Bekhorot 17a (יז.) — the Talmud in English

And if so,

that is

what he said to him

as stated by

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: “

Even up to ten generations are exempt,” unlike the first tanna, who exempted only one generation after the offspring that emerged from the body of the animal.

unlike the first Tanna, who exempted only one generation after the offspring that emerged from the animal’s body.

But according to Rav Huna, who says that the first tanna did not descend to exempt later generations:

That is, the first tanna exempted only the offspring that emerged from the body of the gentile’s animal, but did not exempt any later generations at all;

what is the purpose of the phrase “

even up to ten generations”?

That is, why did he express it in this way? He should have said only, “Even the offspring of offspring are exempt,” and we would have understood by implication that they are exempt through the tenth generation, and even forever.

Rav Huna could have said to you: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

placed

the offspring in the position of their mothers;

he is referring

to a dispute,

for

even the first tanna

descended to exempt later generations.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s dispute concerns the manner in which the offspring were placed in the position of their mothers; in that respect, even the first tanna exempts one generation beyond the animals themselves and the offspring born from them. Therefore, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel had to specify the subject of his dispute: He exempts up to ten generations.

The version of the continuation of the Gemara and its explanation was written according to the words of the Rosh cited in the Shita Mekubetzet.

Ta shma:

Come and hear from what we learned in a beraita:

One who receives tzone barzel from a gentile: They and their offspring—

that is, the offspring themselves—

are exempt

from giving their male offspring for the mitzva of the firstborn;

but the offspring of offspring—

not.

And if so, this is a

refutation of Rav Yehuda,

since the beraita emphasizes that only the offspring themselves are exempt.

Rav Yehuda could have said to you: Read

the beraita: “

They and their offspring”

with two vavs; and this is its meaning: “They” refers to the offspring, and also their offspring—that is, the offspring of the offspring that produced firstborn animals and gave birth to a fourth generation—are exempt.

Some say:

This is what we learned in the beraita: “

They and their offspring”

are exempt; and this is a refutation of Rav Huna!

Rav Huna could have said to you: Read

the beraita: “

They, their offspring”

with one vav;

are exempt, but the offspring of offspring

are liable.

We learned in the Mishna:

A ewe that gave birth to a kid,

and a goat that gave birth to a lamb, are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn:

Rav Oshaya of Neharde’a came and brought a teaching in his hand

that is, Rav Oshaya of Neharde’a came and brought with him a beraita that was taught as follows:

A ewe that is the daughter of a goat, and a goat that is the daughter of a ewe: Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and the Rabbis exempt them.

However, the beraita does not specify the subject of their dispute.

Rav Hoshaya said to Rabba: When you enter before Rav Huna, ask him: “

Rabbi Meir deems liable”

for what purpose?

When you come before Rav Huna, ask him: With regard to what did Rabbi Meir deem it liable? For surely:

If you say with regard to

the matter of

the firstborn,

this cannot be said, for:

And

if

Rabbi Meir, who deems it liable, does not accept

what the Sages expounded from the verse, “

But the firstborn of an ox”:

until it is itself an ox and its firstborn is an ox,

thereby excluding an animal whose appearance is dissimilar—

Rather,

say that it is

with regard to

the matter of

the first shearing.

This too cannot be said, for:

And

if

he does not accept

Rabbi Meir

the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Sheep whose wool is coarse are exempt from the first shearing, as it is stated [Job 31]: “

in Job 31,

And with the fleece of my sheep I warm myself,”

we have thereby learned that a shearing refers only to wool suitable for providing warmth—

And if so, although it is not exempt on account of being an animal of dissimilar appearance, since it is of the goat species, its hair is coarse, and it is exempt from the first shearing.

Rabba said to him

to Rav Hoshaya:

Let us examine the matter ourselves!

Let us see:

What are we dealing with here? With a ewe that gave birth to a kid, and its father

also

was a he-goat,

of the same species as the offspring; or with a goat that gave birth to a lamb, whose father also was a sheep of the same species as the offspring.

And they dispute the matter of

whether the father’s seed is taken into consideration

with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring—

that is the subject of their dispute.

Rabbi Meir holds: The father’s seed is taken into consideration,

and it is prohibited to slaughter the he-goat together with the goat.

And the Rabbis hold: The father’s seed is not taken into consideration,

and it is permitted to slaughter the he-goat together with the goat.

That is, their dispute concerns whether it is permitted to slaughter a father and its offspring on the same day, or whether the Torah prohibited only the slaughter of a mother and its offspring. This law fundamentally depends on the issue of whether the father’s seed is taken into consideration, and the beraita teaches us that the Sages do not take the father’s seed into consideration, even though the father’s seed succeeded in changing the offspring into an animal of his own species.

And we challenge this:

If so, let them dispute the matter of whether the father’s seed is taken into consideration

in general, and let it be the dispute of Hanania and the Rabbis,

who disputed this matter with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering it and its offspring: Hanania deems one liable, while the Sages exempt him.

Rather, they are in fact disputing the matter of the firstborn.

Everyone agrees that if the offspring does not resemble its mother, it is an animal of dissimilar appearance and is exempt from the firstborn;

and here—

where we learned, “a ewe that is the daughter of a goat”—

what are we dealing with?

With a ewe

a male animal of the ewe species,

the daughter of a ewe,

like itself, except that its mother was

the daughter of a goat. Similarly, what we learned, “a goat that is the daughter of a ewe,” means a male goat that is like itself, whose mother was the daughter of a ewe. Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis dispute whether the offspring is considered an animal of dissimilar appearance:

And likewise, what we learned, “a goat daughter of a ewe,” means: a male goat, a goat like itself, and it was a daughter of a ewe. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed whether the offspring is considered “resembling”:

One master—

Rabbi Meir—

holds: Follow its mother;

it resembles her.

And

if so,

this one is not an animal of

dissimilar appearance;

it is not such an animal.

And the other master—

the Rabbis—

holds: Follow its mother’s mother;

it does not resemble her.

And

if so,

this one is an animal of

dissimilar appearance;

it is such an animal.

And if you wish, say that the statement we learned, “a ewe that is the daughter of a goat, and a goat that is the daughter of a ewe,” does not concern two firstborn animals. Rather, it concerns

to explain what we learned, “a ewe born to a goat and a goat born to a ewe,” they are not disputing the status of two separate firstborn animals. Rather:

a ewe

a male animal of the ewe species,

that is the daughter of a goat,

which itself was

the daughter of a ewe:

One master—

Rabbi Meir—

holds:

We say that

the ewes have returned

to their species

and place. Although it does not resemble its mother, since its mother is the one whose species changed, while it returned to its own species, it is not an animal of dissimilar appearance.

because although it does not resemble its mother, since its mother was the one whose species changed, while it returned to its own species, it is not considered an animal that resembles another species.

And the other master—

the Rabbis—

holds: No,

we do not say that “

the ewes have returned to their species and place.” That is, since in relation to its mother it is an animal of dissimilar appearance, the designation “animal of dissimilar appearance” applies to it.

Meaning, since in relation to its mother it resembles another species, that status applies to it.

Rav Ashi said:

What are we dealing with here? With

a case in which it has

in the ewe born to a goat, or in the goat born to a ewe,

some of the identifying features

by which it resembles its mother. Therefore Rabbi Meir deems it liable, as explained in our Mishna, since some identifying features suffice to remove it from the status of an animal of dissimilar appearance.

And who are the Rabbis

who exempt it? It is

Rabbi Shimon,

who

disagreed with our Mishna and

our Mishna and

said:

An animal of dissimilar appearance is not liable with regard to the firstborn

until its head and the majority of its body resemble its mother.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Meir agrees—

who disputed the Sages with regard to the firstborn in the beraita mentioned above—

with regard to the goat of the New Moon

and likewise with regard to the goats of the Festivals,

for we require a

goat

that is the son of a she-goat, and that she-goat itself must be the daughter of a she-goat, tracing back to the six days of Creation.

and that she-goat itself must also be the daughter of a she-goat, back to the six days of Creation.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

And it explains: Because

the verse says

[Numbers 28:15]: “And one goat”

one

for a sin-offering,” which implies:

the distinctive one, which has come from the six days of Creation.

And we challenge this:

And

if

that

the disqualification of an animal of dissimilar appearance

is derived from here?

But

it is derived from there, from another passage, as it is stated [Leviticus 22]: “An ox, or a sheep, or a goat, when it is born, shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day onward it may be accepted for an offering made by fire to the Lord.” And we interpret this: “

from another passage, as it is stated in Leviticus 22: “An ox, or a sheep, or a goat, when it is born, shall be seven days under its mother, and from the eighth day onward it may be accepted as an offering made by fire to the Lord.” And we expound:

An ox or a sheep”

excludes

an animal born from

mixed species; “

or a goat”

excludes an animal of dissimilar appearance!?

And we answer:

It is necessary;

both verses are needed:

For if it were derived from there,

from “or a goat” alone,

I might have said: This applies only where it has not descended through the generations, but where it has descended through the generations—

That is, the disqualification of an animal of dissimilar appearance applies only when it does not resemble its mother. But if it resembles its mother yet does not resemble its maternal grandmother—that is, a goat that is the daughter of a goat that is the daughter of a ewe—

say that it should not

be disqualified, even with regard to the goats of the New Moon and the Festivals, concerning which “one goat” is stated—

The verse teaches us “one”: In these cases, even a goat that is the daughter of a goat that is the daughter of a ewe is disqualified.

And if it were derived from here,

if “one goat” were the only statement written,

I might have said: This applies only with regard to an obligatory offering,

where the Torah disqualified an animal of dissimilar appearance;

but with regard to a

sacrifice of

freewill—

no,

even an actual animal of dissimilar appearance, which does not resemble its mother, would not be disqualified—

It is necessary.

Rabbi Aha bar Yaakov said: Everyone

Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis

agrees that one is not flogged on account of its wool

of a sheep whose nature changed from that of the six days of Creation

because of mixed species

shatnez,

as it is stated

[Deuteronomy 22:11]: “

You shall not wear shatnez, wool and linen together.” The verse juxtaposed wool and linen in order to teach:

The verse juxtaposes wool and linen to teach:

Just as linen that has not changed, so too wool that has not changed.

Rav Pappa said: Everyone agrees that its wool

of a sheep whose nature changed from that of the six days of Creation

is unfit for tekhelet

of tzitzit,

as it is stated: “

You shall not wear shatnez,

wool and linen together;

twisted threads”

[tzitzit]

you shall make for yourself

on the four corners of your garment with which you cover yourself.” The verse juxtaposed the mitzva of tzitzit with linen in order to teach:

Just as linen that has not changed, so too wool

of tzitzit

that has not changed.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Everyone agrees that its wool does not contract ritual impurity through leprosy, as it is stated

[Leviticus 13] with regard to such afflictions: “

In a woolen garment or in a linen garment”;

just as linen that has not changed, so too wool that has not changed.

Rav Ashi said:

We too will say: If one trains a vine over a fig tree, its wine is unfit for libations. What is the reason?

Because it is stated,

“sacrifice and libations”; the verse juxtaposed libations to a sacrifice in order to teach:

The verse juxtaposes libations with the offering to teach:

Just as a sacrifice that has not changed,

since an animal of dissimilar appearance is unfit as a sacrifice,

so too libations that have not changed.

Ravina raised an objection to Rav Ashi,

who holds that when one trains a vine over a fig tree, this is considered a change:

But

if one trains flax over a higa,

a thorny shrub,

is this also considered changed?

For in the case of flax too, you find that its law is similar when it is trained over something else;

and if so, you cannot say: “Just as linen that has not changed,” since flax too changes;

and yet we have not found that the Torah disqualified it.

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Ravina:

This—

a grapevine trained over a fig tree—

its smell has changed

and therefore this is considered a change;

but

if

this—

flax growing over a higa plant—

its smell has not changed

because of this, and this is not considered a change.

Mishna:

With regard to a ewe that had not previously given birth and gave birth to two males, and their two heads emerged simultaneously:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:

Since they emerged simultaneously,

both belong to the kohen,

because the law of the firstborn applies to both of them,

as it is stated: “

And every first issue of an animal that will be yours,

the males

[the plural form]

shall be,”

which teaches us that even two animals can be sanctified as firstborn.

And the Sages say: It is impossible to be precise

and for the two heads to have emerged simultaneously; rather, one emerged first, but we do not know which one emerged first.

Rather, one belongs to him, and one belongs to the kohen.

The Mishna proceeds to explain which one belongs to him and which one belongs to the kohen.

Rabbi Tarfon says: The kohen chooses the better one,

because it stands to reason that the healthier one was the one that emerged first.

Rabbi Akiva says:

They divide the difference in value between them,

meaning that the kohen takes the inferior one, because the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to take property from another.

And the second

that the Israelite took—which is of uncertain firstborn status—

shall graze until it becomes blemished

[until a blemish occurs], and the Israelite may eat it.