Bekhorot 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

Behold, the very tzonei barzel that itself gave birth, and even

their offspring

that came into the Israelite’s share, and then grew, gave birth, and produced a third generation of tzonei barzel, are

exempt

from the law of the firstborn; the reason is explained in the Gemara.

But

the offspring of their offspring

that grew, attained firstborn status, and gave birth to a fourth generation of tzonei barzel are

liable

with regard to the firstborn.

If

the Israelite placed

the

offspring of their offspring in place of their mothers,

meaning that the Israelite opened an opening for himself by saying: If the tzonei barzel die, you will take the offspring that fall to my share, but those offspring will remain in my possession under the same conditions under which I accepted their mothers,

then

the offspring

of the

offspring

that produced a fourth generation are

exempt

from the firstborn,

while

those

offspring of the offspring of the offspring

that produced a fifth generation are

liable

with regard to the firstborn.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Even up to ten generations

of tzonei barzel are

exempt

from the firstborn, because

their liability is to the gentile.

That is, they are encumbered to the gentile on account of his money, and therefore they are exempt from the firstborn.

The Mishna teaches an additional law:

A ewe that gave birth to a goat species [“

a nidmeh,” a nonstandard offspring],

and a she-goat that gave birth to a sheep species are exempt from the firstborn

even though both the goat species and the sheep species are liable with regard to the firstborn.

And if it has

in the offspring

some of the signs

by which it resembles its mother, it is

liable

with regard to the firstborn,

except that this is a mum, a blemish, and it may not be offered on the altar; rather, it is given to a priest, as explained in the Gemara above, 3b.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who accepts tzonei barzel from a gentile—their offspring are exempt:

Is that to say

that this is indeed so,

that

ordinary tzonei barzel

since he did not take the principal money,

so that

they remain in the domain of the owner [

since the owner of the flock did not receive money, the gentile’s tzonei barzel remain the property of the owner of the flock and in his domain], as is evident from the fact that our Mishna exempts the tzonei barzel and their offspring from the firstborn, because they belong to a gentile?

But we raise a contradiction

from what we learned in Bava Metzia 70b:

One may not accept tzonei barzel from a Jew, because it constitutes interest.

That is, the animals belong to the recipient, and he becomes obligated to him for money in return. It follows that the half of the offspring paid to the owner is payment for the owner’s waiting for the money until the time they established between them, and this is rabbinic interest—

Apparently, they remain in the recipient’s domain [

the tzonei barzel belong to the recipient and remain in his domain]. If so, why are the tzonei barzel themselves and their offspring exempt from the firstborn?!

Abaye said: It is not difficult!

Here—

our Mishna is speaking of a case

in which he accepted upon himself

the gentile who gave them

loss through accident and depreciation.

That is, the agreement was that if the tzonei barzel were forcibly taken or otherwise lost while in the recipient’s possession, the recipient would not pay him their value, and likewise, if the flock declined in value, the recipient would not have to pay the difference. If so, this is not a sale, and they remain in the gentile’s domain.

But here—

the Mishna in Bava Metzia is speaking of a case

in which the owner did not accept upon himself

the

loss through accident and depreciation,

and therefore the animals belong to the recipient, while the owner receives payment for his money.

He said

in objection

Rava

to Abaye:

a.

If the owner accepted upon himself

the

loss through accident and depreciation, as you explained our Mishna,

then do you call it

“flock”

“of iron”

“you have called it” [

is this properly called “flock of iron”]? The meaning of tzonei barzel is that it is hard and strong like iron, so that the recipient never suffers a loss, because responsibility for the flock rests on him. But when responsibility for the flock rests on the owner, the owner is not assured of the flock’s value?!

b.

Furthermore, there is a difficulty with Abaye’s answer, which distinguished between the “tzonei barzel” in our Mishna and the “tzonei barzel” in Bava Metzia:

there is a difficulty with Abaye’s answer, which distinguished between the “iron-flock” in our Mishna and the “iron-flock” in Bava Metzia:

What basis is there for the distinction?!

That is, what grounds do we have to distinguish between one tzonei barzel and another? Surely it is evident that both our Mishna and the Mishna in Bava Metzia are discussing the same agreement?!

c.

Furthermore, there is a difficulty with Abaye’s answer, which assumes that there are tzonei barzel in which the owner accepts responsibility for accidental loss and depreciation:

there is a difficulty with Abaye’s answer, which assumes that there are iron-flock arrangements in which the giver accepts responsibility for unavoidable loss and depreciation:

If so,

rather than teaching in the latter clause

of that Mishna in Bava Metzia:

But one may accept tzonei barzel from a gentile,

because it is permitted to pay him interest,

let it distinguish

and teach it with regard to that case itself:

let the Mishna distinguish with regard to a Jew himself and say:

When are these words stated,

that it is prohibited to do so? In a case

in which the owner did not accept upon himself

the

loss through accident and depreciation;

but if the owner accepted it upon himself—even if he is a Jew—

it is entirely permitted?!

Rather, certainly, if the owner accepted upon himself the loss through accident and depreciation, this is not at all “tzonei barzel,” and the Mishna is speaking only of tzonei barzel, distinguishing within it between what is prohibited and what is permitted.

Rather, Rava said

in answer:

Both this and that,

both Mishnayot are speaking of a case

in which the owner did not accept upon himself

the

loss through accident and depreciation;

rather, he placed all responsibility on the recipient. And as for your difficulty: Since this constitutes interest, the animals belong to the Jew; why, then, are the animals themselves and their offspring exempt from the firstborn? I can say to you:

And here, with regard to the firstborn, this is the reason

that they are not liable: because

if a gentile were to come,

when the time arrived, and

demand his money and he did not give it to him [

if the gentile came to demand his money at the end of the term, and the recipient did not give it to him],

he would seize it,

the gentile

would seize the animal,

for it is mortgaged to the owner in exchange for his money,

and

even

if he does not find the animal, he seizes its offspring,

for they too are mortgaged to him in exchange for his money.

And behold, the gentile’s hand is involved, and anything in which

a

gentile’s hand is involved is exempt from the firstborn.

We learned in the Mishna: One who accepts tzonei barzel from a gentile—their offspring are exempt, while the offspring of their offspring are liable;

if he placed their offspring in place of their animals, the offspring of the offspring are exempt:

Rav Huna said,

explaining what we learned at the beginning of the Mishna, “Their offspring are exempt”:

The offspring

of the tzonei barzel themselves, which produced a third generation, are

exempt, while

those

offspring of the offspring

that produced a fourth generation are

liable.

And Rav Yehuda said: The offspring of their offspring,

which produced a fourth generation, are

also exempt, while

only

the offspring of the offspring of the offspring,

which produced a fifth generation, are

liable.

And we raise an objection to Rav Yehuda from what

we learned

later in the Mishna:

If he placed their offspring in place of their mothers, the offspring of the offspring are exempt,

and it indicates:

The reason is that he placed them;

then the fourth generation is exempt.

But if he did not place them—

no,

the fourth generation is not exempt.

This is a refutation of Rav Yehuda!

Rav Yehuda could say to you:

The same law applies

that the offspring of the offspring are exempt

even though he did not place them, while

our Mishna, which mentioned the exemption of the offspring of the offspring when he placed their offspring in place of their mothers,

comes to teach us: Even if he placed them as well, for

in such a situation

it is the gentile’s practice to seize its offspring

and we might have thought that the offspring would remain exempt forever, nevertheless,

it is considered as though he did not place them,

and only

the offspring of the offspring are exempt, whereas

the

offspring of the offspring of the offspring are liable.

That is, the Mishna does not come to say that if he placed them beneath their mothers, the halakha changes. Rather, even if he placed the offspring beneath their mothers—so that I might have thought that in this manner the offspring would be exempt forever, because it is the gentile’s practice to seize the offspring—the halakha does not change, and it is as though he had not placed them there: the fourth generation is exempt, whereas the fifth generation is liable.

Now we challenge Rav Huna from the following:

We learned

in our Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even up to ten generations are exempt,

because

their responsibility lies with the gentile.

And this is apparently difficult: Why did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel not say, “Even the offspring of their offspring are exempt”? I would then understand on my own: What difference is there between the offspring of offspring, whose offspring Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel exempted from the status of firstborn, and the tenth generation? After all, neither the former nor the latter emerged from the body of a gentile’s animal?

And

granted, according to Rav Yehuda, who says that the first tanna went so far as to exempt

generations.

That is, even the first tanna did not restrict the exemption to those that emerged from the body of a gentile’s animal; rather, he also exempted their generations—that is, the offspring of the offspring of offspring.