Bekhorot 25b — the Talmud in English

And the Sages prohibit

because of a decree, lest he leave it with him and come to the prohibition of shearing and labor. And Akavya did not decree.

The words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei said to him

to Rabbi Yehuda:

“Akavya ben Mahalalel did not permit in this case,

[namely,] Akavya ben Mahalalel.”

That is, as we conclude in the Gemara, it was not in the case where they slaughtered it that Akavya permitted and the Sages prohibited; rather, if they slaughtered it, even the Sages permit it.

Rather,

in what did they disagree?

With regard to the hair of a blemished firstborn that fell, and they placed it in a window, and afterward it died

by itself:

in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel permits, and the Sages prohibit.

The following clause follows the method of Rabbi Yehuda, as explained in the Gemara.

The matted hair

that is

on a firstborn,

that is: wool that was torn away from the skin while the firstborn was still alive, but nevertheless remains entangled with the rest of the wool upon the firstborn when they slaughtered it:

That which appears to be part of the shearing,

that is, when he shears the wool, the matted shearing also appears as part of the shearing, it is

permitted

through slaughter even according to the Sages, as though it had not fallen at all—

And that which does not appear to be part of the shearing,

that is, it is recognizable that it had been detached from the beginning, that is

prohibited

according to the method of the Sages.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yosei said to him: “Akavya ben Mahalalel did not permit in this case, but rather with regard to the hair of a blemished firstborn that fell, and they placed it in a window, and afterward it died by itself; in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel permits, and the Sages prohibit”:

The meaning of the language of the Mishna is: It was not in the case of slaughter that Akavya permitted, but it was in the case of death that he permitted, and therefore we infer:

By implication,

in the case of slaughter

he prohibited

even Akavya ben Mahalalel, and it was only in the case of death by itself that he permitted. And this is difficult:

Now, if in the case of death—

when the hair attached to the firstborn is prohibited for benefit and requires burial—

Akavya ben Mahalalel permits

the hair that fell while it was alive,

if they slaughtered it—

when the hair attached to it is permitted for benefit—

is it necessary to say

that the hair that fell is permitted for benefit?!

Rather, this is what Rabbi Yosei said:

Rabbi Yosei:

“Not in this case”—

in the case of slaughter—

did Akavya permit and the Sages prohibit.

That is, it was not in this case that the Sages prohibited;

rather, in the case of slaughter everyone agrees

—even the Sages—

permits; when do they disagree?

The Sages disagree with Akavya ben Mahalalel and prohibit it

in the case of death

by itself. And as was explained in the Mishna.

Rabbi Asi said that Reish Lakish said:

The dispute

between Akavya and the Sages is as follows: Akavya permitted only

when

already

an expert had permitted it,

and he could slaughter it, and after the permission the hair fell.

For one

the Sages

holds: Although it is already fit for slaughter, we decree to prohibit it, because if we permitted the hair that fell,

perhaps he will come to leave it

lest he leave it [

in order to leave the firstborn and not slaughter it, so that the hair would fall from it, and meanwhile he would come to the prohibition of shearing and labor],

and the other,

Akavya,

holds: We do not decree

that he will leave an animal fit for slaughter because of the hair that falls.

But

if the hair fell while

an expert had not yet permitted it, everyone agrees that it is prohibited

—the hair that fell—because of a decree lest he leave it.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

from that which was taught in a beraita:

Blemished animals

that are prohibited from being offered upon the altar

prohibit

in a mixture

in any amount,

for if even one blemished animal became mixed among a thousand unblemished ones, all of them are prohibited from being offered upon the altar.

And Rabbi Yosei says: “It shall be inspected”

[it shall be examined], and he proceeds to explain it.

And we raised a question concerning it: What

“shall be inspected”?

If you say, it shall be inspected—that blemished one, if it is present—and he shall remove it, and the others shall be permitted,

if you wish to explain it as follows: They should inspect until they find the blemished one, and once they find it the others become permitted. This cannot be said, for:

By implication, the first tanna said: No,

it shall not be inspected. Are you to say that the first tanna disagrees on this matter and holds that it shall not be inspected, and even if they find the blemished one, the others will not be permitted?!

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said,

to explain:

Here we are dealing with the shearing of a blemished firstborn.

That is, with the shearing of a firstborn that fell while it was alive, and afterward a sage found that it was blemished,

and they became mixed

before they slaughtered the firstborn

with ordinary shearing,

and afterward they slaughtered it. And the explanation of their dispute is: Everyone holds like the Sages,

and who is the first tanna?

It is Rabbi Yehuda, who says:

even

in the case of slaughter the Rabbis prohibit.

And

Rabbi Yosei follows his own reasoning, for he says: In the case of slaughter the Rabbis permit—

And it teaches

“it shall be inspected”:

What, is it not that it shall be inspected with regard to its blemish by a sage; if it is a permanent blemish,

it

is permitted?

This is the explanation of the beraita: Shearings of a firstborn that fell, and a sage has not yet examined them to know whether there is a blemish among them, became mixed with ordinary shearings. Rabbi Yehuda says: They have no remedy through slaughter of the firstborn, since even if he slaughters the firstborn, they will be prohibited for benefit. Rabbi Yosei, however, holds: The sage should examine the firstborn, and if he finds a permanent blemish in it, he should slaughter the firstborn, and consequently everything will be permitted, since even the Sages agree that if they slaughtered the firstborn, what fell from it while it was alive is permitted.

We have learned: The Sages permitted it in the case of slaughter

even though an expert had not permitted it

until after he sheared the wool, since we say “it shall be inspected” now. And since, according to Rabbi Yosei, the Sages, who permit only through slaughter, permit the hair even though it fell before an expert permitted it, the same applies to Akavya: whether in the case of slaughter or in the case of death, it is permitted even though it fell before a sage permitted it.

Rava said: No,

not as you explained, that the sage should now examine the firstborn after the shearing, for in this manner it will not help to permit it. Rather,

“it shall be inspected”

[it shall be examined]

whether an expert permitted it

before he sheared the hair;

if so,

he may slaughter it and the shearings will become permitted;

but if not,

an expert did not permit it before it fell,

no,

its slaughter will not help it.

When

[he ascended]

Ravin

from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

he stated the teaching

[Rav Naḥman’s explanation of the beraita]

before Rabbi Yirmeya!

Rabbi Yirmeya said

Rabbi Yirmeya:

“Foolish Babylonians! Because they sit in a land of darkness, they state dark teachings.”

[Foolish people of Babylonia, because their place of residence is in a dark land, they state dark teachings.] And is it that

they did not hear

[did the Babylonians not hear]

that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The dispute

in which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei disagreed does not concern shearings at all, but concerns blemished animals that became mixed,

in

such a case

that he inspected and did not find

a blemish in any animal: whether we rely upon his inspection to permit all of them.

And they disagree,

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei,

in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages, as we learned

in tractate Niddah 61a:

A mound that is impure [in which there was an olive-sized portion of a corpse] that became mixed among two pure mounds, and they inspected all three and found them pure, all of them are impure,

as Rabbi Meir would say:

Anything that has the presumptive status of impurity remains forever in its impurity, until the impurity becomes known to you where

it

is.

And the Sages say: He inspects until he reaches bedrock

because, since it is hard, a grave certainly was not made there,

or

until he reaches

the

ground

untouched,

that is, hard ground that has not yet been worked.

And here as well, since it was known that one animal was blemished, even though we inspected all the animals and there is no blemished animal here, all of them are prohibited, since there was necessarily a blemished one here. But according to the Sages, “it shall be inspected,” and if no blemished animal is found, all of them are fit for the altar.

And Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan,

to explain the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda in the beraita:

It is always concerning a blemished animal that became mixed, and

the dispute

is in

a

case

that he inspected and found

one animal that was blemished, and their dispute is: Do we assume that this is the animal that was lost, or are we concerned that perhaps it is another one, and the one that was lost has still not been found?

And they disagree,

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda,

in the dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, as it was taught:

A field in which a grave was lost,

then

one who enters it is impure.

A grave was found in it—

after it had been lost in it—and he cleared it away, then

one who enters it is pure, for I say: it is the grave that was lost; it is the grave that was found,

and behold, he cleared it away.

The words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

We do not say, “It is the grave that was lost; it is the grave that was found,” but we are concerned that perhaps it is another one, and the grave that was lost has still not been found, and

the entire field must be examined.

And here as well, according to the Sages, since he examined and found one blemished animal, we are not concerned that perhaps it is another one and a blemished animal is still mixed among the animals, and this is the position of Rabbi Yosei, who permits and said, “It shall be inspected,” meaning until a blemished animal is found. Whereas Rabbi Yehuda holds like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that it is not sufficient if he inspected and found one blemished animal, until he examines all of them.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav Asi—

who explained [the dispute] as referring to a case in which he found one blemished animal—

what is the reason that he did not say as Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba,

who explained their dispute as referring to a case in which he inspected all of them and did not find a blemished animal?

He can say to you,

Rav Asi: In this case even the Sages—who rely on the examination of all the heaps for impurity—agree that examining all of them for a blemish is not sufficient, because

granted, with regard to impurity,

since we examined and there is no impurity here,

say that a raven came and took it,

the impurity,

a mouse came and took it,

the impurity—

But here,

when there was certainly a blemished animal in the mixture and it was not found, the Sages agree that we do not rely on the examination, because

where could the blemished animal have gone [where did the blemished animal go]!?

And even Rabbi Yosei would not rely on the inspection and examination.

And

we explain the reason of

the other one,

namely Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, who holds that according to the Sages one relies on the examination of all the animals for a blemish, according to the position of the Sages:

say, it was a passing blemish and it was healed [and recovered].

The Gemara further explains:

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, what is the reason that he did not say as Rav Asi,

who explained their dispute as referring to a case in which one blemished animal was located through inspection?

He can say to you,

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba: Even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who does not hold, with regard to a grave, “It is the grave that was lost; it is the grave that was found,” agrees that with regard to a blemished animal we say, “It is the blemished animal that was lost; it is the blemished animal that was found,” because

granted, a field

indeed

its way is to be buried in it [it is customary to bury in it], and therefore

we say: Just as this one buried in it, another person buried in it [just as this one dug the first grave, so too one may say that another dug a grave in it as well, and the grave that was found is the grave that the second one dug].

But sacred animals, since they were examined for us and are present,

and

is it their way to develop a blemish!?

Since the animals had been examined for a blemish before they became mixed, and now one blemished animal was found, which can be attributed to being the one that became mixed, is it customary for a blemish to develop in the animals, so that we should be concerned that a blemish also developed in the others?

And

we explain the reason of

the other one,

namely Rav Asi: Indeed,

since they gore one another, a blemish is common among them,

since they gore one another, a blemish is common among them.

He raises an objection—

to Resh Lakish, who holds that if an expert did not permit it, it is forbidden to everyone—from that which was taught:

One who plucks

or it was plucked by itself

wool from an unblemished firstborn

even though a blemish developed in it and he slaughtered it,

it is

forbidden,

and even according to the view that permits hair that fell from a blemished animal and he slaughtered it, because with an unblemished firstborn we decree more strongly, lest he keep it.

And it follows:

The reason is the unblemished animal,

specifically because the hair was plucked from the firstborn while it was still unblemished, it is forbidden—