Bekhorot 16b — the Talmud in English

The iron-flock itself that gave birth, and even

their offspring

that came into the Israelite’s share, and that grew and gave birth to a third generation of the iron-flock, are

exempt

from the law of the firstborn animal, as the Gemara explains.

But

the offspring of their offspring

that grew, produced firstborn animals, and gave birth to a fourth generation of the iron-flock are

liable

under the law of the firstborn animal.

If

the Israelite placed

the

offspring under their mothers

, meaning that the Israelite offered him the following arrangement: If the iron-flock dies, you will take the offspring that fall to my share, but those offspring will remain in my possession under the same conditions under which I accepted their mothers.

Then the

offspring

of the

offspring

that gave birth to a fourth generation are

exempt

from the law of the firstborn animal,

whereas

the

offspring of the offspring of the offspring

that gave birth to a fifth generation are

liable

under the law of the firstborn animal.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Even up to ten generations

of the iron-flock are

exempt

from the law of the firstborn animal, because

their liability rests with the gentile.

That is, they are pledged to the gentile in return for his money, and are therefore exempt from the law of the firstborn animal.

Our Mishna teaches another law:

A ewe that gave birth to an animal of the goat species

“a creature resembling another species,”

and a goat that gave birth to an animal of the ewe species are exempt from the law of the firstborn animal

even though both the goat species and the ewe species are subject to the law of the firstborn animal.

But if it has

in the offspring

some of the characteristics

by which it resembles its mother, it is

liable

under the law of the firstborn animal,

although this constitutes a physical defect, so it may not be offered on the altar. Rather, it is given to a kohen, a member of the priestly family who serves in the Temple, as explained in the Gemara above, 3b.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who accepts an iron-flock from a gentile, its offspring are exempt:

Does this mean

that this is indeed so,

that

an ordinary iron-flock,

since he did not receive the principal money

is therefore

in the possession of its owner

? [Since the owner of the flock did not receive money, the gentile’s iron-flock remains his and is in his possession.] This is apparently the implication of the Mishna, which exempts the iron-flock and its offspring from the law of the firstborn animal because they belong to the gentile.

They raise an objection from a source

that we learned in Bava Metzia 70b:

One may not accept an iron-flock from an Israelite, because this is interest.

That is, the animals belong to the recipient, and he becomes liable to repay money in return for them. Thus, the half of the offspring paid to the owner constitutes payment for the time during which the owner waits for repayment of the money until the time fixed by the parties, and this is interest prohibited by rabbinic decree—

Apparently, it remains in the recipient’s possession

[the iron-flock belongs to the recipient and is in his possession]. If so, why are the iron-flock itself and its offspring exempt from the law of the firstborn animal!?

Abaye said: It is not difficult!

This—

our Mishna—is dealing with a case in which

the gentile who gave the animals accepted upon himself

the

risks of unavoidable loss and depreciation.

That is, the agreement was that if the iron-flock were forcibly taken from the recipient, the recipient would not have to pay its value, and likewise, if the value of the flock declined, the recipient would not have to pay the difference. Therefore, this is not a sale, and the animals remain in the gentile’s possession.

And that—

the Mishna in Bava Metzia—is dealing with a case in which

the giver did not accept upon himself

the

risks of unavoidable loss and depreciation.

Therefore, the animals belong to the recipient, and the giver receives payment for the use of his money.

Rava

challenged

him,

Abaye:

a.

If the giver accepted upon himself

the

risks of unavoidable loss and depreciation—as you explained our Mishna—then

can you call it

“flock

of iron”?

Is that what you call it

? [Is this properly called “an iron-flock”?] The meaning of “iron-flock” is that it is hard and strong like iron, so that the owner never suffers a loss, because responsibility for the flock rests with the recipient. But when responsibility for the flock rests with the giver, the giver is not guaranteed its value!?

b.

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty with Abaye’s answer, which distinguished between the “iron-flock” in our Mishna and the “iron-flock” in Bava Metzia:

How can such a distinction be established!?

That is, what basis is there for distinguishing between one iron-flock and another? Surely it is evident that both our Mishna and the Mishna in Bava Metzia are discussing the same agreement!?

c.

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty with Abaye’s answer, which assumes that there are iron-flock arrangements in which the giver accepts responsibility for unavoidable loss and depreciation:

If so,

rather than teaching in the latter clause

of that Mishna in Bava Metzia:

But one may accept an iron-flock from a gentile

because it is permitted to pay him interest,

let it distinguish

and teach this distinction in that very case

by making the distinction within the case of an Israelite and saying:

When are these words applicable

that it is forbidden to do so? In a case in which

the giver did not accept upon himself

the

risks of unavoidable loss and depreciation. But if the giver accepted them—even if he is an Israelite—

but if the owner accepted it upon himself—even if he is a Jew—

it is entirely permitted!?

Rather, it is certainly the case that if the giver accepts the risks of unavoidable loss and depreciation, this is not an “iron-flock” at all. The Mishna is dealing only with an iron-flock, and within that framework it distinguishes between what is forbidden and what is permitted.

Rather, Rava said

:

Both this and that

the two Mishnayot are dealing with a case in which

the giver did not accept upon himself

the

risks of unavoidable loss and depreciation. Rather, he placed all responsibility upon the recipient. As for your difficulty—since this is interest, the animals belong to the Israelite, so why are the flock itself and its offspring exempt from the law of the firstborn animal—I can tell you:

rather, he placed all responsibility on the recipient. And as for your difficulty: Since this constitutes interest, the animals belong to the Jew; why, then, are the animals themselves and their offspring exempt from the firstborn? I can say to you:

Here, with regard to the law of the firstborn animal, this is the reason

that they are not liable:

If a gentile were to come

when the time arrived and

request his money, and he did not give it to him

[if the gentile came to demand his money at the end of the term, and the recipient did not pay him], then

he would seize

the

animal

because it is pledged to the giver in return for his money,

and

even

if he cannot find the animal, he seizes its offspring

because they too are pledged to him in return for his money.

Thus, the gentile has a hand in the ownership, and anything in which

a gentile has a hand

is exempt from the law of the firstborn animal.

We learned in the Mishna: One who accepts an iron-flock from a gentile, its offspring are exempt, but the offspring of its offspring are liable.

If he placed their offspring under their mothers, the offspring of the offspring are exempt:

Rav Huna said

to explain what we learned at the beginning of the Mishna: “Its offspring are exempt”:

The offspring

of the iron-flock itself, which gave birth to a third generation, are

exempt, whereas

the

offspring of the offspring

that gave birth to a fourth generation are

liable.

But Rav Yehuda said: The offspring of their offspring

that gave birth to a fourth generation

are also exempt, whereas

only the

offspring of the offspring of the offspring

that gave birth to a fifth generation are

liable.

And we raise an objection against Rav Yehuda from what

we learned

later in the Mishna:

If he placed their offspring under their mothers, the offspring of the offspring are exempt,

and this indicates:

The reason is that he placed them

and therefore the fourth generation is exempt;

but if he did not place them—

it is not

exempt, the fourth generation—

a conclusive refutation of Rav Yehuda!

Rav Yehuda can say to you:

The same law applies

that the offspring of the offspring are exempt

even though he did not place them, and

the reason our Mishna mentioned the exemption of the offspring of the offspring in a case where he placed the offspring under their mothers is that

it teaches us this: even if he placed them as well, for

in such a situation,

it is customary for a gentile to seize the offspring

and one might have thought that the offspring would remain exempt forever, nevertheless,

it is considered as though he had not placed them

and only

the offspring of the offspring are exempt,

whereas

the offspring of the offspring of the offspring are liable.

That is, the Mishna does not come to say that if he placed [the offspring] the law changes; rather, even if he placed the offspring beneath their mothers—which I would have thought in this manner that the offspring would be exempt forever, because it is the way of the gentile to seize the offspring—the law did not change, and it is as though he had not placed [them]; the fourth generation is exempt, whereas the fifth generation is liable.

And now we challenge Rav Huna from this, that

we learned

in our Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations they are exempt,

because

their responsibility belongs to the gentile,

and apparently it is difficult: Why did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel not say: “Even the offspring of their offspring are exempt”? And I would understand by myself: What difference is there to me between the offspring of offspring, whose son Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel exempted from the firstborn status, and the tenth generation? After all, neither these nor those emerged from the body of the gentile’s animal:

And

granted, according to Rav Yehuda, who says that the Tanna Kamma descended to exempt

generations.

That is, even the Tanna Kamma did not limit the exemption to those that emerged from the body of the gentile’s animal; rather, he also exempted their generations, namely, the offspring of the offspring of the offspring,