Bekhorot 49a — the Talmud in English

He said

he answered

Shmuel:

Here, with what are we dealing?

One

of the fathers gave authorization to the priest

by authorization

from his fellow to collect, and in either case the priest must return it, for he is certainly liable to one of them.

And we challenge:

But the scholars of Nehardea said: We do not write authorization concerning movable property

[one does not write authorization concerning movable property]!?

And we answer:

This applies only where he denied it

[if the defendant denies it] and the claimant sends his agent with authorization to litigate with the defendant,

but where he did not deny it—

we write

even concerning movable property.

B. The Tosafot raised a difficulty [and see also their words in Bava Kamma 70a, s.v. “concerning movable property”]: According to the first formulation, that even movable property which he did not deny may not be authorized, how then shall we explain this Mishna!? And they wrote several ways of resolving it: A. Our Mishna deals with a case where he redeemed him with land, and it follows Rabbi, who holds that one redeems with land; and with land, “it is not in his possession” is not possible. B. Alternatively, it can be established according to Rabbi Natan, for by the [lien of Rabbi Natan] of Rabbi Natan, one can collect from him if his fellow is liable to him and cannot repay. C. Alternatively, it can be established in a case where one person gave [the money] to his fellow in the presence of all three; nevertheless, they expressed reservations about this—see there. D. If both of them are present before us, and he is able to give it to either one, he must return it, and it was necessary to establish the case as one who came with authorization only so that one of them could collect it from him independently. And in the book Reshit Bikkurim the it resolved their difficulty: It is Shmuel who said here that one came with authorization, and he holds below, on 49a, that if one redeems his son within thirty days and the money has been consumed, his son is not redeemed. Here, we are dealing with a case where the father redeemed him within thirty days, and until thirty days it is merely a deposit in the priest’s possession; and a deposit is called “in his possession,” as the Tosafot wrote here and in several places. [And see explicitly in the Tosafot in Bava Kamma there, at the end of their words, where they wrote concerning our sugya that the money was not given to him in order that he spend it, since the halakha is according to Shmuel. And according to the words of the Reshit Bikkurim, Rashi’s words are resolved from the note in section A: he did not explain the Gemara’s initial assumption here according to the first reason in the Gemara in Bava Kamma, namely, because that does not apply here. However, according to what is explained in his name later in the discussion, that here it is called “property which he cannot collect through the courts,” if so, even if it is a deposit, he cannot make authorization]. And he also raised a difficulty there concerning their first resolution: This is property which he cannot collect through the courts, because with regard to each one we must say: The one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof. If so, even if he redeemed him with land, he cannot make authorization, for any property which one cannot collect through the courts—if he consecrated it, it is not consecrated [and the same applies to making authorization], as explained in Bava Metzia 7a. We learned in the Mishna: Two women belonging to two men who had not previously given birth to a firstborn, and they gave birth

to a male and a female—the fathers are exempt

and the son is liable to redeem himself; two females and a male, or two females and two males—there is nothing here for the priest:

Rav Huna taught

in a beraita a fourth case:

If the two women gave birth to

two males and a female

[one gave birth to a male, and the other gave birth to a male and a female, and it is not known which came first],

there is nothing here for the priest,

even though there is certainly a firstborn here; since it is not known who is the firstborn, even the son is not liable to redeem himself because of the doubt.

And

we explain: The reason

of our tanna

who did not mention this case:

Since

only

in

the case in the latter clause, namely, two women belonging to

two men is it possible.

That is, only in this case is there indeed nothing for the priest; but

in

the case in the first clause, namely:

one man and two women

who gave birth to two males and a female,

it is not possible

that the father should be exempt from giving to the priest in such a case, for certainly a firstborn was born in his house; therefore

it was not taught to him.

Mishna:

This Mishna is not a continuation of the preceding mishnayot, and it deals with ordinary firstborns:

If the son died within thirty days,

even though

already

the father gave

the

priest,

this

he must return,

for he is not liable for redemption until after thirty days.

And if the son died

after thirty days, even though

still

the father did not give

his redemption money—

he shall give it,

as the reason is explained in the Gemara below, on 51b.

If

the son

died on the thirtieth day

itself: This day is

like the day preceding it,

and even if he gave it, he must return it.

Rabbi Akiva

is uncertain about this, and therefore he

says:

If

already

the father gave

to the priest,

he may not take

from him;

and if

still

he did not give

the father,

he may not give, for this is a principle in our possession in every doubt: The one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If he died on the thirtieth day, it is like the day preceding it; Rabbi Akiva says: If he gave, he may not take, and if he did not give, he may not give:

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason of the Rabbis

who hold that the thirtieth day is like one who is less than a month old?

And we explain:

The Rabbis derive

the word

“month”

from “and its redeemed, from one month you shall redeem,”

“month”

from the Wilderness,

“Count every firstborn male, from one month and upward”:

Just as there

in the Wilderness Scripture said

“and upward,”

that is, after thirty days,

so too here

concerning redemption,

“and upward.”

and upward.”

And Rabbi Akiva is uncertain about it,

and his reason is:

Since it was necessary to write

“and upward”

concerning valuations, and they did not derive it from the Wilderness.

That is, in the passage of valuations [at the end of the Book of Leviticus], the Torah says: “And your valuation shall be of a male from twenty years old until sixty years old, and your valuation shall be fifty shekels” [which is the highest valuation]; “And if it is from five years old until twenty years old, your valuation for a male shall be twenty shekels”; “And if it is from one month old until five years old, your valuation for a male shall be five shekels”; “And if it is from sixty years old and upward, if male, your valuation shall be fifteen shekels.” From the verse’s statement “and upward” concerning one who is sixty, we learn that the sixtieth year itself is like one who is less than sixty; and from the scriptural decree “year, year” we learn that the twentieth year is likewise like one who is less than twenty, and the fifth year is like one who is less than five. The same applies: the thirtieth day is like one who is less than a month. And apparently there is a difficulty: Why do I need “and upward” in valuations? We could have learned from the Wilderness that the thirtieth day is like the lower category, and the same would apply to years.

And since Scripture said “and upward” in valuations, and we did not learn this from the Wilderness, if so,

they are—

the Wilderness and valuations—

two verses that come as one, and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach

concerning the redemption of the son that one who is thirty days old is like one who is less than thirty days old.

Or perhaps: When

we say that two verses that come as one

do not teach,

that is specifically

for the world at large,

that is, to learn a third law which is connected neither to this law nor to that law,

but concerning themselves they do teach.

That is, if you come to learn to equate a law resembling one of the two laws, it is possible to learn it even though there are two verses that come as one—

And if so, since the “and upward” stated in the Wilderness was said concerning the redemption of the firstborn of the Israelites in the Wilderness, we also derive this concerning the redemption of the son in the present time.

And for this reason he is uncertain about it,

[this is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s uncertainty].

Rav Ashi said:

Everyone agrees concerning mourning

of the father for the son, if the son died on

the thirtieth day, like

he died on

the day preceding it,

that he is a stillbirth, and one does not mourn for him, and because

Shmuel said: The halakha follows the lenient position concerning mourning.

Mishna:

If the father died within thirty days, the son has the presumption that he was not redeemed,

because a person does not ordinarily redeem [his son] within thirty days— which is before the time of redemption—

until he brings proof that he was redeemed.

And if the father died

after thirty days,

the son is

presumed to have been redeemed,

because the priest is the one who seeks to extract from his fellow and bears the burden of proof,

until they say to him

the son, to whom the father commanded at the time of his death,

that he was not redeemed.

He is to redeem, and his son is to be redeemed,

if a man was obligated to redeem himself, as he is a firstborn, and his firstborn son, and he does not have enough for both of them, then

he takes precedence over his son.

And in the Gemara it will be explained in what manner our Mishna is dealing.

Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence over him,

and because

his mitzva

was

upon his father

who died,

and

if

his son's mitzva were upon him,

he would [take precedence]. And it will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It was stated:

One who redeems his son within thirty days,

when the time of the redemption has still not arrived:

Rav says: His son is redeemed,

as he goes on to explain.

And Shmuel says: His son is not redeemed.

Said

he explained

Rava: Everyone agrees,

both Rav and Shmuel: if the father said,

“From now

let him be redeemed,”

his son is not redeemed,

for the time of the redemption has still not arrived. But if the father said that the son should be redeemed

after thirty days, and the money is present,

the redemption money is intact,

certainly his son is redeemed

after thirty days.

When they disagree,

Rav and Shmuel, it is when the father said that the son should be redeemed

after thirty days, and the money had been consumed

[it is no longer intact] before the time of the redemption arrived:

And the reason for their disagreement is:

Rav says: His son is redeemed, just as it is with the betrothal of a woman

[which is analogous to one who betrothed a woman after thirty days], for

there, is it not that even though the money had been consumed

before thirty days,

the betrothal takes effect,

as is explained in Kiddushin 59a—