Bekhorot 36a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Say that Rabbi Meir said

that one suspected concerning a matter

only to raise suspicion

in general. But

to establish them

as certainly so,

who said so? For when Rabbi Meir says that one suspected concerning one matter is suspected concerning the entire Torah, that is when we are established concerning him that he transgresses one matter.

When Rabbi Meir says that one who is suspected of one matter is suspected concerning the entire Torah, that is specifically when we know that he is established as one who transgresses one particular matter.

They raised a dilemma before them: testimony heard from one witness through another witness—

what is the law concerning testimony about a firstborn?

Can one who knows through another witness testify concerning a blemish that occurred on its own?

Rav Ami forbade it. And Rav Asi permitted it.

Rav Ami said to Rav Asi: But the tanna of the school of Menashe taught: Testimony heard from one witness through another witness is valid only for testimony concerning a woman.

And it implies that it is not valid for testimony concerning a firstborn.

And we answer:

Teach

that the school of Menashe taught: Testimony heard from one witness through another witness is valid

only for testimony concerning a matter for which a woman is fit, exclusively.

And in testimony concerning a firstborn, a woman is fit. For we hold in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says: even his daughter.

Rav Yemar declared testimony heard from one witness through another witness valid concerning a firstborn.

Marimar applied to him: Yemar permits firstborns!

Meaning: Yemar, who permits firstborns; and it is an expression of disparagement.

And the halakha is: testimony heard from one witness through another witness is valid for testimony concerning a firstborn.

Rabbi Ela said: They had not been established concerning it

as

being a firstborn. And

a

single

was its owner

koen who was its owner came and said that it was a firstborn and that its blemish was with it,

meaning that this blemish had not been intentionally placed upon it. And he came before a Sage, who would see whether it was a permanent blemish; he is

trusted.

For the mouth that prohibited it, which said that it was a firstborn, is the mouth that permitted it, which said that it had not been intentionally placed upon it.

And we inquire about this:

What does Rabbi Ela come to teach us

Rabbi Ilaa

that the mouth that prohibited it is the mouth that permitted it?

This

we already learned

in tractate Ketubot:

A woman who said, “I was a married woman, and I am divorced,” is trusted, for the mouth that prohibited it is the mouth that permitted it.

For since she was not established as a married woman, and only through her mouth do we know that she was married, she is trusted also concerning her divorce. And for what purpose did Rabbi Ela need to teach this?

And we answer:

Lest you say:

only

there

is she trusted,

for if she wished

to marry during her husband’s lifetime without a divorce, she

would not have said

to us that she had been a married woman, and she could have married, since she had the presumption of being unmarried.

But here,

concerning a firstborn,

since it is impossible for him not to say

to the Sage that it is a firstborn and that he should instruct him whether it is permitted to slaughter it,

since consecrated animals

that are unblemished

outside

are subject to a prohibition whose punishment is excision,

he does not eat

it without the instruction of a Sage [and they were suspected only concerning the placing of a blemish, which is a prohibition, but not concerning eating unblemished consecrated animals outside],

say that we do not

say

that the mouth that prohibited it is the mouth that permitted it.

It comes to teach us

that he has the status of trustworthiness of the mouth that prohibited it.

For if it is because of that

—that he does not wish to eat unblemished animals outside, and you are concerned that he himself placed a blemish upon it—

he would have placed upon it a blemish that is recognizable

even to an ignoramus,

and he would eat it,

and he would not have needed to show it to a Sage. Therefore, when he comes to a Sage and says to him that it is a firstborn and that its blemish is with it, he is trusted.

Mar bar Rav Ashi challenged this: How is this different from that man who rented to his fellow

[who rented out]

a donkey, and said to him: Do not go

with the donkey

on the road of Nehar Pakkod,

because

there is

there

water.

Rather,

go on the road of Narsh,

where

there is no water. He went

himself

on the road of Nehar Pakkod, and the donkey died. And

the renter

came and said to him

to the owner: Indeed,

I went on the road of Nehar Pakkod

[and thereby transgressed your words],

but there was no water, and the donkey died.

And Rava said: What reason does he have

for the renter

to lie,

since

if he wished, he could have said: I went on the road of Narsh.

And therefore, by virtue of the migo—that he could have lied—he is trusted that indeed there was no water there and that the donkey died in its ordinary manner.

And Abaye said: “

What reason does he have to lie

in a place where there are witnesses, we do not say this,”

for we have conclusive knowledge that at every time there is water in the Nehar Pakkod.

And if so, here too, concerning a firstborn, since we have conclusive knowledge that the kohanim are suspected concerning blemishes, let us not say, “What reason does he have to lie.”

And we answer:

Is this comparable!?

There, certainly there is water.

But

here,

can we say that

he certainly placed a blemish upon it?

But it is only

a suspicion! And in a place of suspicion we say

that he is trusted by virtue of

“What reason does he have to lie?”

Ravina was sitting and reciting this teaching

of Rabbi Ela

without the name of a person,

for he did not state it in his name.

Rava Zutra said to Ravina: We recite it in the name of Rabbi Ila.

Rabbi Tzadok had a firstborn. He placed barley before it

and gave it barley to eat

in baskets of peeled willow twigs. While it was eating, its lips were split,

its lips were torn and it became blemished.

Rabbi Tzadok came

Rabbi Tzadok

before Rav Yehoshua

to show him the blemish.

He said to him,

Rabbi Tzadok:

Have we ever differentiated between

a

scholarly koen and an ignoramus?

For am I suspected of intentionally placing a blemish upon a firstborn like an ignoramus koen?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Yes,

we have differentiated between a scholarly koen and an ignoramus. And you are not suspected of having intentionally placed a blemish.

Rabbi Tzadok came

Rabbi Tzadok

before Rabban Gamliel.

He said to him,

Rabbi Tzadok:

Have we ever differentiated between

a

scholarly koen and an ignoramus?

Rabban Gamliel said to him: No.

He said to him,

Rabbi Tzadok:

But Rabbi Yehoshua said “Yes” to me.

For he differentiated in this matter.

He said to him,

Rabban Gamliel:

Wait until the masters of shields enter the study hall.

And the Torah scholars were called “masters of shields” because of “the defenders,” for they wage the battle of Torah.

When they entered the study hall, the questioner stood

Rabbi Tzadok

and asked: Have we ever differentiated between a scholar and an ignoramus?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No.

Rabban Gamliel said to him: But they told me “Yes” in your name.

For he differentiated in this matter.

He said to him: Yehoshua, stand on your feet, and let them testify against you 31.

Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: What shall I do

since I cannot contradict him?

If only

[if] I were

alone

alive,

and he were

Rabbi Tzadok

dead, I could

have been

the living one to contradict the dead,

and say: I did not say this.

But

now that I am alive and he is alive, how can the living one contradict the living one!?

Rather, certainly I said so, and now I retract my position.

And Rabban Gamliel was sitting and expounding, while Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet, until all the people murmured and said to Rabbi Hutzpit the translator: Stand

and be silent.

And he stood,

and was silent.

Mishna:

The koen is trusted to say: “I showed this firstborn

to a Sage,

and it is blemished,

who instructed me that it has a permanent blemish and that it is permitted to slaughter it. [Provided that he has witnesses that he did not place the blemish upon it.]

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The koen is trusted to say: “An Israelite gave me this firstborn with its blemish,

when it was blemished.

What is the reason?

And we explain:

Concerning every matter that is destined to become known, people do not lie about it.

For since in the end it will become known, he is afraid to lie. And likewise, since the Israelite can come and say, “I did not give it to him with its blemish,” he does not lie.

Rava said: We too have learned this: The koen is trusted to say: “I showed this firstborn, and it is blemished.” What is the reason

that he is trusted?

Is it not because we say: Concerning every matter that is destined to become known, people do not lie about it?

And we reject this: In truth, I can say to you that people do lie, even in a place where the matter is destined to become known. And for what reason is he trusted to say that he showed it to a Sage?

There

it is

because he does not eat consecrated animals outside,

for although they are suspected concerning the placing of a blemish, they are not suspected concerning eating consecrated animals outside. And because he is afraid, he shows it to a Sage.

But here,

when he says that this firstborn was given to him by an Israelite with its blemish,

since they are suspected

concerning the placing of a blemish,

they are suspected

of placing a blemish and saying, “Thus an Israelite gave it to me.”

Rav Shizvi raised an objection

from a Mishna in tractate Demai:

One who says to

a messenger who is

“one who is not trusted concerning tithes”:

, “Buy for me”

produce

from one who is trusted

and does not purchase produce from an ignoramus.

Or

if he says to him, “Buy for me

from one who tithes

the produce that he purchases from an ignoramus”—

he is not trusted

—that messenger—to say that he purchased it from one who is trusted concerning tithes; rather, we are concerned that perhaps he purchased it from an ignoramus.

And

why

is he not trusted?

Let us say: Concerning every matter that is destined to become known, people do not lie about it!?