Bekhorot 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

This

if he plucked wool from a firstborn animal

with a permanent blemish—

analogous to an unblemished animal, for which a specialist had not issued a permit—

it is permitted even though a specialist had not issued a permit

when it fell out, and this is difficult for Reish Lakish!?

And we answer: It is not specifically an “unblemished” animal that is prohibited. Rather:

The tanna teaches: Wherever a specialist has not issued a permit,

“unblemished”

is what he calls it [

until a specialist has declared the animal to be blemished, the tanna calls it “unblemished”].

Shall we say that the

words of Reish Lakish

are subject to a dispute between

the tannaim?

As it was taught:

One who plucks wool from an unblemished firstborn animal, even though

a blemish developed in it,

if he

slaughtered it,

it is

prohibited.

With regard to an animal with a permanent blemish from which one plucked wool

and afterward it died, Akavya ben Mahalalel permits it, while the Sages prohibit it;

this is the opinion of the first tanna.

Rabbi Yehuda said:

It was not in the case

that it

died that Akavya ben Mahalalel permitted

it, for if it died, even Akavya does not permit it.

Rather, it was in the case of wool from a blemished firstborn animal that fell out and was placed in a window, and afterward the animal was slaughtered; in this case

alone

Akavya ben Mahalalel permits it, while the Sages prohibit it,

as Rabbi Yehuda said in our Mishna.

Rabbi Yosei said: My father concedes [

whose name was

Ḥalafta]—

although he was among the Sages who disagreed with Akavya—

in this case,

that it was

slaughtered, that it is permitted—

but [

in truth]

specifically [

and explicitly]

the Sages said: Let him leave it

the wool that fell out

in the window, for perhaps there is

hope.

That is, perhaps he will slaughter the animal and the wool will be permitted, for if he

slaughtered it, everyone agrees that it is permitted—

Rabbi Yosei continues, as he said in our Mishna:

And if it died, Akavya ben Mahalalel permits it, while the Sages prohibit it.

And from this beraita one can infer that the tannaim disagree—according to those who permit it in the opinion of the Sages when it was slaughtered—whether, in their view, wool that fell out before the firstborn animal was shown to a specialist is also permitted. For this appears difficult:

Rabbi Yosei,

who explained the dispute between Akavya and the Sages as referring to an animal that died,

is the same as the first tanna,

who also explained it in this manner!?

Rather, is it not

whether it is necessary that a specialist

issued a permit

before the wool fell out—that

is the difference between them,

the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, according to the position of Akavya’s Sages:

For the first tanna holds:

If he slaughtered it, and the wool fell out after a specialist

had issued a permit, there is no

case in which the Sages concede.

But if not—

no,

as Reish Lakish stated.

And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Even though a specialist had not issued a permit

before the wool fell out, once he slaughtered it, the Sages permit it—

Rava

said,

rejecting this explanation:

No.

The dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei is not as you explained. Rather:

Everyone agrees that if a specialist issued a permit, there is no prohibition; if he did not issue a permit, there is a prohibition.

And I will explain the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei:

There are three opinions—

the first tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yosei— \-

There

is a dispute concerning the matter:

a dispute in the matter:

For the first tanna holds: Akavya and the Sages disagree

whether it died,

and the same is true when it was slaughtered.

And the fact that they disagree in the case of death is to teach you the force of Akavya,

for he permits it even when the animal died.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: In the case of death, everyone agrees that it is prohibited; the dispute is

between Akavya and the Sages

when it was slaughtered.

And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: When it was slaughtered, everyone agrees that it is permitted; the dispute is in the case of death.

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who explains their dispute as referring to slaughter and not to death,

since we learned in the choice Mishna [

that is, tractate Eduyot]

in accordance with him.

As we learned

in Eduyot 5:6:

He [

Akavya]

would permit the wool of a blemished firstborn animal that fell out, was placed in a window, and afterward the animal was slaughtered.

But the Sages prohibit it.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The anonymous

Mishna

in our Mishna’s final clause

also precisely indicates

that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda, for

we learned

in the final clause:

Wool hanging loosely from a firstborn animal: that which is visible from the fleece is permitted,

as it is considered attached;

but that which is not visible

from the fleece

is prohibited,

like wool that fell out and was placed in a window. And this raises the question:

Whose

is this Mishna, which distinguishes between what is visible and what is not visible?

If you say it is Rabbi Yosei,

this cannot be said, for:

And in what

[case are we dealing with the animal]?

If you say it is when it was slaughtered,

then, since you say that it is Rabbi Yosei,

both Akavya and the Rabbis permit both this and that—

both what is visible and what is not visible—

they permit it,

so why does our Mishna prohibit wool that is not visible from the fleece?

Rather,

if you must say that it is Rabbi Yosei’s opinion,

it concerns death,

the final clause of the Mishna deals with a case in which the animal died, for in that case it is not universally agreed that the wool is permitted. If so, it is necessarily not our Mishna according to Rabbi Yosei, for:

And if it is the Rabbis,

then

both this and that—

both what is visible and what is not visible—

they prohibit, for the Sages prohibit wool that was detached and placed in a window.

And if

our Mishna concerns death and follows

Akavya,

then

it should have stated the opposite

the tanna should have said:

What is visible from the fleece is prohibited,

as it is considered attached,

for its death renders it prohibited

and it requires burial; whereas

what is not visible from the fleece is permitted, for it was detached from the outset,

and Akavya permits it even when the animal died.

It follows that there is no way to explain the final clause according to Rabbi Yosei,

but obviously it is Rabbi Yehuda

the anonymous opinion of our Mishna in its final clause.

And the Gemara explains the final clause according to Rabbi Yehuda:

And in what case? If you say it is death,

this cannot be said, for:

both according to Akavya and according to the Rabbis, they both prohibit both this and that.

Rather, is it not when it was slaughtered?

And if it is Akavya

who is reflected in our Mishna, this cannot be said, for:

both this and that are permitted,

since the animal was slaughtered.

Rather, it is the Rabbis

who are reflected in our Mishna, for they do not permit the wool even when the animal was slaughtered; nevertheless, the Sages permit that which is visible from the fleece.

And learn from this that Akavya and the Sages disagree when it was slaughtered,

and the Sages prohibit it; therefore, that which is not visible from the fleece is prohibited.

Learn from this

that the dispute is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that they disagree when it was slaughtered.

Rabbi Yannai raised a dilemma:

If one plucked wool from a perfect consecrated burnt-offering while it was alive, and it then developed a blemish and was redeemed,

and afterward slaughtered it, and

according to the Rabbis,

who do not permit wool plucked from a blemished firstborn animal because of a decree lest one delay using it,

what is the halakha?

Is wool plucked from a perfect burnt-offering likewise subject to the Sages’ decree that one may not benefit from it even after its redemption and slaughter, because of a decree lest he delay offering the burnt-offering so that he can benefit from the wool that will fall out once it develops a blemish, redeem it, and slaughter it? Or did they not issue such a decree? The latter possibility will be explained below.

We raise an objection to this: Did Rabbi Yannai really raise a dilemma about one who plucked the wool intentionally? For

one who plucks

intentionally,

is there anyone who permits it [

can one imagine that anyone would permit it]? Surely according to the Rabbis it is certainly prohibited, since he is wicked!?

Rather,

this is Rabbi Yannai’s dilemma:

wool that fell out

by itself

from a perfect burnt-offering

while it was alive, and it then developed a blemish and was redeemed—according to the Rabbis,

what is the halakha?

The Gemara explains:

Wool

of a sin-offering or guilt-offering

that fell out, and the animal developed a blemish, was redeemed, and slaughtered,

you need not raise the dilemma

for yourself, as it is certainly permitted, and there is no concern that he may delay offering it because of the wool,

for since they come for atonement,

sin-offerings and guilt-offerings

he will not delay them.

Likewise, wool

of a firstborn animal

unblemished

and of an

unblemished

animal tithe

need not be the subject of your dilemma,

for since they do not come for atonement,

we issue a decree lest he

delay them

from offering them.

When you raise the dilemma, it is concerning wool

of a

burnt-offering—what

is its status? Should it be compared to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, or to a firstborn animal and animal tithe? The sides of the dilemma are: