Bekhorot 25a (כה.) — the Talmud in English

It was also stated: Rav Ḥananya bar Shelamya said in the name of Rav: In its corresponding case on a Festival

it is permitted,

because the reason for Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam’s ruling is that one does not intend to perform the prohibited labor.

And we raise an objection:

But did Rav say this

that in its corresponding case on a Festival it is permitted, and this is because “an act that one does not intend to perform is permitted,” in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains this generally

? But Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rav:

The stopper of his winepress [

the stopper of a barrel, around which one wraps tow and rags]

may not be tightened on a Festival [

it is prohibited to tighten it onto the barrel on a Festival, since the wine is squeezed out of the rags. This demonstrates that Rav holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who generally maintains: an act that one does not intend to perform is prohibited]!

And we answer:

In that case—

tightening the stopper of the winepress—

even Rabbi Shimon agrees

that it is prohibited,

as Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of “cut off its head and will it not die?”

We nevertheless raise an objection:

But Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav

explicitly:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!

And Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said that Shmuel ruled: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi

Shimon.

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin taught the matter without the names of the sages [

without the amoraim who stated the rulings in the name of Rav and Shmuel]:

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And if so, how are we to explain the reason for Rav’s ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam regarding a firstborn animal, and for Rav’s permitting this action on a Festival—that it is because an act that one does not intend to perform is permitted?!

Rather,

in light of this objection, the Gemara explains the reason Rav ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam regarding a firstborn animal, and also permitted performing this action on a Festival, in a different manner:

Rav actually holds that an act that one does not intend to perform is prohibited,

but with regard to a firstborn animal it is permitted to pull out the wool even intentionally,

and

because

pulling out is not the same as shearing,

and this is why Rav ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam—

And with regard to a Festival, this is the reason Rav permitted it

because

it is removing something from its place of growth in an unusual manner,

as it is not customary to pull out the hair; rather, it is customary to shear it.

And we raise an objection:

And

if

pulling out is not the same as shearing,

why would you say that Rav permitted pulling out the wool of a firstborn animal even intentionally?!

But it was taught in a baraita: One who pulls out

on Shabbat

a wing feather [

one who pulls a feather from the wing of a bird],

and cuts off its tip

at the head of the feather after pulling it out, as the head of the feather is thin and suitable for placing in a pillow or cushion,

and strips it

toward its tail, which is hard; he strips away its hair from both sides, discards the shaft, and puts the hair into a pillow or cushion, such a person is

liable to bring three sin-offerings.

And

Reish Lakish

explained: Pulling out entails liability because of the labor of

the labor of

shearing; cutting off the tip entails liability because of the labor of

the labor of

cutting,

and stripping entails liability because of the labor of smoothing.

Thus it is explicit that pulling out entails liability because of shearing.

And we answer:

A wing

of a bird

is different, as that is its ordinary manner:

Its ordinary manner is to pull out the feather rather than shear it, and therefore pulling it out is included in shearing. But with the wool of an animal, whose wool is not customarily pulled out but rather shorn, pulling it out is not included in shearing.

The Gemara further explains:

And from the fact that Rav holds in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam,

who maintains that pulling out is not the same as shearing, it also follows that

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam holds in accordance with Rav,

who maintains that an act that one does not intend to perform is prohibited.

And the following difficulty arises: And

if Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam indeed holds that an act that one does not intend to perform is prohibited

—

was it taught that way?!

But it was taught

with regard to a red heifer, which is disqualified by two black hairs:

Two hairs

whose

roots were red but whose tips were black, Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: He cuts the black tips with scissors

and thereby repairs the heifer,

and he need not be concerned

about the prohibition of shearing the heifer. The reason he need not be concerned is evidently that he does not intend to shear, but rather to repair the heifer. This demonstrates that an act that one does not intend to perform is permitted. And we answer:

A heifer is different, as it is not an animal subject to shearing,

since cows have no wool, and the Torah did not prohibit shearing their hair.

We raise an objection to this:

But it was taught: “

You shall not work with the firstborn of your ox, nor shear the firstborn of your flock,”

and I have only that an ox is prohibited for work and a sheep for shearing. From where do we derive that what is stated with regard to one applies to the other as well?

The verse states: “

You shall not work, and you shall not shear,”

as the conjunction “and” adds the second matter to the first. It is therefore clear that even an ox or a cow is prohibited for shearing?!

Rather,

the Gemara offers a different answer:

A heifer is different, as it is consecrated for the Temple treasury.

We raise an objection to this:

But Rabbi Elazar said: Property consecrated for the Temple treasury is prohibited for shearing and work?!

And we answer:

By rabbinic decree

it is prohibited.

We nevertheless raise an objection:

But

in the final analysis,

there is a rabbinic prohibition!?

And we answer:

A heifer is different, as it is uncommon,

and since the prohibition against shearing property consecrated for the Temple treasury is rabbinic, the Sages permitted it in the case of the heifer, for the Sages did not issue a decree concerning an uncommon matter. We raise an objection: Since the Sages prohibited shearing other property consecrated for the Temple treasury, they should likewise not have permitted shearing a red heifer, even though it is uncommon. Rather,

let us redeem it

for the heifer

and take it out to non-sacred status, shear it, and then consecrate it again [

redeem the heifer and shear it while it is non-sacred and therefore not subject to the prohibition, and then consecrate it again]!

And we answer:

Its value is high,

and he does not have enough money to redeem it.

We nevertheless raise an objection:

Let him do for it as Shmuel said, for Shmuel said: If consecrated property worth one hundred dinars was redeemed for an item worth one peruta, it is redeemed!?

And we answer:

Shmuel said that he redeemed it

only after the fact, meaning that it is redeemed; however,

did he say that this may be done initially

—to redeem something worth a great deal with something worth little!?

Here the Gemara returns to resolve the question in another manner: It had seemed that Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam holds like Rav, that an unintentional act is prohibited, whereas this does not appear to be so from the fact that he permitted cutting the black hairs of the cow with scissors:

Alternatively,

actually, it may be as we said initially: “A cow is different, as it is not subject to shearing.” And as for your difficulty—behold, it is explicit in the beraita that an ox, too, was included with regard to shearing—one may say to you:

When an ox was included, it was included only with regard to shearing its tail

that is, it was included only with regard to shearing its tail, and not with regard to shearing its hair.

And

alternatively, Rav

indeed

holds in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam,

that plucking is not the same as shearing,

and

if

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam did not hold in accordance with Rav,

then, according to his view, an unintentional act is permitted, and this is why he permitted cutting the black hairs of the cow with scissors.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may pluck the hair, provided that he does not move it from its place:

Rav Asi said that Reish Lakish said: They taught this only with regard to [plucking] by hand; however, [plucking] with an implement is prohibited.

And we raise an objection:

But it was taught

in our Mishna:

He makes a place with a hatchet on either side,

which indicates that it is permitted even with an implement!? And we answer:

Read

in our Mishna: He makes a place

for the hatchet

with which he will slaughter it.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, one who plucks the hair to see a blemish:

They raised a dilemma:

Is it permitted

initially

to pluck the hair in order to see the blemish, just as it is permitted for the purpose of slaughter?

Or

perhaps it is prohibited initially, and only

after the fact,

if he plucked the hair, must he not move it from its place, just as this is prohibited with regard to slaughter?

Rabbi Yirmeya said: Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

Wool tangled in an ear

in which there was a blemish,

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: One plucks it out and displays his blemish.

Conclude from this that this is permitted initially.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from this.

Rav Mari said: We, too, have learned [this]:

in our Mishna:

And likewise, one who plucks the hair to see the place of a blemish—

But

what

is the meaning of “likewise”?

If you say

that it refers to

that

“he must not move it,”

this cannot be said, for it is obvious, as follows:

Now, if one who slaughters, whose slaughter proves concerning him

that he did not intend to shear,

must not move it, is it necessary to state this with regard to one who seeks to see the place of a blemish!?

Rather, is it not that “likewise” refers to the one who plucks,

and it is permitted even initially, as in the first clause.

Conclude from this—

initially.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from this.

A. All animals disqualified from consecrated offerings—that is, consecrated animals that developed a blemish and were redeemed—and likewise a firstborn animal with a blemish, are prohibited with regard to shearing, and their milk is also prohibited. This is derived above, on page 15a, from the verse stated concerning animals disqualified from consecrated offerings: “Only according to your every desire may you slaughter and eat meat”; and we expound: “You may slaughter,” but not shear, and “meat,” but not “milk.” Alternatively, since it is stated, “You may slaughter and eat,” they have no permitted use before the time of slaughter, but not shearing and milk, which are benefits derived while the animal is alive.

B. Wool that was plucked from them or that fell from them is prohibited according to everyone as long as they have not died or been slaughtered. Whether the reason for this prohibition is biblical or a rabbinic decree is subject to a dispute among the early authorities, as explained in the notes on the passage.

C. Our Mishna deals with the law governing hair that fell from a firstborn animal, or was plucked from it, while it was alive, and the firstborn was then slaughtered or died: What is the law of the hair? The tannaitic authorities in our Mishna disagree concerning this matter.

Mishna:

The hair of a firstborn animal with a blemish that fell

from it while it was still alive,

and he placed it in a window

because it was prohibited to benefit from it while the animal was alive, and he intended to benefit from it once he slaughtered the animal,

and afterward he slaughtered it:

Akavya ben Mahalalel permits

the hair to be used by a kohen.