Bekhorot 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Perhaps when Rabbi Meir said

that one who is suspect regarding a matter—

it is only with regard to suspicion

in general. But

to establish them as

certainly suspect,

who says so? When Rabbi Meir says that one who is suspect regarding one matter is suspect regarding the entire Torah, this applies when we have established that he transgresses one matter.

The Gemara raises a dilemma:

What is the halakha with regard to testimony transmitted by one witness from another witness—

may he testify concerning a firstborn?

That is, may one who knows of a defect from another witness testify that the defect arose on its own?

Rav Ami prohibited it, and Rav Asi permitted it.

Rav Ami said to Rav Asi: But the tanna of the school of Menashe taught: Testimony transmitted by one witness from another witness is valid only for testimony concerning a woman.

This implies that it is not valid for testimony concerning a firstborn.

And we answer:

Teach

the statement of the school of Menashe as follows: Testimony transmitted by one witness from another witness is valid

only for testimony with regard to which a woman is qualified to testify.

And a woman is qualified to testify concerning a firstborn, as we hold in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that even his daughter may testify.

Rav Yeimar validated testimony transmitted by one witness from another witness concerning a firstborn.

Marimar applied the following verse to him: “Yeimar permits firstborns!”

That is, Yeimar, who permits firstborns; this is an expression of disparagement.

And the halakha is: Testimony transmitted by one witness from another witness is valid for testimony concerning a firstborn.

Rabbi Ilaa said: If the animal was not established as

a firstborn,

and

a kohen

alone

who owned it

came and said that it was a firstborn and that its defect accompanied it,

meaning that he had not intentionally inflicted this defect upon it, and he brought it before a Sage to determine whether the defect was permanent, then he is

deemed credible.

For the mouth that prohibited it—that said that it was a firstborn—is the same mouth that permitted it, saying that the defect had not been intentionally inflicted.

The Gemara inquires:

What does

Rabbi Ilaa

teach us by stating that

the mouth that prohibited is the same mouth that permitted? But

we already learned

this in Tractate Ketubot:

A woman who said: “I was a married woman, and I am divorced,” is deemed credible, because the mouth that prohibited is the same mouth that permitted.

Since she was not established as a married woman, and we know that she was married only on the basis of her own statement, she is likewise deemed credible concerning her divorce. And why was it necessary for Rabbi Ilaa to teach us this?

And we answer:

Lest you say:

Only

there

is she deemed credible,

because if she wished

to marry during her husband’s lifetime without a divorce, she

would not have said

to us that she had been a married woman, and she could have married, since she had the presumptive status of an unmarried woman.

But here,

with regard to a firstborn,

since he necessarily must say

to the Sage that it is a firstborn, so that the Sage can instruct him whether it is permitted to slaughter it,

since consecrated animals

that are unblemished

outside

the Temple are subject to a prohibition punishable by karet,

he will not eat

it without the instruction of a Sage [and they are suspected only of inflicting a defect, which is a mere prohibition, and not of eating unblemished consecrated animals outside the Temple],

perhaps we should not

say that

the mouth that prohibited is the same mouth that permitted.

He teaches us

that he has the credibility accorded by the principle of the mouth that prohibited.

For if that were the reason

—that he does not wish to eat an unblemished animal outside the Temple, and you are therefore concerned that he himself inflicted the defect—

he would have inflicted a conspicuous defect upon it

that would even be recognizable to an ignoramus,

and he would eat it, and he would not have needed to show it to a Sage. Therefore, when he comes to a Sage and says that it is a firstborn and that its defect accompanied it, he is deemed credible.

Mar bar Rav Ashi challenges this:

What is different from the case of that man who rented

[who rented]

a donkey to another, and said to him: Do not go

with the donkey

on the road of the Nahar Pekuod,

because

there is

water

there.

Rather,

go on the road of Neresh,

where

there is no water. He went

on the road of Nahar Pekuod,

and the donkey died. And

the renter

came and said to him,

to the owner: Indeed,

I went on the road of Nahar Pekuod

[and thereby violated your instruction],

but there was no water, and the donkey died.

And Rava said: What reason does he have

the renter

to lie?

After all,

if he wished, he could have said: “I went on the road of Neresh.”

Therefore, by virtue of the migo—the fact that he could have lied—he is deemed credible that there was indeed no water there and that the donkey died naturally .

And Abaye said: “

What reason does he have to lie

is not said in a place where there are witnesses,

as we have clear evidence that there is water in the Nahar Pekuod at all times.”

And if so, here too, with regard to a firstborn, since we have clear evidence that the kohanim are suspect concerning defects, we should not say, “What reason does he have to lie?”

And we answer:

Can these cases really be compared!?

There, there is certainly water.

But

here, may we say that

he certainly inflicted a defect upon it?

After all, it is only

a suspicion! And in a case of mere suspicion we say

that he is deemed credible by virtue of the principle of

“

What reason does he have to lie”.

Ravina was sitting and reciting this halakha

of Rabbi Ilaa

without mentioning the man,

without stating it in his name.

Rava Zutra said to Ravina: We teach it in our tradition in the name of Rabbi Ilaa.

Rabbi Tzadok had a firstborn. He placed barley

and gave it to the animal to eat

in baskets woven from peeled willow branches. As it was eating, its lips were torn,

and it became blemished.

Rabbi Tzadok came

to

Rav Yehoshua

to show him the defect.

He said to him,

Rabbi Tzadok:

Have we ever distinguished between

a kohen

who is a scholar and an ignoramus?

For am I not suspected of intentionally inflicting a defect upon a firstborn, just like an ignorant kohen?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Yes,

we have distinguished between a kohen who is a scholar and an ignoramus. You are not suspected of intentionally inflicting a defect.

Rabbi Tzadok came

to

Rabban Gamliel.

Rabbi Tzadok said to him,

Rabbi Tzadok:

Have we ever distinguished between

a kohen

who is a scholar and an ignoramus?

Rabban Gamliel said to him: No.

Rabbi Tzadok said to him,

Rabbi Tzadok:

But Rabbi Yehoshua said “Yes” to me.

He said that they had made this distinction.

Rabban Gamliel said to him

Rabban Gamliel:

Wait until the masters of shields enter the beit-midrash.

The Torah scholars were called “masters of shields” because they are like shields, fighting the battle of Torah.

When they entered the beit-midrash, the questioner stood

Rabbi Tzadok

and asked: Have we ever distinguished between a scholar and an ignoramus?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No.

Rabban Gamliel said to him: But they told me “Yes” in your name.

They said that they had made this distinction.

He said to him: Yehoshua, stand on your feet, and let them testify against you 31 .

Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: What shall I do

when I cannot deny his statement?

If only

[had] I been

the only one

alive,

and he

Rabbi Tzadok

had been dead, I could

have been

the living one denying the dead,

saying that I had not spoken that way.

But

now that I am alive and he is alive, how can the living deny the living!?

Rather, that is certainly what I said, and now I retract my position .

And Rabban Gamliel would sit and expound, while Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet, until all the people murmured and said to Rabbi Hutzpit the interpreter: Stand

and be silent.

And he stood,

and was silent.

Mishna:

The kohen is deemed credible when he says: “I showed this firstborn

to a Sage,

and it is blemished,”

who instructed me that it has a permanent defect and may be slaughtered. [Provided that there are witnesses that he did not inflict the defect upon it.]

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The kohen is deemed credible when he says: “An Israelite gave me this firstborn with its defect”,

when it was already blemished.

What is the reason?

And we explain:

People do not lie about any matter that is destined to become known.

Since it will ultimately be revealed, he is afraid to lie. Likewise, since the Israelite could come and say, “I did not give it to him with its defect,” he does not lie.

Rava said: We too learned this: “The kohen is deemed credible when he says: ‘I showed this firstborn to a Sage, and it is blemished.’” What is the reason

that he is deemed credible?

Is it not because we say that people do not lie about any matter that is destined to become known?

And we reject this: In fact, I would say that people do sometimes lie even in a place where the matter is destined to become known. And what is the reason that he is deemed credible when he says that he showed it to a Sage? Because

there

it is

that he does not eat consecrated animals outside the Temple,

for although they are suspected of inflicting a defect, they are not suspected of eating consecrated animals outside the Temple. Therefore, because he is afraid to eat it, he shows it to a Sage.

But here,

when he says that an Israelite gave him this firstborn with its defect,

since they are suspect

of inflicting a defect,

they are suspect

of inflicting a defect and saying, “An Israelite gave it to me this way.”

Rav Shizevi raised an objection

from a Mishna in tractate Demai:

One who says to

a messenger who is

“

one who is not trustworthy with regard to tithes,”

“Buy fruit for me

from one who is trustworthy,”

meaning one who does not purchase produce from an ignoramus;

or

if he says to him, “Buy for me

from one who tithes

the produce that he purchases from an ignoramus”—

he is not deemed credible

when that messenger says that he purchased it from one who is trustworthy with regard to tithes. Rather, we are concerned that perhaps he purchased it from an ignoramus.

And

why

is he not deemed credible?

Let us say: People do not lie about any matter that is destined to become known!?