Bekhorot 19a (יט.) — the Talmud in English

And therefore

it was necessary

for our Mishna to teach us that according to Rabbi Akiva the priest does not take the better one in any of the three cases.

Mishna:

A caesarean birth

that was not born through the womb,

and the one that follows it

through the womb:

Rabbi Tarfon says: Both of them

are doubtful firstborns, and

they shall be left to graze until they become blemished, and they may be eaten by their owners because of their blemishes,

and the Gemara explains the reason.

Rabbi Akiva says: Neither of them is a firstborn; the first, because it is not “

the one that opens the womb,”

since it did not emerge through the womb;

and the second, because another preceded it,

even though the first did not emerge through the womb.

Gemara:

The Gemara explains:

With regard to what do

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree?

Rabbi Tarfon is uncertain

whether

a firstborn in one respect—

that is, the caesarean birth, which is the first of the offspring but is not the first to emerge from the womb, and likewise the one that follows it, which is the firstborn with regard to the womb but is not the firstborn of the offspring—

is considered a firstborn or is not considered a firstborn. Therefore, both shall be left to graze until they become blemished, since each is a firstborn in one respect.

and therefore both shall be left to graze until they become blemished, since each is a firstborn in one respect.

And Rabbi Akiva considers it obvious that a firstborn in one respect is not considered a firstborn.

b. In Kehillot Yaakov, Bechorot, section 19, passage beginning “And let us examine,” raised the following uncertainty: If a woman became pregnant with a firstborn and the fetus died in her womb without being born, is the one born after it a firstborn? One might say that since the first was the firstborn with regard to conception, the second is not a firstborn in every respect, as it is not the firstborn with regard to conception, and therefore is not a firstborn. He wrote that it appears reasonable that this applies specifically when the first emerged through the side, since this too is considered a birth, and it is therefore the firstborn with regard to birth; consequently, the second is not a firstborn in every respect. But the fact that a fetus had previously been in her womb before this second one does not detract from the second’s status as a firstborn in every respect, since with regard to birth it is first in every respect. For if this were not so, but rather we said that because of the first conception, when a fetus was in her womb, the second is not a firstborn in every respect, then when she conceived two offspring, one of which completed its formation before the other, but the second was born first, neither would be exempted from the status of firstborn: this one is not the firstborn with regard to conception, and that one is not the firstborn with regard to birth. If so, whenever two emerge, there would only be a doubtful firstborn, since perhaps the one that emerged last completed its formation first. Yet we learned in the Mishna: “If she gave birth to two males, one belongs to the priest.” Rather, it is necessarily the case that the fact that a fetus preceded it does not detract from the latter’s status as a firstborn, since with regard to birth it is the firstborn in every respect. This proof should be analyzed and discussed. c. The Shulchan Arukh wrote in Yoreh De’ah [305:24] with regard to a human firstborn: “A caesarean birth and the one born after it in the usual manner are both exempt; the first, because it did not emerge from the womb, and the second, because another preceded it.” This is based on what is explained below, on page 47b, with regard to a human firstborn, as it is explained here with regard to an animal firstborn: The first is not the one that opens the womb, and the second is a firstborn in one respect and is not a firstborn. And the Taz wrote there an innovative point: “Although that other one [the first] did not open the womb, nevertheless, since this one born after it is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, as it is not ‘the first of his vigor,’ it is likewise not a firstborn for the priest. A firstborn in one respect—that is, with regard to the womb and not with regard to the offspring—is not a firstborn.” This is what we say in the chapter Yesh Bekhor, page 47. Something similar was written in Sederi Tahara in his novellae on Niddah, page 26, and he subsequently cited the words of the Taz as well. d. Below, in the chapter Yesh Bekhor, page 47b, with regard to a human firstborn, the view of Rabbi Shimon is explained: The first is not a firstborn because “the one that opens the womb” is required, whereas the second is a firstborn because a firstborn in one respect is a firstborn. See Mahariṭ Algazi [24:4, passage beginning “And behold”], who questioned why Rabbi Shimon did not likewise distinguish with regard to an animal firstborn. See there for an extensive discussion.

The Sages taught

among the hermeneutical principles through which the Torah is expounded: “

A general statement that requires a specific statement

[for the general statement requires that the specific statement accompany it],

and ‘

a specific statement that requires a general statement

[there are cases in which the specific statement requires that the general statement accompany it],

how:

It is written [Exodus 12]: “

Sanctify to Me every firstborn.”

One might have thought that even a female is included; the verse states

[Deuteronomy 16]: “Every firstborn that is born among your cattle and your flocks,

the male

you shall sanctify,” and we have an established principle: “A general statement [‘every firstborn’] followed by a specific statement [‘male’] includes only what is in the specific statement.”

If “

firstborn

male,”

one might have thought

it is sufficient that it be the firstborn among males, and

even if a female emerged before it

it would be a firstborn. For this is the implication of “firstborn male”: one that is firstborn among males—that no other male preceded it—is a firstborn, even though it is not the firstborn among the offspring or with regard to the womb.

The verse states “

the one that opens the womb,”

not “the male that opens the womb.” This is “a general statement that requires a specific statement”: it comes to clarify that an animal is not called a firstborn until it is also the firstborn with regard to the womb.

If “

the one that opens the womb,”

one might have thought even if it emerged

through the womb

after a caesarean birth,

since it is the one that opens the womb,

the verse states “

firstborn,”

which implies a firstborn in every respect. This one is not the firstborn among the offspring, although it is the firstborn with regard to the womb. This is “a specific statement that requires a general statement,” since “male” and “the one that opens the womb,” which are the specific statements, require “firstborn,” for had “firstborn” not been stated, I would have said that even though it is not the firstborn, it should be sanctified.

Rabbi

challenged

Rav Shemaya to Abaye:

The first clause

[the middle clause]

does not derive it from “

firstborn.” When the beraita says, “If male—one might have thought that even if a female emerged before it,” it does not exclude this from “firstborn.”

Thus,

apparently, a firstborn in one respect—

such as this one, which is a firstborn among males but not among the offspring or with regard to the womb—

is

included in “

firstborn.” Therefore, the beraita did not exclude from this category the one born after the female—

whereas

the latter clause—“If the one that opens the womb: one might have thought even if it emerged after a caesarean birth; the verse states ‘firstborn’”—

does derive it from ‘firstborn’

[the beraita excludes this case from “firstborn”],

apparently, a firstborn in one respect—

such as this one, which is the firstborn with regard to the womb but not among the offspring—

is not

included in “

firstborn”!?

firstborn”!?

He said to him,

Abaye to Rav Shemaya:

In fact, a firstborn in one respect is not

included in “

firstborn”

until it is a firstborn in every respect. Indeed, a firstborn born after a female is also excluded by “firstborn.”

And the first clause,

which we learned otherwise,

means as follows: If “

male,”

one might have thought that even if it emerged through a side opening

itself would be sanctified with firstborn sanctity;

the verse states “

the one that opens the womb,”

and consequently the one born after a female is also excluded by this, and there is no need to derive it from “firstborn.”

b. Rashi wrote: Now the Gemara could not derive this exclusion through “firstborn,” since this one is a firstborn in every respect, as no other offspring preceded it in the world. Therefore, it used “the one that opens the womb.” c. Mahariṭ Algazi raised the following difficulty there: Why did the Gemara not explain that a practical consequence of the derivation from “the one that opens the womb” is to exclude a woman who gives birth to a male and a female simultaneously, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who holds that it is possible for two births to occur precisely simultaneously? That is, if she gives birth to a male and a female simultaneously, it is explained in the earlier Mishna—as Tosafot explained above, 17b, in the passage beginning “Male”—that even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who holds that it is possible for two births to occur precisely simultaneously, and the male certainly opens the womb, nevertheless, since a female emerged with it and she too opens the womb, its firstborn status is completely nullified. We know this only because “the one that opens the womb” is written, implying that it alone opens the womb. [See further there, where he reconciles the wording of the beraita: “One might have thought a female emerged before it.” See further there, where he explains that even according to the Sages a derivation from “the one that opens the womb” is necessary in such a case; see there.] d. Mahariṭ Algazi [24:4] found it difficult: Why is it necessary to exempt the caesarean birth because of “the one that opens the womb”? It can be inferred from the words “every firstborn that is born,” since an unspecified birth is in the usual manner, excluding a caesarean birth. See there. Ravina said:

In fact, a firstborn in one respect is a firstborn,

and from the meaning of “firstborn” alone we would not have known to exclude the one born after a caesarean birth.

And the latter clause,

which we derive from “firstborn” to exclude one born after a caesarean birth, was not derived from the meaning of “firstborn,” but from the superfluous occurrence of “firstborn,” and

this is what it means:

If it enters your mind that one born after a caesarean birth is sanctified, “

firstborn”

that the Merciful One wrote, why do I need it?

For: