a gentile]

with whom you cannot litigate!”

And we answer:

A gentile is different, for he has no paternal relationship

with his Israelite son, and the son does not come by his power.

It was stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Yasina said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish:

If a priest died within thirty days and left a ben ḥalal, the son is obligated to redeem himself, since the father did not acquire the redemption payment,

in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥisda.

If he died after thirty days, the son is not obligated to redeem

himself, for his father had acquired the redemption payment.

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, one who did not wait three months after her husband

and remarried and gave birth, and it is unknown whether the child was born after nine months to the first husband or after seven months to the second, is a firstborn with regard to a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance:

And we ask: Is it only that he does not qualify as

a firstborn with regard to inheritance,

to receive a double portion, that

he is not

the son whose father is uncertain?

But

one portion,

like

the rest of a son who is

not a firstborn,

he does receive!?

And why

should he receive any inheritance at all, whether from the property of the first husband or from that of the last husband? For:

Let him go to this one, and let him reject him,

if he comes to the other sons of the first husband to take a share of their inheritance, they can refer him to the sons of the second husband, on the grounds that his paternal identity is uncertain;

and to this one, and let him reject him

when he comes to the sons of the second husband to take a share of their inheritance, they can refer him to the sons of the first husband, on the grounds that his paternal identity is uncertain!?

He said—

Rabbi Yirmeya

answered:

It was necessary

for our Mishna to teach that he is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance

only concerning the one who comes after him,

to teach that a child born to the second husband after this child of uncertain identity also does not receive a firstborn’s share.

And this is what

the tanna

said: The child of uncertain identity is

a firstborn with regard to a priest,

for he is certainly one who opened the womb,

and

also

the one who comes after him is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance,

for his brothers will say to him: “The first child too is our father’s son, and he is the firstborn. If he did not receive the firstborn’s share because of the uncertainty, you too will not receive it because of the uncertainty.” However, he will certainly receive an ordinary son’s share, since he is certainly their father’s son.

The Gemara still asks: Why should the child of uncertain identity and the one who comes after him not take the firstborn’s share together!?

Let them write authorization to one another,

with one granting the other authorization to take the firstborn’s share in his place; he could then come with the authorization to the brothers and say to them: “If I am the firstborn, give me the firstborn’s share; and if the child of uncertain identity is the firstborn, he has authorized me to take his share”!

And if you would say: The Mishna is speaking of a case without authorization,

you might say that if they granted authorization to one another, they indeed would receive the firstborn’s share, but that our Mishna is discussing a case without authorization. This cannot be said, because

we establish it

as referring to the Mishna later in the chapter,

before us

[49a],

which

deals

with authorization!?

And we answer:

Our Mishna supports

the position of

Rabbi Yannai, for Rabbi Yannai said:

If the offspring were identified

at first, so that it was known which child belonged to which father,

and ultimately they became intermingled,

so that it is no longer known which child is whose, they

may grant authorization to one another

in order to take their shares of the inheritance. But if

they were never identified,

from the outset,

they may not grant authorization to one another.

Therefore, in our Mishna as well, since it was never known which child was the firstborn, they cannot grant authorization to one another.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the third category listed at the beginning of the preceding Mishna:

Who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to a priest,

even though he is not literally the first child:

If a woman miscarries a sac

[the membrane of a fetus]

full of water, full of blood, or full of colors

[shades]—or

if she miscarries something resembling fish, locusts, creeping animals, or crawling creatures—

And

likewise,

if she miscarries

up

to the fortieth day

[including the fortieth day] of the pregnancy—

In all these cases,

the one who comes after them

is

a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to a priest.

The Mishna further explains the fourth category in the preceding Mishna:

A child born by caesarean section

[a child whom they removed through the woman’s side rather than through the opening of her womb],

and the one who follows him

through the womb,

neither of them is a firstborn, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to a priest.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The first

[the one who emerged through the side] is a firstborn

with regard to inheritance, and the second

the one who followed him is a firstborn

with regard to the five sela.

That is, he is obligated in redemption. The reason for the opinions of the Sages and Rabbi Shimon will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If a child is delivered by caesarean section and another child is born after him in the usual manner, neither is a firstborn, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to the koen. Rabbi Shimon says: The first is a firstborn with regard to inheritance, and the second is subject to five sela.

And we explain the reasoning of the Sages:

The first is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance

because

“and they bear him”

“sons... and the firstborn son shall be hers who is unloved”

is required,

and this firstborn was not born in the usual manner.

Rashi. However, Tosafot proved that this wording alone is insufficient to exclude a child delivered by caesarean section, for with regard to a woman who gives birth, they needed to derive from the verse, “When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male,” that she must give birth from the place where she conceives; they did not derive it from the word “gives birth” alone. And in Sefat Emet wrote an explanation reconciling the position of Rashi: The reason that we derive the requirement from “and they bear him” is that birth through the side is not birth that occurs by itself; rather, it must be brought about through human action. Accordingly, it can be said that this applies specifically to a first birth. But if a fetus has already emerged through the side, and an opening has already been made by a person, then, in a second pregnancy, it is possible that she will give birth through the side by herself. Therefore, with regard to the impurity of a woman who gives birth, which also applies to a second pregnancy, the requirement cannot be derived from “gives birth,” but rather from “when a woman conceives.” This is not so in our case, where the discussion concerns a first pregnancy, and therefore we can properly derive the requirement from “and they bear him.” However, according to what the Rambam wrote, as cited in note 8, that a woman who gives birth through the side dies, Tosafot explained the reasoning of the Sages as follows: We derive by means of a gzera shava the phrase “and they bear him,” which is stated with regard to a firstborn, from “When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male,” from which a child delivered by caesarean section is excluded, so that his mother does not observe for him the days of impurity and purity, since the verse requires birth from the place where she conceives, as it says, “When a woman conceives and

he is also not subject to five sela

the firstborn,

because

“the one who opens the womb”

is required.

The second is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance,

because although he is the first with regard to “and they bear him,”

“the first of his vigor”

is required,

and the second is not the first of his vigor. what was explained above, on folio 46b, in note

9.

He is also not subject to five sela

the second,

even though he is the first to open the womb,

because

the tanna קמא holds

that a firstborn with regard to one matter —meaning one who is a firstborn with regard to the womb but not with regard to the children— is not a firstborn. Shulchan Arukh wrote in Yoreh De'ah [305:22]: “A child delivered by caesarean section and the child born after him in the usual manner are both exempt: the first, because he did not emerge from the womb, and the second, because another preceded him.” And the Taz wrote there a novel point: Even though that other child [the first] did not open the womb, nevertheless, since the child born after him is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, as he is not the first of his vigor, he is likewise not a firstborn with regard to the koen, because a firstborn with regard to one matter—namely, with regard to the womb but not with regard to the children—is not a firstborn. This is what we say in the chapter Yesh Bekhor, folio 47. Similarly,

Sederi Tahara

wrote in his novellae on Niddah, folio 26, and then also cited the words of the Taz. And

Rabbi Akiva Eiger

wrote in his glosses to the Shulchan Arukh [and this is also what he wrote in Sederi Tahara there] that according to the words of the Taz: “If the fetus delivered through the side is nonviable, the second is a firstborn with regard to the koen, for he is also a firstborn with regard to inheritance, since the first was nonviable.”

Rabbi Shimon says: The first is a firstborn with regard to inheritance, and the second is subject to five sela,

because

Rabbi Shimon follows his own reasoning, as he says:

that concerning the verse stated with regard to a woman who gives birth [Leviticus 12], “And if she gives birth”

“she gives birth”

[“then she shall be impure for two weeks, as during her menstruation...”],

comes to include a child delivered by caesarean section,

so that she observes for him the days of impurity and purity; and since with regard to a woman who gives birth, birth through the side is considered birth, the same applies with regard to a firstborn.

And

if

the second were subject to five sela,

because

Rabbi Shimon holds:

a firstborn with regard to one matter —one who is a firstborn with regard to the womb but is not a firstborn with regard to the children— is a firstborn.