Bekhorot 24a — the Talmud in English

If so,

“the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei ben Ha-Meshullam”

why do I need this!?

For surely it is included in his first statement!? And we answer:

if

Rav had only said,

“the halakha throughout the chapter,”

and had not said

“the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei ben Ha-Meshullam,”

I would have thought

that Rav’s first statement

refers to Rabbi Yosei ben Ha-Meshullam

and not to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel. And if this is difficult for you:

and what is

“throughout the chapter,”

which implies: in more than one law the halakha is so, let us say that it is to be explained:

Rabbi Yosei stated two things [two halakhot Rabbi Yosei ben Ha-Meshullam stated in the following Mishna], and in both the halakha is according to him. -

And

I would have said that

the dispute of the beraita is a dispute,

and since the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel in the beraita, the halakha is not according to him; therefore:

Rav informs us

Rav:

the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei

ben Ha-Meshullam, in order

to inform us that

his first statement

refers to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, and the dispute of the beraita is not a dispute.

What is the beraita

in which the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel of our Mishna?

As it was taught:

One who purchases a suckling animal from a gentile—the offspring that comes after it is a firstborn of uncertain status,

and one cannot prove from its nursing that it has already given birth,

because it shows affection [loves]

it

even though it does not give birth.

That is to say, sometimes it has not given birth, but because of its love for its fellow’s offspring, it nurses it.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:

The

matter retains its presumption,

for the offspring that it is nursing is its own offspring, and it has already given birth.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel would likewise say: One who enters his flock at night and sees approximately ten or fifteen first-time mothers and non-first-time mothers nursing,

and

on the following day he rises early and finds males hanging from the non-first-time mothers and females hanging from the first-time mothers,

so that, according to appearances, there is no male firstborn here,

need not be concerned that the offspring

the male

of this one

the first-time mother

came to that one

the non-first-time mother, in which case it would always be a firstborn; rather, he assumes that each one is nursing its own offspring, and there is no firstborn here.

We learned in the beraita: One who purchases a suckling animal from a gentile—the offspring that comes after it is a firstborn of uncertain status, because it shows affection even though it does not give birth; Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says, the matter retains its presumption:

They raised a dilemma:

“The matter retains its presumption”

that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says,

namely,

that it does not show affection

it does not love [another offspring] in order to nurse it

unless it gives birth,

and necessarily this animal has already given birth and is not a first-time mother,

is it so that where it has given birth, we are concerned that it shows affection,

but if it has already given birth, the nursing is not proof that the offspring it is nursing is indeed its offspring, because once it is a nursing animal, it is possible that it also loves the offspring of its fellow and nurses it.

Or perhaps:

An offspring

of its own

alone is what it

shows affection for

and nurses, but an offspring

that is not its own, it does not show affection for it [it never loves in order to nurse anything except its own offspring and not that of its fellow], and if so, the offspring it is nursing is its own offspring?

And the Gemara explains:

And the Gemara explains:

what practical difference is there

to know whether this is its offspring or another is its offspring?

To have lashes imposed upon her on account of “it and its offspring”,

to receive lashes for slaughtering the offspring she is nursing on the same day that he slaughtered its mother, on account of “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day”; and this is the dilemma:

If you say that she shows affection for her own, but does not show affection for one that is not her own [if you say that she loves only her own offspring],

he receives lashes

for slaughtering this offspring together with its mother on one day, for it is necessarily her offspring.

And if you say:

Once she has given birth—

she also shows affection for one that is not her own [once she has given birth, sometimes she loves in order to nurse the offspring of her fellow]

he does not receive lashes

for slaughtering the offspring together with her on one day, because perhaps it is the offspring of her fellow.

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: One who purchases a suckling animal from a gentile need not be concerned that it was the offspring of another,

for we take the position that this is its offspring, and if he slaughters them on one day, he receives lashes.

And we reject this:

Does it teach “he need not be concerned that it

was the offspring of another,”

is it?

which would imply: this is its offspring!? But it says: “he need not be concerned that it

was the offspring of another,”

it teaches,

and this is what it says:

He need not be concerned that it was the offspring of another, provided that it had an offspring originally.

That is to say, it is necessarily proof that this animal had an offspring, for otherwise it would not have nursed the offspring of its fellow, but it is not necessary that this offspring is its own offspring.

Come and hear

from our Mishna, where we learned:

He entered into his flock and saw the first-time mothers nursing, and the non-first-time mothers nursing; he need not be concerned that the offspring of this one came to that one, or that the offspring of this one came to that one,

but each one is nursing its own offspring -

And if you should say that an animal that has given birth shows affection even for the offspring of its fellow,

why do we rely on the assumption that this is the offspring of the first-time mother and is certainly a firstborn? But

let us be concerned: perhaps she shows affection

for the offspring of her fellow!?

And we answer:

In the place of her own, she does not abandon her own and show affection for one that is not her own [when her offspring is before her, she will not abandon her own offspring from nursing it and nurse the offspring of her fellow]; the dilemma is where her offspring is not before us.

Come and hear

from what we learned in the beraita:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says:

The matter retains its presumption,

namely, he relies on the nursing to say that it has already given birth,

and likewise

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel would say: One who enters his flock at night and sees approximately ten or fifteen first-time mothers and non-first-time mothers, and on the following day rises early and finds males hanging from the non-first-time mothers and females hanging from the first-time mothers, need not be concerned that the offspring of this one came to that one; rather, he assumes that each one is nursing its own offspring and there is no firstborn here -

What, is not the first clause analogous to the latter clause? Just as in the latter clause

we attribute the nursing offspring to her as

certainly its own,

for it has already been explained that she does not abandon her own offspring and nurse the offspring of her fellow,

so too in the

first clause

we attribute the offspring it is nursing to her as

certainly its own, for an animal never nurses the offspring of its fellow.

so too in the

first

And we reject this:

Are they necessarily related [is it necessary to compare the first clause to the latter clause]!? For it can be said:

This

the latter clause

is as it is, namely, it is certainly her offspring, and this

the first clause

is as it is,

namely, it is not certainly her offspring, but it is certain that she has given birth. -

And what of “

and likewise,”

which implies that it is identical? It is not so, for “likewise” is

a parallel exemption from the law of firstborns,

for both in the first clause and in the latter clause she is exempt from the firstborn status: this one because she has already given birth, and that one because she gave birth to a female.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: He saw

a pig attached to a ewe

and nursing from her; she is

exempt from the firstborn status,

for she has certainly already given birth,

and it is forbidden

the pig

to be eaten -

“until he comes and declares righteous judgment for you,”

and he goes on to explain it.

And we raise an objection:

“Exempt from the firstborn status,”

in accordance with whom?

It is

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel,

for according to the Rabbis it is not certain that she has already given birth -

And I would say that if “it is forbidden to be eaten” were in accordance with the Rabbis, who do not hold that it is certain that she gave birth to it, and perhaps it emerged from an impure animal!? And furthermore, there is a difficulty: if it is in accordance with the Rabbis, what is “until he comes and declares righteous judgment for you”!?

And we challenge this: “

exempt from firstborn status”—

in accordance with whom?

in accordance with whose opinion?

It is

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

because according to the Rabbis there is no certainty that she has already given birth. -

“Until you know a matter”

[until you know that she indeed gave birth to it]

he should have said,

for here there is no halakhic uncertainty but rather uncertainty of fact!?

there is another difficulty:

And should you say: It is uncertain to him

Rabbi Yoḥanan

whether the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel or according to the Rabbis,

and that is why he said, “until he comes and declares righteous judgment for you”—[until it becomes clear] according to whom the halakha is. This too cannot be said, for:

If it is uncertain to him -

according to whose halakha -

why is she exempt from the firstborn status,

for it is an uncertainty!?

And furthermore, is it uncertain to him [does Rabbi Yoḥanan doubt according to whose halakha it is]!? For Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Everywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel taught in our Mishna, the halakha is according to him, except for

three disputes, which are:

the guarantor, Ṣidon, and the final proof.

And if so, it is obvious to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the halakha is according to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel, so why did he doubt whether the pig may be eaten!?

why is it exempt from firstborn status

And we explain:

In fact, it is obvious to him

Rabbi Yoḥanan that

the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel,

and therefore she is certainly exempt from the firstborn status;

however,

for this reason he was uncertain whether the pig may be eaten, because

it is uncertain to him

Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the dilemma that the scholars of the academy raised above:

whether Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that an animal that has given birth shows affection even for another offspring, and if so, although it certainly has given birth—for otherwise it would not show affection—nevertheless it is not clear that this is its offspring, and if so, it is forbidden to be eaten,

or whether it does not show affection

ever except for the offspring that it gave birth to, and if so, it is a pig born from a ewe and is permitted to be eaten; and this is what he said: “until he comes and declares righteous judgment for you,” and resolves the dilemma.

And we raise an objection:

if so,

before he informs us about a pig, let him inform us about a lamb, and let him impose lashes upon him on account of “it and its offspring”,

[why did Rabbi Yoḥanan state the practical difference in this uncertainty in the case where she is nursing a pig, and not raise the question even when she is nursing a lamb, with regard to lashes on account of “it and its offspring,” which depends upon this uncertainty, as above]!?

Does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel hold that an animal that has given birth feels affection

even for another animal’s offspring? If so, although it certainly gave birth—for otherwise it would not feel affection—nevertheless, it is not clear that this is her offspring, and therefore it is prohibited to eat.

Or does it not feel affection

And we answer:

It was necessary for him to mention a pig

to inform us,

for if he had informed us about a lamb, I would have said: If you should conclude that he holds that an animal that has given birth shows affection for one of its kind, but for one that is not of its kind -

no,

And we answer:

[I would have said that there is no room for uncertainty except specifically with regard to a lamb, for in this case there is room to say that once it has given birth, it shows affection for one of its kind, but if it nurses a pig, it is necessarily its offspring], and therefore

he informs us about a pig, and even one that is not of its kind as well, for it may be said that perhaps it shows affection [and therefore Rabbi Yoḥanan informed us of the uncertainty with regard to a pig, to say that it is possible that she shows affection even for one that is not of her kind] -

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

no,

[I would say that there is room for uncertainty specifically with regard to a lamb, because one might say that once it has given birth, it feels affection for an offspring of its own species, but if it nurses a pig, it must be its own offspring]. Therefore,

he teaches us the case of the pig, and even one that is not of its species may also be one that it loves

[and therefore Rabbi Yoḥanan stated the uncertainty specifically with regard to a pig, to teach that it is possible that she feels affection even for an animal that is not of her species] -

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

he teaches us the case of a pig, and even one that is not of its species as well, for it is possible that it shows affection

[and that is why Rabbi Yoḥanan taught us the uncertainty with regard to a pig: to say that it is possible that she shows affection even for an offspring that is not of her species] -

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: