Bekhorot 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Eliezer

held in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is possible to measure precisely

even

in matters determined by Heaven; all the more so in matters determined by human beings.

Shall we say that it is a dispute between tannaim,

whether the tannaim disputed the law of whether it is possible to measure precisely in matters determined by human beings?

As it is taught in a beraita:

If

the slain person

was found exactly between two towns, they do not perform the ritual of breaking the calf’s neck

at all.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Both towns bring two calves.

But

is it not with regard to this that they disagree: The first tanna holds that it is impossible to measure precisely,

even though this is a matter determined by human beings, and we do not know which town is truly the nearer one?

And Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is possible to measure precisely,

and that the term “nearer” applies even when there are two equally near towns. And we reject this:

Can you understand it

as you explained it!? But

if the first tanna holds that it is impossible to measure precisely,

and therefore there is in fact only one nearer town,

why do they not break the neck of the calf

at all?

Let them bring one calf jointly and stipulate,

that if one town is the nearer one, the entire calf belongs to it and provides atonement for it, and if the other town is the nearer one, the entire calf belongs to it and provides atonement for it!?

Rather, everyone agrees, according to these tannaim, that it is possible to measure precisely,

and here they disagree

with regard to “the nearer”

and not “the nearer ones.”

The first tanna holds:

The Torah required the bringing of a calf whose neck is broken only from

“the nearer”

and not “the nearer ones,”

and if there were two towns equally near, they do not bring a calf at all.

And Rabbi Eliezer holds:

“The nearer”

even means “the nearer ones.”

The Gemara asks:

What conclusion was reached,

with regard to the uncertainty we raised according to the Sages, whether it is possible to measure precisely in matters determined by human beings?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said that Rabbi Amram said: A tanna

taught in a beraita:

If the slain person was found exactly between two towns:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

It is possible to measure precisely, and “the nearer” even means “the nearer ones”; therefore:

Both towns bring two calves.

And the Sages say: Let them bring one calf jointly and stipulate,

as he proceeds to explain the reason.

But

what do the Sages hold?

If the Sages hold that it is possible to measure precisely and

“the nearer”

even means “the nearer ones,”

this cannot be said, for if so,

let them bring two

[let them bring two calves].

And if

the Sages hold that it is possible to measure precisely and that

“the nearer”

means “the nearer” and not “the nearer ones,”

this too cannot be said, for if so,

let them not bring even one

[neither town should bring a calf].

Rather, learn from this that the Sages hold that it is impossible to measure precisely, even in matters determined by human beings,

and there is only one nearer town; they bring one calf jointly because of the uncertainty and stipulate.

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from this

as you said.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Tarfon says: The kohen selects the better one.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason of Rabbi Tarfon?

And it explains: Because

he holds

that Rabbi Tarfon holds:

The one that is healthy emerges first

[the better and healthier animal is the one that emerges first]. We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: They divide the fat

between them:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba explained in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: The kohen takes the lean one.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said

he challenged

Rabbi Yohanan: But we learned

“They divide the fat”

in the Mishna,

which implies that they divide the fat—that is, whatever one animal is superior to the other—between them. How, then, do you say that the Israelite takes the better one and the kohen takes the lean one!?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba:

While you were eating kippeneiot in Babylonia, we here interpreted it

[while you were indulging yourself in dates in Babylonia, we here interpreted Rabbi Akiva’s words in the first clause on the basis of his words in the latter clause]—

For

it

teaches in the latter clause: If one of them dies, Rabbi Tarfon says, they divide it; Rabbi Akiva says, the claimant must produce proof—

And if it enters your mind that

“they divide the fat”

means

that they divide it equally between them

[that they divide it between themselves], if so,

here too, let them divide it equally between themselves

[if we interpret this as dividing the surplus value of the better animal over the lean one, without applying the principle that the claimant must produce proof, then when one dies as well, we should not apply that principle, but should divide it equally], and just as when one of them dies we say that the claimant must produce proof, so too, with regard to the lean and the better animals, we say so.

Rather, what does

“they divide

the fat

between them”

mean? That

the fat shall remain

between them, so that they will come to court over it,

as the Israelite says

to the

kohen

with regard to that fat:

Bring proof that it is the firstborn and take it

[bring proof that the better one is the firstborn, and take it].

We learned in the Mishna:

And the second one shall graze until it develops a permanent blemish.

And it is liable for the priestly gifts, while Rabbi Yosei exempts it:

It was explained above, in the Mishna on page 14a, that any animal whose consecration preceded the development of its blemish, and which was then redeemed, is exempt from the laws of the firstborn and from the priestly gifts. And it was explained above, in the Gemara on page 15a, that the source of this is that the Torah likened consecrated animals disqualified by a blemish to a deer and a ram; just as they are exempt from the priestly gifts, so too consecrated animals disqualified by a blemish that were redeemed are exempt from the priestly gifts.

Included in this exemption is a firstborn animal with a blemish, which is exempt from the priestly gifts, even if it does not belong to a kohen, who is exempt from the priestly gifts.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason of Rabbi Meir

[with whom the anonymous Mishna accords], who obligates one to give the priestly gifts? The Israelite should say: Perhaps it is a firstborn, and a firstborn animal with a blemish is exempt from the priestly gifts!?

Rabbi Yohanan said,

explaining

Rabbi Yohanan:

Since the kohen has a claim against him from two sides

[in either case]:

As the kohen says

to the Israelite:

If it is a firstborn,

then

all of it is mine; if it is not a firstborn, give me its priestly gifts

[if it is a firstborn, it is entirely mine by virtue of the laws of the firstborn; and if it is not a firstborn, give me its priestly gifts].

And what is the reason of Rabbi Yosei

that he does not hold this way!?

Rava said,

explaining

Rava:

They treated

[the kohen]

who does not acquire it as one who acquires it, and although the firstborn had not reached

the

hand of

the kohen,

the Sages rendered it as though it had reached the hand of

the kohen,

and he sold it to the Israelite with its blemish

[although the firstborn had not reached the kohen’s hand, the Sages treated it as though it had reached the kohen’s hand, and he sold the firstborn to the Israelite with its blemish], and received the second animal in exchange for it.

Rabbi Elazar said:

Everyone agrees—

even Rabbi Yosei, who exempts the animal in our Mishna [as he proceeds to explain]—

with regard to an uncertain firstborn whose substitute is not

[in exchange for it]

in the hand of the kohen,

and this is referring to a case in which it is not uncertain which animal is the firstborn, but rather it is uncertain whether there is a firstborn here at all, and because of the uncertainty it remains in the Israelite’s possession—

that he is liable

the Israelite

for the priestly gifts.

And we challenge this:

“Everyone agrees”—

who?

Surely

Rabbi Yosei

is the one who agrees, and if so,

it is obvious

that he agrees when its substitute is not in the hand of the kohen, because:

Rabbi Yosei exempted the animal there only when its substitute was in the hand of the kohen, because they treated

the kohen

who does not acquire it as one who acquires it

as a firstborn and he exchanged it for an ordinary animal.

But when its substitute is not in the hand of the kohen—

no,

what is Rabbi Elazar teaching us?

And we answer: Rabbi Elazar’s statement was necessary, because

it might enter your mind to say that the reason of Rabbi Yosei

is not that they treated one who does not acquire it as one who acquires it and sold it in exchange for its substitute, but rather

that he holds:

It is a rabbinic enactment to exempt it from the priestly gifts like a firstborn, because

if you obligate him to give the priestly gifts, he will come to shear it and work with it,

as he will think that there is not even an uncertainty concerning its firstborn sanctity. If so,

even when its substitute is not in the hand of the kohen as well,

he should be exempt from the priestly gifts.

He teaches us

that Rabbi Elazar does not hold this way.

The Gemara expresses astonishment at this answer:

Can you really say this—

that the reason is not that its substitute is in the hand of the kohen and that they treated one who does not acquire it as one who acquires it—

but the latter clause teaches

[in the Mishna on page 18b, with regard to an uncertain firstborn whose substitute is in the hand of the kohen, concerning the reason of Rabbi Yosei, who exempts it from the priestly gifts]:

As Rabbi Yosei would say: