Bekhorot 26a — the Talmud in English

The

if he plucked from a firstborn

blemished animal—

analogous to an unblemished animal whose blemish had not been authorized by an expert—

it is permitted even though no expert authorized it at the time it fell out; and this is difficult for Resh Lakish!?

when it fell out, and this is difficult for Reish Lakish!?

And we answer: It is not specifically an “unblemished animal” that is forbidden, but

the tannaitic teaching is: Wherever no expert authorized it,

“unblemished”

he calls it [

before an expert has established that it is a blemished animal, the tanna calls it “unblemished”].

Shall we say

that the words of Resh Lakish

are a matter of dispute between tannaim

?

For it was taught:

One who plucks wool from an unblemished firstborn, even though

a blemish developed in it,

if he

slaughtered it,

it is

forbidden.

In the case of a blemished firstborn from which he plucked

and afterward it died, Akavya ben Mahalalel permits, and the Sages forbid,

this is the view of the first tanna.

Rabbi Yehuda said:

Not in the case

that

died did Akavya ben Mahalalel permit,

for if it died, even Akavya does not permit it,

but in the case of the wool of a blemished firstborn that fell out and he placed it in a window, and afterward slaughtered it—in this case

alone

Akavya ben Mahalalel permits, and the Sages forbid,

and this is as Rabbi Yehuda said in our Mishna.

Rabbi Yosei said: My father agrees [

my father, whose name was]

Ḥalafta—

even though he was among the Sages who disputed Akavya—

in this case,

that he

slaughtered it, it is permitted—

But [

in truth]

in particular [

and explicitly]

the Sages said: Let him leave it

the wool that fell out

in a window, for perhaps there is

hope.

That is, perhaps he will slaughter it and the wool will be permitted, for if

he slaughtered it, according to everyone’s words it is permitted—

Rabbi Yosei continues and says, as he said in our Mishna:

And if it died, Akavya ben Mahalalel permits, and the Sages forbid.

And from this beraita it may be learned that the tannaim disputed—according to those who permit, in accordance with the Sages, when it was slaughtered—whether in their view the wool that fell out before they showed the firstborn to an expert is also permitted, for apparently it is difficult:

Rabbi Yosei,

who explained the dispute between Akavya and the Sages as referring to when it died,

is identical to the first tanna,

who also explained it in this manner!?

Rather, is it not

if it requires that

an expert authorized it

before it fell out, that is what

is the difference between them

between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei according to the position of Akavya’s Sages:

For the first tanna maintains:

If he slaughtered it, and it fell out after

an expert authorized it, there is no

this being what the Sages concede,

but if not—

no,

and this is like Resh Lakish.

And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Even though an expert did not authorize it

before it fell out, since he slaughtered it, the Sages permit it—

He said—

Rava

rejected:

No,

not as you explained the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, but:

according to everyone, if an expert authorized it, yes; if he did not authorize it, no.

And I shall explain to you the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei,

and there are three disputes—

the first tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yosei— \-

There

is

a dispute in the matter:

For the first tanna maintains: Akavya and the Sages dispute

when it dies,

and the same applies when he slaughtered it,

and the fact that they dispute when it died is to inform you of Akavya’s power,

for he permits it even when it dies.

And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: When it dies, according to everyone it is forbidden; they dispute

Akavya and the Sages

when he slaughtered it.

And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: When he slaughtered it, according to everyone it is permitted; they dispute when it dies.

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who interprets their dispute as referring to when he slaughtered it and not to when it died,

since we learned in the chosen [Mishna] [

that is, tractate Eduyot]

in accordance with him.

For we learned

in Eduyot 5:6:

He [

Akavya]

would permit the wool of a blemished firstborn that fell out, and he placed it in a window, and afterward slaughtered it.

And the Sages forbid.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The anonymous

Mishna [

our Mishna] in the final clause

also precisely indicates,

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, for

we learned

in the final clause:

Wool hanging loosely from a firstborn: That which is visible from the fleece is permitted,

as it is like attached wool,

but that which is not visible

from the fleece

is forbidden,

like wool that was plucked and placed in a window. And this is:

whose

is this Mishna of ours, which distinguishes between what is visible and what is not visible?

If you say it is Rabbi Yosei,

it is impossible to say this, for:

And with what [

shall we deal with the animal],

if you say when he slaughtered it,

since you have said that it is Rabbi Yosei, then

both Akavya and the Rabbis, this and that—

both what is visible and what is not visible—

permit,

so why did our Mishna forbid the wool that is not visible from the fleece?

But rather, necessarily, if you will say that it is Rabbi Yosei—

if you must say that it is Rabbi Yosei’s opinion,

when it died

the final clause of the Mishna is dealing with a case in which it is not agreed that it is permitted. If so, it is compelled that our Mishna is not according to Rabbi Yosei, for:

And if it is the Rabbis, then

then

both this and that—

both what is visible and what is not visible—

they forbid, since the Sages forbid the detached wool placed in a window.

поскольку мудрецы запрещают вырванную шерсть, лежащую в окне.

And if

our Mishna is dealing with when it died and is according to

Akavya, then

then

it should have been the reverse

for the tanna to say:

What is visible from the fleece is forbidden,

as it is like attached wool,

for its death renders it forbidden

and it requires burial, whereas

what is not visible from the fleece is permitted, for it was detached from the outset,

and Akavya permitted it even when it died.

And it follows that under no circumstances can we explain the final clause according to Rabbi Yosei,

but evidently it is Rabbi Yehuda

who is the anonymous Mishna in the final clause.

And the Gemara explains the final clause according to Rabbi Yehuda:

And with what, if you say when it died,

it is impossible to say this, for:

both according to Akavya and according to the Rabbis, both this and that they forbid.

Rather, is it not when he slaughtered it?

And if it is Akavya,

our Mishna, it is impossible to say this, for:

both this and that he permits,

since he slaughtered it.

Rather, is it not that it is the Rabbis

who are represented by our Mishna, who do not permit it when he slaughtered it; nevertheless, the Sages permit that which is visible from the fleece.

And learn from it: They dispute when he slaughtered it,

Akavya and the Sages, and the Sages forbid it; therefore, that which is not visible from the fleece is forbidden.

Learn from it

that it is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, for they dispute when he slaughtered it.

Rabbi Yannai raised a question:

One who plucks wool from a perfect elevation-offering while it is alive, and it became blemished and was redeemed,

and afterward he slaughtered it, and

according to the Rabbis,

who do not permit the wool of a firstborn that was plucked from a blemished animal, because of the decree lest he leave it,

what is the halakha?

Does the same decree apply to wool plucked from a perfect elevation-offering, so that the Sages decreed that one may not benefit from it even after redemption and slaughter, because of a decree lest he delay offering the elevation-offering so that he could benefit from the wool that falls out when a blemish develops in it, redeem it, and slaughter it; or did they not decree so, as this side will be explained below?

And we raise an objection to it: Did Rabbi Yannai really have a doubt concerning one who plucked it intentionally!? For

one who plucks

intentionally,

is there anyone who permits [

can it be that there is someone who permits it]? Surely according to the Rabbis it is certainly forbidden, for he is wicked!?

Rather, this is what Rabbi Yannai was asking:

Wool

that was plucked

on its own

from a perfect elevation-offering

while alive, and it became blemished and was redeemed—according to the Rabbis,

what is the halakha?

And the Gemara explains:

Wool

of a sin-offering and a guilt-offering

that was plucked, and it became blemished, and he redeemed and slaughtered it,

you need not ask about it,

for it is certainly permitted, and there is no concern lest he delay offering it because of the wool,

for since they come for atonement,

the sin-offering and the guilt-offering

he will not leave them.

And likewise, wool

of a firstborn

unblemished

and of a tithe-offering

unblemished

also

you need not ask about it,

for since they do not come for atonement,

we decree lest

he leave them

without offering them.

When you ask about it,

wool

of an elevation-offering—what

is its status? Does one compare it to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, or to a firstborn and a tithe-offering? The sides of the doubt are: