Bekhorot 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages prohibit it

because of a decree, lest one leave it in that state and come to violate the prohibitions against shearing and working with it. And Akavya did not issue this decree.

The statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yose said to

Rabbi Yehuda:

Akavya ben Mahalalel did not permit it in this case

.

That is, as we conclude in the Gemara, Akavya did not permit it in the case where the animal was slaughtered and he permitted it while the Sages prohibited it; rather, if it was slaughtered, even the Sages permit it.

Rather,

in what case did they disagree?

Regarding the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that fell, was placed in a window, and afterward the animal died

on its own:

in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel permits it, and the Sages prohibit it.

The following clause follows the method of Rabbi Yehuda, as explained in the Gemara.

The matted hair

that is

on a firstborn animal,

that is: wool that became detached from the skin while the firstborn was alive, but remained entangled with the rest of the wool on the firstborn when it was slaughtered:

If the hair appears to be part of the shearing,

that is, when one shears the wool, the matted hair too appears to be part of the shearing, then it is

permitted

after slaughter even according to the Sages, as though it had never fallen off—

But if it does not appear to be part of the shearing,

that is, it is recognizable that it had originally become detached, then it is

prohibited

in accordance with the view of the Sages.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not permit it in this case, but rather regarding the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that fell, was placed in a window, and afterward the animal died on its own; in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel permits it, and the Sages prohibit it:

The meaning of the wording of the Mishna is: Akavya did not permit it when the animal was slaughtered; rather, it was when the animal died that he permitted it. Therefore, we infer:

By implication,

when it was slaughtered,

he prohibited it,

even Akavya ben Mahalalel; it was only when the animal died on its own that he permitted it. This is difficult:

Now, if when it died—

the hair attached to a firstborn animal is prohibited for benefit and requires burial—

Akavya ben Mahalalel permits

the hair that fell while the animal was alive,

when it was slaughtered—

the hair attached to it is permitted for benefit—

is it not obvious

that the hair that fell is permitted for benefit?!

Rather, this is what Rabbi Yose is saying

:

Not in this case—

when it was slaughtered—

did Akavya permit it while the Sages prohibited it.

That is, this is not the case in which the Sages prohibited it;

rather, when it was slaughtered, everyone agrees—

even the Sages—

it is permitted; when do they disagree?

The Sages disagree with Akavya ben Mahalalel and prohibit it

when the animal died

on its own. And this is as explained in the Mishna.

Rabbi Asi said that Reish Lakish said:

The disagreement

between Akavya and the Sages is as follows: Akavya permitted it only

when

the animal had already

been declared permitted by an expert,

so that it could be slaughtered, and after the declaration of permissibility the hair fell off.

For one—

the Sages—

maintains: Although the animal is already fit for slaughter, we issue a decree prohibiting the hair, because if we were to permit hair that had fallen off,

we would be concerned

lest one come to leave it in that state [

that is, to leave the firstborn animal without slaughtering it so that its hair will fall from it, and in the meantime come to violate the prohibitions against shearing and working with it],

while the other

Akavya

maintains: We do not issue a decree

that one will leave an animal that is fit for slaughter because of the hair that falls from it.

But

if the hair fell when the animal

had not yet been declared permitted by an expert, everyone agrees that the hair that fell is prohibited,

because of a decree lest one leave it in that state.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

from that which was taught in a beraita:

Blemished animals,

which are prohibited from being offered on the Altar,

prohibit

in a mixture

in any amount,

for if even one blemished animal became mixed with a thousand unblemished animals, all of them are prohibited from being offered on the Altar.

And Rabbi Yose says: It shall be examined [

that is, it shall be checked], and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And we raised the question: What does the expression

“it shall be examined” mean?

If we say that the blemished animal itself shall be examined to determine whether it is present, and it shall be removed, and the others shall be permitted,

that is, perhaps one might explain it as follows: They should examine the animals until they find the blemished one, and once they find it, the others become permitted. This cannot be said, however, for:

By implication, the first tanna says: No,

the animals shall not be examined. Would you say that this is the point on which the first tanna disagrees, maintaining that they should not be examined, and that even if they find the blemished animal, the others do not become permitted?!

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said,

to explain:

Here we are dealing with the shearing of a blemished firstborn animal.

That is, we are dealing with wool that fell from a firstborn animal while it was alive, and afterward a Sage determined that it was blemished;

it became mixed—

before the firstborn was slaughtered—

with ordinary wool,

and then the firstborn was slaughtered. The explanation of their dispute is: Everyone holds like the Sages,

and who is the first tanna?

It is Rabbi Yehuda, who says:

Even

when it was slaughtered, the Rabbis prohibit it.

And

Rabbi Yose follows his own reasoning, for he says: When it was slaughtered, the Rabbis permit it—

And it teaches

“it shall be examined.”

What, is it not saying that it shall be examined by a Sage for its blemish, and if it is a permanent blemish

then

it is permitted?

This is the meaning of the beraita: Wool from a firstborn animal that fell off, before a Sage had examined it to determine whether it had a blemish, became mixed with ordinary wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: It has no remedy through slaughter of the firstborn, since even if one slaughters the firstborn, the wool remains prohibited for benefit. Rabbi Yose, however, maintains: The Sage should examine the firstborn, and if he finds a permanent blemish in it, he should slaughter the firstborn, and consequently all the wool becomes permitted, since even the Sages agree that if the firstborn was slaughtered, the hair that fell from it while it was alive is permitted.

We have therefore learned: The Sages permitted it when the animal was slaughtered

even though an expert had not declared it permitted

until after he had shorn the wool, since we say that it should now be examined. And since according to Rabbi Yose the Sages, who permit it only after slaughter, permit the hair even though it fell before an expert declared the animal permitted, the same applies to Akavya: whether the animal was slaughtered or died, he permits it even if the hair fell before a Sage declared it permitted.

Rava said: No,

not as you explained it—that the Sage should now examine the firstborn, after the wool fell—for in such a case the examination will not render it permitted. Rather,

“it shall be examined [

that is, checked]

whether an expert declared it permitted

before the hair was shorn.

If so,

it may be slaughtered and the wool will become permitted;

but if not,

if an expert did not declare it permitted before the hair fell,

no,

its slaughter will not render it permitted.

When [

when he ascended]

Ravin

from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

he presented the teaching [

the interpretation of Rav Naḥman’s explanation of the beraita]

before Rabbi Yirmeya!

Rabbi Yirmeya said

Rabbi Yirmeya:

You foolish Babylonians! Because you sit in a dark land, you state dark teachings [

“You foolish Babylonians: because your place of residence is in a dark land, you state dark teachings].” And

did they not hear [

did the Babylonians not hear]

that which Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

The disagreement

between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yose concerning blemished animals that became mixed is not at all about wool; rather, it concerns blemished animals that became mixed, and

in

a case

where one examined them and found no blemish

in any animal: Do we rely on his examination and permit all of them?

And they disagree,

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yose,

in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages, as we learned

in tractate Niddah 61a:

A mound that is impure [because there was a kezayit of a corpse there] became mixed among two ritually pure mounds. They examined all three and found them pure; all of them are impure,

as Rabbi Meir would say:

Anything that has the presumptive status of impurity remains forever in its state of impurity, until it becomes known to you where the impurity

is.

is.

And the Sages say: One examines until he reaches bedrock,

since, because it is hard, a grave was certainly not made there,

or

until he reaches

the

ground that is

virgin,

that is, hard ground that has not yet been worked.

Here too, since it was known that one animal was blemished, even though we examined all the animals and there is no blemished animal here, they are all prohibited, since there must have been a blemished animal here. According to the Sages, however, “it shall be examined,” and if no blemished animal is found, they are all fit for the Altar.

And Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said,

to explain the dispute between Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Yehuda in the beraita:

It is indeed referring to a blemished animal that became mixed with others, and

the disagreement

concerns

a

case

where one examined them and found

one animal that was blemished. Their dispute is whether we assume that this is the animal that had been lost, or whether we are concerned that it is a different animal and that the one that was lost has still not been found.

And they disagree,

Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Yehuda,

in the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as it was taught:

A field in which a grave was lost ,

then

one who enters it is impure.

If a grave is found in it—

after a grave was lost there and it was cleared away, then

one who enters it is pure, as I say: It is the grave that was lost; it is the grave that was found—

and it was indeed cleared away.

These are the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

We do not say: It is the grave that was lost; it is the grave that was found. Rather, we are concerned that perhaps it is another one, and the grave that was lost still has not been found; therefore

the entire field must be examined.

And here too, according to the Sages, once he examined the animals and found one blemished animal, we are not concerned that it is another one and that a different blemished animal is still mixed among the animals. This is the position of Rabbi Yosei, who permits it and said: “It shall be examined,” meaning until a blemished animal is found. Rabbi Yehuda, however, holds like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that it is not sufficient to examine the animals and find one blemished animal; rather, he must examine all of them.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav Asi—

who explained the dispute as referring to a case in which one blemished animal was found—

why did he not state his explanation in accordance with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba,

who explained their dispute as referring to a case in which all the animals were examined and no blemished animal was found?

He could say that

Rav Asi: In such a case, even the Sages—who rely on the examination of all the piles for impurity—agree that examining all the animals for a blemish is insufficient, because

granted, with regard to impurity,

once we examined and there is no impurity here,

say that a raven came and carried it away

the impurity;

a mouse came and carried it away

the impurity—

But here,

when there was certainly a blemished animal among the mixture and it was not found, the Sages agree that we do not rely on the examination, because

where could the blemished animal have gone [where did the blemished animal go]!?

And even Rabbi Yosei would not rely on the examination.

And

we explain the reason of

the other one,

namely, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, who holds that according to the Sages one may rely on examining all the animals for a blemish:

say that it was a passing blemish and it healed [and recovered].

The Gemara further explains:

And why did Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba not state his explanation in accordance with Rav Asi,

who explained their dispute as referring to a case in which one blemished animal was located through examination?

He could say that

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who does not hold with regard to a grave that “it is the grave that was lost; it is the grave that was found,” agrees that with regard to a blemished animal we say: “It is the blemished animal that was lost; it is the blemished animal that was found,” because

granted, with regard to a field,

it is

its nature to have graves buried in it [it is customary to bury in it], and therefore

we say: Just as this person buried in it, another person may have buried in it [just as this person dug the first grave, so too one may say that another person buried someone else in it, and the grave that was found is the second grave that he dug].

But with regard to consecrated animals, once they were examined by us and remain

and

is it their nature to develop a blemish!?

Since the animals had been examined for blemishes before they became mixed together, and now one blemished animal was found, which can be presumed to be the one that became mixed in, is it customary for animals to develop a blemish, such that we should be concerned that a blemish also developed in the others?].

And

we explain the reason of

the other one,

namely, Rav Asi: Indeed,

since they gore one another, a blemish is common among them,

since they gore one another, a blemish is common among them.

Meytivi—

against Reish Lakish, who holds that if an expert did not permit it, it is prohibited to everyone—from that which is taught in a beraita:

One who plucks

or from which it was plucked on its own

wool from an unblemished firstborn animal

even though a blemish developed in it and it was slaughtered,

it is

prohibited,

even according to the opinion that permits hair that fell from a blemished animal and it was slaughtered, because with regard to an unblemished firstborn animal we issue a decree more stringently, lest one leave it in its unblemished state.

And it follows:

The reason is the unblemished status,

specifically because the hair was plucked from the firstborn animal while it was still unblemished, it is prohibited—