Bekhorot 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

Anyone whose exchange is in the possession of a priest is exempt from the gifts, but Rabbi Meir obligates him -

This apparently means:

If his exchange is in the possession of a priest, yes,

but

if his exchange is not in the possession of a priest -

no,

and if so, the difficulty returns to its place: Why did Rabbi Elazar need to teach us this?!

And we answer: In any event, Rabbi Elazar needed to teach us this, because:

It might enter your mind:

Actually, according to

Rabbi Yosei, even though his exchange is not in the possession of a priest, he is also exempt, and that which he teaches: “

Anyone whose

exchange

is in the possession of a priest is exempt from the gifts” -

is stated according to Rabbi Meir’s

position, as he

says to him:

As far as I am concerned, even

when

his exchange is not in the possession of a priest,

he is exempt from the gifts, and this is because

if you obligate him to give the gifts, it will lead to shearing and labor -

But

as far as you are concerned -

since you disagree with this enactment -

at least concede to me that where his exchange is in the possession of a priest, they treated one who does not acquire as one who acquires.

And Rabbi Meir said to him:

Even so,

no,

he is not exempt from the gifts.

He teaches us

that Rabbi Elazar says that the entire basis of Rabbi Yosei’s ruling applies only when his exchange is in the possession of a priest, because they treated one who does not acquire as one who acquires.

Rav Pappa said:

An animal tithe that has a blemish is eaten by its owners and is exempt from the gifts to the priesthood.

Everyone agrees with regard to an uncertain animal tithe

for example, a tithe animal became mixed with animals that had already been tithed, and all of them are eaten by their owners while blemished -

that it is exempt from the gifts.

And we raise an objection to this:

Everyone agrees? Who is this? Rabbi Meir

who obligates an uncertain firstborn to be given the gifts - but

it is obvious,

for an uncertain tithe is different, since:

Rabbi Meir obligates only there,

in the case of an uncertain firstborn,

because the priest approaches it from two sides:

even if you say that it is a firstborn, it belongs entirely to the priest.

But in the case of an uncertain tithe

for if it is a tithe animal, it does not belong to the priest -

no,

Rabbi Meir did not say so; rather, he agrees that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant?!

And we answer: Rav Pappa needed to teach us, concerning an uncertain tithe, that Rabbi Meir exempts it from the gifts, because

it might enter your mind: The reason for Rabbi Meir’s

position with regard to an uncertain firstborn is not that the priest approaches it from two sides, but that the Sages enacted this,

so that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten, and

if so,

even an uncertain tithe as well

would be obligated by Rabbi Meir to give the gifts for the same reason -

He teaches us

that Rav Pappa says that the reason for Rabbi Meir is only that, in the case of a firstborn, the priest approaches it from two sides.

The Gemara challenges this answer:

Can you really say this,

that the reason for Rabbi Meir is so that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten?!

But does he not teach in the latter clause

of the following Mishna:

For Rabbi Yosei would say: Anyone whose exchange is in the possession of a priest

is

exempt from the gifts, but Rabbi Meir obligates him,

even when his exchange is in the possession of a priest. And granted, if you say that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that the priest approaches it from two sides, this is why Rabbi Yosei said that anyone whose exchange is in the possession of a priest is exempt, since for this reason the priest cannot approach it from two sides. But if Rabbi Meir’s reason is that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten, why did Rabbi Yosei mention the reason that his exchange is in the possession of a priest? For in this case Rabbi Meir also agrees that he should be exempt, and he disagrees with him only because the law of the gifts should not be forgotten.

And we answer: Even so, Rav Pappa needed to teach us that the reason for Rabbi Meir is not that the law of the gifts should not be forgotten, because

it might enter your mind:

Actually,

Rabbi Meir obligates even an uncertain tithe, and the reason they dispute the case of exchanges is to demonstrate the force of Rabbi Yosei, who exempts even where the priest approaches it from two sides -

He teaches us.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one of them died

one of the uncertain firstborns -

Rabbi Tarfon says: They divide it:

And we raise an objection: Rabbi Tarfon himself maintains that the healthy one should be given to a priest, because presumably it is the firstborn. If so, when one of them dies,

why should they divide it?!

But

let us see: If the thin one died,

certainly

the priest’s animal

died, since according to Rabbi Tarfon the thin one emerges first,

and this one that remains

the animal that is found]

belongs to the homeowner

and is the one that remains.

And if the fat one died,

certainly

the homeowner’s animal died,

as it is the one that emerges last and is not the firstborn,

and this healthy one that remains -

is it the priest’s animal?!

Rabbi Ami said: Rabbi Tarfon retracted his position.

We learned in the Mishna: If one of them died, Rabbi Tarfon says: They divide it.

Rabbi Akiva says: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Tarfon’s analogy is to what? To two people who deposited

animals

with a shepherd,

and one of the animals died, but we do not know whose animal died.

The shepherd leaves

the remaining animal

between them

so that they may divide it,

and withdraws. For we cannot say that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, since neither party has a stronger presumption of possession. Therefore, they divide it. Rabbi Tarfon likewise said that they divide it only in a case in which it is impossible to say that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, such as when the living animal is not in the Israelite’s possession, but has been entrusted to a shepherd.

For we cannot say that the claimant must produce the proof, since neither party has stronger possession here; therefore, they divide the animal. Rabbi Tarfon also said that they divide it only in a case where it is impossible to apply the principle that the claimant must produce the proof—for example, when the living animal is not in the Israelite’s possession, but has been entrusted to a shepherd.

And Rabbi Akiva’s analogy is to what? To one who deposited an animal with a homeowner,

and one of them died, and the uncertainty is whether the depositor’s animal died or the homeowner’s animal died,

so that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant,

since the living animal is in the homeowner’s possession. Rabbi Akiva likewise said this only in such a case—where the animal is in the Israelite’s possession.

The Gemara asks:

Rather,

if so—if they did not disagree in the same circumstance—

over what do they disagree?!

Could it be that

Rabbi Akiva disagrees in the case of two people who deposited animals with a shepherd, where the shepherd leaves the animal and withdraws,

and

that

Rabbi Tarfon disagrees in the case of one who deposited an animal with a homeowner,

saying that they divide it?!

Rava said, and some say Rav Pappa:

Everyone agrees in the case of two people who deposited animals with a shepherd, that the shepherd leaves the animal between them and withdraws.

And

everyone agrees

in the case of one who deposited an animal with a homeowner, that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant -

They disagree only

when the remaining animal is

in the homeowner’s courtyard, and

the

Israelite’s animals were all entrusted to a

priestly shepherd.

And the basis of their dispute is:

Rabbi Tarfon holds: He grants him

the Israelite grants the priestly shepherd -

a place in his courtyard,

so that the priest will acquire the firstborns immediately upon their birth,

because it is pleasing to him

that the Israelite

should fulfill a mitzva with his property,

by raising the priest’s firstborns in his courtyard,

and

consequently

it is like two people who deposited animals with a shepherd, where the shepherd leaves the animal between them and withdraws,

since here there is no claimant removing property from another, for the courtyard belongs to both of them.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: Since the Israelite has

a

loss

at stake because of the uncertainty concerning the firstborn or the uncertainty regarding which animal died—for as a result of granting the courtyard he cannot say to the priest, “The burden of proof rests upon the claimant”—therefore

he does not grant him anything [

anything],

and

if so,

it is

like one who deposited an animal with a homeowner, where the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.