Bekhorot 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

If so,

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam”

why do I need this!?

For it is already included in his first statement!? And we answer:

if

Rav had merely said:

“the halakha applies throughout the chapter,”

and had not said

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam,”

I would have said

that Rav’s first statement

refers to Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam

and not to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And if this is difficult for you:

what is the meaning of

“throughout the chapter,”

which implies that the halakha is so in more than one law? Say instead that

Rabbi Yosei stated two laws [two halakhot were stated by Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam in the following Mishna], and in both the halakha is in accordance with him. -

And

I might have said that

the dispute in the beraita is indeed a dispute; and since the Sages disputed Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the beraita, the halakha should not be in accordance with him. Therefore:

Rav

teaches us:

Rav says

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

ben HaMeshullam,” in order

to teach us that

his first statement

refers to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and that the dispute in the beraita is not in fact a dispute.

What is the beraita

in which the Sages disputed Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel of our Mishna?

As it was taught:

One who purchases a nursing animal from a gentile: the offspring born after it is a firstborn animal of uncertain status,

and one cannot prove from its nursing that it has already given birth to a firstborn.

Because it shows affection

[that is, loves]

even though it has not given birth.

That is to say, sometimes it has not given birth, but because of its love for another animal’s offspring, it nurses it.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

The

matter retains its presumptive status;

the offspring that it is nursing is its own offspring, and it has already given birth to a firstborn.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would likewise say: One who enters his herd at night and sees approximately ten or fifteen firstborn animals and non-firstborn animals nursing,

and

the next morning rises early and finds males hanging from the non-firstborn animals and females hanging from the firstborn animals,

so that apparently there is no male firstborn among them,

need not be concerned that perhaps the offspring

the male

of this one

the firstborn animal

came to that one

the non-firstborn animal, and is in fact a firstborn; rather, he assumes that each one is nursing its own offspring, and there is no firstborn animal here.

We learned in the beraita: One who purchases a nursing animal from a gentile: the offspring born after it is a firstborn animal of uncertain status, because it shows affection even though it has not given birth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The matter retains its presumptive status:

They raised a dilemma before them:

“The matter retains its presumptive status,”

as stated by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel:

that is,

it does not show affection -

it does not love an offspring to the extent that it will nurse it -

unless it has given birth;

and it is therefore certain that this animal has already given birth and is not a firstborn,

but where it has given birth, we are concerned that it may show affection: but if it has already given birth, its nursing is not proof that the offspring it is nursing is indeed its own, because once it is nursing, it is possible that it will also love another animal’s offspring and nurse it.

Or perhaps:

It is only

offspring

its own

that it

loves

and nurses, but offspring

that is not its own, it does not love it [it never loves an offspring to the extent that it will nurse it unless it is its own offspring and not another’s]. If so, is the offspring it is nursing its own offspring?

And the Gemara explains:

What practical difference does it make

to know whether this is its offspring or another’s offspring?

To have him flogged because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

to flog one who slaughters the offspring it is nursing on the same day that he slaughtered its mother, because of the prohibition “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day.” And this is the dilemma:

one would receive lashes for slaughtering the offspring that it is nursing on the same day that one slaughtered its mother, because of the verse, “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day.” This is the uncertainty:

If you say that it loves its own offspring, but does not love offspring that is not its own

[if you say that it loves only its own offspring],

he is flogged

for slaughtering this offspring together with its mother on the same day, since it is necessarily its offspring.

And if you say:

Once it has given birth,

it also loves offspring that is not its own

[once it has given birth, sometimes it loves another animal’s offspring to the extent that it will nurse it],

he is not flogged

for slaughtering the offspring together with it on the same day, because perhaps it is another animal’s offspring.

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who purchases a nursing animal from a gentile need not be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal,

for we take the position that this is its offspring; and if he slaughters them on the same day, he is flogged.

And we reject this:

Does it teach

“he need not be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal”

is

which would imply: This is certainly its offspring!? But it teaches: “He need not be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal”

was

it teaches;

and

this is what it is saying: He need not be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal, unless it had an offspring originally.

That is to say, it is necessarily proof that this animal had an offspring, for otherwise it would not have nursed another animal’s offspring; but it is not certain that this offspring is its own.

Come and hear

from our Mishna, where we learned:

He entered his herd and saw the firstborn animals nursing, and the non-firstborn animals nursing; he need not be concerned that perhaps the offspring of this one came to that one, or that perhaps the offspring of this one came to that one,

but rather each one is nursing its own offspring -

And if you say that an animal that has given birth also shows affection for another animal’s offspring,

why

do we rely on the assumption that this is the offspring of the firstborn animal and is certainly a firstborn, when

we should be concerned: perhaps it shows affection

for another animal’s offspring!?

And we answer:

Where its own offspring is present, it does not abandon its own and show affection for another’s

[when its own offspring is before it, it does not abandon its own offspring in order to nurse another animal’s offspring]; the dilemma applies where its own offspring is not before us.

Come and hear

from what we learned in the beraita:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

The matter retains its presumptive status,

meaning that he relies on the nursing to say that it has already given birth.

And likewise

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: One who enters his herd at night and sees approximately ten or fifteen firstborn animals and non-firstborn animals, and the next morning rises early and finds males hanging from the non-firstborn animals and females hanging from the firstborn animals, need not be concerned that perhaps the offspring of this one came to that one; rather, he assumes that each one is nursing its own offspring, and there is no firstborn animal here -

Does this not mean that the first clause is analogous to the latter clause: Just as in the latter clause

we assume that the offspring nursing from it

is certainly its own,

for it has already been explained that it does not abandon its own offspring and nurse another animal’s offspring,

so too

in the

first clause

we assume that the offspring it is nursing

is certainly its own; thus, an animal never nurses another animal’s offspring.

the latter clause

And we reject this:

Is it necessarily so

[is it necessary to equate the first clause with the latter clause]!? It can be said that

this

the latter clause

is as it is stated

meaning that it is certainly its offspring, while

this

the first clause

is as it is stated

meaning that it is not certainly its offspring, but it is certain that the animal has given birth. -

And what is the meaning of

“and likewise”

which implies that they are identical? It is not so, for “and likewise” refers to

exemption from the firstborn status: in both the first clause and the latter clause, the animal is exempt from the firstborn status—this one because it has already given birth, and that one because it gave birth to a female.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one saw

a pig clinging to a ewe

and nursing from it, it is

exempt from the firstborn status,

because it is certain that the ewe has already given birth,

and it is forbidden

the pig

to be eaten

-

although, if it were certainly its offspring, it would be permitted, since whatever emerges from a pure animal is pure -

“until one comes and teaches you righteous instruction,”

and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And we raise an objection:

“Exempt from the firstborn status”

in accordance with whose opinion?

It is

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

for according to the Rabbis, it is not certain that the animal has already given birth -

And

if

“forbidden to be eaten”

were in accordance with the Rabbis,

who do not consider it certain that the ewe gave birth to this pig, and perhaps it emerged from an impure animal!?

And furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

If it is in accordance with the Rabbis, what is the meaning of

“until one comes and teaches you righteous instruction”!?

“Until you come to know the matter”

[until you come to know that she indeed gave birth to it]

should have been what he said,

for this is not a halakhic uncertainty but an uncertainty concerning the facts!?

And should you say: He is uncertain

Rabbi Yoḥanan

whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or in accordance with the Rabbis,

and this is what he means when he says, “until one comes and teaches you righteous instruction”—that is, until it is established whose opinion is the halakha. Even this cannot be said, because:

If he is uncertain -

whose ruling is the halakha -

why is it exempt from the firstborn status?

For its status would be uncertain!?

And furthermore, is he uncertain

[is Rabbi Yoḥanan uncertain whose ruling is the halakha]!?

For Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with him, except for

three disputes, which are:

the guarantor, Ṣidan, and the final proof.

If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan is certainly of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Why, then, was he uncertain whether it is permitted to eat the pig!?

And we explain:

In fact, it is certain

to Rabbi Yoḥanan that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

and therefore the ewe is certainly exempt from the firstborn status.

However,

he was uncertain whether the pig is permitted to be eaten, because

Rabbi Yoḥanan was uncertain

about the dilemma raised earlier by the scholars of the academy:

whether Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth shows affection

even for another animal’s offspring, and if so, although it is certain that she gave birth—for otherwise she would not show affection—nevertheless it is not clear that this is her offspring, and therefore it is forbidden to eat it;

or whether she does not show affection

for any offspring other than the one to which she gave birth, in which case the pig is the offspring of the ewe and is permitted to be eaten. This is what he meant by “until one comes and teaches you righteous instruction,” and resolves the dilemma.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

And we answer:

before he teaches us the case of a pig, let him teach us the case of a lamb, so that we may flog one who slaughters it because of the prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

[Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan state the practical consequence of this uncertainty specifically in the case of an animal nursing a pig, rather than raise the uncertainty even when it is nursing a lamb, with regard to flogging because of “it and its offspring,” which depends on this uncertainty, as stated above]!?

And we answer:

The case of a pig was necessary for him

to teach us,

for had he taught us the case of a lamb, I would have said: If you conclude that he holds that an animal that has given birth shows affection for an offspring of its own species, but for one of another species

not,

[I would have said that there is room for uncertainty specifically in the case of a lamb, since one could say that once it has given birth, it shows affection for an offspring of its own species, but if it nurses a pig, it is necessarily its own offspring], and therefore

he teaches us the case of a pig, and even one that is not of its species as well, for it is possible that it shows affection

[and that is why Rabbi Yoḥanan taught us the uncertainty with regard to a pig: to say that it is possible that she shows affection even for an offspring that is not of her species] -

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: