Bekhorot 49a (מט.) — the Talmud in English

He said:

Shmuel

explained:

This is referring to what case?

One

of the fathers authorizes the other to collect the money from the priest,

by means of authorization

from his fellow, and in either case the priest must return the money, since he certainly owes it to one of them.

And we raise an objection:

But didn’t the scholars of Nehardea say: We do not write authorization documents concerning movable property

[One does not write an authorization document concerning movable property]?

And we answer:

That statement applies when he denied owing it

[when the defendant denies the claim and the claimant sends his agent with authorization to litigate with the defendant],

but when he did not deny owing it—

we do write

even concerning movable property.

b. The Tosafot raised the following difficulty [and see also their comments in Bava Kamma 70a, s.v. amataltelin]: According to the first formulation, that one does not write an authorization document even for movable property that he did not deny owing, how can we explain this Mishna? They offered several resolutions: a. Our Mishna is dealing with a case in which he redeemed the firstborn with land, in accordance with Rabbi, who holds that one may redeem with land; and with regard to land, the assertion that it is “not in his possession” cannot apply. b. Alternatively, it may be explained in accordance with Rabbi Natan, for by virtue of Rabbi Natan’s lien [the lien of Rabbi Natan], one can collect from him if his fellow is indebted to him and unable to pay. c. Alternatively, it may be explained as a case in which one person transferred money to another in the presence of all three parties; however, they expressed reservations about this explanation; see there. d. If both fathers are present before us, and the priest can tell one of them to pay, he must return the money. The Mishna needed to establish the case as one in which one father came with authorization only so that one of them could collect from the priest independently. And in the book Reshit Bikkurim he resolved their difficulty as follows: It was Shmuel who stated here that one father came with authorization, and he holds below, on 49a, that if one redeems his son within thirty days and the money has been consumed, his son is not redeemed. Here, we are dealing with a case in which the father redeemed his son within thirty days; until thirty days, the money is merely a deposit in the priest’s possession, and a deposit is considered “in his possession,” as the Tosafot wrote here and in several other places. [And see explicitly the Tosafot in Bava Kamma there, at the end of their discussion, where they wrote concerning our sugya that the money was not given to him for the purpose of spending it, since we rule in accordance with Shmuel. According to the words of Reshit Bikkurim, Rashi’s explanation is reconciled with the comment in note a: he did not explain the Gemara’s initial assumption here according to the first reason given in the Gemara in Bava Kamma, because that reason is not applicable here. However, according to what is explained in his name below—that here it is considered “money that he cannot collect through the courts”—even if it is a deposit, he cannot make an authorization document]. And he further raised a difficulty there against their first resolution: This is money that he cannot collect through the courts, because with regard to each of them we must say: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If so, even if he redeemed the firstborn with land, he cannot make an authorization document, since anything that one cannot collect through the courts cannot be consecrated [and likewise, one cannot make an authorization document concerning it], as explained in Bava Metzia 7a. We learned in the Mishna: Two women married to two different men who had not previously given birth to a firstborn, and they gave birth to

a male and a female, the fathers are exempt

and the son must redeem himself; if they gave birth to two females and a male, or to two females and two males, the priest receives nothing:

Rav Huna taught

a fourth case in the beraita:

If the two women gave birth to

two males and a female

[one gave birth to a male, and the other gave birth to a male and a female, and it is unknown which was born first],

the priest receives nothing,

even though there is certainly a firstborn here. Since it is unknown which child is the firstborn, even the son is not obligated to redeem himself because of the uncertainty.

And

we explain the reason

of our tanna

for not mentioning this case:

Since

only

in

the case in the latter clause—namely, two women married to

two different men—is it possible

to find a case in which the priest receives nothing, but

in

the case in the first clause—namely,

one man and two women

who gave birth to two males and a female—

it is not possible

for the father to be exempt from giving the priest anything, since a firstborn was certainly born in his household. Therefore,

it was not taught.

Mishna:

This Mishna is not a continuation of the preceding Mishnayot; it deals with ordinary firstborns:

If the son dies within thirty days,

even though

the father had already

given

the money

to the priest,

he must

return it, since the father is not obligated in redemption until after thirty days.

for he is not liable for redemption until after thirty days.

And if the son dies

after thirty days, even though

the father has

not yet given

his redemption money—

he must give it,

as the reason is explained in the Gemara below, on 51b.

If

the son dies

on the thirtieth day

itself, this day is

like the day before it,

and even if the father had given the money, he must return it.

Rabbi Akiva

was uncertain about this matter, and therefore he

says:

If

the father had already

given

the money to the priest,

he may not take it

from him;

and if

the father has

not yet given

it,

he should not give it, since we have an established principle concerning every uncertainty: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If the son dies on the thirtieth day, it is like the day before it. Rabbi Akiva says: If the father gave the money, he may not take it; and if he did not give it, he should not give it:

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason of the Rabbis

who hold that the thirtieth day is like a child who is less than one month old?

And we explain:

The Rabbis derive

the word

“month”

from “you shall redeem from one month old”

“month”

from the wilderness

[“Take a census of every firstborn male from one month old and upward”]:

Just as there,

in the wilderness, the verse says

“and upward,”

meaning after thirty days,

so too here,

with regard to redemption, the verse says

“and upward.”

and upward.”

And Rabbi Akiva is uncertain about this,

and this is his reasoning:

Since it was necessary to write

“and upward”

with regard to valuations, and they did not derive it from the wilderness.

That is, in the passage concerning valuations [at the end of Leviticus], the Torah states: “And your valuation shall be for a male from twenty years old until sixty years old, and your valuation shall be fifty shekels” [which is the highest valuation]; “And if it is from five years old until twenty years old, your valuation for a male shall be twenty shekels”; “And if it is from one month old until five years old, your valuation for a male shall be five shekels”; “And if it is from sixty years old and upward, for a male his valuation shall be fifteen shekels.” From the verse’s use of “and upward” with regard to one who is sixty, we learn that the sixtieth year itself is treated as less than one who is sixty. From the Torah’s use of “year by year,” we likewise learn that the twentieth year is treated as less than one who is twenty, and the fifth year as less than one who is five; similarly, the thirtieth day is treated as less than one month old. The apparent difficulty is: Why is “and upward” needed in the passage concerning valuations? We should have derived from the wilderness that the thirtieth day is treated as the lower category, and likewise that the corresponding years are treated as the lower category.

And since the verse says “and upward” in the laws of valuations, and we did not derive this from the wilderness,

they become—

the wilderness and valuations—

two verses that come as one, and two verses that come as one do not teach

with regard to the redemption of the firstborn that the thirtieth day is like the period before thirty days.

Or perhaps: When

we say that two verses that come as one

do not teach,

that is specifically

for other cases,

meaning, to derive a third law that is unrelated to either of these two laws;

but they do teach their own subject.

That is, if one seeks to derive a law resembling one of the two laws, it may be derived even when there are two verses that come as one—

And if so, since the “and upward” stated in the wilderness concerns the redemption of the firstborn of the Israelites in the wilderness, we can likewise derive the law concerning the redemption of a firstborn in the present era.

And for this reason he is uncertain,

[this is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s uncertainty].

Rav Ashi said:

Everyone agrees with regard to mourning

of the father for his son that if the son dies on

the thirtieth day, it is like

dying on

the day before it,

meaning that he is a possible stillborn, and the father does not mourn for him, and this is

because Shmuel said: The halakha follows the lenient opinion in matters of mourning.

Mishna:

If the father dies within thirty days, the son is presumed not to have been redeemed,

because a person does not ordinarily redeem his son within thirty days —

until he brings proof that he was redeemed.

And if the father dies

after thirty days,

the son is

presumed to have been redeemed,

because the priest is the claimant, and the burden of proof rests upon him,

until they say to him

that the son was told by his father at the time of his death

that he had not been redeemed.

He is to redeem, and his son is to be redeemed,

if a man is obligated to redeem himself, as he is a firstborn, and his firstborn son, and he does not have enough money for both,

he takes precedence over his son.

The Gemara will explain in what circumstance our Mishna is dealing.

Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence over him,

because

his mitzva

was

upon his father

who died,

and

if

his son’s mitzva were upon him,

he would take precedence. This will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It was stated:

With regard to one who redeems his son within thirty days,

when the time for the redemption has not yet arrived:

Rav says: His son is redeemed,

as he proceeds to explain.

And Shmuel says: His son is not redeemed.

Rava said,

he explained:

Everyone,

both Rav and Shmuel, agrees that if the father said:

“From now

the child shall be redeemed,”

his son is not redeemed,

since the time for the redemption has not yet arrived. But if the father said that the child shall be redeemed

after thirty days, and the money is extant,

the redemption money remains intact,

his son is certainly redeemed

after thirty days.

Where they disagree,

Rav and Shmuel, is when the father said that the child shall be redeemed

after thirty days, and the money was consumed

before the time for the redemption arrived:

The reason for their disagreement is:

Rav says: His son is redeemed, just as in the case of the betrothal of a woman

[which is comparable to one who betroths a woman after thirty days], because

there, even though the money was consumed

before thirty days,

the betrothal takes effect,

as explained in Kiddushin 59a. -