Bekhorot 18b — the Talmud in English

Anyone whose substitutes are in the possession of a priest is exempt from the gifts, and Rabbi Meir obligates.

It follows by implication:

when his substitutes are in the possession of a priest, yes;

but

when his substitutes are not in the possession of a priest—

no.

And if so, the difficulty returns to its place: why was it necessary for Rabbi Elazar to teach us this!?

And we answer: in any event, it was necessary for Rabbi Elazar to teach us this, because:

lest you say:

Perhaps, according to

Rabbi Yosei, even though his substitutes are not in the possession of a priest, he too is exempt, and that which he teaches: “

Anyone whose

substitutes

are in the possession of a priest is exempt from the gifts”—

it is according to the words of Rabbi Meir that

he

says to him:

According to me, even

when

his substitutes are not in the possession of a priest,

he is exempt from the gifts, because

if you obligate him in the gifts, it will lead to shearing and labor—

but

according to you—

who disagree with this enactment—

at least concede to me that where his substitutes are in the possession of a priest, they made one who does not acquire into one who acquires.

And Rabbi Meir said to him:

even so,

no,

he is not exempt from the gifts.

He teaches us

that Rabbi Elazar [intended to teach] that Rabbi Yosei’s entire ruling applies only when his substitutes are in the possession of a priest, because they made one who does not acquire into one who acquires.

Rav Pappa said:

An animal tithe that has a blemish is eaten by the owners, and is exempt from the gifts to the priests.

Everyone agrees regarding an uncertain animal tithe—

for example, a tithe became mixed among animals that had been tithed, and all of them are eaten with their blemishes by the owners—

that it is exempt from the gifts.

And we raise an objection to this:

“Everyone agrees”—who? Rabbi Meir—

who obligates an uncertain firstborn in the gifts; but

it is obvious,

for an uncertain tithe is different, since:

Rabbi Meir obligates only there

in the case of an uncertain firstborn,

because the priest approaches it from two sides:

for even if you say that it is a firstborn, it belongs entirely to the priest.

But an uncertain tithe—

for if it is a tithe, it does not belong to the priest—

did not

Rabbi Meir say so; rather, he agrees that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant!?

And we answer: Rav Pappa needed to teach us, regarding an uncertain tithe, that Rabbi Meir exempts it from the gifts, because

lest you say: Rabbi Meir’s reason

regarding an uncertain firstborn is not because the priest approaches it from two sides, but because the Sages enacted this

so that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten, and

if so,

even an uncertain tithe as well

Rabbi Meir would obligate in the gifts for the same reason—

he teaches us

that Rabbi Meir’s reason is only because, in the case of a firstborn, the priest approaches it from two sides.

The Gemara is astonished at this answer:

Can you really say this—

that Rabbi Meir’s reason is so that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten!?

But it teaches in the latter clause

in the following Mishna:

For Rabbi Yosei would say: Anyone whose substitutes are in the possession of a priest

is

exempt from the gifts, and Rabbi Meir obligates,

even when his substitutes are in the possession of a priest. And granted, if you say that Rabbi Meir’s reason is because the priest approaches it from two sides, this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone whose substitutes are in the possession of a priest is exempt, for by this reason the priest cannot approach it from two sides. But if Rabbi Meir’s reason is so that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten, why did Rabbi Yosei state the reason as being that his substitutes are in the possession of a priest? For in this as well Rabbi Meir agrees that he should be exempt, and he disagrees with him only because the law of the gifts should not be forgotten.

And we answer: even so, Rav Pappa needed to teach us that Rabbi Meir’s reason is not so that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten, because

lest you say:

Perhaps

Rabbi Meir obligates even an uncertain tithe, and the fact that they disagree regarding substitutes is to inform you of Rabbi Yosei’s strength, for he exempts even where the priest approaches it from two sides—

he teaches us.

We learned in the Mishna:

One of them died—

of the uncertain firstborns—

Rabbi Tarfon says: They divide.

And we raise an objection: Rabbi Tarfon himself holds that the healthy one is to be given to a priest, because presumably it is the firstborn. If so, when one of them dies,

why should they divide!?

But

let us see: if the lean one died,

surely

it was the priest’s

that died, since the lean one emerges first according to Rabbi Tarfon,

and this one that remains—

the animal that is found—

belongs to the homeowner.

It

and if the fat one died,

surely

the homeowner’s died,

as it emerges last and is not the firstborn,

and this healthy one that remains—

is it the priest’s!?

Rabbi Ami said: Rabbi Tarfon retracted his position.

We learned in the Mishna: One of them died; Rabbi Tarfon says, They divide.

Rabbi Akiva says: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Tarfon’s analogy—to what is the matter comparable? To two people who deposited

animals

with a shepherd,

and one of the animals died, and we do not know whose died,

the shepherd leaves

the animal that remains

between them

so that they divide it

and withdraws,

for we cannot say that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, because here there is no one who is more in possession; therefore, they divide. And Rabbi Tarfon as well, when he said “they divide,” said this in a situation in which it is impossible to say that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, such as where the living animal is not in the possession of the Israelite, but, for example, was delivered to a shepherd.

And Rabbi Akiva’s analogy—to what is the matter comparable? To one who deposited with a homeowner, and one of them died, and the uncertainty is whether the depositor’s died or the homeowner’s died,

the burden of proof rests upon the claimant,

since the living animal is in the possession of the homeowner. And Rabbi Akiva as well said “the burden of proof rests upon the claimant” in such a case—where the animal is in the possession of the Israelite.

The Gemara asks:

But

if so—since they did not disagree in one and the same situation—

in what do they disagree!?

Could it be that

Rabbi Akiva disagrees in the case of two who deposited with a shepherd, so that the shepherd leaves [the animal] and withdraws,

and

that

Rabbi Tarfon disagrees in the case of one who deposited with a homeowner,

that they should divide!?

Rava said, and some say Rav Pappa:

Everyone agrees in the case of two who deposited with a shepherd, that the shepherd leaves [the animal] between them and withdraws.

And

everyone agrees

in the case of one who deposited with a homeowner, that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant—

They disagree only

where the animal that remains is

in the courtyard of the

homeowner, and

all the Israelite’s animals were delivered to a

priest-shepherd.

And the basis of their disagreement is:

Rabbi Tarfon holds: He grants him—the Israelite grants the priest-shepherd—

a place

in his courtyard

so that the priest will acquire the firstborns immediately when they are born,

because

it is pleasing to him—

the Israelite—

that a mitzva should be performed with his property,

that his firstborns should be raised in the priest’s courtyard,

and

automatically

it is like two who deposited with a shepherd, so that the shepherd leaves [the animal] between them and withdraws,

for here there is no claimant taking from another, since the courtyard belongs to both of them.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: Since the Israelite has

a

loss

from this, in the case of an uncertain firstborn or an uncertain death—for through this grant he cannot say to the priest, “The burden of proof rests upon the claimant”—therefore,

he does not grant him anything

[anything],

and

if so,

it is

like one who deposited with a homeowner, where the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

Mishna:

Two ewes that had not yet borne, and

he arose early and found that

they had borne two males;

this one

gives

the

two of them to the kohen, for we attribute that each one bore a firstborn, and not that one bore both of them while the other aborted and the fetus dissolved.

, a member of the priestly family. This is because we assume that each ewe gave birth to one firstborn, and not that one ewe gave birth to both while the other miscarried and its fetus dissolved.

And if they bore

a male and a female,

this one gives the

male to the kohen, for the two mothers had not yet borne.

, since neither of the two mothers had previously given birth.

And if they bore

two males and a female,

and it is not known which one bore which, and whether the female preceded them, this one gives

one to himself and one to the kohen, for one bore a firstborn and the second is a doubtful firstborn.

, because one of the ewes certainly gave birth to a firstborn, while the other produced an offspring that is of uncertain firstborn status.

Rabbi Tarfon says: The kohen chooses for himself

from among the two males

the better one.

Rabbi Akiva says: They divide the value between them,

that is, the kohen takes the inferior one.

And the second—

which is a doubtful firstborn—

shall graze until it becomes blemished,

and the Israelite shall eat it.

And he is liable

the Israelite

for the gifts, according to the words of Rabbi Meir, but

, according to Rabbi Meir, but

Rabbi Yose exempts,

and their rationales were elucidated in the Gemara above.

If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: They divide.

Rabbi Akiva says: The one who extracts from his fellow—the burden of proof is upon him.

And it was elucidated in the Gemara above in which manner they disagreed and what their rationales are.

And if she bore

two females and a male, or two males and two females,

for in both of these cases it is possible that there is no firstborn here at all,

there is nothing here for the kohen.

And if he had in his flock two ewes,

one

already

having borne and one not having borne, and

he arose early and found that

they had borne two males,

one of which is a firstborn and the other is not a firstborn:

one for him and one for the kohen.

Rabbi Tarfon says: The kohen chooses the better one.

Rabbi Akiva says: They divide the value between them.

That is, the kohen takes the inferior one.

And the second,

which is in the possession of the Israelite,

shall graze until it becomes blemished.

And

the one that is in the possession of the Israelite

is liable for the gifts; Rabbi Yose exempts.

For Rabbi Yose says: Everything whose substitute is in the possession of a kohen,

that is, for example, this doubtful one that the kohen took as its substitute and in exchange for the firstborn, this one is

exempt

from the gifts,

because they treated the one who does not acquire as one who acquires, as was elucidated in the discussion above concerning the preceding Mishna.

And Rabbi Meir obligates,

even though its substitute is in the possession of a kohen.

And if

one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: They divide, and Rabbi Akiva says: The one who extracts from his fellow—the burden of proof is upon him,

as was explained in the discussion above in which manner they disagreed and what their rationales are.

And if they bore

a male and a female, there is nothing here for the kohen.

Gemara:

It is necessary

for the Mishna to inform us of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon as to whether the kohen takes the better one or the inferior one in all three cases:

For if it had informed us of the first one—

that is, concerning one ewe that bore two males, a better one and an inferior one—I would say:

In that case Rabbi Akiva says

that he does not take the better one,

because they are two from one

[because the two emerged from one], and it is not established that the better one is the one that emerged first;

but concerning two ewes that had not yet borne, two from one and one from one,

[that is, two were born from one and another one from the other],

let us say that Rabbi Akiva agrees

with Rabbi Tarfon

that the one that bore one gives birth to a more excellent one

[for when one is born, the offspring is more excellent].

And if it had informed us of this—

that is, concerning the birth of two twins and one alone from two ewes—I would say: Only

in this case Rabbi Akiva says

that it is not established that the better one emerged alone,

because both had not yet borne, but concerning one that had already borne and one that had not yet borne, and they bore two males, let us say that Rabbi Akiva agrees

with

Rabbi Tarfon! ![](pamud.bmp "

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that the one that had not yet borne gives birth to a more excellent one [the one born from this one, which until now had not borne, is more excellent and better], and the kohen will take the better one.

, and the kohen takes the better one.