Bekhorot 34b — the Talmud in English

and it was cut off

the baheret unintentionally,

he is pure.

And we derive this from that which is written: “All the days during which the affliction is upon him he shall be impure”—to exclude the case where he had a baheret and it was cut off.

And if

he cut off

the baheret

intentionally —

Rabbi Eliezer says:

They fine him for having transgressed the prohibition against cutting off an affliction, and he becomes pure only

when another affliction appears on him

and

he becomes pure from it,

and then he becomes pure even from the first affliction. For it has become clear that Heaven took pity on him, since even if the first baheret had remained, he would have recovered from it as well.

And the Sages say: Until it spreads

the baheret of the later affliction

over his entire body,

over all of his flesh. For even if the baheret had remained upon him [and he had not cut it off], he would have become pure. As it is written: “And if the tzara'at has covered all his flesh, he shall pronounce the affliction pure.”

Or until his baheret is reduced

the first one

to less than a gris.

That is, at the time he cut it off, it was smaller than a gris, which is the minimum size of an affliction that renders one impure .

But if at the time of cutting it off it had the size of a gris, he does not become pure even when another affliction appears on him and the baheret spreads over his entire body, because the Sages fined him permanently.

It is evident that Rabbi Eliezer does not impose a permanent fine. Why, then, does he say regarding a firstborn animal that it may never be slaughtered?

And we answer:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: When Rabbi Eliezer imposes a fine, it is

with regard to his property.

Therefore, regarding a firstborn animal he says that it may never be slaughtered. But

with regard to his person, he does not impose a fine.

And therefore, regarding a baheret, he maintains that he becomes pure when another affliction appears on him.

And we explain:

With regard to his property, it is possible to say

that if they did not fine him permanently, there would be concern

that he might come to make

a blemish in it. It is not enough that we fine him only for this blemish, by prohibiting him from slaughtering the animal on its account, because he reasons:

In either event,

I will make a blemish in it. If they permit it to me, I have gained; and if they require me to wait for another blemish, what have I lost? In any event, I would have had to wait until a blemish arose. Therefore, they must fine him permanently, so that he will not come to make a blemish in it.

But

with regard to his person, is it conceivable that he would come to act “‘

in either event’”?

Even if we fined him not permanently but only until another affliction appears on him, that alone would suffice to prevent him from cutting off his baheret. It is preferable for him to remain with the baheret and wait until it heals than to cut it off and wait for another affliction, which may or may not appear; and even when it appears, he will have to wait until it heals.

Rava said:

And is it only

Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer

alone that is

difficult,

while

the statement of the Sages in accordance with the Sages is not difficult?

After all, we find that regarding a firstborn animal the Sages did not impose a permanent fine, whereas regarding an affliction they did impose one. Why, then, did you resolve the difficulty only according to Rabbi Eliezer?

And we answer:

Rather, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer is not difficult, as we answered,

for a person himself differs from his property.

The Sages’ statement in accordance with the Sages is also not difficult. Here, they fined him for what he did; here, they fined him for what he did.

The Sages never imposed a permanent fine in any context except with regard to the prohibited act that he himself performed.

And we explain:

Here,

with regard to a firstborn animal,

they fined him for what he did.

For

with regard to what did he intend to permit it for himself?

The firstborn animal

by means of this blemish

that he deliberately inflicted upon it. Therefore,

the Sages fined him so that he may not benefit from it by means of this blemish

.

And here,

with regard to one who cuts off his baheret,

they fined him for what he did.

For

with regard to what did he intend to render himself pure? By means of this cutting off!

Therefore,

the Sages fined him with regard to this cutting off

so that it should not benefit him. Rather, it is as though the baheret were still present, and consequently he remains impure forever. For even if another affliction appears and he recovers from it, the Sages maintain that this does not prove that had the baheret remained, it too would have healed.

Rav Pappa raised a dilemma:

Regarding that which Rabbi Eliezer said: When another affliction appears on him, he becomes pure from it—is

“he becomes pure”

what we learned,

meaning that as soon as another affliction appears on him, he becomes pure from the first one?

Or is

“and he becomes pure”

what we learned,

meaning that when another affliction appears on him and he becomes pure from the later one, he then becomes pure from the first one as well?

What practical difference is there?

After all, even if he becomes pure from the first one immediately, he is still impure because of the second affliction.

With regard to a bridegroom on whom an affliction appeared.

As we learned: If an affliction appeared on a bridegroom —

they grant him the seven days of his wedding celebration

so that the kohen will not inspect the affliction

on him, or on his garment, or on his house.

For if an affliction appeared on any of these, as long as the kohen has not declared him, or his garment or house, impure, he is not impure.

And

similarly, anyone on whom an affliction appears

also

during

a Festival—

they grant him all the days of the Festival 21 .

Here too, the case is one in which the second affliction appeared on him during the days of the wedding celebration.

If you say, “he becomes pure” is what we learned,

meaning that he becomes pure immediately when another affliction appears on him, then

from the first one

from the first affliction

he becomes pure

from the moment the second affliction appears. But

with regard to the later one,

the second affliction,

we wait for him

and refrain from rendering him impure through the kohen’s inspection until the completion of

the seven days

of the

celebration.

But if you say, “and he becomes pure” is what we learned,

meaning that he becomes pure from the first affliction only when he becomes pure from the second affliction, he remains impure during the days of the celebration. Since

ultimately,

even

though he is not rendered impure

yet

by the later one

during the days of the celebration, nevertheless

he is still subject to impurity from the first one,

as he does not become pure from it until he becomes pure from the second one; and the second one remains suspended during the days of the celebration, neither impure nor pure.

What is the ruling?

And we conclude:

Teyku.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira:

If one

pierced the ear of a firstborn animal, and died,

the person who pierced it—

what is the law concerning fining

his

son after him,

so that his son too may never slaughter the animal?

We maintain [in the fourth chapter of Gittin] that if one sells his slave to a gentile, they fine him to redeem the slave for up to ten times his value, because he deprived the slave of the mitzvot, which he cannot perform in the gentile’s possession. There, the dilemma was raised: if the seller dies, do they fine his son to redeem the slave?

And in resolving that dilemma we say: even

if you should say

that if one

sells his slave to a gentile and dies, they fine his son after him,

so that just as his father was required to redeem the slave from the gentile for up to ten times his value, so too the son must redeem him,

nevertheless, it is possible that only there did they fine his son after him to redeem him, because

every single day

that the slave remains with the gentile, the gentile

deprives him

the slave

of mitzvot.

That is not the case with a firstborn animal, where the fine is imposed only because he transgressed the prohibition against inflicting a blemish; therefore, his son, who did not transgress the prohibition, should not be fined.

We maintain that if one deliberately arranged to perform his work during the intermediate days of a Festival, although he could have done it before the Festival and left it for the intermediate days [when it was a matter involving loss, which is permitted during the intermediate days], they fine him by prohibiting him from doing it during the intermediate days, even if he will suffer a loss.

And we raise the dilemma: if one deliberately arranged to perform his work during the intermediate days of a Festival and died before the Festival, did they fine his son as well, so that he may not perform it, or did they not fine him?

And in resolving it we say:

If you should say that if one arranged his work for the intermediate days of a Festival and died, they did not fine his son after him, because he did not commit the transgression,

as he died before the Festival and did not manage to transgress, therefore his son is not fined,

here,

with regard to a firstborn animal, where the father transgressed the prohibition against inflicting a blemish,

what is the ruling?

Did they fine his son after him or not?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Do

the Sages fine him personally, but he is no longer present?

Or perhaps, they fine his property,

which is the firstborn animal,

and it is still present.

He said to him: You have learned the answer: A field that was cleared of weeds during the Sabbatical year

meaning that detached thorns that had been scattered in it were removed—

may be sown after the Sabbatical year,

and we do not fine him, since this is not significant agricultural labor. But if it

was fertilized,

or

was manured,

meaning that it was fertilized either with manure or by bringing animals into the field so that it could be sown after the Sabbatical year—

it may not be sown after the Sabbatical year,

because we fine him since he performed significant labor during the Sabbatical year.

And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Hanina, said: We have received,

a tradition from our fathers, a practice transmitted by our teachers , that if he

fertilized it,

manured it,

and died—

his son may sow it

this field.

Apparently,

only

him personally did the Sages fine.

But

the Sages did not fine his son.