Bekhorot 35b (לה:) — the Talmud in English

And we explain the reason:

he says

this shepherd

will not leave

the owners,

who are Torah scholars, and give it to me.

For an ordinary shepherd is an am haaretz, and he says that his master will certainly give the firstborn to a priest who is a Torah scholar; therefore, he will gain nothing by testifying that it is permitted, and consequently he is trustworthy.

And that which the Mishna teaches, “The shepherds of priests are not trustworthy,” means

shepherds

of the animals of

priests, who are Israelites,

and the shepherds are Israelites;

they are not trustworthy.

And the reason is:

we are concerned about a morsel,

as he wants the priest to feed him from it.

And all the more so,

a shepherd who is

a priest

testifying

for a priest

who is the owner, is not trustworthy for two reasons. One is also that

we are concerned about reciprocal favors,

that they will do favors for one another, each testifying about the other’s animal. And also, we are concerned

about a morsel,

as he wants the priest to feed him from it.

And Rabban Shimon

ben Gamliel

came to say: The priest is trustworthy

with regard to another person’s animal,

but is not trustworthy with regard to his own.

And even a priest is trustworthy with regard to another priest’s animal. For we are concerned neither about reciprocal favors nor about a morsel; and all the more so, an Israelite is trustworthy with regard to a priest’s animal, as there is only concern about a morsel.

And Rabbi Meir came to say: One who is suspected regarding a matter may neither judge it nor testify about it.

Therefore, priests who are suspected regarding firstborn animals are not trustworthy, whether with regard to a priest or with regard to an Israelite. And he disagrees with both of them: According to the first tanna, only a priest testifying for a priest is not trustworthy, but a priest testifying for an Israelite is trustworthy. And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, even a priest testifying for a priest is trustworthy. Whereas according to Rabbi Meir, a priest is not trustworthy, whether with regard to a priest or with regard to an Israelite.

And we raise an objection:

Granted, according to the one who says

that the first tanna holds that

Israelite shepherds who are priests are trustworthy.

[This is the second opinion.]

This is what Rabbi Meir came to teach: One who is suspected regarding a matter may neither judge it nor testify about it.

And he disagrees with the first tanna, for according to the first tanna, a priest who is a shepherd is trustworthy when testifying for an Israelite, whereas according to Rabbi Meir he is not trustworthy.

But according to the one who says

that the first tanna holds that

shepherds of priests’ animals who are Israelites are not trustworthy—

what did

Rabbi Meir come to teach us?

But

this is identical to the first tanna!

For with regard to priest-shepherds, both of them hold that they are not trustworthy, whether with regard to a priest or with regard to an Israelite.

And we answer:

The difference between them is the case of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kafosai.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kafosai says: A firstborn animal in the possession of a priest requires two people from the marketplace to testify about it,

in order to permit its slaughter on account of a blemish, and even if they are priests. But this is provided that they are from the marketplace and not members of his household.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

They do not require two people from the marketplace. Rather,

even his son, even his daughter

may testify about it. And he follows his own reasoning, as he says that a priest is trustworthy with regard to another person’s animal, even if he is that person’s relative, and he is suspected only with regard to his own animal.

Rabbi says: Even ten people, and they are members of his household, may not testify about it.

But someone from the marketplace may testify, even if he is only one witness; and he disagrees with Rabbi Yehoshua, who requires specifically two people from the marketplace. And this is the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Meir. The first tanna accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kafosai: Priests from the marketplace are trustworthy even with regard to firstborn animals belonging to priests, as the first tanna is speaking only about a priest who is a shepherd, with regard to whom there is concern about reciprocal favors when the owner is a priest, and with regard to an Israelite owner there is concern that the shepherd thinks the owner will give him the firstborn. But a priest from the marketplace is trustworthy whether with regard to a priest or with regard to an Israelite. Rabbi Meir, however, does not accept the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua, and holds that priests are never trustworthy, even priests from the marketplace.

In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Ḥisda said in the name of Rav Ketina: In the case of a doubtful firstborn animal born in the possession of an Israelite,

such as when two males were born simultaneously and we do not know which of them is the firstborn, [and the law is that one is given to a priest and the other is eaten by its owner once it develops a blemish,]

two people

from the marketplace are required to testify about it,

and members of his household are unfit to testify?

In accordance with whose opinion? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kafosai.

Just as he holds that a firstborn animal in the possession of a priest requires two people from the marketplace to testify about it, so too, a doubtful firstborn animal in the possession of an Israelite requires this, since he is its owner.

Rav Naḥman said:

With regard to a doubtful firstborn animal in the possession of an Israelite,

even the owners may testify about it!

For an Israelite is never suspected with regard to blemishes.

For if you do not say this,

then

with regard to animal tithe

according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds that one who is suspected regarding a matter may neither judge it nor testify about it—

who can testify about it?

For animal tithe is eaten by its owners. And all Israelites, with regard to animal tithe, are like priests with regard to a firstborn animal, as each person has animals and tithes them; and since he is suspected with regard to his own animals, he cannot testify about another person’s animals. Rather, certainly an Israelite is not suspected with regard to blemishes.

We challenge this:

With regard to definite animal tithe, he is trustworthy!

Even the owner is trustworthy, since he may lawfully cause a blemish,

for if he wishes, he can place a blemish on his entire flock

before tithing it, while the animals are still unconsecrated. Therefore, he is not suspected regarding this matter, and there is no proof from animal tithe with regard to a doubtful firstborn animal.

Rather,

this is how Rav Naḥman infers:

With regard to a doubtful firstborn animal, according to Rabbi Meir, who can testify about it?

For if the owners are suspected with regard to it, it follows that all Israelites are suspected with regard to a doubtful firstborn animal should one happen to have one in his flock; and anyone who is suspected regarding a matter is not trustworthy to another person concerning it. If so, who can testify about it?

And should you say that this is indeed so, that there is no remedy

for a doubtful firstborn animal according to Rabbi Meir—

Can it be said that this is so?

But didn’t we learn

above, in the second chapter [18b],

that Rabbi Yosei would say: Any animal whose counterpart is in the possession of a priest,

for example, when there are two doubtful firstborn animals, one of which remains in the possession of the owner, while its counterpart, meaning the second one, is given to a priest, then even this one that remains in the possession of the Israelite

is exempt from the priestly gifts

of the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw. And there we explain the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: “They rendered that which does not acquire as though it acquired.” It is considered as though the priest acquired both animals and sold one of them to the owner. And an Israelite who purchases an animal from a priest is exempt from the priestly gifts.

But Rabbi Meir obligates

the owner to give the priestly gifts.

We see that according to Rabbi Meir, a doubtful firstborn animal is fit to be eaten, and it is impossible to say that it truly has no remedy.

Rather, conclude from this:

With regard to a doubtful firstborn animal,

the owners may testify about it.

What is the reason?

It is priests who are suspected with regard to blemishes; Israelites are not suspected with regard to blemishes!

It was stated: Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

that even his son and daughter are trustworthy to testify.

Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi,

who says that even ten people who are members of his household are not trustworthy.

And we challenge this:

Did Rava really say this?

But Rava said:

If the

owners

of the firstborn animal, meaning the priest, were standing

outside with us,

and the firstborn animal

entered whole

into his house

and emerged injured, his household members may testify about it,

as they were inside the house, that the blemish it developed occurred on its own.

Apparently, Rava holds in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that even members of his household are trustworthy. How, then, did Rava rule in accordance with Rabbi, who says that even ten people who are members of his household are not trustworthy?

And we answer: Do not say that “the owners” were standing outside.

Rather, say: “

All the owners were standing

with us outside.” That is, even his sons and members of his household were outside, and the shepherd who was in the house testifies about it.

And we refute this:

If so, what is the point of stating it?

And we answer:

Lest you say that we should be concerned about suspicion,

and perhaps the shepherd caused the blemish.

It teaches us

that we do not suspect him.

And we challenge this:

If so, what is the point of stating it?

And we answer:

Lest you say that we should be concerned about suspicion,

perhaps the owners caused the blemish by placing a fig in its ear, so that the dog would bite it inside, or by making a pit inside so that it would fall into it; and an animal with a blemish caused in this manner may not be slaughtered on account of it.

It teaches us

that we are not concerned about this.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Specifically, his son and daughter

are trustworthy;

but his wife is not

trustworthy.

What is the reason?

His wife is considered like his own person!

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Rabbi Meir, who says

in our Mishna:

“One who is suspected regarding a matter may neither judge it nor testify about it,” and Rabbi Meir says

above (30a):

“One who is suspected regarding one matter is suspected regarding the entire Torah,”

and as for

priests

who are suspected with regard to firstborn animals,

is it indeed the case that they may not judge cases?

For since they are suspected with regard to firstborn animals, they should be considered suspected regarding the entire Torah; and one who is suspected regarding a matter may not judge others with regard to that same matter.

But it is written: “The priests, the sons of Levi, shall approach” ...

“and according to their word shall be every dispute and every affliction.”

“and by their word shall every dispute and every affliction be decided.”