Bekhorot 35a — the Talmud in English

Abaye said: We have taken it as established: ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

If one rendered his fellow’s pure produce impure and died, his son was not fined after him

to pay the damage.

What is the reason?

It is damage that is not recognizable

to the eye, for it is not recognizable upon the pure produce that it has become impure, and

it is not called damage.

And since the obligation to pay for such damage is only

a rabbinic fine.

Therefore,

for him the Rabbis imposed a fine; for his son the Rabbis did not impose a fine!

Mishna:

An incident

that occurred

with a male sheep

a ram,

old, with its hair hanging loose,

because it had never been shorn.

And one procurator saw it,

an official appointed by the government.

And he said: “What is the nature of this one?”

Why had they allowed it to grow so old?

They said to him: “It is a firstborn! And it may be slaughtered only if it has a blemish!”

He took a pointed weapon,

a spear,

and pierced its ear,

and it became blemished.

And the incident came before the Sages, and they permitted

the firstborn, since he had not done this with the intention of permitting it. For he did not know that through the blemish he would make in it, it would be slaughtered.

The procurator saw

that the Sages

had permitted

the firstborn.

He went and pierced the ears of other firstborn animals, and they prohibited

the Sages from slaughtering them on account of that same blemish!

Once, children were playing in the field, and they tied the tails of lambs to one another. And the tail of one of them was severed, and it was a firstborn

and became blemished.

And the incident came before the Sages, and they permitted it. They saw

the children

that they had permitted it, and they went and tied the tails of other firstborn animals

so that their tails would be severed.

And they prohibited

the Sages from slaughtering them on account of that same blemish!

This is the rule

in this law:

Anything that is according to his intention,

when he inflicted the blemish in order to permit it,

is prohibited

to slaughter upon it.

That which is not according to his intention is permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“Once there were”

children playing.

And it is necessary

to inform us of the incident with the procurator and the incident with the children.

For had it informed us of a gentile

who inflicted a blemish on a firstborn, but had not informed us of the children, I would have said: We permit only in the case of a gentile, when he did not intend this, because

he will not come to become habituated

—we are not concerned if, through this, the gentile becomes accustomed to inflicting blemishes, since in any event he is accustomed to transgressing prohibitions—Rashi .

But in the case of a minor

Israelite

who will come to become habituated

and become accustomed to inflicting a blemish on consecrated animals,

I might say: No,

the firstborn should not be permitted through the blemish that he inflicted in it.

And had it informed us of a minor,

I would have said that they permit only in the case of a blemish made by a minor,

because people will not come

to

confuse it with an adult

who inflicted a blemish, so that they would say that even then it is permitted.

But in the case of a gentile,

if we permit the firstborn through him,

they will come to confuse it with an adult

Israelite who inflicted a blemish in order to permit the firstborn,

I might say:

the firstborn should not be permitted through the blemish that he inflicted.

Therefore,

it is necessary

for both.

Rav Hisda said that Rav Ketina said: They taught this only

that the firstborn is permitted through a blemish inflicted by the gentile

when they said to him

—the Israelites said to the gentile—that the firstborn is not permitted

unless it had a blemish.

For this implies a blemish that occurs by itself. In such wording, the gentile will not understand that they want him to make a blemish in it.

But if they said to him

that the firstborn is not permitted except

if a blemish is made in it,

it is

like one who said to him: “Go, make a blemish in it.”

For “is made” implies even one made by a human being.

Rava said: Since it is in any event,

for even when they said to the gentile, “unless a blemish is made in it,” he did not know that it would be permitted through him, since he held that if one makes a blemish in order to permit it, it is ineffective and since he did not intend to permit it—

what difference is there to me between “it had” and “it is made,”

for both have one meaning with regard to the gentile?

Rather,

even when they said to him, “unless

a blemish is made

in it,”

it is likewise in any event,

for even then he holds that it is specifically when the blemish fell upon it by itself that it permits it.

And there is no difference.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the rule: anything that is according to his intention is prohibited.”

“This is the rule,”

to include what?

And we explain:

To include

a blemish brought about through

indirect causation,

such as when he placed dough in the firstborn’s ear so that a dog would come and take it; even this is prohibited to slaughter upon.

We learned in the Mishna: Anything that is

not according to his intention is permitted.

To include: one speaking innocently,

where the gentile was not asking about the firstborn; rather, the Israelite was innocently telling him that this firstborn would not be permitted until a blemish fell upon it. And the gentile went and inflicted a blemish in it, even then it is permitted, since the Israelite did not intend that the gentile inflict a blemish in it.

Mishna:

If a firstborn was pursuing

a person, to gore him,

and the person kicked

it

and made a blemish in it, he may slaughter upon it.

And even if the one who made the blemish was a kohen, it is permitted, since he did not intend to permit it, but only to save himself.

Gemara:

Rav Pappa said: They taught this only when he kicked it at the time of the pursuit. But

if he kicked it

after the pursuit, he may not

slaughter upon it.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious!

And we answer:

Lest you say,

this man

is recalling his pain.

He remembered the pursuit and therefore kicked it, and did not intend to make a blemish.

It teaches us otherwise.

Some say: Rav Pappa said: Do not say, “At the time of the pursuit, yes; not at the time of the pursuit, no.” Rather, even

if he kicked it

after the pursuit as well

it is permitted.

What is the reason? He is recalling his pain.

And when he kicked it, he did not intend to inflict a blemish in it.

Rav Judah said: It is permitted to inflict a blemish in a firstborn before it emerges into the air of the world,

for it is not consecrated until it becomes consecrated upon emerging from the womb.

Rava said: In the case of a kid—

in its ears.

A kid’s ears are long and visible outside before the entire head emerges [and it is still not regarded as born], and at that point one may inflict a blemish in its ears.

In the case of a lamb—

in its lips.

A lamb emerges with its lips, which are seen first. But its ears are small and are not seen until the entire head emerges.

Some say: In the case of a lamb as well, in its ears.

For

perhaps it emerges through its temples,

so that the lamb’s temples emerge first, with its ears upon them, and it turns out that the ears emerged before the head. 25 .

Rav Pappa said: It eats, and it is not visible.

If the firstborn has a blemish inside its mouth, and when it eats the blemish is not visible, but when it

cries,

shouting,

it is visible,

because it opens its mouth wide,

it is a blemish,

and it is considered a blemish that is visible .

And we challenge this:

What does it teach us?

But

we learned

it below:

“The outer strings,”

the gums in which the front teeth are fixed,

that were split

and some of them is missing,

and that were blunted,

that were cut with a knife, and nothing was missing from them, but something resembling a crack was formed in them—it is a blemish, since they are visible to the eye.

And likewise,

the inner ones,

the gums in which the inner grinding teeth are fixed,

that were uprooted

entirely, are a blemish.

But the inner ones that were split or blunted are not a blemish, since the matter is not visible in them and it is not considered a blemish that is visible.

What is the reason

that the inner ones are a blemish when they are uprooted?

Is it not because when it cries, it is visible?

For when it cries, it is visible, and therefore it is a blemish; and what does Rav Pappa teach us?

And we answer:

Rava said: Rav Pappa also explains the reason for the Mishna

there:

“What is the reason that when they are uprooted

in the inner ones

it is a blemish? Because when it cries, it is visible.” [

And nevertheless, when they are split or blunted, it is not visible at all.]

Mishna:

All the blemishes that can be brought about by a human being,

where it is possible that a person made this blemish—for example, its eye was blinded, its hand was severed, its ear was split [excluding blemishes that cannot be made, such as an animal with five legs, for the Mishna is not speaking of these]—therefore

Israelite shepherds are trustworthy

to say that the blemishes occurred by themselves. But

kohen shepherds are not trustworthy,

for they are suspected of lying in this matter .

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: He is trustworthy concerning that of another, but he is not trustworthy concerning that of himself.

Rabbi Meir says: One who is suspected concerning a matter may neither judge it nor testify concerning it.

And in the Gemara he explains their dispute.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar

dispute concerning the explanation of the Mishna.

One said:

That which is taught in the Mishna, “Israelite shepherds are trustworthy,” means

Israelite shepherds,

and even if the firstborn is standing

with kohanim

who are its owners,

the shepherds are trustworthy,

for we are not concerned that perhaps this blemish was intentionally made by a person and the shepherd is lying, saying that it occurred by itself, so that his master would slaughter it and feed him from it, because

for a morsel

that is small

we are not concerned

that he will lie.

And that which is taught, “kohen shepherds are not trustworthy,” means

shepherds

who are

kohanim,

while the firstborn is found

with Israelites,

and therefore

they are not trustworthy,

because

he says:

the shepherd, who is a kohen: “I will inflict a blemish in it, and certainly the owner will give me the firstborn, because

since I labor over it,

I work for him,

he will not leave it for me and give it to others.”

And the same law

applies to a

kohen shepherd

testifying

for a kohen

owner: it is reasonable that he is not trustworthy, because

we are concerned about reciprocal favors.

Perhaps the shepherd thinks: “Today I will testify for him that his firstborn is permitted, and tomorrow, when I receive an unblemished firstborn from an Israelite, I will inflict a blemish in it, and he will repay me by testifying that the blemish occurred by itself.”

These are the words of the first tanna.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel came to say: He is trustworthy

the kohen to testify

concerning

a firstborn

belonging to another

whether he is shepherding for him or not.

But he is not trustworthy concerning that of himself,

for only concerning his own firstborn, which he received from an Israelite, is he suspected of inflicting a blemish in it.

And Rabbi Meir came to say: One who is suspected concerning the matter,

that is, a kohen who is suspected concerning firstborn animals,

may neither judge it nor testify concerning it,

for he is not trustworthy to testify even for another [and this is the view of the first tanna].

And one said

in the explanation of our Mishna: That which is taught in the Mishna, “Israelite shepherds are trustworthy,” means:

shepherds

of animals belonging to

Israelites, who are kohanim, are trustworthy.