Bekhorot 17b — the Talmud in English

and he is liable —

the second one that the Israelite took —

with the priestly gifts,

the gifts of the priesthood [the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw]. But that which the priest took is not subject to the gifts, for a priest is not liable for the gifts.

And Rabbi Yose exempts

even the Israelite from the priestly gifts, and their reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And if

one of them dies:

Rabbi Tarfon says: They divide it.

Rabbi Akiva says:

it remains in the possession of the Israelite [and he pastures it until it becomes blemished, and he eats it with its blemish], for

the one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the proof,

and therefore the priest who comes to extract it must bring proof. And in the Gemara it will be explained in what manner they disagreed, and their reasons.

And if she gives birth to

a male and a female

and their two heads emerge together, since it is impossible to make them exactly equal, it is possible that the female emerged first, and

the priest has nothing here,

for the one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the proof.

Gemara:

They said in the academy of Rabbi Yannai:

From Rabbi Yose the Galilean we learn

in our Mishna

that he says: It is possible to make them exactly equal through the hands of Heaven.

That is, even something not done with the intention of making exactly equal and precise, such as something done by the hands of Heaven—as in our Mishna, with the birth of two males—or by a person without the purpose of making exactly equal, once it appears to us equal and precise, we say that it indeed is equal and precise—

and all the more so

that it is possible to make exactly equal

through the hands of a person,

that is, when from the outset something was done with the purpose of making it exactly equal and precise, it is obvious according to Rabbi Yose’s view that if it appears to us equal and precise, we assume that it indeed is equal and precise, since that was their intention.

And as for the Sages,

we learn from them in our Mishna that they hold:

through the hands of Heaven—

as with the birth of two males, where there was no intention to make them exactly equal—

it is impossible to make exactly equal.

However, according to their view, one must inquire:

through the hands of a person,

who intended to make exactly equal and precise, and it was found equal and precise,

what?

Do we take the position that it indeed is equal and precise?

Come and hear:

A thread of crimson

was [dyed red]

encircling

the altar

in the middle,

in order

to distinguish between the upper bloods,

that is, blood whose law is that it be sprinkled above the midpoint of the altar,

and between the lower bloods,

that is, blood whose law is that it be sprinkled from the midpoint of the altar and below; and that thread was placed in the middle of the altar so that the priest would know where to sprinkle.

And if you say that it is impossible to make exactly equal

even

through the hands of a person,

then, although at the time of placing the thread they intended to make it exactly equal and precise at the middle of the altar, we take the position that they did not make it exactly equal and precise,

and

it follows that

sometimes he gives

the priest blood

[which should be] upper, below,

the midpoint of the altar, for although he gives it above the thread, perhaps the thread is not at its midpoint but below its midpoint,

and

sometimes the priest gives blood

[which should be] lower, above,

for perhaps the thread is above its midpoint. Rather, necessarily, if they intended to make it exactly equal and precise, it is indeed so even according to the Sages.

And we reject this:

for it is made somewhat broad.

That is, he does not place a thin thread but a broad thread, so that even if he is not precise, above the thread is certainly the upper half, and below it is the lower half.

Come and hear from the measurements of the vessels

of the Tabernacle and the Temple

and from the measurement of the altar,

for if you say that it is impossible to make exactly equal even when one intends to be precise in the measurement, the vessels and the altar would not be valid, since there is an exact measure for all their measurements.

And we reject this:

There it is different, for the Merciful One said “

make”

make this measure or that measure],

and in whatever manner you are able to make it, it is acceptable to Him

and whatever you make will be valid], and even if it is not truly precise, but appears so to our eyes, it is valid.

Rav Ketina said: Come and hear:

An impure earthenware oven that they broke and divided: that part in which the majority of the vessel is found remains in its impurity, whereas the other part is pure.

If they divided it

an impure earthenware oven

into two, and they are

the two parts]

equal, both are impure, because it is impossible to make exactly equal

and one of them is the majority of the vessel, which is still impure; and since we do not know which one it is, both are impure. It is thus proven that even when one intends to make exactly equal and precise, we take the position that it is not precise and exact; for otherwise, we should have declared both pure, since neither of them contains the majority of the vessel.

He said

he rejected it:

Rav Kahana: An earthenware vessel is different, since it has hollows,

for it is not divided equally. Rather, when they break it, pieces protrude from it and make a hollow here and likewise in many places, and therefore it is impossible to measure those protrusions.

Come and hear:

If a slain person is found and they do not know who killed him, the court measures toward the city nearest to the corpse, and it brings a heifer whose neck they break in a valley in order to atone for them.

If the slain person is found

the slain person

exactly between two towns

at an equal distance from the two towns on either side of the place where he was found], then

both bring two heifers

whose necks are broken—

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

But

what is the reason

for Rabbi Eliezer? Is it not

because he holds

like the Sages, that it is impossible to make exactly equal, but nevertheless

through the hands of a person—

that is, when the court measures—

it is possible to make exactly equal, and

when the Torah said [Deuteronomy 21, “And it shall be, the city that is

nearest

to the corpse, and the elders of that city shall take a heifer of cattle,” it means]:

even

if there are two cities

nearest,

both shall bring a heifer. It follows that one who holds that it is impossible to make exactly equal concedes that through the hands of a person it is possible to make exactly equal.

b. Now, according to Rashi’s view, that “through the hands of Heaven” refers to everything where they did not intend to make exactly equal at the time of the act, explanation is needed as to why this is called “through the hands of a person”?! And Tosafot already raised this difficulty, and this is their wording: “It is possible to make exactly equal through the hands of Heaven”: the Kuntres explained it as the case of birth, where although they are not particular about this, and all the more so through the hands of a person, when they intend to make some measure or some thing exactly equal, it is certainly possible to make it exactly equal. Rabbi Yitzhak found this difficult: How does he establish that it is possible to make exactly equal when they intend to measure? Necessarily, although they can make the thing exactly equal when they intend to measure, nevertheless, according to the Sages it is impossible for the thing to be exactly equal between two towns, since it is “through the hands of Heaven”: it fell there by itself initially, and they did not occupy themselves with measuring it and placing it there exactly from the outset. [The explanation of their wording is that since according to Rashi’s view it is impossible in reality to make exactly equal, necessarily the distinction between “through the hands of Heaven” and “through the hands of a person” concerns the reality of the equality, and not its examination. Since we say that it is impossible for a thing to be exactly equal, we can distinguish only between whether they intended to make it exactly equal or did not intend to make it exactly equal. But one cannot say that examining equality through the hands of a person—such as with a slain person found exactly between two towns—is equality through the hands of a person, for in the end, since there was no intention to make it exactly equal at the time of the act, it necessarily is not exactly equal.] Therefore they explained: “And it appears to Rabbi Yitzhak that even according to the one who says that it is impossible to make exactly equal through the hands of Heaven, at times it is found that it is exactly equal. Rather, this is what he says: It is impossible to ascertain equality through the hands of Heaven, such as birth, where there is no time to ascertain and determine which emerged first, and therefore neither belongs to the priest. But through the hands of a person, where there is time to ascertain, we inquire about it. And he resolves it from the case of one found exactly between two towns: If you say that it is impossible to ascertain whether it is exactly equal, although I have explained that at times it is called exactly equal, since it is impossible to discern, they would not bring two heifers because of the doubt, for it is an uncommon matter, and we do not assume from doubt that this occurred.” And in Keren Ora, in Eruvin 5b, he wondered at the words of Tosafot in their understanding of Rashi: How can one say that it is impossible for it to happen that the slain person should fall exactly [between the towns]? Perhaps by chance he was killed exactly between two towns. And what Rashi explained concerning the firstborn, that it is impossible to make exactly equal in any manner, is because the strengths of the offspring are not equal, and it is impossible that one not precede the other. And this is what we inquire there: Through the hands of a person, is it possible to make exactly equal, or through the hands of a person also is it impossible for there to be equal measurements there, and impossible to make them exact in any manner? c. In the Likutei of Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Hullin 28b, he wrote that although it is not common for something to be exactly equal between two towns, nevertheless we do not rely on this, and wherever it is possible to clarify, we clarify: “As is demonstrated by that case of the slain person found [according to the view of Tosafot]. For if Rabbi Eliezer held that it is impossible to make exactly equal, both would bring one heifer and stipulate, since perhaps exact equality is not common. Even so, since he holds that it is possible to make exactly equal, they bring two heifers and do not rely on its being uncommon; necessarily this is because they are obligated to clarify.” d. Rabbi Akiva Eiger asked Rabbi Akiva Eiger [ brought in Likutei Bekhorot here]: according to the view of Tosafot, that even according to the one who holds that it is impossible to make exactly equal, it is possible that it was exactly equal, and there is no difference in this between Rabbi Yose and the Sages, for they disagreed only over whether examination of the equality is decisive or not—if so, the sugya above, 9a, is difficult. We learned there in the Mishna: A she-donkey that had not previously given birth and gave birth to two males: he gives one lamb to the priest. And we say about it there in the Gemara: Who is the author? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is not according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, for if it were Rabbi Yose the Galilean, he says that it is possible to make exactly equal. According to the view of Tosafot, this is difficult: There, the birth did not take place before us; rather, two males were found in the pen. How, then, does this depend on the dispute between Rabbi Yose the Galilean and the Sages as to whether we rely on examination? In any event, the birth did not take place before us, and if we are concerned according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean that it was exactly equal, we should likewise be concerned according to the Sages. Necessarily, according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean it is possible that there was exact equality, whereas according to the Sages we take the position that there was no exact equality. And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained regarding Rabbi Eliezer, that he holds like the Sages of our Mishna, that it is impossible to make exactly equal; rather: