Bekhorot 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

Both this one and that one

do not lose their impurity

until the dog,

but in the case of

the blood clot, it is fit for a dog, so

it should become impure through carrying. If it is indeed the case that impurity is considered as though it is present, why does it not become impure through carrying?!

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult!

The essential matter: Bar Padda said: Severe impurity

through carrying

lasts until it is unfit even for a convert, whereas lesser impurity

through contact

lasts until it is unfit for a dog.

And Rabbi

Yohanan said: Both this one and that one last until it is unfit for a dog.

And we explain:

What is the reason for Bar Padda’s view?

It is because

it is written [Deuteronomy 14:21]: “

“You shall not eat any unslaughtered animal carcass;

to a convert

who is within your cities you shall give it, and he shall eat it.” From the juxtaposition in the verse we learn: An unslaughtered animal carcass

that is fit for a convert—

that is, for which “and he shall eat it” can be fulfilled— -

is called an unslaughtered animal carcass, but

an unslaughtered animal carcass

that is not fit for a convert is not called an unslaughtered animal carcass.

And the other one—

that is, Rabbi Yohanan—explains this verse as coming

to exclude a case in which it became putrid from the outset

[from the beginning], and is not fit for a convert, in which case it does not impart impurity. But if it did not become putrid from the outset, but was initially fit and then became putrid, its status as an impure object does not lapse until it becomes unfit for a dog.

And the other one

[Bar Padda] holds:

A case in which it became putrid from the outset does not require a verse to exclude it

[the verse does not need to exclude it] from impurity, for

it is merely earth

[it is like earth]. Therefore, the verse must have come to exclude an object that is not fit for a convert even if it did not become putrid from the outset.

And we raise an objection from that which

we learned

in our Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: In the case of a large animal that discharged a blood clot, it must be buried, and it is exempt from the law of the firstborn. And Rabbi Hiyya taught: It does not impart impurity through contact or carrying. And Rabbi Yohanan said: They addressed this matter because of nullification by the majority—

and the difficulty is:

Why specify that it is because of nullification by the majority? One can derive that it was not fit

from the outset

at all,

and in this regard even Rabbi Yohanan agrees that the measure is until it is unfit for a convert?!

And we answer:

This too was initially fit for a convert through its mother

[this clot too was fit for a convert when it was in its mother’s womb].

We learned there

in tractate Makhshirin [6:3]:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Pure brine

belonging to an am ha-aretz

into which any amount of water falls

is

impure,

as the reason is explained below.

Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: This indicates that amei ha-aretz were suspected of mixing half

water

into brine,

for although the brine does not become impure until any amount of water falls into it, as the reason is explained below, nevertheless, once any amount of water falls into it and the water becomes the majority over the brine, like meets its own kind and is reawakened, as we said earlier, on page 22a.

And we ask:

Why do I need

to say that amei ha-aretz were suspected of mixing water into brine up to

half?

But

even

if they were suspected only of mixing water

into brine

less than half

[less than half—that is, close to half]—

also

it would make sense that the brine should become impure when water falls into it,

and

because

that small amount

that fell into it

would become half

water,

and half-and-half is not nullified.

That is, the water is impure, and you purify it only because of nullification by the majority. Once a further amount of water falls in, the mixture becomes half brine and half water, and there is no majority to nullify the water?!

And we answer: Indeed,

say:

amei ha-aretz were suspected of mixing

up to half.

That is, close to half.

Alternatively, say: In fact

as we taught: “amei ha-aretz were suspected of mixing

half,”

and because if there had initially been less than half, and through the falling of the water it became half, it would still not be impure, since

the impurity of an am ha-aretz

is only

rabbinic, and

also

the impurity of liquids

is only

rabbinic,

and therefore:

When water is the majority, the Sages decreed

water

but when it is half-and-half, the Sages did not decree impurity upon it,

and until the falling of the water increases it so that water is the majority, there is no impurity.

Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:

a.

One who purchases a nursing animal from a gentile need not be concerned lest

it did not give birth in his possession and

its offspring—

which it is nursing—

belonged to another animal,

in which case the offspring that she will give birth to is a firstborn. Rather, he relies on the fact that she gave birth to it and has already given birth previously, as the reason is explained in the Gemara: an animal does not love another animal’s offspring sufficiently to nurse it. b. If

he entered his herd and saw the animals giving birth for the first time

[whose first birth this was]

nursing

each a particular animal, and

those that were not giving birth for the first time

[which had already given birth before this offspring]

nursing

other animals,

he need not be concerned: lest the offspring of this one

that was not giving birth for the first time, whose offspring is not a firstborn

came to that one

that was giving birth for the first time,

and lest the offspring of this one

that was giving birth for the first time, whose offspring is a firstborn,

came to that one

that was not giving birth for the first time. In that case, we would not know which is the firstborn, and all of them would be cases of uncertain firstborn status. Rather, he relies on the assumption that each one nurses its own offspring: the animal giving birth for the first time nurses the firstborn, and the animal not giving birth for the first time nurses the non-firstborn.

Gemara:

Rav said: The halakha throughout this chapter is in accordance with the rulings, except where there is a dispute,

that is, the halakha follows all the laws taught in the Mishnayot of this chapter, except in those places where we explicitly taught a dispute.

Rav Sheshet said: I would say that Rav stated this teaching while dozing and lying down

[it appears that Rav said these words while he was dozing and lying down], for

with regard to which

[with regard to which Mishna did Rav need to inform us that the halakha follows it], since:

If you say that it refers to the beginning

[perhaps you might say that he intended to inform us that the halakha follows the first Mishna in this chapter], this cannot be said, for:

Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva explicitly disagree

with regard to it,

and when we have taught a dispute, Rav said that the halakha does not follow it.

Rather, it refers to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov:

perhaps you might say that Rav intended to inform us that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in the ruling taught in the second Mishna of this chapter. This too cannot be said, for:

We have an established principle:

“

The teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is measured and clean

[few laws were transmitted in his name in the Mishnayot, but they are measured and clean, meaning that the halakha follows them].” Rav therefore did not need to inform us specifically about this chapter that the halakha follows him.

Rather, it refers to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel:

perhaps you might say that Rav intended to inform us that the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, whose view is taught in our Mishna. This too cannot be said, for:

They explicitly disagree in a beraita:

we have learned in a beraita that the Sages disagreed with Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, and wherever we have taught a dispute among the Sages, the halakha does not follow that view, as Rav said: “except where there is a dispute.”

We learned in the Mishna below, on page 24b: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: One who slaughters a firstborn animal makes an opening with a cleaver on either side [around the place of the slaughter] and plucks the hair [and this does not involve the prohibition against shearing a firstborn animal, which is forbidden by Torah law], provided that he does not move it [the plucked hair] from its place. He likewise plucks the hair in order to see the site of a blemish.

Rather, [it is referring] to Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam

who appears in the Mishna below, 24b. Even this cannot be said, because:

Did Rav not state this once already [

he already said this once before],

for Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam.

We learned in a Mishna below, 25a: If the hair of a blemished firstborn animal fell out and one placed it in a window, and afterward slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel permits it, while the Sages prohibit it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not permit this case; rather, he permitted the case of the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that fell out into a window and afterward the animal died, whereas the Sages prohibit it.

Rather, [it refers] to the hair of a blemished animal,

perhaps you might say that Rav needed to teach us the halakha concerning the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that fell out and afterward the animal was slaughtered or died. Even this cannot be said, for:

They are indeed in dispute—

in the Mishna below, 25a—

Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Sages.

And we answer:

Actually, it is [referring] to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

in our Mishna, whom Rav said the halakha follows,

and

although the Sages disputed his opinion in the beraita,

this is what Rav teaches us

Rav:

that the dispute in the beraita is not considered a dispute.

That is, when Rav said “except where there is a dispute,” he was not referring to this dispute, but rather to the dispute stated in the Mishna.

And we object:

And since Rav said "

the halakha throughout the entire chapter is except where there is a dispute"